

**SERGEY  
KREMLYOV**



# BERIA

## BEST MANAGER OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Moscow  
"YAUZA"  
"EKSMO"  
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The image of the “executioner” and “ghoul” created by the enemies of Russia for decades obscured the true image of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria from us.

This book serves the cause of his complete historical and moral rehabilitation.

In his early youth, Beria dreamed of building new cities, but in the end he became the second after Stalin the builder of a great Power.

He created a new Tbilisi and flourishing Georgia, as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he restored the rule of law. His intelligence warned Stalin of an imminent war. It was Beria who prepared the defense of Moscow and managed to defend the Caucasus. Stalin's deputy for the State Defense Committee, he pulled the "cart" of military production, and after the war became the founder of the nuclear and missile industries.

No wonder even many enemies considered Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria "the best manager of the 20th century."

Only the great Administrator Beria could become a worthy successor to Stalin and give rights and freedom in Russia not to the nomenklatura, but to the people!

About these great people, about the great era of Stalin and Beria, read in the new book

Sergei Kremlev.

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I don't believe in the collective mind of ignorant individuals.

*Thomas Carlyle*

The reappraisal of the past is not necessary for conscience alone. There is a reappraisal of history the only way possible.

*Petr Chaadaev*

The author proposes to regard this book as a conceptual basis for the actions of those of their fellow citizens who have the right to legislative initiative, to organize a campaign for the full legal and historical rehabilitation of the outstanding son of Russia, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, as well as for the worthy perpetuation of his memory on a national scale.

**From the author**

Dear reader!

In the last decade, the name of Beria, in terms of the frequency of his mention among other historical figures of the Soviet era, is perhaps in third place after Lenin and Stalin.

Is it by chance?

I think no. Moreover, among what has been written about Beria, there are also serious works, such as, for example, "Unknown Beria" by the untimely deceased Alexei Toptygin, and libels such as "Red Sunset" by the former party crat Valery Boldin.

The Murder of Stalin and Beria by Yuri Mukhin and The Last Knight of Stalin by Elena Prudnikova became widely known. A lot of pages are devoted to Lavrenty Pavlovich in the sometimes controversial, but bright book by Alexander Bushkov "Stalin: the Ice Throne".

However, the topic is far from exhausted. And so I - after some doubts - decided to make my own book about Beria. It all started, however, with a proposal to write a journal article about his contribution to the solution of the Soviet uranium Problems.

Knowing for a long time that the name of Lavrenty Pavlovich was largely slandered, I set to work with pleasure and was soon surprised by the appearance of Beria, which

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was observed during a careful study of the objective documents of the Atomic Project of the USSR. The Chairman of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR looked not only an outstanding organizer of the new industry, but also ...

Yes, he also looked like a man of high moral standard, normal and even sincere, sensitive person!

Moreover, I dealt with reliable declassified documents published in accordance with Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 17, 1995 No. 160 "On the preparation and publication of an official collection of archival documents on the history of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR." Eight solid volumes of this collection weigh more than ten kilograms!

And from these documents a man, not a monster, looked through!

I had to get into the materials on Beria and his era (and, alas, in the lampoons about him and her) more deeply. I became more and more interested in the topic and, finally putting aside other ideas, I set to work on the work, the results of which

I now present it to the distinguished reader.

Concluding this brief introduction, the author considers it his pleasant duty to thank many of his colleagues for their assistance and fruitful discussions, including: V. Akulov, V.M. Boteva, L.A. Kochankova, P.P. Maksimenko, A.A. Mukasheva, A.P. Osipsova, N.A. Soroka, and separately - V.M. Voronov, who with invariable benevolence helped the author to find some materials and constantly discussed his future book with the author.

The author is sincerely grateful to A.I. Kolpakidi, both for providing a number of valuable materials and for useful discussions of various aspects of the problem in the course of the work.

## Chapter 1

### REASONS ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF THE BOOK, ABOUT THE PRIMARY SOURCES AND SOMETHING ELSE...

IT WOULD seem that the subject of the book is clearly indicated on the cover - this is the fate of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. However, in reality, everything is not so clear. Therefore, when starting work, I thought a lot about how to understand his life in such a way as to give, if possible, its *reconstruction*, and not a version. Now there is a series of books with the intriguing title "Declassified Lives". Lavrenty Beria was not a secret agent - from a young age he became a person, as they say, a public one. And, nevertheless, if we include his biography in some kind of series, then the name "Secret Lives" would suit her very well.

There are many reasons for this.

One of them is that for almost half a century they either didn't say anything about Beria, or they lied so that it was impossible to form any more or less correct idea about him. Perhaps, only one more figure of world history was sought to be expelled from the memory of society with the same insistence. This is Herostratus, in 356 BC, on the night of the birth of Alexander the Great, who burned the temple of Artemis in Ephesus.

Beria did not destroy, but created, but he was also persistently expelled from official history. And even if they created glory for him, it was exclusively for Herostratus. However, time really sooner or later puts everything in its place, even if someone is cut out of history for a while in the literal sense

words - with a razor blade, as the name of Beria was cut out of it.

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Yes, in 1953, subscribers of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia received a package by mail, inside of which there was a quarter of a sheet, where the following was typographically stated:

#### "SUBSCRIBER OF THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA

The State Scientific Publishing House "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" recommends removing pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 from the 5th volume of the TSB, as well as a portrait pasted between pages 22 and 23, in exchange for which pages with new text are sent to you.

Use scissors or a razor blade to cut off the indicated pages, keeping the margins near the spine to which new pages should be glued.

*State scientific publishing house "Great Soviet Encyclopedia".*

It is believed that the longest surname in Soviet history is "Joining knimshepilov".

This once famous party and statesman, editor-in-chief of Pravda, candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, minister

Foreign Affairs, who settled the Suez crisis of 1956, spoke out against Khrushchev at that meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in June 1957, when the majority of the Presidium (and, above all, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov) were ready to remove Khrushchev from leadership. Soon, the majority of this majority, and with it "Shepilov, who joined them," lost all their posts after the plenum of the Central Committee, which was quickly provoked by Khrushchev.

Shepilov lived a long life and died in 1995, ninety years old. I will later refer to a book about him and his memoirs, and then the author's attitude towards him will be outlined more clearly. Now I mentioned this owner - as the wits of that era considered - "the longest surname in the USSR" only to refute the wits and declare that a "surname" with 22 letters is not a record! For in the "surname" "Pasted between 22 and 23 pages" there are 29 letters, and, it turns out, Beria became the absolute record holder both in terms of anonymity and in the length of the involuntary "pseudonym".

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Accordingly, after 1953 we would have searched in vain for his name in any Soviet reference book. Even the most detailed and detailed academic publications did not mention the name of the person to whom four (!) pages were devoted in the 5th volume of the TSB and whose portrait occupied one more page there. Beria was completely thrown out of national history.

And from the history of the world?

In the fourth volume of the Oxford Illustrated Encyclopedia, published in Russian by the Ves Mir publishing house in 2000, there is scarce information about this person who did not exist for decades in the USSR, and this encyclopedia assigns Lavrenti Pavlovich to the Soviet politician Beria played a truly monstrous role in carrying out large-scale "purges" of the Stalin era.

In fairness, I note that the Russian "Oxford" sparingly admits that during the war Beria was engaged in the development of the defense industry. And then, distorting the chronology (Lavrenty Pavlovich was arrested not in July, but on June 26, 1953), Oxford reports that after the death of Stalin, Beria lost to the coalition of Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev, was arrested, convicted and shot.

So, for world history, the key words in Beria's part are: "monster", "purges", "camps", "liquidation", "conspiracy", "execution", "death"...

And through the teeth - "development".

Homegrown "analysts" and "researchers" of the "democratic" type follow roughly the same pattern. They say, by instilling fear, the "NKVD chief" knew how to use terror to ensure the work of various industries, he managed nuclear work well, but - "all the same, a bastard," as one still "democratized" acquaintance told me. And tell him that in reality everything was different. No, he "knows" everything!

In order for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous! This recipe was widely used by Goebbels, but already in the First World War, Anglo-Saxon propaganda falsely accused Germany of producing fats extracted from the corpses of innocently murdered French babies.

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And WHAT did the "monster" Beria do?

Here is a quote, which I will quote without the slightest cut:

"... the essay, already written, lay on my desk. I put the last point and thought and once again experienced all the horrors associated with the name of a man who will surely be cursed for many generations. And if I wrote in the first four essays with pain in my heart and with compassion for the innocent

executed marshals, then the fifth, which will be discussed, deserved not only to be shot, but, if it were possible, he would also have to be hanged, put in an electric chair, cut off his head with a guillotine (actually, the literary norm is "on the guillotine" - S.K.) - and all this would not have been enough for his crimes.

The four "innocents" are: 1) the self-confident, with the manners of Bonaparte, the "genius" of the Trotskyist persuasion Tukhachevsky; 2) a marshal with a very confusing fate Yegorov; 3) the incompetent "marshal" Kulik and 4) the degraded, self-lost Blucher.

The fifth marshal is Beria. And his hater is the writer Vladimir Karpov, who at one time left the camp for the front and there became a regimental intelligence officer, a Hero of the Soviet Union.

You read this and think - where does the "engineer of human souls" get such bestial bloodthirstiness? Yes, and not animal - the beast is not bloodthirsty, it is just wants to eat.

So why such pathological hatred? From an old grudge? But it is very vindictive ... No, it is unlikely that everything is explained by resentment. There is something different here... Perhaps it was an instinctive rejection of a person who was bright, outstanding, and—unlike the detractors—not mercenary, who lived—unlike the detractors—not for personal gain, but for lofty ideals? But there are enough bright, non-standard personalities in Soviet history besides Beria.

So why is it stupidly viciously about Beria? The charming Constance Bonacieux from The Three Musketeers declared: "Whoever says: "Richelieu", he says: "Satan". Today, "intellectuals", "intellectuals", liberals and "democrats" of a wide spectrum say the same about 10

Shania Beria. And this is a very infrequent case of absolute, total demonization of a historical personality not on the pages of an adventurous historical novel, but in real history.

To say a kind word about Beria - no matter how it is backed up by facts - not easy. Further we will see that even the one who cites information that is deeply positive for Lavrenty Pavlovich from the practice of personal communication with him, shyly makes a reservation: they say, Beria, of course, is a "monster" and "creator of the Gulag", but, they say, he personally conducted with *me* I didn't wash myself like a human being into camp dust and didn't even swear. And so, what doubts can there be - "executioner"!

However, was it a boy? You mean a demon?

Russian history is rich in outstanding statesmen who were slandered for one reason or another, starting with Ivan the Terrible ... Arakcheev, for example, has become a negative household name ... Although objective documents prove the opposite, starting, for example, with the fact that the reformer of the Russian artillery of the era The Patriotic War of 1812 had nothing to do with the excesses of the "military settlements" with which his name is firmly associated.

And in our time, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria has become such a gloomy "sign" figure.

The "internal chronicler" of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikolai Zenkovich in one of his books thumped bluntly that, they say, the question is not whether Stalin was killed, but how it was done. The recognition is valuable, but about the same can be said, referring to Beria. The question is not whether he was vilely slandered, but why he was slandered so vilely and totally.

This question comes to the mind of everyone who begins to study the problem with an open mind.

They asked Yuri Mukhin.

They asked Elena Prudnikova.

I asked them too.

And my answer is close to the answers of other objective researchers of the Beria phenomenon: he was first slandered, and then generally cut out of the history of the country because it was not he who was the criminal, but his detractors and destroyers.

State potential of Beria compared to all

by these Khrushchevs and Malenkovs was so great that the ends of the crime had to be hidden in the mud.

That's where they hid them.

And now it is difficult to figure out where is sinful and where is righteous. Moreover, there is little primary information about Beria in scientific circulation, which is understandable: try to get to them, hidden in deadfly closed archives! And are there all the facts in these seventy or more years old archives? And how many "facts" in quotes are there in these archives?

Khrushchev had already begun to destroy the archives, under Gorbachev this line was successfully continued, "enriched" by the practice of making strategic fakes.

And under Yeltsin ...

The process of destruction and falsification of historical archival documents is not typical for Putin's Rossiya, but only because Putin's predecessors had already done a huge amount of work in this direction. The lie about the Great October Revolution, about the "white and fluffy" White Guards, about Lenin and Stalin, about the Great Patriotic War and the "seventy-year" "Soviet" slavery has already been condensed to the limit. The spring of falsification of the history of the Fatherland is compressed so that its "coils" are almost closed. And gradually the reverse process begins.

HOWEVER, not every positive testimony about Beria can be trusted, especially if it comes, for example, from Beria's son, Sergo, who wrote the sensational book "My father is Lavrenty Beria." This book contains a lot of frank fiction. For example, Sergo was clearly not at the test of our atomic first-born RDS-1 in 1949. It is very inaccurate in many details. Fantastic are his statements that Robert Oppenheimer was the guest of his father's mansion and Sergo's interlocutor at the end of 1939. And Sergo's story about his father's meeting in his presence with the commander of a German submarine that arrived at the Soviet naval base a week before the start of the war does not fit into any gate at all, so that the boat commander could inform Beria about the order to sink Soviet ships in a week.

But when Sergo writes that his father was modest in

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life, you can believe in it, as well as in the fact that his father loved outdoor activities (looking at amateur photos of Beria on vacation, it is easy to verify this).

Sergo Lavrentievich's reports that the father did not interfere with the young son's desire to drive a car are also clearly reliable, but only after the son himself (albeit with the help of experienced mechanics) assembles a "fordik" from junk

for riding.

And, as I understand it, Beria Sr. really brought stacks of foreign magazines to his son for translation, accustoming Sergo, under the guise of helping his father, to work and to master languages.

These seem to be trifles ... But these are indicative trifles, speaking about the essence and a lot of personality.

And even - a lot.

And you can also believe the same Sergo that Beria openly called the trade unionists idlers, because at the level of the highest trade union

leaders (Beria dealt, of course, with them) because it most often happened. And Beria, being a man of action, complained no more of talkers and loafers than Stalin.

It is quite possible to believe those historians and memoirists who are disloyal to Beria, but from whose materials conclusions objectively follow, positive for Lavrenty Pavlovich (as, for example, in the case of the memoirs of the missile defense system designer Kisunko). This information can be considered reliable!

It was very easy to stray into such an approach: "Molotov himself recalled ...", or: "In the memoirs of the legendary Sudoplatov ...", etc. But how often such information is objectively worth little. Somewhere memory fails, somewhere, alas, conscience... Later additions are not ruled out. And how often, I repeat once again, we are dealing with direct, Goebbels-type lies!

The granddaughter of the outstanding Russian neuropathologist, psychiatrist and psychologist, morphologist and physiologist of the nervous system Vladimir Mikhailovich Bekhterev, Academician Bekhterev, in the late 80s, stated that her grandfather, after a medical examination of Stalin, called him paranoid, for which he was de poisoned .

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Oh, how many "democratic" denunciations were around this statement. But in 1995, in No. 32 of the Arguments and Facts weekly, the granddaughter-academician admits: "It was a tendency to declare Stalin crazy, including using the alleged statement of my grandfather, but there was no statement ... They began to put pressure on me, and I had to confirm that it was..."

Consider, dear reader, this confession!

And after all, even after him, Natalya Bekhtereva walked the earth with unshaken feet, instead of publicly, under the gaze of television cameras, crawling on her knees behind the Lenin Mausoleum and publicly repenting on her knees in front of Stalin's grave.

Alas, even the most repentant villain will not be able to do this before grave of Lavrenty Beria. She just doesn't exist.

But there are documents - although many of them must be approached critically. There are memoirs, historical works, and so on... It is impossible not to use the same, say, books by Felix Chuev about his conversations with Molotov and Kaganovich - this is a normative source, so to speak. However, there are enough inconsistencies and "blunders" there, starting from purely factual and ending with logical ones.

And I tried to either cross-check everything, or proceed from the principle: what a person tells about his direct, personal contacts with Beria, you can most likely believe - after analyzing both the factual and psychological side of the matter. And if someone retells something (as, for example, NKVD General Sudoplatov - the stories of Beria's secretaries, which he heard from them already in prison during a joint "time"), then most likely you should not believe this. This is a very slippery thing for a historical researcher -

"spoiled phones" memoirs. So for many "evidence" it is better not to rely.

And it's not about the temptation to discard information that is inconvenient for you, but about the huge scale of the Khrushchev-Gorbachevsky Yeltsin denigration of both the Stalin era and its leading positive figures, including Beria.

But there are still reliable documents about Beria, first of all, the totality of them that is contained in the declassified "atomic" archives mentioned above. These demons

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controversial documents are a good guiding thread for an objective researcher.

Moreover, their reliability is guaranteed not only by the high status of the publication, but also by the professional and personal qualities of the two leading figures in this work, which was carried out in the main Russian nuclear weapons center in Arzamas-16 - RFNC-VNIIEF.

I mean the oldest weapons physicist German Arsenyevich Goncharov, Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize, and Colonel Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko, former long-term head of the USSR Ministry of Defense representation at VNIIEF.

Once, in a conversation, I told Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko that, having started mastering the material, I was dumbfounded by how abruptly and positively the figure of Beria began to change for me.

And heard in response:

- When I started working with archival documents a few years ago, I was, of course, prejudiced towards Beria. But as I worked, my impression of him changed to the exact opposite.

- How about a person? I clarified.

- Yes, including as a person ...

There is another thread - the simple logic of our modern life. The public atmosphere today is unrighteous and deceitful. So, if its creators speak badly about something or someone, then in reality everything is, most likely, the other way around.

If they say about Beria that he was an intriguer, then it is logical to assume that in fact he was quite noble.

If they say that he was a careerist, then it is logical to assume that in reality he was not looking for high posts, but they themselves found him worthy of these posts.

If it is said that he was voluptuary, then it would not be very wrong to think that he was rather an ascetic and, in any case, a man sufficiently reserved in his personal needs.

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But it is, dear reader, so, in general, it was. And I will try to prove it!

While working on the book, I had to clean up a lot of dirt that had accumulated on the already yellowed newspaper and magazine pages of the "perestroika" era, on the pages of "monographs" and "memoirs". However, in the course of my work, pleasant surprises also awaited me, when I found information that was quite positive for Beria, even where, it would seem, I could not find it in any way.

And as the book was being written, I began to understand better why they made a "monster" out of Beria. I hope that as you read the book, this understanding will come to the reader.

In the meantime, I invite him to travel with the author for more than half a century ago, to Moscow in March, saying goodbye to Stalin.

## **Chapter 2**

### **MOVEMENTS ON THE STAND OF THE MAUSOLEUM**

ON MARCH 10, 1953, they stood on the podium of the Mausoleum...

Lavrenty Beria, Nikolai Bulganin, Klimenty Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Georgy Malenkov, Anastas Mikoyan, Vyacheslav Molotov, Vyacheslav Malyshev, Mikhail Pervukhin, Maxim Saburov, Nikita Khrushchev...

The country buried Stalin. People cried, trains stopped on the way, factory horns blared, farewell artillery salutes thundered.

And now they personified the state, standing now on the podium of the Mausoleum



Lenin, now becoming the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum.

And now they are the leaders of the state.  
Collectively.

But even among equals, someone becomes the first.

Khrushchev was the chairman of the commission for organizing the funeral.

Members - member of the Presidium of the Central Committee L.M. Kaganovich, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.M. Shvernik, Minister of War Marshal AM Vasilevsky, Secretary of the Central Committee N.M. Pe

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gov, commander of the Moscow military district, Colonel-General P.A. Artemiev, Chairman of the Moscow City Executive Committee M.A. Yasnov.

None of the members of the commission claimed leadership even close, despite the fact that formally the first person of the state was Shvernik. But even under Stalin he was formally the first.

Another thing is Georgy Malenkov. He was not a member of the commission, but, nevertheless, not only claimed the first role, but also found it in many respects, becoming the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instead of Stalin.

However, the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU were led by Khrushchev. And that's something too meant.

Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria, who before Stalin's death also headed the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers on Atomic and Missile Affairs, after Stalin's death became the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and was appointed Minister of the Interior - with the reunification of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs.

But his range of duties and interests was not limited to this. He was active all around. And this, I must say, was not new to him - he worked

"multi-station" all his life.

And everywhere - effectively!

Yes, the most comprehensively competent, energetic and suitable for the role of not only the formal, but also the informal leader of the country was he - Lavrenty Beria.

For the time being, without bothering with lengthy proofs of what has been said, I will cite data from page 407 of the collection of documents of the International Fund "Democracy" (Foundation of the late Alexander N. Yakovlev) "Lavrenty Beria. 1953".

Neither in this fund, nor in the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace and Stanford University, which acted as co-editors of the collection, was anyone going to raise the communist Beria to the shield. But the reference data given about Beria in the collection mentioned above and concerning his activities in the period only from 1941 to 1945, when Lavrenty Pavlovich was a member of the State Defense Committee, are impressive.

GKO is the highest emergency body, which during

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war led the country, was formed on June 30, 1941 as part of: I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov (Deputy Chairman), L.P. Beria, K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov.

Since February 1942, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, later - N.A. Voznesensky.

And this is what the collection of A.N. Yakovlev:

"By the GKO resolution of February 4, 1942 on the distribution of responsibilities between its members, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of aircraft and engines, the formation of the Air Force, in addition, in the future, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on

the production of weapons, mortars, ammunition, tanks, as well as monitoring the work of three people's commissariats: the oil, coal industries and communications.

In addition, by decision of the State Defense Committee of March 13, 1942, "due to the difficult situation on the railways and the need to get out of this situation," an operational group was created under the leadership of Kaganovich, Beria and Malenkov, "which was entrusted with all responsibility for all transportation by rail" .

And Beria in July 1941 and later put a lot of effort into the creation of the Reserve Front, "which included a significant number of military formations of the NKVD of the USSR."

In 1942, Stalin sent Beria as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the North Caucasus.

And from August 21, 1943, he was a member of the highest leading group of the Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from German occupation.

And none of these duties was formal, parade. In the USSR, Stalin was not handed out sinecures.

In 1944, Stalin appointed Beria Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee instead of Molotov and Chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, which "considered all current issues."

Plus, all this time, Beria was the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. During the Tehran 1943, Crimean (Yalta) and Potsdam 1945 conferences

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"He was entrusted with ensuring the protection of the Soviet delegation, and at the Crimean Conference - of other delegations."

Knowing all this, we can say with confidence that during the war more than Beria in the country, only one person was loaded and overloaded with the highest responsibility - Stalin himself.

And after the war, too! After all, Beria was entrusted with the most complex and new tasks - the uranium problem, control over the development of air defense systems (with the expectation of future missile defense).

And besides this, from the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Beria was not relieved of the responsibility for supervising a number of peaceful sectors of the economy.

Only a highly professional versatile manager with extensive experience and good general and special erudition and an instant business reaction could pull such a "cart".

And of course - who knows how to pick up shots and skillfully use them later use.

Beria possessed all these qualities and objectively was head and shoulders above all the others who stood on the podium of the Mausoleum on a March day. And definitely he understood it.

His neighbors in the podium also understood this.

But were they ready to accept the leadership of Beria? They stood under the March sky and did not know how everything would turn out there ...

Or did you know?

Perhaps someone knew.

And that "someone" was certainly Khrushchev.

A YEAR ago, Stalin stood in the center of the podium.

He waved affably to the little girl waving to him from below, from her father's shoulders,

passing by the Mausoleum in the May Day column.

Now Stalin was gone. And so on the podium of the Mausoleum certain shifts were inevitable. Yes, they have already happened. But still, the future of those standing on the podium in March 1953 was still vague. And they couldn't help but think - what will it be like?

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Today we know the answer to this question. As early as May 1, 1953, the composition of the higher leadership, who occupied the festive platform, did not differ from the March one.

But already on November 7 of the same year, Beria was not on the podium.

On June 26 he was arrested.

At the July (July 2-7, 1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he was expelled from the party "for treacherous actions aimed at undermining the Soviet state" and decided to bring him to justice "as an enemy of the party and the Soviet people."

On August 8, 1953, the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on "depriving L.P. Beria of the powers of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, removing him from the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR with the deprivation of all titles and awards assigned to him and transferring the case of criminal actions to L.P. Beria for consideration by the Supreme Court of the USSR.

Four years passed, the year 1957 came, and the leaders of the "anti-party group" Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov left the rostrum, and Pervukhin and Saburov, who supported them, also left.

Having disowned the incorrigible "Stalinists", Bulganin and Voroshilov could not resist, however, on the podium. And seven years later, Nikita Khrushchev himself left her ingloriously.

Mikoyan stayed on it the longest - until March 1966.

Some left the podium of the Mausoleum, others came to it. The nomenklatura conjuncture was changing, the political sympathies of those who occupied the center of the rostrum were changing. Worker Lugansk, named Voroshilovgrad in 1935, was returned to its old name in 1958, in order to be renamed again in 1970 Voroshilovgrad, which over the years became Lugansk again. Something similar happened to ancient Rybinsk, which was renamed four times: Rybinsk - to Shcherbakov, Shcherbakov - to Rybinsk, Rybinsk - to Andropov, and, finally, again to Rybinsk.

But the name of Lavrenty Beria, who left the podium in March 1953, is no one never returned to the life of the country.

Only with the beginning of "perestroika" did it gain loud fame, however just to be in the eyes

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"progressive" and "politically advanced" sections of society "a disgusting personification of bloody tyranny and total totalitarianism."

And WHAT if Lavrenty Beria not only did not leave the main rostrum of the state, but also firmly occupied its center? And it would keep her busy for years to come. After all, he was a good amateur athlete, did not smoke, was not fond of alcohol, nor, contrary to gossip, women ... So he could have lived a long time.

Say, until the age of seventy-seven.

That is, he could have died in the same 1976, when the future four-time Hero of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, was presented with a second Heroic star complete with the star of the Marshal of the Soviet Union.

But Beria was arrested, isolated and shot. There are several versions of how and when this happened, but I will not dwell on them now, but will introduce the reader to one of those letters that Beria

wrote after the arrest.

In fact, he wrote three letters to his former comrades in leadership. And their authorship is disputed, for example, by Yu. Mukhin, E. Prudnikova, and also indirectly by Sergo Beria, who claimed that his father was shot during his arrest in the mansion where he lived with his family and Sergo. But I have no doubt that the "letters from the bunker" are genuine! Why I am sure of this, I will tell in due time, but now I will simply pick up the Yakovlev-Hoover-Stanford collection of documents of 1953 on Beria and open it on page 74, where the second letter from Lavrenty Pavlovich to the Central Committee of the CPSU begins Malenkov.

### Chapter 3

#### LETTER FROM THE CAMERA

DATED July 1, 1953, this letter occupies five and a half sheets of typographical size 70x100 /16 in the book. Therefore, I will not give it in<sup>1</sup> full, but it deserves our serious attention. From one

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On the other hand, the letter became a kind of summing up of all the political and state work of Beria, and on the other hand, it turned out to be something like his political testament.

There are enough errors in the text, sometimes the style is "lame", but only the publishers know where the errors belong to Beria, and where those who translated the manuscript into a typographical text. The same letter can be read in different ways. In addition, the author of the letter was undoubtedly worried that the writing style could not but be affected - Beria was still not a writer.

I will immediately comment on certain parts of the letter, and in such a way that these comments gradually acquaint the reader with some of the circumstances of that ancient and not very well-known era to this day.

The letter begins like this:

*"To Comrade MALENKOV*

*Dear George!*

*During these four difficult days for me, I thoroughly thought through everything that took place on my part in the last months after the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, to [a]k at work, and in relation to you personally and - some comrades of the Presidium of the Central Committee and subjected his actions the most severe criticism, strongly condemning himself. Especially hard and unforgivable is my behavior towards you, where I am one hundred percent to blame. Among other comrades, I also firmly and energetically set to work with the sole thought of doing everything possible and not to fail for all of us without Comrade Stalin and to support the new leadership of the Central Committee with deeds. and the Government... »*

There is no desire to pity and justify. The conditions for writing a letter for its author were not only uncomfortable, but simply wild. However, it is imperceptible that he was psychologically crushed. But peace is far from here, and Beria analyzes what he did wrong before his comrades so that he was suddenly arrested.

And here comes something interesting:

*"In accordance with the available instructions of Ts.K. and the Government, strengthening the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local bodies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted to the Central Committee and the Government according to your co22*

*vetu and on some issues on the advice of Comrade Khrushchev N.S. a number of deserving political proposals, for example: ... "*

Well, well, what is this *worthy* advice to the new minister

of Internal Affairs, the new presiding minister Malenkov and the secretary of the Central Committee Khrushchev?

And here's what:

*"... such as: on the rehabilitation of doctors, the rehabilitation of those arrested in the so-called Mingrelian [th] national center in Georgia and the return of those incorrectly exiled from Georgia, On amnesty, on the elimination of the passport regime, on correcting the distortion of the party line allowed in national politics and in punitive measures in the Lithuanian SSR, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, but your criticism, criticism of N.S. Khrushchev, is absolutely fair. and criticism of other comrades at the Presidium of the Central Committee; with my last participation ... "*

From these lines it follows that the initiative, for example, "rehabilitation" in the "doctors' case", came, contrary to popular belief, not from Beria, but from Khrushchev and Malenkov. After all, Beria would not invent non-existent initiatives of his colleagues in a letter to these colleagues!

True, some of the initiatives actually belonged directly to the new Minister of the Interior, but these were precisely the initiatives that, after the execution of Beria, were completely or partially curtailed as "erroneous." And, let's say, we will still have a reason to talk about national politics in the vision of Beria himself.

But I will dwell on the "doctors' case" right away, recalling that it began in 1952 with a letter from Lidia Fedoseevna Timashuk to the Central Committee, written and transferred to the MGB back in 1948.

In 1952, Lydia Timashuk was fifty-four years old, and since 1926, after graduating from a medical institute, she worked in the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Department, and since 1948 she was in charge of the electrocardiography room of the Kremlin hospital. Retiring in 1964 as the head of the department, Timashuk died in 1983, at the age of eighty-five. "Democrats" contempt

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They often write about her as "Nurse Timashuk", but this, as we see, is a lie.

By 1948, while taking a cardiogram to Andrei Andreyevich Zhdanov, she, an experienced practical doctor, diagnosed "myocardial infarction in the region of the left ventricle and interventricular septum." But the Kremlin professors V.N. Vinogradov, V.Kh. Vasilenko and P.I. Egorov, attending physician G.I. Mayorov and diagnostician S.E. Karpay said that nothing serious happened.

Zhdanov, however, had been "treated" before that in such a way that "treatment" in itself was a crime. If not state, then medical - for sure! So, Mayorov entrusted the care of the sick to a nurse, and he himself fished for hours - it happened in Valdai, in the sanatorium "Long Fords".

The chief therapist of the Kremlevka, Professor Vinogradov, also looked no more attractive. The word "therapy" actually comes from the Greek "therapeia" - "care, care" But this renegade of the Hippocratic oath, instead of organizing the daily health care of the country's leadership, focused on something else. He "at the same time headed the department at the 1st Moscow Medical Institute, was the editor-in-chief of the Therapeutic Archive journal, head of the electrographic department of the Institute of Therapy of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and held a number of other positions." Here I use information from G. Kostyrchenko's book "Stalin's Secret Policy. Power and anti-Semitism", published in 2001 at the expense of the Jewish Congress.

Such are the lovers to earn income wherever possible and determined the appearance Medical and Sanitary Administration of the Kremlin! Kostyrchenko himself writes:

"In the famous "Kremlevka", as elsewhere (yes. - S.K.), there was

the atmosphere of general surveillance and denunciation created by the "authorities", a dead spirit of bureaucratic hierarchy, corporatism, mutual responsibility hovered.

"The atmosphere of universal surveillance and denunciation created by the 'organs'" — this is on the conscience (if he has one) of Kostyrchenko ... At such, say, a super-mode "object" as the atomic KB-11 in Sarov, there was nothing like that - an atmosphere of business concentration reigned there, slovenliness, of course, was not encouraged.

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*But about the "mutual responsibility" - this is already interesting! In the dictionary of Moritz Ilyich Michelson "Russian thought and speech. Yours and someone else's. Experience of Russian phraseology. Collection of "figurative words and allegories" in article 702 "Mutual responsibility" is a relevant quote here from the "Diary of a provincial in St. Petersburg" by Saltykov-Shchedrin:*

"How this mutual guarantee of indulgence was created - I do not presume to explain, but that this guarantee was once very strong - this will be confirmed by every provincial."

G. Kostyrchenko is not a provincial, but here he also confirms that the guarantee of the professorial rogues in the Kremlevka was strong, and as a result, Timashuk was forced to rewrite the conclusion in accordance with the professor's diagnosis: "a functional disorder due to sclerosis and hypertension."

On August 28, 1948, the head of the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin, Professor Yegorov, wrote in the medical history: *"It was recommended ... to increase traffic, from September 1 to allow travel by car, on September 9 to resolve the issue of a trip to Moscow."*

*But Zhdanov was taken to Moscow earlier, because on August 31 he died.*

A medical error is a terrible thing, but possible for any doctor ... However, in this case, everything was quite transparent - the cardiogram showed a heart attack confidently! And how could one lordly neglect the conclusion of an experienced professional Timashuk, who, like Vinogradov and others like him, did not occupy a string of profitable positions, but all her life she was engaged in her direct business - treating people ?!

Timashuk wrote a letter to Vlasik, head of the Main Directorate of Security of the MGB. And on September 6, 1948, Professor Yegorov called a meeting in his office, where he branded Lydia Fedoseevna as an ignorant doctor and an "alien, dangerous" person.

For all this "warm" company, Timashuk was really dangerous, as any honest person is dangerous for scoundrels. And Egorov was supported by Vinogradov, Mayorov, pato

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logoanatomist of the Kremlin hospital Fedorov, professor Vasilenko.

Vinogradov then still enjoyed the full confidence of Stalin (he "treated" him and other members of the Politburo, accompanied Stalin in 1943 to Tehran), and Timashuk's letter was then hushed up. Vinogradov told the Minister of Health of the USSR E.I. Smirnov: "Either I will work in the Kremlin hospital, or she."

Unfortunately, they left the professor, and Timashuk was transferred to one of the branches of the Kremlevka.

But in the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin such "arts" and "healing Mistakes" acquired (taking into account the allegedly high qualifications of senior personnel) such a strangely massive character that in 1952 Timashuk's letter was extracted from the archive, published in the press, and on January 21, 1953, she herself was awarded the Order of Lenin.

By that time, professors Vinogradov, Egorov, Vasilenko, Vovsi, Kogan, Grinshtein, Feldman, Temkin were sitting at the Lubyanka ...

When on November 4, 1952, the operatives came for Vinogradov, "they were struck by the rich decoration of his apartment, which could be confused with a mediocre museum. The professor came from a provincial family (and, that's where the skill of mutual responsibility comes from! - S.K.) a small ... employee, but even before the revolution ... he managed to become quite a wealthy person, kept his own prize horses at the hippodrome, collected paintings, antiques . The walls of the life doctor's dwelling were decorated with paintings by I.E. Repin, I.I. Shishkin, K.P. Bryullov and other first-class Russian masters. During the search, in addition, gold coins, diamonds, other valuables, even a substantial amount in American currency were found.

That's all, dear reader, I quoted Kostyrchenko's book (p. 645), so the information is accurate, paid for by the Jewish Congress, and anti-Semitism cannot smell here. But I'll note from myself: it's a pity that this professorial bourgeois (according to Kostyrchenko, an "intellectual of the old school") was undercut in the 17th ...

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You look, and Zhdanov would be alive!  
And he's not alone!

Kostyrchenko, by the way, claims that the "doctors' case" began earlier than the time when Timashuk's letter was launched. But this is just an attempt to change cause and effect. The real reason for the "doctors' case" was their criminal negligence at least.

Or maybe more than negligence! The devil knows, these Kremlin "esculapius"... Looking ahead, I remind you that they were all "rehabilitated" later, quietly forgetting that Vinogradov was already guilty of a number of quite vulgar criminal acts, secretly storing gold, jewelry, currency.

Yes, and it would not hurt to think - why does Professor Vinogradov need all these "pebbles" and dollars? Did he hide them until better times, hoping for such changes in the USSR that became possible only after 1991? And did he really try to bring such changes closer?

But were there such "trifles" in the Kremlin then - after the triumph of the winners of the "monster" Beria, who was sitting in the underground bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District!

BACK, however, to this bunker and, as researchers, we will get a grasp of through the back of Lavrenty Pavlovich in continuation of his letter to the Central Committee ...

*"... absolutely fair... criticism... at the Presidium of the Central Committee; with my last participation in response to my wrong desire, together with the decisions of the Central Committee, to send out memoranda of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of course, in this way, to a certain extent, [the significance] of the very decisions of the Central Committee was belittled .... I want to say frankly that on my part, insisting on the distribution of memorandums was stupidity and political thoughtlessness, all the more you advised me not to do this. My behavior at a meeting of the Presidium [a] of the Central Committee, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, was very often wrong and unacceptable, introducing nervousness and excessive harshness, I would say, as [a] to this is now well thought out and understood, sometimes it came to unacceptable rudeness and impudence with my parties against comrades Khrushchev [a] N.S. and Bulganina N.A. when discussing*

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*On the German question, of course, I am unquestionably guilty here and deserve all condemnation ... "*

Here, perhaps, something needs to be clarified... Today it is extremely difficult for us to imagine what it is - a purge of the Party. Something punitive arises in the imagination, but when we say that we need to take the suit to the dry cleaner, then

we do not mean anything bad, but simply inform that we would like to have a clean, or rather, cleaned suit.

So, the purges of the Party had as their goal not a certain beating and humiliation of the members of the Party, but, on the one hand, the cleansing of the Party from the "adhering", and on the other, the purification and self-purification of completely reliable members of the Party.

When a Christian goes to confession, he goes not only for the remission of sins. He also goes in order to purify himself by confessing to someone outside himself - the priest, of certain sins. The believer confesses them secretly - and that becomes purer. And the Bolsheviks, during the purges, engaged in self-criticism publicly, in front of their party comrades, and this was—one must clearly realize this—a really powerful means of self-education and self-improvement.

After all, even Chekhov recommended squeezing a slave out of himself every day - drop by drop. And in a strong party collective during the purges, people not only squeezed rubbish out of themselves drop by drop, but whole streams!

Over time, this mode of behavior became automatic for the old party members if they fell into a situation of sharp criticism from the outside. They did not take offense, as is customary now, at those who criticize, they did not become embittered, but began to think - what did I do wrong? Unless, of course, they were Bolsheviks, party members, and not "members of the party."

But Beria was a party member! That is, a person who lives by the business entrusted to him, and does not figure out how to squeeze more personal benefit out of this business. And his letter had to some extent the meaning of a personal purge - fortunately the situation contributed to this. He continues in the letter from time to time not to engage in self-flagellation and humiliate himself before the leadership of the Central Committee, but sincerely, as it was then said, admits mistakes.

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Sincerely ... Although to a modern person this may seem cowardice and ostentatious remorse.

But it was not cowardice!

As for the "German" question, as well as the "Korean", "Turkish", "Iranian" questions mentioned below, "answers to Eisenhower and Churchill", "action when receiving Hungarian comrades", we will talk about some of these "questions" much later, and now I will only note that Beria's foreign policy concepts were interesting and realistic.

Let's continue reading...

*"Suggestions about Nagy Imre should not have been made by me or someone else, but you had to do it, and then I jumped out idiotically, in addition, along with the correct remarks, I allowed liberties and swagger, for which of course I should be warmed up tightly».*

It is said energetically, and behind these words the character is quite felt - not always restrained, but very sincere.

Sincere, dear reader!

And the following lines seem to me just as sincere...

*"... But I must say with all honesty I myself carefully prepared and forced my assistants to prepare for the meetings of the Central Committee. and governments, to the best of their ability to help in the correct solution of the issues under discussion. If initiative questions were introduced by me, then I reviewed them several times together with my comrades working with me, so as not to make a mistake and not let Ts.K. and the Government. I stayed at the Council of Ministers, I did not have time to present you a memorandum and a draft decision on streamlining award cases, I spent about two months on this (we are talking about the idea of establishing new orders of the USSR. - S.K.) ... In relations with comrades With*



*whom[and] I work, I always tried to be principled, party, demanding, so that the work entrusted to him was carried out, as [a]k is required in the interests of our party and our Government. I have never had any other relations with these comrades. Take at least senior officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. T-schei Kruglov, Kobulov, Serov, Maslennikov, Fedotov, Stakhanov, Pitovranov, Korotkov, Sazykin, Gorlinsky, Goglid*

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*ze, Ryasny, Sudoplatov, Savchenko, Raikhman, Obruchnikov, Meshik, Zyryanov and many others, apart from helping them in their work, I had no requirements to better organize the fight against the enemies of the Soviet State, both inside the Country and outside it. Yes, and these comrades worked as it should be for real party members. Comrade Serov with a brigade to assist the Moscow and Leningrad police simply drove him to do everything possible to restore order in the work of the police of these cities and draw the necessary conclusions and proposals for other Republics ... "*

I repeat: sometimes the authorship of this letter is disputed - they say, Beria could not write it, he had already been killed by that time, and therefore the letter - fake.

I'm sure otherwise! A careful analysis of the content and style of the letter convinces us that it was Lavrenty Pavlovich who wrote it, like other "letters from the bunker". This letter is very densely "stuffed" with such details and facts that no one, even a nomenklatura, "clerk" could know. Yes, and the level of thinking and feeling, characteristic of letters, "clerk" is not able to have.

But even without deep analysis, one positive mention of the names of Serov and Stakhanov shows that Beria wrote the letter.

Nikolai Pavlovich Stakhanov, Chekist General, then headed the Main Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then was Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, from 1955 to 1961 - Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR. Why would it be - in the event of a falsification of the letter - "attach" it to Beria?

Well, Army General (since 1955) Ivan Serov, who in 1953 was not even fifty, was generally a solid "Khrushchevite". And no "clerk"-forger would include him and Stakhanov among those about whom Beria "should have" spoken approvingly.

And the fact that Kruglov, mentioned in the "clip", immediately after the arrest of Beria, was appointed Minister of the Interior, also indirectly testifies to the authenticity of the letter.

No, at the beginning of July 1953, Lavrenty Pavlovich was alive. And it was he, and not a dummy "clerk", recalling his entire past life and struggle, wrote to Malenkov:

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*"...Everything of value in my life is connected [with] working with you. From the very first days in 1938, to restore order in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, your participation in the acceptance and delivery of cases (when Beria was appointed in 1938 to the NKVD of the USSR. - S.K. ), strengthening the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with your help, is a big, intense work during the war in the State Defense Committee, when the will of the party was for us instructed you to organize in the required quantities in the relevant enterprises of the ministries - the production of aircraft and engines, and I - weapons and ammunition or issues of formation for the front. Joint work in the Operational Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the organization of the national economy during the war, when it was necessary to strongly support the work of transport, both of you and I were sent. Kaganovich A.M. and Mikoyan A.I. for the establishment of railway transport, which [th]*

*played an exceptional role. The first weeks of the war, when there was nothing to cover the Western[th] front - which the Germans strongly pressed against our joint work to create, under the leadership of the State Committee] of the Headquarters and personally Comrade Stalin, a reserve front to protect the approaches to Moscow, alone only for the reserve front, 15 full-blooded Chekist military divisions were organized. At the same time sending you to the Stalingrad [th] front, me to the Caucasian. It must be said frankly that we were most conscientious about the successful fulfillment of the instructions of the Party, the Government and Comrade Stalin, we never spared strength and energy and knew no fear ... "*

No, a "clerk" won't write like that!

LOOKING LIKE, having begun to remember the past, Beria even forgot where and why he writes all this! And immediately after the above text, he enthusiastically and in detail touches on nuclear problems and the Berkut and Kometa air defense systems, and then, remembering that he is not writing a memorandum, returns to the topic, reminds Malenkov of the years of joint work:

*"I'm not talking about all sorts of assignments, " he writes, " that were given to us by the Central Committee, the government, and personally Comrade Stalin, with [in] what we had to work very often and painstakingly, we always tried to be principled*

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*objective, we had no other interests, it so happened that we met almost every day for ten years and our conversation was always only about business, about people, how best to organize this or that work and to [a]k it is better to carry out the available assignments. I always had a need to consult with you and it always turned out better for the cause ... Therefore, my tragedy is that, as I said above, for over ten years we have been real Bolshevik friends, worked with soul in a variety of difficult working conditions were in complex bindings and no one upset our friendship, so valuable and necessary for me, and now it is solely through my fault that I have lost everything that connected us ... "*

And then Lavrenty Pavlovich writes: *"I want to say a few words in regard to comrades..."* and addresses the rest of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

To Molotov:

*"... Vyacheslav Mikhailovich! I always had an excellent even attitude towards you, working in the Transcaucasus, we all highly valued you, considered you a faithful student of Lenin and a loyal ally of Stalin, the second person after Comrade Stalin ... You remember very well when at the beginning of the war it was very bad and after our conversation with comrade Stalin at his nearby dacha. You posed the question point-blank in your office at the Council of Ministers that we must save the situation, we must immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland, I fully supported you then and suggested that you immediately call Comrade Malenkov to a conference ... After ... we all went to comrade Stalin and convinced him [about] the immediate organization of the Committee for the Defense of the Country ...*

*I would cite other facts, but I will say one thing that I have said more than once, the one who quarrels Molotov with Stalin commits a monstrous crime against our Country ... I think that this can be confirmed by comrade Malenkov G.M. and Mikoyan A.I. and others. Very often, earlier, and more recently, Comrade Stalin called Malenkov G.M. and me, meaning you and Mikoyan.*

Stalin had reason to be disappointed in some of his old comrades-in-arms...

However, this is not the essence of what is important now, but

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how Beria swept aside accusations of some intrigue! It was possible to refer in a letter to Malenkov to Malenkov's testimony only when one was telling the truth.

And it turned out that the truth, and not slander, was the same as Beria wrote about. She was like this:

*"Clement Efremovich! I'll start the same with Transcaucasia, we loved you dearly, I, on behalf of the leading bodies of Georgia, went specially to Moscow to the Central Committee, etc. Stalin insisted on sending you in connection with the fifteenth anniversary of Soviet Georgia.*

*At the beginning of the war, Comrade Stalin scolded me severely and called me a political coward when I proposed. Appoint in difficult times experienced by our Motherland known to all [th] country, comrades you and Budyonny, as commanders Scolded, and, a little later, comrade Stalin carried out the appointment ... "*

I draw the reader's attention to the formula *"on behalf of the governing bodies of Georgia" ...* Not *"I traveled"*, but *"I am on behalf of the leading bodies of Georgia ..."*.

If Beria had a low nature, he most likely would not have failed to stick out his *personal* role in the invitation to Voroshilov ... But Beria has always been a "man of the team." And once again confirmed this in his letter.

To Khrushchev and Bulganin, he addressed briefly and "replied", dryly attesting both as "excellent Bolsheviks and comrades."

Bulganin was a very gray figure, as for Khrushchev, Lavrenty Pavlovich, it seems, already understood who he was ... The five lines addressed to Nikita are interesting only for the message that Khrushchev at the Presidium of the Central Committee "strongly and angrily" scolded Beria.

But although also briefly, but expressively and sincerely, the author of the letter addressed to Kaganovich and Mikoyan:

*"... Lazar Moiseevich and Anastas Ivanovich. Both of you have known me for a long time. Anastas sent me back in 1920 from Baku for illegal work in Georgia, then still Menshevik on behalf of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP and the Revolutionary Council, the XI Army, Lazar knows 1927 and I will never forget with [help]*

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*rendered to me for party work in Transcaucasia, when you were secretary of the Central Committee. During my time in Moscow, I could say a lot. But I will always say one thing, I have always seen principled relations on your part, assistance in work and friendship, for my part I did everything I could ... "*

How many insinuations can be read about Beria's service in Musavat intelligence. And I'll tell you about it in detail... But aren't these lines, just read by the reader, enough to put an end to all slander? Would Beria remind you of 1920 at *such* an hour if he were unclean?

Hardly.

The last appeal was "personal" in half. Lavrenty Pavlovich wrote about Pervukhin and Saburov, but without referring to them ... However, he wrote something so, in my opinion, interesting for understanding Beria's personality that I will not tell the reader this part of the letter for the time being, having returned to it in due time and in your place.

And this surprisingly capacious and multifaceted letter ended like this:

*"... All this may be, I should not have written in my position, but I ask you to forgive me for this. Dear George, I ask you to understand me, that you know me better than others. I just lived, how best to make, of course, within my capabilities, together with you, a Mightier and Glorious Country, to think differently about me is simply unacceptable to my head. Of course, after everything that happened, I must be called firmly to order, indicate my place and pull back so that you remember until the end of your life, but understand, dear comrades, I am a faithful son of our Motherland, a faithful son of the party of Lenin and Stalin, and your faithful friend and comrade. Wherever you want, for any job, send the smallest one, take a closer look, I can still work ten years faithfully and*

*I will work with all my heart and with all my energy. I speak from the bottom of my heart, it's not true that since I held a big post I won't be fit for any small job, it's very easy to check in any region and region, state farm, collective farm, construction site, and I beg you*

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*Do not deprive me of being an active builder, [on] any small section of our glorious Motherland, and you will be convinced that in 2-3 years I will be strongly improved and will be still useful to you. I am devoted to my last breath to our beloved party and our Soviet Government.*

*Lavrenty Beria.*

The signature was followed by an inscription:

*"T-shchi I apologize that I am writing not quite coherently and badly because of my condition, as well as due to the weakness of the light and the lack of pince-nez (glasses).*

I don't know about anyone, but when I read this letter for the first time, for some reason this last explanation in brackets - "(points)" cut to the heart. Some kind of naive defenselessness blew over me from him, some kind of naive innocence...

But maybe it's just me, I don't know.

THIS is the letter from the bunker. According to the account - the second, but the first - short, dated June 28, I will give later. And what can be said about this?

Confession?

To some extent, yes.

But rather than a confession (this was unusual for Beria's nature), but a report on the work done.

Or rather, a report about the life lived, about what it was filled with.

Yes, here, in this letter, in fact - the whole life. And it seems to be stormy, and in general it is monotonous. No more Canary and Bahamas... And no Nice, unless you get to Lake Ritz... No "Versace" suits and five-star hotels... No saunas in presidential apartments... And no memories like: "Do you remember how we cut ourselves hard in Courchevel and sang a dozen girls at once" ...

But did he need them - all these Courchevel, Versace, apartments and so on ?!.

Instead of them, he had - Business!

Sovereign!

What else does a man need to calmly look into the eyes of the Age and History?

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The tone of the letter was quite decent. There were no "vain calls for help" in it, which "liberal intellectuals" see in Beria's appeal to the Central Committee. They do not quote the letter in detail, but snatch a couple of phrases from it in order to either fool or "democracy" fellow citizens, and then relish slandering the author of the letter.

But the only word that betrayed Beria's extreme inner tension escaped from him at the very end - "I beg" ... But in the context it is pathetic and doesn't look creepy.

No, it doesn't look!

Finishing his second letter, Beria did not rule out, judging by the tone and content of the letter, that his biography, personal and political, would not be exhausted by what had already been done before. He hoped to be given the opportunity to work further - where the Central Committee would say.

However, we know what went wrong. Whether in that or another month of 1953, but the life path of the hero of this book ended in the same year when his

arrested.

How did this path begin?

#### Chapter 4

#### BEGIN BIOGRAPHY

I DO NOT STRIVE to write only a biography of Beria - even a political one. Rather, the theme of the book can be defined as an era through the fate of Beria and the essence of this fate as a guide for understanding the past of the state and ... And - its future, glorious or ingloriously disastrous.

But, speaking of a person, one cannot but say nothing about the time of his formation, about his childhood and youth. After all, we all come from childhood.

Looking at the photographs of the young and young Lavrenty, taken at sixteen, seventeen, thirty-one, thirty-three and even later, you are surprised to find that they show nature in something indestructibly simple-hearted and naive ... Nature with a touch of spiritual idealism and sincere faith in people.

By the way, it is unlikely that the beautiful Nino Gegechkori is herself from  
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not a cold "vamp" at all - she would marry a prudent selfish pragmatist.

Another thing comes to mind when looking at these photos. If in 1930 Beria was removed without pince-nez, then already in 1934 he wears it. It turns out that this guy had read a lot by the age of thirty-five - this is not Khrushchev for you with his famous resolution "Aznakomitsy" ...

However, the craving for knowledge and education is confirmed, of course, not by pince-nez on the bridge of Beria's nose, but by the facts of his biography.

He was born on March 17 (29), 1899 in the mountain village of Merkheuli, Sukhumi district in Georgia. Born, according to some sources, in a poor, according to others - in a prosperous, peasant family.

Both are possible ... On the one hand, from very poor families, and even those from the Caucasus, rarely anyone received an education, and at the age of eight Lavrenty entered the Sukhumi Higher Primary School, also called real.

On the other hand, in order to send their son to school, the parents had to sell half the house. There *would* be no need for the prosperous to do so . And, most likely, the Beria family did not beg, but lived modestly.

The gymnasium is an educational institution for the "pure". And the real school was a standard opportunity for talented children of the poor to "go out into the world." Let us recall that both Pavka Korchagin and the creator of his image, the worker's son Nikolai Ostrovsky, studied at the real school.

Lawrence's father, Pavle, moved to Abkhazia from Mingrelia, according to his grandson Sergo, because of the persecution of the gendarmes for participating in peasant unrest. This is very possible. I must say that the memories of the son of Beria are the more reliable, the further they are from that 1953, which cut short the life of his father and distorted the fate of Sergo, and the closer they are to the childhood of both Sergo himself and Lavrenty.

*Merkheuli, although it was in Abkhazia, was a Mingrelian village, so his choice as a rebellious Mingrelian was quite understandable.*

Lavrenty's mother, Marta Jakeli, according to the same Sergo, was in what that relationship with Prince Dadiani, the owner

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Cem of Mingrelia, but at the same time very poor. She married Pavle with a second marriage,

having a son and a daughter from his first marriage.

Sergo Beria writes that his grandfather conquered his grandmother with courage and beauty, and this is certainly true. Grandchildren often look like grandfathers, and the fact that young Sergo was damn handsome is proved not only by photographs (they often lie). This is confirmed, for example, by Korney Chukovsky. In his diary for 1953 there is an entry dated July 12 (when Father Sergo had already been arrested): *"I remember the son of Beria - handsome, like porcelain, sleek, silent, arrogant, calm."*

I will note in brackets that "sleek" and "arrogant" are on Chukovsky's conscience, because Sergo's colleagues in the 3rd Main Directorate (development of air defense systems) note just his modesty.

Apparently, the family was friendly and hardworking. The father was always at work, the mother sewed beautifully and all her life (even when her son held a high position) worked part-time as a tailor.

Parents really wanted to give their son an education. He appreciated it and tried to help the family as best he could. To help, without neglecting his studies, he could only earn money by tutoring, and in his autobiography, written by him on October 27, 1923, Beria reports that he trained elementary school students at the Sukhum school. I note that the weak do not go to tutors, and they are not hired. So we do not have to doubt the success of the young highlander in mastering the sciences.

Sergo Beria wrote:

*"Some of my father's teachers, and these were amazing people who taught by vocation, I met many years later in Georgia. They told me a lot of interesting things about my father's childhood, and he himself always spoke warmly about them, knowing full well what he owed to his first teachers."*

At the age of sixteen, Lavrenty, having graduated with honors from the Sukhumi School, leaves to study in Baku. Why exactly there - after all, Tiflis was closer? It seems that none of the biographers asked this question, but it is interesting.

I think two factors played a role. Baku by

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At that time it was both the largest industrial center in Transcaucasia and the center of political life. In Baku, it was easier to get a technical education, earn extra money, and get involved in political life. There are reasons to think that the first consideration prevailed - Lavrenty had an engineering vein and the makings of a scientist (later such a competent expert as Academician Kapitsa would note this).

Since 1915, Beria has been a student at the Baku Secondary Mechanical and Construction schools. And besides, he is a member of the student Marxist circle.

In the same year, a mother with a five-year-old granddaughter and a deaf-mute come to him - after an illness - a sister. The time has come to pay the debts of the sacrifice of relatives, and Lavrenty pays: he has three women on his payroll. They lived, of course, very poorly, the mother at one time sewed clothes, but then the son began to earn extra money as a postman, and the situation with money improved somewhat. Mother even stopped sewing.

My father still lived in Merkheuli in a small house (in order for Lavrenty to go to Baku, he had to sell the remaining half of the house) and worked as a peasant. Why it happened so, I'm not going to guess. And is it worth it?

According to Beria's own words, his first acquaintance with Marxism took place in October 1915 - in an illegal Marxist circle organized by a group of students from the Baku Technical School and other educational institutions.

"The motives for creating the circle," recalled Beria in 1923, "were: the organization of students, mutual material support and self-education in

Marxist spirit (reading abstracts), analysis of books received from workers' organizations, and so on.

During the summer holidays of 1916, Lavrenty served in the main office of Nobel in Balakhany, "earning," as he himself admitted, "to feed *himself* and his family." However, next summer he will spend far from the Caspian Sea - in Odessa.

More on this, however, a little later.

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And now, finishing a short story about the time of the formation of Lavrenty Beria, let us ask ourselves: how, most likely, could his character be formed in those living conditions in which he was formed?

It is not difficult to give an answer to this question. Beria was born into a working-class family, where they could not and did not want to spoil him, but where they wanted to see him as a developed person. A developed person is an educated person. And in relation to their son, the parents behaved intelligently and selflessly, sacrificing worldly well-being for the sake of his education. And they were able to instill in him a sense of not dependency, but gratitude for the good.

Thrift, frugality, peasant thoroughness and the ability to limit oneself also entered the character of Beria.

Teachers by example of their own life gave him lessons of service public cause and helped to understand what duty is.

The mountains also gave something to Beria. After all, he was in the full sense of the word a son of mountains. And the mountains are able to create a character proud, independent, wide and wise. The highlander knows that the world surrounded by mountains is not cramped - as it might seem at first glance. Work hard, climb to the top, and exciting vistas will open up for you, you will see far and see a lot. But all this - only after considerable effort.

Forced early - from the age of eight - life outside the family brought up autonomy and a sense of responsibility. Yes, I learned to recognize people.

Tutoring gave me a certain pedagogical skill and the ability to approach people. And there is no doubt about one more thing - that Beria was formed as an energetic, active person.

All these qualities soon came in handy for him.

## **Chapter 5**

### **REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR**

In MARCH 1917, Beria turned eighteen years old. The revolution in Russia was less than a month old. And in Baku, as in Petrograd, dual power was first established: about

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The Executive Committee, an organ of the oil owners and landlords, and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies were formed.

Beria counted his party experience from March 1917 - then he and a group of fellow students organized a cell of the RSDLP (b). But, say, Antonov-Ovseenko-son assures that Beria joined the party only in 1919 (in February). It is unlikely that there can be one opinion.

After all, it was a revolution! What precise account of membership could there be then! The man united a few more around him, and they said to themselves and to others: "We are Bolsheviks." They did not have membership cards, but the essential thing was that they acted like Bolsheviks.

And formally membership could be issued later. By the way, in the "Nominal Commentary" to the correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich, published in 2001 by the ROSSPEN publishing house and the Russian State Archives

socio-political history, it is clearly stated: "Beria L.P. (1899-1953), party member since 1917.

One way or another, in June 1917, Beria voluntarily entered the hydraulic engineering organization of the army of the Romanian Front as a trainee technician and went to Odessa, and then to Romania, where he began working in the forest detachment of the village of Negulashty.

In 1953, after his arrest, he would be charged with this - they say, he considered himself a Bolshevik since March 17th, and without the permission of the party organization he left for who knows where. Considering when it was and who Lavrenty was then, the reproach looks stupid.

The first summer of the revolution was passing, but the revolution itself was not going shaky or roll. Beria is only eighteen, he is not a party leader, not an experienced revolutionary. And although he wants to build a new life, he wants to *build it!* He dreams about architecture, he draws well, even paints with watercolors and oils. Looking ahead, I will say that, as soon as the opportunity arose, he was eager to continue his studies in order to become an engineer, builder, and architect. He did not aspire to purely political work - he was drawn into it by the era, the tough political situation.

And now a young guy who needs to feed himself, and his mother with his sister and niece, is tucked into an offer that is tempting in all respects: to see new lands, floor 41

to improve technical practice and - what can we deny - to fix financial affairs, to help the family ...

And the party? And the revolution? So he doesn't shy away from them. What difference does it make where to work for a new life - on the Caspian Sea, on the Black Sea? .. The main thing is work!

And what kind of tough party discipline could be discussed among young and politically green enthusiasts? After all, it was only the summer of 1917! It was not yet that a civil war was not foreseen, but the proletarian revolution was also in question.

In short, Lavrenty went to the Black Sea and Romania and stayed there until January 1918. And then he returned to Baku.

Psychologically and historically everything is explainable. In distant lands, he did not stand aloof from the revolutionary process already gaining momentum, he was - as he himself wrote - "an elected from the workers and soldiers ... a delegate from the detachment", often visited "at district congresses of representatives of the districts" in Pashukani (Romania) .

Autumn gave Russia October, the situation escalated, it became clear that the good old life would not go away. And I wanted to fight for a new life in my native places. And, of course, I wanted to continue my studies. This can be seen from Beria's own confession: *"Upon arrival in Baku, I continue my studies at the school at an accelerated pace, quickly catching up."*

The political struggle in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia promised to be especially difficult. Since the end of the 19th century, local nationalists and separatists have formed here into separate political parties. But there were also parties that were common to the entire Russian Empire.

The Mensheviks of Georgia were especially strong. Here are some interesting numbers. Of the 8 deputies of the workers' curia from Georgia, there were 5 Mensheviks in the first State Duma. In the Second Duma all deputies from Georgia were Mensheviks. In the third - 3 deputies, 2 of them Mensheviks.

In the fourth and last convocation of the Tsarist Duma, Georgia was represented by two Mensheviks and one Socialist-Federalist.

Noy Zhordania - Chairman of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers' Deputies in February 1917, and in 1918-1921



The Prime Minister of Georgia is a Menshevik. And Nikolai Chkheidze, deputy of the 3rd and 4th Dumas, and in 1917 Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, too. A Menshevik was both a member of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet and a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and later - Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and then Minister of Internal Affairs of the Provisional Government Irakli Tsereteli.

That's how strong the Georgian Mensheviks were even on the scale of Russia!

And this is not counting the "pure water" of the nationalists, who did not have deputies in the tsarist Duma, but enjoyed a certain influence among the Georgian masses.

The socialist revolution of November 7, 1917 in Petrograd did not lead to the establishment of Soviet power in Tiflis. There, at the end of November, the increasingly "blushing" Tiflis Soviet was liquidated and a Menshevik government was formed. And it lasted until 1921.

Such was the post-October political "disposition" in Georgia.

In Armenia, in 1890, the nationalist party "Dashnaktsutyun" (in Armenian - union) was formed. The Dashnaks had secret connections with the politicians of France, England, the United States and with the Turks, counting on the creation of a "Great Armenia". There were, however, more modest plans: the autonomy of Western Armenia within Turkey (the "realism" of such plans was shown in 1915, when the Young Turks slaughtered more than a million Armenians in Turkish Armenia).

The Dashnaks widely used terror, not neglecting the methods of massacre (with the covert approval of Tsarist Petersburg, which was inclined to rule on the national outskirts, dividing).

After the collapse of the Russian Empire in Armenia, not the Bolsheviks, but the Dashnaks came to power. They came, of course, with outside help. But already in March 1920, Mikoyan wrote to Kirov in Astrakhan: *"In Armenia, work has improved, our forces are growing."*

In April 1920, Soviet troops occupied Baku. And in August, the Dashnak government of Armenia declared war on Kemalist Turkey, and soon the Turkish troops were already threatening

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pity Erivan. All memorandums of the Dashnaks to the League of Nations, European and (how could it be without it!) American "democracies" had the expected result, that is - null.

On November 9, 1920, Stalin arrived in Baku and set a direct task liberation of Armenia. In an interview with Pravda at the end of November, he said:

"Dashnak Armenia fell, undoubtedly, a victim of the provocation of the Entente, which set it against Turkey and then shamefully left it to be torn to pieces by the Turks. There can hardly be any doubt that Armenia has no chances of salvation left, except for one: an alliance with Soviet Russia. This circumstance, no doubt, will serve as a lesson for all peoples whose bourgeois governments never cease to kowtow before the Entente.

On November 29, 1920, Soviet power was established in Armenia. But, as it turned out, not yet final. On December 2, 1920, the Dashnak government of bourgeois Armenia signed the Alexandropol "peace treaty", according to which Armenia was declared a Turkish protectorate. The next, by the way, could be Georgia.

Counting on the support of Turkey, the Dashnaks rebelled in February 1921 and captured Erivan with the surrounding areas. The situation in the Caucasus immediately became more complicated. And on March 16, 1921, the RSFSR had to conclude an agreement with Turkey, according to which the regions of Kars, Ardagan and Artvin went to the Turks. The sacred mountain of Armenians, Ararat, also turned out to be outside the borders of Armenia.

Located at a distance of about sixty kilometers from Yerevan, it still towers over the Armenian capital, but already on Turkish territory. The "democrats" put this fact at the expense of Lenin, but Ararat, lost by the Armenians, is the price of the last adventure of the Dashnaks.

In July 1921, they were finished with: they were knocked out of the last base - Zangezur, and peace finally came to Armenia. Although rest was still far away.

Somewhat earlier, Menshevik Georgia ceased to exist. 25  
February 1921 the Red Army entered Tiflis.

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In Azerbaijan, the nationalist tone was set by the Musavat (Equality) party. It was formed in 1912 and had a program of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. After the February Revolution, the Musavatists united with the Federalist Party of Azerbaijani Beks.

On November 17, the Baku Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies was formed, and it was headed by Stepan Shaumyan. The returned Beria begins in January 1918 to work in his secretariat.

In the 1991 Politizdat collection "Beria: the end of a career" (analyzing this "documentary" libel, you can write a separate book) on page 335 "significantly" says:

*"From mouth to mouth, where secretly, and where they explicitly transmitted, for example, the story that Beria in 1918 was the commander of a security platoon of the Baku Commune, and everyone wondered how he managed to escape, and even more so to avoid arrest, in while those whom he protected under Soviet power were both arrested and shot.*

Everything is not clear here (or, on the contrary, everything is very clear) ... Firstly, Why "by word of mouth" and "secretly"?

Beria did not have such great power in the early 20s (and was not very eager for it, which is a weighty documentary, not denied by anyone, evidence in his autobiography of 1923, which I will talk about later), in order to "wash into camp dust" those who this "story", that is, gossip, "transmitted", instead of raising the question in the party order (which was a common practice in such cases).

Secondly, why would Beria, who had no military experience, be appointed commander of a security platoon of the Baku Commune? He was, according to the concepts of that time, already an educated person, and it was advisable to use him with considering "literacy". What, in fact, was done - Lavrenty worked in the secretariat of the Council.

Thirdly, Beria, what, was he the twenty-seventh Baku commissar? Even if he guarded them, it was fundamentally easier for him to hide than for those whom he "guarded" under Soviet rule. Moreover, he did not guard them, because ...

For, fourthly, to hide from the party the fact of being

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in such a prominent (in the sense of public) position it would be pointless for Beria. But they could show off. However, in his detailed autobiography of 1923 (this is, in fact, the most valuable document for analysis!) he does not mention this. And he does not mention, of course, because he has never been any head of a security platoon!

On the contrary, he himself clearly stated in 1923 that he remained an employee of the Baku Soviet until September 1918, and the events of October of that year found him "in the liquidation of the commission of Soviet employees", and not in a guard platoon.

Such "revelations" of Beria in the "accusatory" literature about him are abundant. And almost all of them are refuted even without the involvement of documents - by simple logical analysis.

Let us return, however, to Baku in 1918.

At the end of March, the Musavatists raised an anti-Soviet revolt in Baku. It was quickly suppressed, and on April 25 the Baku Council of People's Commissars was created, which included Shaumyan, Azizbekov, Dzhaparidze, Fioletov ... However, on June 18, the Musavatists formed their government with the center in Elizavetpol (later Kirovabad) and began to flirt with both Turks and Germans, and with the British (after all, the First World War was still going on).

A period of interventions began, and on July 31, 1918, Soviet power in Baku fell, and on August 1, the "Centro-Caspian dictatorship" was formed, which included Musavatists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Dashnaks ...

On August 4, Baku was occupied by the British under the pretext of military assistance against the Turks. That is, the "nationalist" "Musavat" brought the Turks and the British to the Caucasus and cooperated with both. As, however, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

It must be said that the political situation in Baku resembled a kaleidoscope. On September 11, due to the advance of the Turks, the British troops left the city, and on September 15, the Germans and Turks occupied Baku. A reign of terror was established. On the night of September 20, 1918, between the stations of Akhcha-Kuyma and Pereval, the Socialist-Revolutionaries (with the complicity of the British) shot 26 Baku commissars, led by Shaumyan.

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During the first period of the Turkish occupation, Beria worked as a clerk in the White City at the Caspian Partnership plant. But, as he himself wrote in his 1923 autobiography, "due to the beginning of intensive studies at a technical school and the need to pass some transitional exams," he "was forced to leave the service."

His party work, of course, could no longer be stopped.

At the end of October 1918, Turkey withdrew from the war, and soon the Turks occupied Baku. And on November 17, the city was again occupied by the British. The fighting of the First World War in the Middle East and Mesopotamia was ending, and the Britons had the opportunity to switch to the Caucasus. The liberated troops (mostly Sikhs) were brought in from Iran and Iraq. A "sign" sign of the situation was the creation of interventionist structures to manage the oil industry.

In December 1918, the chairman of one of the Baku oil companies Herbert Ellen candidly stated:

"British armed forces appeared in the Caucasus ... Their arrival was welcomed by almost all the peoples who were waiting for protection - some from the Turkish yoke, others from the Bolsheviks ... Never before has the history of the British Isles given us such a favorable opportunity for the peaceful expansion of British influence and British trade, to create a second India or a second Egypt ... The Russian oil industry ... would in itself be a valuable addition to the empire ... "

Is it worth it, dear reader, to comment on this speech?

The British are recognized democrats, and therefore life in Baku under them was established in something similar to life in an apartment building. The British played the role of the owner of the "house". Socialist-Revolutionaries and Musavatists - the role of the manager. At the same time, some "apartments" were occupied by "official" authorities and parties, but there was also a place for the semi-legal existence of the Bolsheviks - they were seriously afraid to touch them, because they were such a people that they could snap back.

In 1919, Beria graduated from college, becoming a certified technician. By the time it was a big deal

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research, and Lavrenty would like to continue it. Political work for him

still - the need of the moment, but he wanted to be an architect. Alas, I had to do something else.

"From February 1919 to April 1920," he wrote in his autobiography, "being chairman of the cells of technicians, under the guidance of senior comrades, carried out individual party assignments of the district committee, himself studying with other cells as an instructor ... "And here we come to that moment in Beria's life, which, according to, for example," the internal chronicler of the Central Committee of the CPSU "Nikolai Zenkovich, is a "dark page" in the biography of Lavrenty Pavlovich. This, of course, is service in the Musavat counterintelligence...

However, I personally do not see anything particularly dark here and invite the reader to understand this story together.

The mode of life in Baku in 1919-1920 was largely determined by the presence, as I have already said, of British interventionists (officially "allies"). Kolchak's adventure by the summer of 1919 had failed, and Denikin had a clear failure. So, it was out of hand for the Socialist-Revolutionary-Musavatist "authorities" and the British to openly commit atrocities and "tighten the screws" in the conditions of the growing looming over the Caspian Sea of the 11th Red Army. Moreover, the political life of Baku (and indeed in the Transcaucasus) was full then, like a gypsy skirt, and sometimes it was simply impossible to figure out who was who. A little later, I will give an interesting assessment of this by Ivan Isakov, the future Soviet admiral.

In such an environment, the notorious "dark page" began in the biography of a young technician. He himself wrote about it in 1923 as follows:

"In the autumn of the same 1919, from the Hummet party, I entered the counterintelligence service, where I worked together with Comrade Mussevi. Approximately in March 1920, after the assassination of Comrade. Moussevi, I leave my job in counterintelligence and work for a short time in the Baku customs."

In the otherwise mentioned anti-Beria collection of Politizdat of 1991, regarding the Gummet party, a mean and slurred reference is given: "the social democratic organ 48

nization, which operated from the end of 1904 to February 1920, created for political work among working Muslims.

I think that this tongue twister is not accidental. For a detailed information about the social democratic group "Gummet" ("Energy"), I refer the reader to a completely accessible source - the 13th volume of the second edition of the TSB (p. 202), and here I will report that it was created on the initiative of Stalin in 1904 for political work among the working people of all Azerbaijan, and not just Muslims (along with Azizbekov, it was headed by Alyosha Japaridze, Nariman Narimanov was among the leaders). In the Baku period of Stalin's activity in 1907-1910, he worked closely with Gummet, but the group was not homogeneous in its composition - nationalist elements were active in it.

And just in the summer of 1919, "Gummet" split, and part of it, "rolled down, - as the TSB writes, "on positions hostile to the proletariat", joined the Mensheviks, and the Bolshevik part of the Gummet subsequently joined the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.

And NOW you can reconstruct the events! In the summer of 1919, it was not difficult to foresee such a turn of affairs when the 11th Army marched on Baku. To prepare for this, information about the actions of the enemy was needed, and it was decided to send Beria to the Musavatists. Most likely, Anastas Mikoyan also participated in the decision-making (although, as we will see later, he "forgot" this).

It is very likely that M. Mussevi, mentioned by him, was also related to the direction of Lawrence - in 1919, the deputy head of the Organization

for the fight against counter-revolution (that is, counterintelligence) under the State Defense Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Let the reader not be confused by the super-r-r-revolutionary name of the organization, one of the leaders of which was Mussevi, who died in March 1920. This organization was ... the very Musavat counterintelligence, which Beria came to. Indeed, in the government of the puppet Azerbaijan Republic there were continuous r-r-revolutionaries

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ry - Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks. And they "also fought against the counter-revolution." On your  
lad - language.

Such "seventeen moments of spring" then flew over Baku.

The time and channel for the introduction of Beria into counterintelligence were chosen (by him or by "senior comrades") very competently. If someone pays attention to the recent "redness" of a new employee, then it is easy to explain - yes, I'm from Gummet! There was, they say, nonsense in my youth, but it came out, and they parted, they say, my paths with the Bolsheviks. For that (and only for that?) there was nothing particularly surprising in such a metamorphosis!

Let's ask ourselves a question: "If Beria was a secret agent of counterintelligence, working in the party, would he openly join counterintelligence? »

I don't think so.

Or rather, no!

It was easy to dissuade him - he was not sent to the open front, but to the secret one. Here, a refusal can be easily framed - they say, under bullets, comrades, even now, but you are not accustomed to pretending, they will expose you at the moment!

But maybe Beria was already recruited during his service in counterintelligence? It doesn't work either! First, when everything was already possible and necessary to say - after his arrest in 1953, even after the end of the "investigation", Beria was never formally charged with such a thing. At the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Bakradze called Lavrenty Pavlovich a "spy of international imperialism," but it was said like that, for a dirty word.

. Most importantly, if Beria had been recruited, then the whole "pattern" of his nature would have changed! What pressure and rigidity are there in hot times! Caution, restraint, unhurried climb up, but it would be better without it at all. The higher you climb, the more people look at you...

Note political libelist Antonov-Ovseenko-son wrote a lot and vilely about Stalin. He "noted" in the "Beria" topic, writing a "work" called "The Way Up", placed in the collection "Beria: the end of a career." It is not easy to analyze Ovseenko's psychopathic nonsense

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one hundred - you yourself can go crazy, sorting out the "inconsistencies" of facts and logic allowed by him, sometimes within one page. At the same time, Ovseenko states: "My work is based on facts."

I will have occasion to dwell on his "facts" more than once, but now I will cite one "fact" regarding Beria's work with the Musavatists. Ovseenko writes: "Bagirov sent the data obtained by Beria to Tsaritsyn, to the headquarters of the 10th Army."

Dear reader, with reference to Ovseenko, I first read about this "fact" by N. Zenkovich ("Marshals and General Secretaries", "Rusich", Smolensk, 1997, p. 207) and then I thought that there was a typing error, it is necessary - to the "headquarters of the 11th army", because Zenkovich lowered "to Tsaritsyn".

"Internal chronicler of the Central Committee of the CPSU" Zenkovich cites this "fact" even to justify Beria, they say, he transmitted information, even, they say, Ovseenko did not

denies. That is, Beria brought some benefit to the Motherland. Although, they say, "page and dark."

But the thing is that no headquarters of the 10th Army has any information from Beria could not act - they were needed there, like a cart's fifth wheel.

It's simply incomprehensible to the mind - if Ovseenko and Zenkovich don't know the history of the Civil War, then you really need to know geography!

Where is Baku, and where is Tsaritsyn?

And why did Bagirov or anyone else need to slurp a thousand and a half miles of jelly to Tsaritsyn, when the headquarters of the 11th Army was much closer along the way (in The Red Army, in fact, did not accept Roman numerals in unit numbers) - in Astrakhan! As early as March 14, 1919 (to be completely, in military terms, at 2:46 pm), Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis signed in Serpukhov directive No. 1185 / op on the reorganization of troops in connection with the liquidation of the front, where paragraphs 2 and 3 read :

*"2. From the rest of the troops of the former Kaskavfront (Caspian-Caucasian Front. - S.K.) to form the 11th Army, bringing them into two rifle and one cavalry divisions ...*

*3. Headquarters of the 11th Army, Astrakhan.*

And in this headquarters, operational information from Baku was extremely necessary. Beria passed it there.

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And the information was obviously valuable if, as Beria wrote in 1923, he was later sent *"from the registrar (intelligence department. - S.K.) of the Kavfront at the RVS 11th (Beria writes the number correctly. - S.K. ) army to Georgia for underground work abroad"*.

These are the "facts".

Such, to match them, "arguments".

And so - finally ... In 2003, the publishing house "Olma-press" published a translated (from Italian) two-volume "History of espionage" by a certain E. Boyadzhi. It is written biting, the history of world intelligence is presented in it with the expectation of a sensation. However, in the article "Beria is the great architect of the secret police" not a word was said about Beria's alleged provocateurism. Apparently, even Boyadzhi did not dare to undermine his reputation with cheap gossip.

Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, the authors of the capital Encyclopedia of Espionage, who are actually eager for inventions, do not mention Beria's alleged "provokatism". After all, they are not Antonov-Ovseenko or Nikita Khrushchev.

1920 BEGINS.

Transcaucasian political farce (alas, not without considerable blood of the peoples!) All still continued, but nearing its end.

The main hostilities of the Civil War in Great Russia and Ukraine were ending, and it became possible to deal with Caucasian affairs. In February 1920, the First Congress of the CP(b) of Azerbaijan was illegally held in Baku. Kirov arrived in Astrakhan.

On March 17, Lenin sent a telegram in cipher to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front Smilge and Ordzhonikidze, where he wrote:

*"It is extremely, extremely necessary for us to take Baku. Direct all your efforts towards this, and in your statements be purely diplomatic and ascertain as much as possible that a firm local Soviet power is being prepared. The same applies to Georgia, although I advise you to treat it even more carefully. .."*

And the 11th Army, led by Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, began to advance towards Baku. and Mikoyan.

On April 27, 1920, an uprising began in Baku, on the same

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day the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee was formed. And on the morning of April 28, rapidly, at full speed, flying armored trains of the 11th Army with landing troops entered Baku. Ships of the Volga-Caspian flotilla approached from the sea with a landing detachment of sailors under the command of Ivan Kozhanov.

The Azerbaijan SSR was formed.

The remnants of the White Guards and the British went to the Iranian port of Enzeli (now Pehlavan). They took there all the ships and auxiliary vessels of their Caspian flotilla and a considerable number of merchant ships.

Our command decided to return them by force.

The destroyers "Karl Liebknecht", "Active", "Easy", gunboats "Kars" and "Ardagan", auxiliary cruisers "Rosa Luxembourg", "Soviet Azerbaijan", "Australia", two minesweepers were assigned to the operation. On May 17, they and transports with a landing force of two thousand sailors left Baku and on May 18 approached Anzali. At the same time, a cavalry division approached from Astara.

The Persians were told that we were not at war with them, they came to Anzeli "for Russian property."

The fighting ended on the same day and consisted mainly of negotiations with the English General Champaign, who tried to delay the unpleasant moment of inevitable surrender until dark, and periodic reminders of the need to hurry with the gunfire of the cruisers.

10 cruisers, air transport, 4 British torpedo boats, quite a few medium and small schooners and scows were returned to Baku. And this is not counting the trophy cargo on the ships and the property abandoned by the British (also looted to a large extent), as well as 50 guns of the English coastal batteries.

One of the leaders of the operation, Ivan Isakov, then the commander of the destroyer "Active", wrote in his diary:

*"When the destroyers slowly passed along the fairway into the bay, a huge crowd of Enzelians, standing in a solid wall along the pier and mooring walls, waved affably small red flags (hastily concocted from cloth and paper) and warmly applauded the newcomers ...*

*It was a kind of gratitude for what we banished*

*the English..."*

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There is no information about this or that participation of the young Beria in the development and conduct of the operation in Anzali. But he could not be unaware of her, and he certainly learned her lessons, especially since there was something for the future Chekist to learn here.

The Anzelian operation is little known, but in vain. It should be mentioned in the elementary school history course as an example of how the real Russian government should act, restoring Russian interests.

Politically, the Enzelian operation had a brilliant result: on May 20, the Iranian government proposed to the Soviet government "to regulate good-neighborly relations" ...

On September 30, 1920, a union treaty was signed between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the RSFSR, which stated that the governments of both republics were carrying out, as soon as possible, the unification of the military organization and military command, bodies in charge of the national economy and foreign trade, supply bodies, railway and water transport, postal telegraph office and finance.

In fact, the new Azerbaijan returned to the new Russia.

But before that happened, it took several years of struggle.

For the young Bolshevik Beria, this struggle was at times illegal. A

any secret work provides rich opportunities for slandering those who carry it out. To understand what I mean, I invite the reader to think about how ordinary residents of Rovno would have met the Soviet intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov, if he had remained alive and after the war would have come to Rovno without prior public explanations why he passed a couple of years ago along the same streets in the uniform of a Wehrmacht officer?

This is also the case with the accusations against Beria as a "double", allegedly working for the Musavatists. There is enough false "information" on this score, and therefore, we must return to this moment in Beria's life again.

Sergo Beria writes:

"The fact that my father, on the instructions of the Bolshevik Party, worked in counterintelligence in Baku, was never hidden. Exactly there

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He began his career in intelligence. Anastas Mikoyan, who worked there on the same assignment, knew better than others."

But is it necessary to believe the son of Beria? After all, his book "My Father Lavrenty Beria" is often an unreliable source, which is once again confirmed by his ridiculous statement about working for the Musavatists and Mikoyan (Anastas Mikoyan was known in Baku as flaky, because he was already one of the party leaders of Transcaucasia ).

But, say, the magazine "Youth" in No. 9 for 1989 publishes a letter from a certain F.Ya. Berezina, whose father Ya.D. Berezin, secretary of the IChK in 1918-1921, was allegedly a victim of Sergo Beria's father.

The author of the letter, according to his father, claims that in December 1921, Yakov Berezin summoned Dzerzhinsky to him and handed over a warrant for the arrest of Beria. "At the same time," Berezin Jr. writes, "Felix Edmundovich said that Kedrov (at that time a prominent Chekist. - S.K.) wrote a memorandum in which there are facts about the provocative activities of Beria, a responsible worker of the Azerbaijan Cheka." .

Stop!

Berezin is just the secretary of the IBSC. It means: take away, bring, serve and etc. and so on. To give him a warrant for arrest is understandable.

But why would the Chairman of the Cheka suddenly report to an ordinary worker, even the central apparatus, such operational data that this worker is not supposed to know in order to complete the task? After all, this is the ABC for everyone who deals with secrets - anyone is supposed to know only what he is supposed to know! With the announcement of this rule, the first briefing of those who are admitted to secret information begins.

OK! Suppose the "iron Felix" turned out, according to Berezin, either to his father or to his son, a talker. But then the Berezinsky narrative becomes completely implausible! A detachment of four Chekists was allegedly appointed to detain Beria, who was arriving by night train from Baku, but even the elder did not know whom they should arrest.

How is that? How are they going to arrest the unknown? And why along could not give the name to anyone in

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Moscow then not known to Beria? Berezin himself, the father, is the name for the first time heard in Dzerzhinsky's office.

Here the fantasy of either the father or the son clearly failed. And such incidents are explained by a shift in perception. They lie after a long time and at the same time forget that in 1953 the name of Beria thundered, and in 1921 the outfit would only shrug its shoulders - Beria, they say, so Beria ... We took not such Berias!

And then the events - according to Berezin the son - unfolded like this.



"A few hours before the arrival of the night train from Baku, Dzerzhinsky again called Berezin, said that Beria's arrest was cancelled, asked him to surrender the warrant and abruptly tore it up.

"What's happened?" Berezin asked.

"Stalin called and, referring to the guarantee of Mikoyan, asked not to take strict measures against Beria, "Dzerzhinsky answered ...

Beria did not arrive in Moscow that night; he did not receive reproaches for not appearing at the Cheka. It turns out that it was the sanction of Dzerzhinsky or Stalin.

"Father told me," continued Berezin, "that ... Beria ... felt the danger of arrest looming over him after the check carried out by Kedrov in Baku."

No, dear reader! It's good, after all, that the "victims of the regime" are so inclined towards "memoirs"! Admiral Canaris told Major Steinglitz that the signs of a donkey are not necessarily ears. So it is with narrators like the Berezins. They themselves do not understand what they write.

Let us ask ourselves the question: "How did Stalin, who had nothing to do with the operational activities of the Cheka at that time, and even more so Mikoyan, learned about the upcoming (not completed) arrest, albeit a responsible, but peripheral employee of the Cheka?"

Maybe someone talked? But who? And to whom? However, Berezin-papa himself stated that Beria could not receive information about the impending arrest from the workers of the ICChK. But how

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would he have received it from them, if even those who were supposed to arrest him allegedly did not know his name?

This means that the version that Beria got in touch with Mikoyan, while he himself, out of harm's way, has not yet gone to Moscow, does not work. And about the "skin felt" - also unconvincing. Was Beria a newcomer to Chekist affairs? If he assumed an arrest and knew his true sins against the party, he would understand: they didn't take him in Moscow - they would take him in Baku.

And then he would simply, taking his legs in his hands, would rush to run to "his" - for cordon. Then it was easy to do!

Further ... Berezin-son writes that his father in 1932 "in a narrow circle of Chekists spoke about Dzerzhinsky's former intentions to arrest Beria and about the role of Stalin and Mikoyan in this matter."

How should *this* post be judged? What can be said about a person who, on the basis of just unproven suspicions (or, more simply, rumors), in a circle of colleagues, vilifies another colleague? It is clear that this is at least slanderer and envious.

But 1932 was a difficult time.

Beria is already the party leader of the Transcaucasus, who replaced the "leaders" who failed. He is completely devoted both to the cause of Stalin (that is, to the cause of building socialism in Russia), and to Stalin personally.

The political struggle between the Bolshevik core of the CPSU(b) and the "deviations" in 1932 begins to gain momentum. And at this moment, the security officer "in a narrow circle of security officers" is trying to undermine the reputation as the leader of the communists of Transcaucasia, and at the same time the reputation of the leader of the party. How should this be understood?

Can this be regarded otherwise than as proof of the Trotskyist sympathies of the "twice honorary Chekist"?

I don't believe in the story with the warrant issued by Dzerzhinsky (I don't know to what extent I also convinced the reader of the validity of my distrust). But I believe that Berezin-papa launched provocative rumors in 1932. This fits perfectly into the objective picture of that era.

Berezin tried, among other things, to denigrate Beria in the year of the 15th anniversary of the organs of the Cheka-OGPU. And a year before that - March 30

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In 1931, the Chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky issued order No. 154/93 ...

However, I'm getting ahead of myself too much. Let's go back to the twenties, about which in the early thirties Beria wrote from Tbilisi to Moscow to Ordzhonikidze this:

*"Levon Gogoberidze is resting in Sukhum. According to the stories of comrade Lakoba and a number of other comrades, comrade Gogoberidze spreads about me and in general about the new Transcaucasian leadership (Beria since 1932 was the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which united the party organizations of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. - S.K. ) disgusting things. In particular, about my past work in the Musavatist counterintelligence, he claims that the party allegedly did not know about this and does not know. Meanwhile, you are well aware that I was sent to the Musavat intelligence service by the party and that this issue was dealt with in the Central Committee of the AKP (b) in 1920, in the presence of you, comrade Stasova, Kaminsky, Mirza Daud Huseynov, Narimanov, Sarkis, Ruhulla, Akhundov, Buniat-zade and others (in 1925 I gave you an official extract on the decision of the Central Committee of the AKP (b) on this issue, by which I was completely rehabilitated).*

This letter was published in No. 2, 1995, of the theoretical and political journal Svobodnaya Mysl, published by such a stronghold of democracy as the Gorbachev Foundation. The communist Beria is hardly admired there, so one can believe in the authenticity of the letter, especially since the original is stored in the RTSKhIDNI, the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents of Recent History.

As you can see, the son of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria can be trusted in this case. But the son of Yakov Davidovich Berezin is unlikely.

Like Yakov Davidovich himself.

And what is characteristic - these alleged revelations of Berezin-son were also included in the 1991 political publishing collection "Beria: the end of a career." It turns out that Lavrenty Pavlovich's "denunciators" have a hard time with documentary evidence, if you have to use such gossip over and over again ...

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Let's get back to the analysis. In Baku, Beria worked in the Musavat counterintelligence. If party comrades had any doubts about its reliability, then after its establishment in Azerbaijan

Would the Soviet authorities be sent back to work illegally already in Georgia? And they sent him there!

So what is the reason for the gossip around the Baku period of Beria's work? I think, not least of all, they are explained by the insinuations of Kedrov mentioned by Berezin.

Mikhail Kedrov left a complex memory in history. The old Bolshevik, known to Lenin, after October, he carried out various assignments in the North of Russia, from January 1 to August 18, 1919 he headed the Special Department of the Cheka, but by the end of the year he was appointed chairman of the All-Russian Commission to improve the sanitary condition of the republic.

Such an appointment for an experienced worker in a hot time is not very explicable, unless we assume that he simply did not suit Dzerzhinsky for some serious reason.

What could these reasons be? There was fame about Kedrov as a person not just tough, but cruel. However, in harsh times, rigidity is not the biggest vice. But excessive suspicion and a tendency to slander and arbitrariness in such a place as the Special Department of the Cheka is a direct threat to the strength of the army!

Perhaps that is why Dzerzhinsky got rid of Kedrov. Keeping the latrines clean when there is typhus and cholera around is also an important task, but here you can't threaten with a tribunal.

Later, Kedrov also served as chairman of commissions for the verification of various institutions. Here, captiousness and suspicion were not good either, but the specific measures for punishment were still determined by others.

Temporarily Kedrov returned to the KGB job in 1921-1924, combining the duties of the Commissioner of the Council of Labor and Defense for the fishing industry of the southern Caspian with the duties of the Commissioner of the Cheka for the Caspian. It was then, in Baku, corrosive and suspicious, he "unearthed" "compromising evidence" on Beria.

Intelligence, and even more so illegal intelligence, agents

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naya, - a subtle thing, during the years of the Civil War, most often not documented. Kedrov, on the other hand, was, I think, of a limited nature, like any suspicious person who is ready to believe rumors. And he could not correctly assess the situation.

Only Azerbaijan was within its sphere of competence. From Baku, from Kedrov, and since the age of 21 there has been a rumor about the "Musavat agent" Beria.

And some people liked this rumor very much. After all, Beria did not work in a hospice institution, but in the Cheka. And the principled and intelligent employees of this department have never had a shortage of ill-wishers ...

BUT YET, Kedrov is checking the toilets, and Beria ...

And Beria is again sent to illegal work. And let him talk about it

he himself:

*"From the very first days after the April coup in Azerbaijan, the regional committee of the Communist Party (b-kov) from the registrar (registration, intelligence department. - S.K.) of the Cavalry Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army was sent to Georgia for underground work abroad as an authorized representative. In Tiflis, I contact the regional committee in the person of Comrade. Hmayak Nazaretyan, spreading a network of residents in Georgia and Armenia, establishing contact with the headquarters of the Georgian army and guards, regularly sending couriers to the registry office in Baku. In Tiflis, I was arrested along with the Central Committee of Georgia, but, according to the negotiations between G. Sturua and Noah Zhordania, they released everyone with a proposal to leave Georgia within 3 days ... "*

And here I will interrupt Lavrenty Pavlovich to explain something.

Georgy Fedorovich Sturua - then he was 36 years old - is one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Georgia, a Bolshevik since 1901, a professional revolutionary. In 1903-1914, he worked in illegal Bolshevik printing houses in Baku and Moscow, was repeatedly arrested, was exiled to the Naryn Territory, from where he fled.

On June 8, 1926, Stalin, answering the greetings of the workers of the main railway workshops in Tiflis, wrote:

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"I remember 1898, when I first received a circle of workers from the railway workshops. That was twenty-eight years ago. I remember how I was at Comrade Sturua's apartment ... I received my first lessons in practical work ... "

So *this* Sturua is Ivan, this is the elder brother of Georgy Sturua, a member of the Central Committee CP(b) of Georgia, member of the RSDLP since 1896.

Ivan was born in 1870 and died in 1931. And George, being 14 years younger than Ivan, died in 1956 in Tbilisi, seventy-two years old. Already someone who

the Sturua brothers knew a lot about both Stalin and Beria... But here, no one has ever repressed them. For what?

They were Bolsheviks without "deviations", they lived honestly. Therefore, probably, by the way, they did not get into that volume of the second edition of the TSB, which was signed for publication on April 21, 1956 - already after Nikita Khrushchev's speech at XX congress on the "cult of personality", already after the dispersal of a youth demonstration in Tbilisi on March 2, 1956, protesting against the defamation of Stalin.

Together with the younger Sturua and other prominent Georgian Bolsheviks, Beria was arrested - right in the building of the Central Committee. After all, the situation then in Tiflis was not with Beria as in Berlin with Stirlitz - the communists in Georgia acted in 1920 quite openly and energetically. The future, and already close, was behind them.

The Mensheviks of Georgia, then still formally in power, were, as they say, worse off than a general. It seems to be power, but with these damned Bolsheviks, no drastic measures are possible. The only thing that is permissible is to cordon off the building of their Central Committee by a guard detachment, to arrest and send.

They were expelled, and the same Sturua soon worked in Baku as the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan. But Beria was sent to Georgia to organize illegal work! And he organized it. And the intelligence network had already been created, and even among the Georgian gendarmes ("guards") there were already connections. And Beria stayed, which in itself proves his high sense of responsibility and duty.

He himself about this without the slightest panache, admiration and sa

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mo-reklamy, and later wrote in a purely informational style as follows:

*"However, I manage to stay, having entered the service under the pseudonym Lakerbay in the representative office of the RSFSR to Comrade Kirov, who had arrived in Tiflis by that time (Sergei Mironovich Kirov at that time was the plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Georgia. - S.K.). In May 1920, I leave for Baku to the registry office to receive directives in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Georgia ... "*

Yes, Beria in Tiflis was, of course, easier than Stirlitz in Berlin - Standartenführer could not go to Moscow for consultations. But intelligence at different times has a very different operational design.

So, Beria received new instructions in Baku, but on the way back, as he writes, he is "arrested by telegram from Noah Ramishvili" and taken to Tiflis, and from there "despite Comrade Kirov's troubles" they are sent to the Kutaisi prison ...

Noah Ramishvili was the Minister of Internal Affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia (we will hear about him later).

In the meantime, I will say that there is no evil without good. The owner of one of Beria's safe houses was the Bolshevik Alexander Gegechkori, who had a charming 15-year-old niece, Nino. Nino's second uncle, Yevgeny Gegechkori, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Menshevik government. Such incidents were, however, characteristic of Transcaucasia.

When Beria went to prison, Gegechkori was already there, naturally Gegechkori the Bolshevik. Lavrenty and Alexander sat in the same cell, and Alexander's wife Mary came to her husband on a date and took Nino with her. So Lavrenty first saw his future wife. The plot is quite for the cinema, but Beria's life was even then more interesting than any movie.

And yes, it was an interesting time for him.

IF Beria was already arrested at the border, it means that Tbilisi already knew who this employee of Kirov really was. After all, that side had

their agents

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on our side. Therefore, it is quite understandable why Kirov's efforts were not successful, although the request of *such* an plenipotentiary in the summer of 1920 meant hardly less in Tiflis than the request of Ambassador Smith in the same Tiflis in the year 1918 would mean.

So, despite Kirov's demanding requests, Lavrenty is not released. He's writing:

*"In June and July, 1920, I am imprisoned, only after four and a half days of a hunger strike declared by political prisoners, I am deported to Azerbaijan in stages."*

On that, Beria's underground ordeals ended once and for all. And here full of dirty fictions and rumors of "antiberiad" was yet to come.

For example, in the "anti-Beria" collection of 1991, a tasty story is given ... Say, either in 1928, or in 1929, the Menshevik ex-Ministry of Internal Affairs Ramishvili and his ex-subordinate, the former head of the "special detachment" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Meki Kedia, they recalled that after the arrest, Beria de "wept and blabbed everything about his assignments and connections, after which he was released." Moreover, he allegedly "split" without any violence against him.

Could something like this really happen?

Of course not! The whole story of Ramishvili and Kedia is an undoubted fiction. If Beria had been released, "dissolving the snot", then, firstly, she knew about it the whole prison. He wasn't a petty criminal!

Secondly, if he had been taken like this and released as a reward for betrayal, would he have gone to Baku?

And most importantly, if Lavrenty "blabbed everything about his connections and tasks," then, taking into account the fact that Beria knew a lot, there would not be enough guardsmen in the Georgian guard at Meka Kedia to ensure the arrest of Beria's agent network! However, Noi Ramishvili could not boast of anything like this.

It would seem that it is impossible to lie and slander like that, all right, impudently, otherwise it's stupid! But I did not quote a collection of anecdotes above, but an almost scientific work published in Moscow in 1991 by the Publishing House of Political Literature under the general editorship of Doctor of Historical Sciences V.F. Nekrasov.

Felix Chuev wrote down the following words of Lazar Kaganovich:

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"Somewhere they found some kind of witness who spent 30 years in prison, and he and Shatunovskaya (I will remember this madam much later. - S.K.) are chatting ... Nonsense! The most nonsense! Dreyfusiada! Designed from start to finish. And this Antonov Ovseenko is the same ... "

Lazar Moiseevich was indignant at the fabrications about the 17th Party Congress. But his words can be fully attributed to the evil inventions about Beria.

Let us return, however, to our hero, who was exiled in stages to Soviet Azerbaijan. As already mentioned, his underground ordeals ended once and for all. But the exciting work of the state, full of intense work, was still ahead.

## Chapter 6

### CHEKIST DECADE

ON RETURN to Baku in August 1920, Beria was appointed manager of the affairs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan. In such a position, one could prove oneself well in the only way - thoroughness, accuracy and diligence. And yet - honesty and incorruptibility.

The young, punctual manager showed, presumably, precisely these qualities, because already in October he was appointed executive secretary

Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers.

The choice of Beria for this position was clearly successful - even after decades, having risen to the heights of state power, being the Chairman Special Committee in the 1940s, he could dismiss the director of a "nuclear" enterprise for - do not be surprised, dear reader - neglect of the social sphere. The origins of this approach go back to the time of Lavrenty's youth, when Beria learned to be attentive to the needs of the working people.

*"This work," he wrote in Autobiography, "I and Comrade Sarkis (Chairman of the Commission) (Sarkis - S. Ter-Kasparyan (Kasyan). - S.K.) carried out in shock order until the liquidation of the Commission (February 1921)".*

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Moreover, the activities in the commission had to be combined with studies at the institute. In the autumn of 1920, the Baku Mechanical Construction School was transformed into the Polytechnic Institute, and Beria immediately entered it. He wants more than anything to be a student to become a civil engineer, but rather an architect.

How many young people, but in his place, would already consider that fate is for they grabbed a beard, and that they surpassed all sciences, and he thought like a romantic.

However, as a "practical" romantic who knows how to do everyday things, without losing the taste for life and the ability to dream vividly...

The expropriation of the bourgeoisie, if carried out resolutely and wisely, The action is not endless. And, as Beria continues the story, with the end of his work in the commission, he *"manages to beg (!! - S.K.) the Central Committee to give him the opportunity to continue his education at the institute."*

The Central Committee satisfies the request of Beria and lets him go to study, even giving scholarship *"through the Baku Council"*.

It would seem that one can finally take up books and a slide rule ... However, not even two weeks pass before Beria is requested through the Caucasian Bureau to work in Tiflis.

So, there he is remembered only from the good side. But valuable personnel are not lying on the road anywhere, and if Beria is in Baku, and Tiflis demands him, then if Lavrenty is already torn off from school, is it worth giving him "to the side"? It will come in handy in Baku too!

Judging by what followed, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan reasoned in exactly this way, because it ended like this ... Beria was "removed" from his studies, but instead of sending him to Tiflis, the Central Committee of the AKP (b) appoints 22-year-old Lavrenty to the Azerbaijan Cheka as deputy head of the secret operational department (SPO), and soon - head of the SPO and deputy chairman of the Azchek.

This is already serious and more than responsible. But this is only the beginning of a rapid career growth. Yes, it was service, and not career, as they would say now. After all, the fact that Beria did not strive for making a career, the reader

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I could already be convinced, if only from how persistently he strove to be not a boss, but a student!

Nino arrives in Baku, and soon they and Lavrenty become husband and wife (the son Sergo was already born in Tbilisi, where Beria would be transferred in 1922).

How did he live then? Well, I will again give the floor to the youngest Lawrence to answer this question. He remembers his life better than anyone else ... In addition, above and below, I quote quite a few obliging memoirs, but the official document that still lies in Beria's personal file in

hidden, but still not destroyed archives and which he entitled "Autobiography".

*"I will not dwell on the tense and nervous nature of the work in Azchek," Beria declares decisively, but at least briefly it is impossible not to dwell on such work, and he does not hold back. - As a result, such positive results soon affected. I stop here on the defeat of the Muslim organization "Ittihat", which numbered tens of thousands of members (the Turkish right-wing party "Ittihad not Taraki" - "Unity and Progress" was founded in 1889 and existed until 1926. - S.K.). Next -*

*defeat of Transcaucasia. rights organizations. Socialist-Revolutionaries, for which the GPU (VChK), by its order of February 6, 1923, No. 45, announces gratitude to me with the award of weapons. The results of the same work were noted by the Council of People's Commissars of the ASSR in their commendation list of September 12, 1922, and in the local press.*

*Working in Azcheka, at the same time I am the chairman of the Azmezhkom (Azerbaijan interdepartmental commission) from VII - 1921 to XI - 1922. Then in the commission of the VES (High Economic Council) and in the commission for the inspection of the Revolutionary Tribunal. On the party line, I am attached from the BK AKP (Baku Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. - S.K.) to the working cells, and later, for convenience, to the cell of the Cheka, where I am a member of the bureau, I have been elected to almost all congresses and conferences of the AKP, I have been also a member of the BakSoviet ... "*

Everything is right here. And this is confirmed by documents stored in the personal file of L.P. Beria and cited, oddly enough, in the "anti-Beria" collection of 1991.

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There, in addition to such, say, a characterization as Kirov's (Kirov was then secretary of the Central Committee in Baku): "... comrade. Beria is a good and energetic Chekist, he showed himself in the Chekist work on a good side, "there are three more documentary evidence of Beria's work in the AzChK.

So first:

**"Azerbaijani  
socialist  
Soviet Republic  
Azerbaijan Council  
People's Commissars**

The Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars, in commemoration of the execution by the head of the secret-operational department of the Azerbaijan Extraordinary Commission, comrade. Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich of his duty to the proletarian revolution, expressed in the skillful leadership of the brilliantly executed on a national scale, the work of liquidating the Transcaucasian organization of the PS. — R., rewards him with a gold watch with a monogram.

*Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars  
G. Musabegov.*

Second:

"Extract from the order of the GPU  
dated 1923 for No. 45

For the energetic and skillful carrying out of the liquidation of the Transcaucasian organization of the PS. -R. early s.o.h. Baku Provincial Department comrade. Beria and early secret department comrade. Yossem are awarded weapons - Browning revolvers with inscriptions about what to put on their track records ...

*Deputy Chairman of the GPU (Unshlikht)."*

And third:

"Certificate

This was given to the responsible party worker comrade. Beria L.P. in that he [possesses] outstanding abilities, manifested in various apparatuses of the state

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mechanism ... Working as the Manager of the Central Committee of Az. Communist Party, the Extraordinary Commissioner of the Registrar of the Caucasian Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army and the Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers, he, with his inherent energy, perseverance, completed all the tasks assigned by the party, giving brilliant results with his versatile work, which should be noted as the best, valuable, tireless worker, so necessary today in Soviet construction ...

*Secretary of the Central Committee of the AKP Akhundov.*

These documents are given in the "anti-Berian" collection of 1991 with following "scientific" commentary:

"All ... three documents have in common not only a pompous tone, perhaps corresponding ... to Eastern phraseology (yep, especially from the Polish nobleman Unshlikht. - S.K.) ... but also the fate of those who put their signatures under them . They have the same year of death - 1938, when Beria came to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR ... "

So, dear reader, it is written. And it is even said further that at first Beria was deputy people's commissar, and it was even specified that - from August 1938 ... But Joseph Unshlikht was arrested on June 11, 1937, and shot on July 29, 1938.

But Gazanfar Mahmud oglu Musabegov (Musabekov) was arrested in July 1937 and shot on February 9, 1938.

I did not find exact data on Ruhulla Ali oglu Akhundov, but there is no doubt that Beria had nothing to do with his arrest and execution in 1938. Moreover, most likely, Akhundov was arrested in June 1937.

Akhundov and Musabegov in the thirties, of course, often encountered Beria - they were prominent people in the Transcaucasus. But their social position by the second half of the 30s was lower than that of Beria. As we see, they did not count any sins for him during the years of the Civil War. And they were arrested not because of the intrigues of Beria, but because of a different reason - the general aggravation of the inner-party struggle.

Moreover, Beria did not even have anything to do with the sanction for their arrest, because with adoption at the 8th Extraordinary Congress

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Soviets of the USSR On December 5, 1936, the "Stalinist" Constitution of the USSR, the Transcaucasian Federation was divided into the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian SSR, and in April 1937 the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, whose first secretary by that time was Beria, was abolished.

Akhundov and Musabegov worked in Azerbaijan, and since the spring of 1937, Beria, being the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia, was no longer their party leader. And Bagirov gave the sanction for their arrest along the party line.

As for Unshlikht, Beria did not and could not have no influence.

Like this!

BUT YET, we still have the year 1922, and brilliant service and party



Beria's assessments prove one thing: to do so much and do so much in such a short time, diligence alone is not enough, and even diligence and abilities are also not enough.

Here you need a gift from God, talent!

So after all, Beria was obviously talented! And because of what else, if not because of this, the Georgian leadership so insistently wants to drag him to itself?

Indeed, how is it! He was born in Georgia, his parents are in Georgia, and he works there in the Caspian Sea for the Baku "uncle". No, give it to us in our native lands!

And in November 1922, Beria, by order of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, was recalled from the AzChK to the disposal of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia. And in Tiflis, Lavrenty was appointed head of the secret operational unit and deputy chairman of the Cheka of Georgia.

In his Tale of Life, Konstantin Paustovsky admitted: "I already knew many places and cities in Russia. Some of these cities were immediately captured by their originality. But I have not yet seen such a confused, motley, light and magnificent city as Tiflis.

This is said about Tiflis around the time when the young security officer Beria arrived there - already as in the capital of Soviet Georgia. But not such carelessness awaited him here .

naya life that the young writer Paustovsky could afford.

For example, Paustovsky described his meeting with bandits - deserters in mountains of the Caucasus as an adventure, and Beria had to catch these bandits.

Paustovsky recalled: "All Batum was noisy in the wind from the flags. Almost half of the flags were Turkish. Residents of the city have not yet had time to make new, Soviet flags." And Beria and his colleagues had to figure out who "hadn't had time yet", and who was not averse to Turkish flags flying over Batum in the future.

Paustovsky, as a funny figure, wrote about the commandant of Batum: "A certain handsome and exaggeratedly gallant colonel, who remained in the city as a temporary inheritance from ... the Menshevik army." And Beria had to be assessed - did the colonel remain in Soviet Georgia by chance or by someone else's more specific and definite will?

But even in Paustovsky we find lines about the "alarmed by war and civil strife" of the Caucasus, directly related to the tasks of Beria: "At any turn of the mountain road you could get a bullet in the back ... Calmness came to the Caucasus slowly, gradually, only with the advent of Soviet power" .

And the "punishing sword" of Soviet power in the Caucasus was the GruzChK. And in Tiflis, Chekist Beria had to work no less hard than in Baku. In addition, he is a member of the bureau of a party cell and a member of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

*"Taking into account the seriousness of the work and the large object," wrote Beria, " I give it all my knowledge and time, as a result, in a relatively short time, it is possible to achieve serious results that affect all branches of work: such is the elimination of banditry, which has assumed grandiose proportions. in Georgia, and the defeat of the Menshevik organization and the anti-Soviet party in general, despite the extreme conspiracy."*

Beria's literary style is far from perfect, but he did not come to Tiflis for material for new books. And not without legitimate pride, he recalls that the first

the results of his activities were "noted by the Central Committee and the CEC of Georgia in the form of awarding ... the Order of the Red Banner ..."

A long Tbilisi period begins in the life and work of Beria, which will end in 1938 with his transfer to Moscow.

However, the life of Lavrenty Beria could have turned out differently if the Central Committee of Georgia had set in motion that statement in the form of an autobiography, which I have repeatedly quoted directly or used in my story.

After all, it was, dear reader, a statement with a certain request.

And perhaps, right now, when we have come to 1923, it is appropriate to cite the end of Beria's "autobiography", where this statement is formulated.

Here is what Beria asked senior party comrades:

*"During my party and Soviet work, especially in the bodies of the Cheka, I lagged far behind both in terms of general development, and I still did not complete my special education. Having a vocation for this branch of knowledge, having spent a lot of time and effort, I would ask the Central Committee to give me the opportunity to continue this education in order to complete it as soon as possible. A completed special education will give me the opportunity to give my experience and knowledge in this field to Soviet construction, and the Party will use me in any way it sees fit.*

1923 22/X (signature)".

Yury Mukhin, Elena Prudnikova, and even Nikolai Zenkovich, in the book "Marshals and General Secretaries" of the 1997 edition, have already written about the amazing and revealing essence of this request: "Do you like this young man? Do you like his spiritual impulses, the desire to learn, acquire knowledge, build a new life?"

Zenkovich himself answered his own question: "For example, such qualities are very to my liking!"

However, the "Kremlin scholar" Zenkovich would not have been who he is if he had not immediately asked another question: "Where did the devil, tyrant, executioner come from, whose name is akin to a curse?"

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The exact answer is actually this: "Yes, from the pen of people like Nikolai Zenkovich."

But I'm not sure that the reader will already agree with me right now - after all, my book is still far from finished and the reader has yet to get acquainted with many facts and arguments in order to make a final verdict on both the author's assessments and the hero of his book.

THEREFORE, I will continue to accumulate arguments and say this...

This statement is dated October 22, 1923. And it was written in Tbilisi. And given to the Central Committee - four sheets of this amazing document are in Beria's personal file.

The establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus turned the situation in a completely different direction. And on March 12, 1922, at a plenipotentiary conference of representatives of the Central Executive Committees of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Transcaucasian Federation was established - a federative union of the three Soviet republics of Transcaucasia.

The idea of a federation was resisted not only by "noted nationalists", but also by quite a few national Bolshevik leaders. Mdivani, Dumbadze, Kavtaradze, Okudzhava, Tsintsadze in Georgia, Akhundov, Huseynov, Khanbudagov in Azerbaijan believed that each republic should maintain its own army, have its own currency, enjoy freedom of foreign trade and have party

autonomy from the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee.

Looking ahead, I'll say that almost all of the above "Bolsheviks" were repressed in 1938, but the reason was not in Beria and Stalin, but in the political degradation of their opponents, which will be discussed later.

The federation option was reasonable, and on December 13 of the same 1922, at the 1st Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets in Baku, the federation was transformed into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

On December 30, the TSFSR united with the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR into a single union state - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In Transcaucasia, the restoration of the destroyed and the construction of a new one began. And this economic construction had to be protected from sabotage and sabotage from outside and inside

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countries. And the calmer it became in Transcaucasia, the more difficult was the work to ensure this calmness.

The struggle did not stop, it just changed. And she usually hidden from prying eyes character only complicated the situation.

Many of the leaders of the same Mensheviks emigrated across the cordon - Jordania, Mgeladze, Tsereteli...

Many of their supporters remained in Georgia, but did the assessment of "former supporters" apply to all of them?

Careerists began to "cling" to the party, and they joined it with subversive targets hidden enemies.

I will remind the reader that the writer Shirvan-Zade spoke about the Red Army: "She snatched a gun from the hands of the Caucasian peasants and put a sickle in them, pulled out a dagger from the hands of the proletariat, putting a hammer in them. And the proletariat, the whole people gradually understood this and threw down their arms.

But not everyone dropped their weapons. And even more so, not everyone disarmed ideologically and morally. And the deputy chairman of the GruzChK, young Beria, completely goes into the KGB work.

However, to say so is to say very little. After all, it was difficult back then. in one word or a couple of words to describe what it is: the work of the Cheka.

The civil war is over, and now the tasks of the Chekists have seriously changed. The bodies of the Cheka-GPU-OGPU now had to deal with so many problems at once that it was possible to head ...

No, the Chekists were not allowed to lose their heads under any load. However less - there was one head, but deeds ...

There were many things to do, and different things. Opposition to direct, organized, illegal counter-revolutionary activity goes without saying. But besides this - and economic, and economic problems, and cultural, and even - sports...

And in the national republics there are also national problems. Moreover, specifically in Transcaucasia, all this was painted in especially specific political and social tones.

In 1910, Stalin published two very informative and well-aimed "Letters from the Caucasus" - "Baku" and "Tiflis".

In a letter to Tiflis, he wrote:

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"In terms of industrial development, Tiflis is the exact opposite of Baku. If Baku is interesting as a center of the oil industry, then Tiflis can be interesting only as an administrative, commercial and "cultural" center of the Caucasus. There are about 20,000 industrial workers in Tiflis; less than soldiers and policemen. The only thing

a large enterprise is the railway workshops (about 3,500 workers). The rest of the enterprises have 200, 100, and most of them 40-20 people. On the other hand, Tiflis is literally filled with trading establishments and the "commercial proletariat" associated with them... This... explains why Menshevism... has held out in Tiflis for so long. How different is it in Baku, where the Bolsheviks' sharply class position finds a lively response among the workers!

But Beria was now working not in Baku, but precisely in Tiflis, where the class support for the Soviet government and its special services was less massive. And in Tiflis, Menshevik and bourgeois nationalism was especially developed.

Russia, which was foolishly called the "prison of peoples", for centuries was more like a fortress, behind the walls of which many peoples were able to preserve, if not their national statehood, then national identity, which is perhaps more important. And the most striking examples here are Georgia and Armenia.

It is unlikely that they would exist today, in the 21st century, at least in some form, if it were not for the Russian state, if not for Russia, to which Georgians and Armenians have huddled for centuries. Moreover, what is today called Georgia was gathered around Tbilisi by the first decade of the 19th century by the efforts of Russian policy, contrary to the aspirations of Turkey and Iran to enslave these lands.

Nevertheless, in 1832, a noble conspiracy was uncovered, which had the goal of tearing Georgia away from Russia ... The Georgian Iosif Dzhugashvili, who became known under the political pseudonym Stalin, wrote about this: "The Georgian nobility ... considering "simple citizenship" to belittle their dignity, wished for the "liberation of Georgia"... This movement... did not acquire glory for itself by any single fact..."

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Still would! After all, if the plot was successful, not only Kartli peasants, but also sovereign princes would go under a sharp Turkish knife. But can any nationalists - at all times - see beyond their own arrogant nose?

They didn't see it! And the Georgian "democratic" "intelligentsia" had a strong desire to break away from Russia even in pre-revolutionary times. The leader of the future Mensheviks, Noe Zhordania, in 1893, at the first meeting of the Marxist group in Georgia, proposed to establish not a social democratic, but a national democratic party. And it is no coincidence that it was in Georgia that the Mensheviks proved to be very strong. The Menshevik Party had **tens of thousands of** members in Georgia .

The total number of Bolsheviks in Georgia did not exceed **two thousand** - before the establishment of Soviet power. But less than a year after its establishment, in 1922, there were already 18,821 people in the Communist Party of Georgia!

Soon a purge took place, and almost half of the composition was excluded as clinging and alien elements. There were 10,816 people left, but in 1927 there were already 32,712 members in the GKP (b). But how many of these three tens of thousands of members were real Bolsheviks, it was impossible to say.

But the composition of the Transcaucasian political "okroshka" was not limited to the hidden Georgian Mensheviks. The monarchists, separatists, Armenian Dashnaks, Azerbaijani Musavatists who went underground were a very real factor of destabilization, terror and sabotage.

And besides this - for a complete "gentleman's set" - agents of England (how could it be without them in the then Caucasus and Transcaucasia!), Turkey and Persia (Iran). Yes, and US Ambassador Smith, departing from Tiflis, left someone in Tiflis.

It was impossible to forget about the German agents - both intelligence and agents of influence. After all, the Germans, especially in Transcaucasia, have been strongly present for a long time. Richard Sorge was not born in Leipzig, but in Baku! It was there in 1895 in the family of an engineer of the German oil company Adolf Sorge, who occupied

a two-story house in Ajikent, not far from the Baku crafts, the fifth child was born. But not all Germans, natives of Ajikent, grew up

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melting, became members of the Comintern, like Sorge. Someone went to the Reichswehr, to the political intelligence of Germany.

And in Transcaucasia - as elsewhere in the USSR then - there were enough Trotskyists.

How did they differ from the Bolsheviks? First of all, by the fact that they saw in the USSR the basis of the world revolution. Is it worth it, they say, to strengthen the USSR, they said, if without a "world fire" it is still doomed?

Stalin and his supporters saw in the USSR, first of all, a new Russia, capable in the future, when it becomes powerful, economically developed and militarily invincible, to lead the peoples of the world to a reasonable and just life already on the entire planet.

Trotskyists were enemies of Russia everywhere, and in Transcaucasia Trotskyists were also dangerous because of their nationalism. Typical in this respect is the example of Budu Mdivani. And it is so characteristic that I will dwell on it in detail ...

POLIKARP Gurgonovich (Budu) Mdivani was born in 1877, and has been in the party since 1903. He carried out revolutionary work in Kutaisi, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku and other cities of Transcaucasia. Repeatedly subjected to repression under tsarism. In 1921 - Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia. In 1922 he was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia. In 1924 he was the trade representative of the USSR in France. From 1931 to 1936 - Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of Georgia.

It would seem that everything is OK?

Unfortunately no!

Of those like Mdivani, in the Khrushchev-Gorbachev times, "fighters of the ideological front of the Central Committee" made a "cohort of the Leninist guard", but for the first time the name of Mdivani appears in Lenin's correspondence on September 26, 1922: "Tomorrow I will see Mdivani (a Georgian communist suspected of "independence"). Then Lenin learned for the first time about the existence in nature of this supposedly his "guardsman".

Mdivani was a communist in form, but in essence he was an amazing mixture of nationalist and Trotskyist (it's only oil and vinegar that don't mix, and in politics it's not uncommon to go left and turn right).

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In the early 1920s, just when Beria was sent to Georgia, Mdivani and his supporters were in the majority in the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia. **Most**, dear reader!

In fact, they hindered the economic and political unification of the Transcaucasian republics and sought to preserve the isolation of Georgia. At first, the Mdivani group was generally against the formation of the USSR, and after the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided on the creation of the USSR in October 1922, the Mdivani group began to seek Georgia's direct entry into the union state, and not through the Transcaucasian Federation.

In the comments, not just anywhere, but to the 54th volume of Lenin's Complete Collection writings" clearly states:

"This position of Mdivani and his supporters played into the hands of the bourgeois nationalists, the Georgian Mensheviks, and the communists of Georgia at their congresses, conferences and meetings of party activists rightly regarded it as a deviation towards nationalism"...

But how many of those communists were there then in Georgia? So Mdivani objectively became a very attractive figure for all anti-Soviet Georgian forces. He was also good for the fanfaronist Trotsky, who even then could not stand the businesslike Stalin.

Many years after the events described, when other, very sad events of the late 80s were already taking place in the country, the writer Felix Chuev in his book "Thus Spoke Kaganovich" cited the following conversation with Stalin's former "iron commissar":

*Kaganovich:* And what is happening with Georgia is a nightmare!

*Chuev:* Georgians need trade directly with the West. Of course simple people will get nothing from it.

*Kaganovich:* What Mdivani demanded under Lenin. And they want to get away from us.

*Chuev:* But the Abkhazians don't want to.

*Kaganovich:* Abkhazians are not Georgians.

With this dialogue in mind, let's go back to the year 1922. The Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP(b), to which the national Central Committees were subordinate, was then headed by Sergo Ordzhonikidze.

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He was a firm supporter of the Union, but he was also an ardent person, and his conflict with the Mdivani group also acquired a "hot" character. Moreover, the party mass of Georgia was on the side of Sergo.

In October 1922, the Mdivani group, by direct wire, appealed to Moscow with a complaint against Sergo and "in protest" resigned. The so-called Georgian question arose.

I wrote "complaining", but that didn't seem to be much of a complaint, because On October 21, Lenin sent a cipher to Tiflis, where it was said:

"I am surprised at the indecent tone of the note over the direct wire signed by Tsintsadze and others, handed over to me for some reason by Bukharin (n-yes! - S.K.), and not by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee ... I strongly condemn the abuse against Ordzhonikidze and insist on transferring your conflict in a decent and loyal tone for the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP ... "

On November 25, the Politburo decided to send a commission headed by Dzerzhinsky to Georgia to urgently develop measures "necessary to establish lasting peace in the Communist Party of Georgia."

The Dzerzhinsky commission worked in Tiflis for about two weeks (on December 12, Felix Edmundovich reported to Lenin on the results of the trip), and its work proceeded stormily. Suffice it to say that Ordzhonikidze slapped one of Mdivani's supporters. Stalin and Dzerzhinsky took this calmly, while Lenin was very indignant. But he was indignant all the same in vain - this company deserved nothing else!

And just in November 1922, Beria arrives in Tiflis! He arrives in the midst of a fight (as we see, even in the literal sense of the word) between real Leninists and "Leninists" in quotation marks. And immediately takes the side of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze ...

You can imagine, reader, how much Lavrenty is on this one Beria immediately earned himself not only enemies, but mortal enemies!

What is there! Mentioned in the encryption of Lenin Tsintsadze

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was also old, since 1904, a Bolshevik, under the tsar he worked with Mdivani in Kutaisi, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku. And after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, he became ... a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, a member of the Central Executive Committee of Georgia and ... chairman of the Cheka of the Georgian SSR. That is, the Trotskyist Tsintsadze (in 1927 he was expelled from the party) for some time was the direct superior of Beria!

I do not envy Beria - with his principles!

The conflict was then outwardly settled, but in fact it was only driven inside. And in 1928, Mdivani was expelled from the party for Trotskyist opposition activities. In 1931, he allegedly repented and was restored, but in 1937 he

arrested and sentenced to death.

And quite to the point. After hearing the "execution" sentence, Buda said:

"It's not enough to shoot me, I need to be quartered! After all, it's me, I brought the eleventh army here, I betrayed my people and helped Stalin and Beria, these geeks, enslave Georgia and bring Lenin's party to its knees."

Like this! No more, but no less.

ABOUT "Lenin's party" Mdivani blurted out like this - for effect. But his true political (and human) face in this last word was quite clearly manifested. And it is unlikely that it will look more attractive to you, dear reader, when the time comes for a story about what socialist Georgia was by the summer of 1937 and what it has become in the coming years.

By the way, in 1922 Sergei Ivanovich Kavtaradze was a member of the Mdivani group. The son of a nobleman, he graduated from the law faculty of Petrograd University in 1915. Like Mdivani, he has been a Bolshevik since 1903, from the age of eighteen. He worked in Kutaisi, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku, St. Petersburg, was arrested. In 1919 he was sent to Georgia - like Beria - for underground work, was arrested twice for "anti-government" activities. Since May 1920, he worked for Kirov - like Beria - in the representative office of the RSFSR in Tiflis. In 1922-1923 - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, in 1924-1928 - the first

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Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR. In 1927 he was a member of the Trotskyist opposition and in December 1927 was expelled from the XV Party.

congress of the CPSU (b).

He was restored to the party only in 1940! Moreover, this former active Trotskyist safely, without hiding anywhere, survived the "great terror", was not arrested, was not repressed, and in 1941 he was appointed head of the Central Asian department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, then - Deputy People's Commissar. After the war, he was ambassador to Romania, retired in 1954 and died in 1971, at the age of eighty-six.

Like this! It would seem that someone had to go "under the knife" of the "executioner Beria", so this is the nobleman Kavtaradze. Both the Trotskyist and the underground work of the "coward and traitor" knew Beria. But Sergei Ivanovich simply stopped playing politics, and there was no need to touch him - there was no reason!

People like Mdivani, Orakhelashvili and others did not let up and squabbled, bred nepotism and mutual responsibility, "dripped" on the brains, itched ... And Beria was a solid Bolshevik-Stalinist. And already in the twenties did not suit many even in the supposedly Bolshevik Caucasian camp.

In the "Letters from the Caucasus" mentioned above, Stalin noted the "special propensity" of the Tiflis Bolsheviks for discussions. He explained this by the fact that in Tiflis they had to wage an especially stubborn ideological struggle against the Mensheviks. However, it is not for nothing that they say that if you sow a habit, you will reap a character, and if you sow a character, you will reap a destiny...

The habit of verbal battles before the revolution led the Georgian party, state and economic leadership of the 1920s to excessive chatter instead of concrete deeds. That is, just to what Beria could not and did not tolerate.

And besides these unfortunate "leaders" there were, as already mentioned, hidden Mensheviks. Back in 1907, Stalin called them "our Caucasian clowns," which, of course, the same Noy Zhordania ("Comrade An") could not forgive him.

Jordania emigrated, but did not withdraw from politics. And so that the reader has a better idea of Jordania's orientation, I will report that this "theorist"

argued at the beginning of the 20th century

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like this: "Who in Georgia is the bearer of progress? Armenians are representatives of backward, reactionary, predatory (commercial) capitalism. Russians - officials and landowners, conservatives. Europeans are progress, they are showing Georgians the way to the future."

Jordania's Kvali (Furrow) organ published laudatory biographies of Napoleon, Gladstone, Bismarck... The Jordanian party especially loved the British Empire, and in 1919 Jordania boasted that he had been conducting propaganda for it for 25 years.

During the evacuation from Batumi to Turkey, the "nationalist" government of Jordania removed from Georgia, by the way, the entire supply of quinine, which was vital for malarial (then) Georgia.

And now Zhordania abroad wanted one thing for Soviet Georgia - death, just like his supporters in Georgia itself. Some were preparing conspiracies, others were simply itching ... However, both the first and the second could not but fall into the field of view of Lavrenty Beria and his department. And in 1923, out of 31 gangs established by the Chekists on the territory of Georgia, 21 were destroyed, during the fighting 123 bandits were killed, 377 were captured alive.

A separate "article" of concern for Beria was the Dashnaks, who at one time moved from the already Soviet Armenia to the still Menshevik Georgia. At the beginning of 1923, the main backbone of the Dashnak activists in Georgia was arrested, including the entire composition of their Tiflis committee. 11 machine guns, 33 boxes of grenades, 70 rifles, 30 bags of artillery powder, 70 dynamite plates, 500 pounds of cartridges were seized from a secret warehouse in Akhaltsikhe...

But the main pain was, of course, the Georgian counter-revolutionaries.

AMAZING all the same thing - the fate of man!

How much they tried to cut out, black out, etch out any positive word about the role of Beria in the history of the USSR! And the truth about him - albeit without mentioning his name - was reported not by anyone, but by Politizdat even in 1978, when the second edition of David's monograph was published in Moscow

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Lvovich Golinkov "The collapse of the anti-Soviet underground in the USSR".

Yes, if a person's affairs are large and he served the Motherland honestly, then it is impossible to completely silence these affairs. So, one of the chapters of the monograph was called "The adventure of the Georgian "parities" and was devoted to the work of the Georgian Cheka in 1922-1925. By the way, even when the organs of the Cheka were replaced throughout the Union by those of the GPU, it was *the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution* that still continued to work in Georgia - that's how difficult the operational situation was there.

In the purely documentary book of Golinkov, the name of Lavrenty Beria is not even mentioned. But the work of the GruzChK, in which the head of the secret political department and deputy chairman played a leading role, is vividly told.

This is the story I use!

From August 25 to August 30, 1923, a congress of Georgian Mensheviks was held in Tbilisi quite legally, the delegates of which represented 11,235 members of the party. The congress announced the liquidation of the party, but even before that, about 17,000 workers and peasants left it. Approximately 2,000 people remained on the side of the former Central Committee of the Mensheviks, mainly from noble and bourgeois circles.

A "Georgian government-in-exile" was formed abroad during led by Noah Zhordania, Noah Ramishvili and Irakli Tsereteli.

In Georgia, however, representatives of the five parties that went underground—the Socialist



Democrats (Mensheviks), National Democrats, Socialist Federalists, Independent Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries - concluded an agreement on the establishment of an "Independence Committee". It was also called the "Parity Committee", because the five parties agreed: after the overthrow of Soviet power, a parity commission would be formed, and not a single party could occupy more than a third of the seats in the coalition government.

With arithmetic, the "parity" was, as we see, bad, because the word "parity" comes from the Latin *paritas*, which means "equality", and five-thirds do not fit into one whole.

The "parity" was led by someone who arrived for this because of

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cordon member of the Central Committee of the Georgian Menshevik Party, former Minister of Agriculture Noy Khomeriki (judging by the number of Noahs in their leadership, the Georgian Mensheviks descended directly from the forefather of post-Flood mankind).

The GruzChK had a serious adversary in the person of the "Committee of Independence", but the committee members in the person of the GruzChK were also far from being mouth-watering. In 1924, the Chekists of Beria arrested Khomeriki, members of the Menshevik Central Committee Chkhikishvili, Nodia and others.

Chkhikishvili was found to have a letter from Noah Zhordania, who instructed the "fighters" as follows:

*"Russian tsars fought Dagestan alone for more than 30 years. And it is easy to imagine how many years the Bolsheviks will need to fight not only with Dagestan, but with the whole of Transcaucasia. The transfer of a military base to the Caucasus Range and the strengthening of all our armed forces there is a guarantee of our victory. Only in this case will Europe pay serious attention to us and provide assistance."*

That's it, reader! These good-looking scoundrels, who honored Stalin as a barbarian, were ready to turn Transcaucasia into a place of constant hostilities, devastating the region and bringing suffering to the people. Yes, they soon tried to do this - an uprising was being prepared in Georgia.

But the Menshevik adventure was already close to collapse. On August 6, 1924, the GruzChK arrested the emissary of Jordania, Valiko Dzhugeli. Moreover, Beria behaved with Dzhugeli in such a way that he was convinced that even without his confessions, the Georgian Chekists have detailed information about the activities of the Independence Committee.

Further, the deputy chairman of the GruzChK, Beria, acted nobly and at the same time prudently. And he proved at the same time that he understands: human blood is not water.

It would seem that if most of the threads of the conspiracy are in your hands, then the best way for a careerist to curry favor is to immediately start arrests, regardless of the scale of losses, both others and their own. On the contrary, the larger they are, the more weight can be given to victory.

And Beria accepts the proposal of Dzhugeli (it is possible, however, that he Jugheli himself suggested this) to turn

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Xia from the conclusion to the leaders of the impending speech with the recommendation to abandon - as he was convinced - the adventure. Jugheli did not want wasted blood. But Beria did not want her either!

Dzhugeli's letter was published in Soviet Georgian newspapers, and now that he wrote, among other things:

*"I experienced the terrible influence of the Cheka air, and I realized that the whole strength of this air lies in the fact that it is here that you get to know the reverse side of our work, with all its shadowy sides."*

Jugheli declared that it was not cowardice and cowardice that led him to give up the fight, but the hopelessness of the planned enterprise. But after all, it was necessary to be able to prove this to Dzhugeli, to convince him. And to convince, it was necessary to have convincing evidence. And the secret political department of the GruzChK had them.

However, the conspirators did not heed the call of Dzhugeli, and on August 28, the armed group of Prince George Tsereteli captured Chiatura and formed the Provisional Government of Georgia. There were minor performances in Senak, Seberinsky, Zugdidi, Dusheti districts, in Guria ... But by August 31, 1924, everything was over with the support of the population itself in most places. In Adjara, 1,500 peasants came to strengthen the protection of the border with Turkey.

On September 4, 1924, employees of the GruzChK tracked down and arrested the main composition of the "Parity Committee" headed by Prince Kote Andronikashvili. But, as often happens, the liquidation of the "head" of the conspiracy did not liquidate all its participants.

And it soon came to light in a very visible way.

IN AUTUMN 1925, Beria, with a group of Chekists in two cars, was returning along the Georgian Military Highway to Tiflis. An ambush awaited them at the mountain pass. Beria rode in the first car - this was the way it was in the Cheka from the first days: the one who is the most senior in rank takes the first risk.

One Chekist was killed, two were wounded. But Beria - this is not my assessment - "not lost his presence of mind" and, shooting back, covered the rest.

Well, what here, it would seem, to complain about? Hero, rane

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he did not abandon his comrades, he covered them with fire. But the slanderer will always find where to bite ... And Antonov-Ovseenko "thinks" about this: "How did Beria survive if he was driving the first car, and even shooting back?"

This "still shot back" is just great! According to Ovseenko, it turns out that if Beria had not fired back, then he would have had more chances to survive!

Absurd?

Alas, not quite... This is the same monstrous lie, when one lies so totally that it is hard not to believe in a lie. Unless, of course, you do not act in accordance with Marx's recommendation: "Question everything."

Do not "doubt everything" - it is useless! But question everything in order to, after a balanced analysis, either accept something as fact, or discard it as fiction.

And as soon as we act "according to Marx", all "suspicions" regarding the staging of this ambush by Beria collapse immediately. In life, there are no dramatizations where three people in a transient situation get real bullets and where the customer of the dramatization himself in the mountains can easily get a fourth - just crazy.

No, at that (and only at that?) time, real and cruel enemies fired at Beria. And these enemies, as the Soviet power strengthened, only changed the forms of struggle, but did not renounce the struggle as such. Therefore, Beria had to remain a Chekist, without "retraining" as an architect.

BOURGEOIS public figure and moderate Kolchakist I.I. Serebrennikov in exile wrote his memoirs, where there are frank confessions ...

The beginning of the nationalization of industrial and commercial enterprises, he recalled, - the confiscation of valuables in banks and, most importantly, the violation of all freedoms and the rights of private property deepened the sea of anger against the invaders in all circles of society, except for those who had nothing to lose (and there were about 70 percent of them in tsarist Russia . - S.K.) ...

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Bolshevik "action" gave rise to its opposition. Resistance to the Bolsheviks was expressed in various forms; the main forms of its expression were passive methods of struggle, boycott and sabotage...

In Irkutsk, as in many large urban centers of Russia, many employees of government agencies began to leave their jobs ... The rest ... began to work under pressure ... without showing any zeal and sometimes even deliberately undermining the success of this enterprise ...

In Irkutsk, almost in February 1918, the organization of officers in a secret anti-Bolshevik detachment.

This is how it all started... And not only, of course, in Siberia, but also in the Transcaucasus. The defeat in the Civil War of opponents of the nationalization of industrial and commercial enterprises, the confiscation of valuables in banks and the "trampling" of the right to private property temporarily reduced the apparent confrontation between the old, greedy, and the new - human ... But immediately after Stalin's party headed for industrialization and collectivization, a new civil war began in the country of an embittered and highly educated minority against the majority.

It was conducted by different methods and was conducted everywhere - starting from those places where the sun comes to the country, from Primorye. And what about the turbulent 20s! Looking ahead, let's take the year 1933... At the most powerful Putyatinsky cannery in Primorye, daily production decreased from 1000 boxes of canned food per day to 150-200. Part of the export canned food was daily delivered to landfills...

In Vladivostok, a new bakery was "commissioned" without a fermentation chamber and other necessary equipment...

At the Far Eastern Industrial Academy, academicians Mirokhin and Ushakov spoke openly about the restoration of capitalism, and when they were expelled from the academy, their supporters gave them a magnificent send-off, in which communist students participated ...

Rumors spread on the collective farms of the Ussuriysk region -

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Komsomol members will be buried alive in the ground. The kulaks declared: "We'll see who wins"...

It was also restless in the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army ... A typical example from the report of the Chairman of the OGPU G.G. Berries to Stalin on May 4, 1933:

"Assistant]. for the political part of the chief of communications of the tyazartdiv 1 S.D. Divanov, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, during political studies under the Red Army, called the book "Issues of Leninism" a prayer book, the law of God, drew Jesus Christ on it, and before the start of classes said "Hallelujah, hallelujah" ...

Let's take places closer to Moscow - Central Kazakhstan, the shores of the Bertys Bay ... Balkhashstroy, the Balkhash copper smelter.

The investment program for the 1st quarter of 1934 was thwarted, out of 20 million rubles, 316,500 rubles were disbursed for half a quarter. The chief engineer Arkhireev was not at the construction site for two months. Assistant Chief Engineer Kraines, the former owner of the copper smelter, laid out the engineering and technical workers ... Arriving equipment is not taken into account ... Work is carried out without projects and estimates ...

And this is not an invention of the OGPU, dear reader, although the data is taken from a special report by the Deputy Chairman of the OGPU G.E. Prokofiev to Stalin dated March 20, 1934.

And here is Moscow itself, August 1931. Kaganovich complains to Stalin:

"With the order for oil tankers, an ugly picture emerged of deliberate delay and red tape on the part of the NKTorg, but meanwhile the PB directive was quite clear - to purchase 250 tons of vessels no older than 25 years, spending up to 25 million. rubles, and now you have to spend the currency on chartering. You read about such savagery and do not believe that the country was able to get out of all these "drag and toss" in a matter of years! The first stage of the same Balkhash plant was commissioned in 1938. In 1950, in those places where nothing had grown before, a botanical garden bloomed, delicious watermelons and tomatoes ripened on irrigated lands ...

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And Vladivostok by the end of the thirties had a different look. And the general mood of the active part of the people by 1938, and even more so by 1941, had changed beyond recognition. The revolution took place, I repeat, in a matter of years!

But one of the reasons for this is the tough repressive policy of the Bolsheviks, who in the same few years managed to severely separate the "tares" from the "grains" in the masses in the interests of the masses themselves! And it's time to understand it!

But perhaps in the name of the smart and abundant life of the people, the assistant for political affairs of the chief of communications of the tyazhartdiv 1 S.D. Divanov, having made his way into the CPSU (b), led anti-communist propaganda among the troops?

Did the chief engineer of Balkhashstroy Arkhireev, destroying the construction, do it in the name of a powerful and independent Russia?

And Chekist Beria served a Russia that, under the leadership of Stalin's party, before the eyes of the whole world, was transforming itself into a first-class world power.

BERIA worked hard and well. Back in 1924, the then 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee Alexander Myasnikov (Myasnikyan) gave him a very flattering description and noted that "Beria is an intellectual ... declared himself in Baku as a capable Chekist ...".

Myasnikov, a Bolshevik since 1906, was thirteen years older than Beria, in 1911 he graduated from the law faculty of Moscow University and, having served a year in the army as a volunteer, until 1914 he was an assistant barrister in Moscow (since 1914 at the front, ensign). All this means that Myasnikov himself was a completely intelligent, developed person. And the fact that he appreciated not only the KGB qualities of Beria, but also his intelligence, speaks for itself.

Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize one more point, which is somehow forgotten. And in the AzChK, and in the GruzChK, and then in the GPU of Georgia, Beria was not just a deputy chairman, but also the head of the SPO - the secret political department. In other words, he was in charge of intelligence. And intelligence, as you know,

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it is a delicate matter, and they try to keep the poorly educated ignoramuses away from it.

Beria himself, however, constantly felt the lack of a real education and in May 1930 wrote to Ordzhonikidze:

*"Dear Sergo, more than once I have raised the question of my studies before you. Time passes, around people grow, develop, and those who were far from me yesterday, today have gone ahead. I know that I am way behind. After all, with our Chekist work, we often do not even have time to read a newspaper, let alone engage in self-education ..."*

Perhaps, when he wrote these lines, Beria was also thinking about a blonde with blue eyes - Nino's wife, who graduated from the economics department of the university, was preparing a dissertation. All this was as far away from him in 1930 as it was in 1922, in 1923... And he remarked bitterly:

*"Dear Sergo! I know you will say that now is not the time to raise*

*question about education. But what to do ... I feel that I can no longer ... "*

Beria at that time went only thirty-second year, and he was Chairman GPU of Georgia and Deputy Chairman of the GPU of the Transcaucasian SFSR.

And, even occupying such positions, he wanted to learn. Although it is possible that now, if he had the opportunity to choose the profile of education, he would choose not the Faculty of Architecture, but, say, the Industrial Academy, which trains cadres of economic managers.

After all, Beria always had the makings of a brilliant leader and a major organizer. Both before his arrival in Georgia and after his departure to Moscow, in all the posts he held, he showed obvious competence and even supercompetence.

Supercompetence is a diverse concept. Confirmation of an athlete's supercompetence is a world record. Composer - "Moonlight Sonata" ... Writer - "War and Peace" ...

What does it mean to be a super-competent leader? Working fourteen hours a day? I do not argue, this is also. Be able to give specific instructions or advice, be able to

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to make the right and quick decision, and not to carry out "general interference in the affairs of subordinates"? And this is also... As well as the ability to see problems as a whole, the ability to see the future.

But a super-competent leader is, first of all, a skillful selection of personnel and the ability to neutralize the threat of their degradation. It is said that the environment "plays" the king. Right! But in order to be strong, the king must be competent in choosing an environment that is strong and extraordinary in itself.

As deputy chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia, Beria did not have the absolute ability to form an ideal "team", but he - there can be no doubt - treated this responsibly and with interest. That is competently.

And he obviously didn't show off when he wrote to Ordzhonikidze in Moscow:

*"My departure at work will not be reflected. The apparatus of the GruzGPU both in the center and in the localities is well-established and works so well that any comrade who heads it after me will cope with the situation.*

*The AzGPU apparatus in the center is also adjusted. The apparatus is now being strengthened ArmGPU by transferring new workers there."*

And this strong apparatus "in the center and in the localities", established by Beria, could carry out Chekist work calmly, systematically and also competently. In the Transcaucasus, under Beria, there was no assault and "shock campaigns". Speaking in sports terms, consistently high results were ensured by persistent and daily "training".

By the way, about sports.

For a security officer, good physical shape is one of the essential qualities of a competent professional. And Beria, as I said, could already in the Transcaucasian period of his activity claim to be super-competent - not in sports, of course. And if so, then in the KGB bodies of Transcaucasia, the physical development of employees should have been treated with due attention.

And so it was, because the deputy chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU himself set a personal example here. For example, he played football in such a way that in the early 20s he played for the Tbilisi "Dina

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mo ", and when the Moscow team arrived in Tiflis, he played as a left midfielder against Nikolai Starostin himself (this Spartak player will still be

mentioned later).

Actually, the high level of Georgian football already in the thirties is not least indebted to Beria ... And certainly the city of Tbilisi owed him a wonderful republican stadium, not by chance named the same way as the KGB sports society - "Dynamo", and not by chance bearing the name of Beria until the summer of 1953.

So, in the early 1930s, in purely KGB work in the Transcaucasus, Beria was competent and largely independent. However, the general leadership of the life of Transcaucasia was not then included in the prerogatives of Beria. This was done by "senior comrades", who most often did not have, to put it mildly, high business, and by that time, political competence. They brewed political "porridge", and the Chekists often had to disentangle them. It turned out like this, for example, with collectivization in Transcaucasia.

Around the events of the "Great Break" in the life of the peasantry and in its mass consciousness, a number of vile myths have been created today, and this is also one of the signs of an unprecedented troubled time in Rus'. Exposing such myths is beyond the scope of my book, but something needs to be said here.

Repeatedly and unreasonably ridiculed by the "democrats" "History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). A Short Course, published by Gospolitizdat in 1945, reported:

"The policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class was enshrined in the historic resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 5, 1930 "On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction" ...

Various rates of collectivization were established. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) defeated regions of the USSR in terms of the pace of collectivization into three groups.

The first group included the most important grain-growing regions, the most prepared for collectivization, which had more tractors, more state farms, more experience in the fight against the kulaks in the past grain procurements.

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campaigns - the North Caucasus (Kuban, Don, Terek), the Middle Volga, the Lower Volga. For this group of grain regions, the Central Committee proposed that collectivization should be completed in the spring of 1931.

The second group of grain regions, which included Ukraine, the Central Chernozem region, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan and other grain regions, could basically complete collectivization in the spring of 1932.

The rest of the regions, territories and republics (Moscow region, Transcaucasia, Central Asian republics, etc.) could stretch the terms of collectivization until the end of the five-year plan, that is, until 1933).

As you can see, Moscow and Stalin were quite realistic and, on the whole, right, and they singled out the groups and set the dates. But two factors worked: the desire of the "places" to report as soon as possible, and to an even greater extent, hidden Trotskyist provocations. So, the Moscow region began to focus on the completion of collectivization in the spring of 1930 (instead of the deadline - the end of 1933). And one of the reasons was that the 1st secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU (b) was Karl Bauman, who was arrested in April 1937 as a Trotskyist.

In 1931, Bauman was simply replaced by Lazar Kaganovich, making him the first secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee (that's how strong the hidden oppositionists were then in the party). And by the end of 1931, in the Moscow region, the level of collectivization reached a mark of only 37.5% of peasant farms.

In Transcaucasia, even more gross "excesses" were allowed. Although there, behind this standard formula much more often than in other areas, there were not only "percent mania" and opposition from the opposition, but also a disguised

internal counter-revolution and subversion from without.

Here is part of the note of the chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU S.F. Redens and head of the secret operations department L.P. Beria, sent on March 11, 1930 to the First Deputy Chairman of the OGPU G.G. Berry on a straight wire:

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*"Owls. secret*

*Moscow, OGPU - comrade. BERRY*

*As a result of the insufficient coverage of a huge number of newly created collective farms, the excesses made, shortcomings within the collective farms and the general activation of anti-Soviet and kulak forces, mass anti-collective farm demonstrations have intensified, taking on a political coloring, a number of areas are engulfed in fermentation ... Collective farms are rapidly disintegrating, accompanied in a number of cases by the defeat village councils, the beating and expulsion of party members and soviet activists. The demonstrations that have taken place so far have been liquidated by peaceful means and persuasion, and only in rare cases, by demonstrations and insignificant military force, the initiators and direct participants in the defeats and violence, with a few exceptions, have not been arrested ... all this was interpreted by the population as a sign of weakness in power and contributed to even greater exposure acting under the influence of anti-Soviet forces ...*

*A particularly tense situation was created in the Turkic regions. In the Vedibasar district of the Erivan district, up to 250 people went into the mountains together with their families, of which up to 150 were armed. The departed led a wide agitation in the surrounding villages and the recruitment of supporters. To eliminate the speech, which took on a broad character, it was necessary to send a military group of up to 30 bayonets. Subsequent negotiations did not yield results, so operational operations will begin on March 11.*

*In the rest of the Turkic regions of Armenia, as well as in individual border Turkic villages of Georgia, there is a strong migration movement - flight to Turkey. In Georgia and Armenia, and especially in Azerbaijan, groups of kulaks have gone underground and are hiding with weapons, the existing gangs have significantly replenished at their expense ... "*

And it was the very "old Bolsheviks", those "victims of Stalin and Beria", about whom the current liberals and "democrats" shed tears, that created such a conflict situation. They were also created on the basis of leftist delusions - Sergey Kavtaradze, for example, was a sincere supporter of a tough policy.

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They were also created maliciously - to discredit the "Stalin regime". After all, if you believe not just anyone, but Antonov-Ovseenko (and here you can trust him!), among the then Georgian leadership "they still remembered the opinion of the old guard of the Social Democrats: Noah Zhordania called Stalin nothing more than a barbarian."

And the "recognized Bolsheviks" Mikha Tskhakaya, Philip Makharadze, Shalva Eliava, Mamia Orakhelashvili - according to Ovseenko - were perplexed: "What kind of leader is this?"

Well, the 65-year-old (in 1930) long-liver Tskhakaya (he died in 1950), chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the TSFSR, was already a predominantly representative figure - like Kalinin in Moscow.

Replaced Tskhakaya as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the TSFSR in 1931 63-year-old (in 1931) Philip Makharadze (died in December 1941 in Tbilisi) was a fighter from the same venerable gray-haired cohort of permanently grumbling patriarchs.

But the 47-year-old (in 1930) chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, Shalva Eliava, the former People's Commissar of the Military Sea of Georgia, together with the 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian

the regional committee, 49-year-old Mamiya Orakhelashvili, was not so much grumbling as acted. After all, for them, almost their age, Stalin, who in 1930 was only 51 years old, was not very much a leader. In contrast, it should be noted, from the "old revolutionary" Trotsky.

These "genatsvale", accustomed to the Caucasian kunachestvo and cabal, were already interfering with the normal socialist construction in Georgia, and their conflict with the course of the "barbarian" Stalin was inevitable. Therefore, their conflict with Beria was inevitable.

In the 19th century, the French historian Jules Michelet said: "Sensitive people, weeping over the horrors of the revolution, shed a few tears over the horrors that gave birth to it."

And at the beginning of the 21st century, let me be allowed to say to myself: "Shameless falsifiers, crying crocodile tears over the horrors (I'm not ironic!) of repression, shed a few tears over the infamies, provocations and ambitions that gave birth to them."

After all, they were, my dear reader, both provocations and ambitions...

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Beria in March 1930 turned thirty-one years old. Not yet the age of Christ, however...

Bursting with self-conceit and ambitions, Mdivani, Orakhelashvili, Eliava and the Okudzhav brothers brewed conflicts, and Beria had to take "prompt" actions to eliminate them.

And this is not an evening gathering. These are the bayonets of military groups, the arrests of the initiators of the speeches and instigators, the arrests of ordinary peasants, the liquidation of bandit groups, machine guns, rifles, cartridges and grenades ...

This is blood. Both one's own and someone else's, which, although someone else's, is also blood. And this, of course it was tiring.

Indeed, on the Chekist front, a real Chekist received not only well-deserved bullets from the enemy, but also undeserved spitting, albeit ignorant and deceived, albeit not able to look into the future, but his own fellow citizens. And not only the ignorant... And perhaps not so much the ignorant as the fully educated, for the ignorance of highly educated ignoramuses is the most vicious and indestructible.

The note by Redens and Beria to Moscow about the situation with the collective farms is dated March 1930. And in May, Beria writes to Ordzhonikidze the letter that I have already partially quoted. And it contains lines indicative of the then psychological state of Lavrenty. Justifying before Ordzhonikidze the possibility of his direction to study, Beria wrote:

*"I think that my departure from the Transcaucasus will even serve the best. After all, during ten years of work in the organs of the GPU in the conditions of the Transcaucasus, I had enough of an eyesore not only to all anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary elements, but also to some of our comrades. How many people will downright welcome my departure, so I have become boring to them with my constant awakening and revealing the existing shortcomings. They wanted everything to be covered up, but here, if you please, rejoice, there are flaws and blunders all around ..."*

*All the stories that have ever been in Georgia and in the Transcaucasus in general are beginning to be associated with me ... In the minds of many comrades, I am the root cause of all the troubles that have befallen my comrades in recent times, and appear almost as an informer.*

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Well, a comprehensive assessment of the situation and leadership on the ground was part of the direct official duties of the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU of Transcaucasia. And Lavrenty Beria never neglected his duties.



And he didn't let others do it either.

They are not liked in many "smoking rooms", and even more so in most bosses' offices. Indeed, for the opposite, it is required that the owner of the office himself be an active leader, whose main "hobby" is his business, which takes twenty-four hours a day, and not the prescribed "present" watch.

Lenin was such a leader. Stalin, too... Lenin, according to the Menshevik Dan, was always thinking about one thing, about the socialist revolution. Stalin also thought about one thing - about building a power for the working people.

But were the "old party intellectuals" capable of this? Especially in Tiflis - with its atmosphere of "princely" nobility among those in power, which has not weathered over the years of Soviet power!

Don't think.

And the mood of Beria, which broke through in a letter to Ordzhonikidze, could be understood ... Yes, anywhere - if only away from these party "princes"! Especially since the first five-year plan is beginning throughout the country, grandiose socialist construction is beginning.

Construction! For Beria, this word has always been attractive, because he was a builder by education! And I wanted to build... And for this I wanted to get a fundamental, higher education.

Ordzhonikidze was at that time a candidate member of the Politburo (soon he would become a full member), Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the USSR, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense. On November 10, 1930, he headed the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh).

And all these circumstances allow us to assume that Beria hoped, having learned a little, to ask Sergo for economic work (Lavrenty did not know then that during the war years he would have this work above the eyeballs).

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But the era of Beria was needed not yet in the national economy, but in the Chekist department. And here I will give extracts from the order of March 30, 1931 of the Chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky No. 154/93, which I just mentioned earlier:

*"March 30, 1931*

*Secret*

*Gor. Moscow*

*March 21 marked the 10th anniversary of the existence and heroic struggle of the organs of the GPU of Georgia...*

*The work of the GPU of Georgia was difficult, many glorious fighters fell out of action, but the achievements were enormous: the Menshevik Party of Georgia, one of the most powerful and organized anti-Soviet parties in the USSR, was crushed, dozens of members of its Central Committee, hundreds of local committees, thousands of active members were seized; lines of communication were smashed, and as a result, the 80,000-strong Menshevik Party, which had the support of the interventionists and the entire 2nd International, was reduced to the position of a miserable group of counter-revolutionaries exposed to the working masses.*

*Also, major anti-Soviet bourgeois parties of national democrats and socialist-federalists.*

*Defeated banditry...*

*The Collegium of the OGPU notes with particular satisfaction that all this tremendous hard work has been basically done by our own national cadres, nurtured, educated and tempered in the fire of combat work, under the permanent leadership of Comrade. Beria, who managed with exceptional flair to always clearly navigate and in the most difficult situation politically*

*correctly solving the assigned tasks ... at the same time, infecting employees with personal example and, passing on their organizational and operational skills, educating them in unconditional devotion to the Communist Party and its Central Committee ...*

*Chairman of the OGPU V. Menzhinsky.*

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What can be said here?

Beria's detractors sometimes hint that, they say, the order was actually prepared by Deputy Menzhinsky Yagoda, since, they say, the Chairman of the OGPU himself was already "seriously ill" at that time. But at that time Menzhinsky (he died in 1934) intellectually was still quite "in shape".

So, Dzerzhinsky's colleague Menzhinsky, an experienced party member and Chekist, could not discern in real time the careerist, Bonapartist, "dirty" sides of Beria's nature, if they were present at the chairman of the GPU of Georgia?

What, Menzhinsky and the top leadership of the OGPU were blind and did not want to pay attention to those "mountains of compromising evidence" that were available, according to the aforementioned "anti-Beria" collection of 1991, anywhere, even in the Rostov department of the GPU?

No, answer "democratic" "historians" and "publicists". And they say that the leadership of the OGPU of the times of Menzhinsky-Yagoda, and then the NKVD of the times of Yezhov, was so afraid of the "executioner" Beria, who enjoyed the patronage of another "bloody executioner" - Stalin, that they could not even think about expelling the "rogue" and "provocateur" from the Chekist environment and about his worthy punishment. And, being afraid, he praised Beria and praised him.

So, our story includes the theme "Stalin and Beria". Well, let's see how and when these two "executioners" first came together...

## **Chapter 7**

### **CORRESPONDENCE OF STALIN AND KAGANOVICH**

On August 5, 1931, the last subparagraph (subparagraph "p") of paragraph 2 of the Politburo resolution "On the personnel and activities of the OGPU", the authorized representative of the OGPU of Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria, was approved as a member of the OGPU collegium.

The decision of the Politburo is an act that could not pass by Stalin, and all the names that appeared in such documents, one way or another, were in the circle of Stalin's attention.

Beria also entered this circle, and, of course, not from August 5

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1931. But until the beginning of the 1930s, contacts between Stalin and Beria could not be either frequent or confidential.

In the 1920s, Stalin rested (if you can call rest just a temporary drop out of a completely damned whirlwind into a mode of relatively calm work) in the Sochi region. And this is the Krasnodar Territory, the North Caucasus, and the Georgian Chekists had nothing to do there.

And only when Stalin began to prefer the Abkhaz Gagra, the Plenipotentiary of the OGPU of Transcaucasia, Beria, was simply obliged to visit the resting places of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

And I have been.

But more and more often he came into Stalin's field of vision, not because he constantly flickered before Stalin's eyes. By the way, if he did this, then Stalin would reasonably ask: "What are you doing here, Comrade Beria? I have a rest, I deserve it, and you? The Soviet leader both by sight and by

the word was sharp, we have a lot of evidence for this.

No, Stalin in Beria was attracted precisely by his managerial competence, especially noticeable against the background of all these Mamiya, Miha and Shalv ...

And on August 17, 1931...

No, first I will explain how I know what I did (specifically, what and to whom wrote) on this day Stalin.

In 2001, the publishing house "Russian Political Encyclopedia" and the Federal Archival Service of Russia published the correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich for 1931-1936 in a circulation of 2000 copies. This correspondence is exciting in itself - I read it like a novel by Dumas! But it was also useful to me in practice - Beria is often (although not so often) mentioned there.

And what's interesting! In 1995, the (much more modest) correspondence between Stalin and Molotov for 1925-1936 was published. As you can see, the period of this second correspondence is five years longer than that of the first. Nevertheless, in the Molotov correspondence, the name of Beria is absent altogether.

Why?

Is it because the correspondence between Stalin and Molotov is only 86 letters (for comparison: the correspondence with Kaganovich has a volume of 862 letters), which 79-summer Molotov handed over in December 1969 to the Central Party Archive according to sob 99

private initiative? And if so, are we not dealing here with the censorship of Molotov himself?

Personally, I am convinced that the absence of the name of Beria in the letters handed over by Molotov cannot but look significant. It seems that Vyacheslav Mikhailovich did not want to present to his descendants a very objective picture of the distant past.

But be that as it may, I had at my disposal an extensive correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich, and in it I found a lot of interesting information, starting right from the first pages.

On August 17, 1931, Stalin wrote from the south to Kaganovich in Moscow:

*"... Now it is clear to me that Kartvelishvili (until 1929 - Presovnarkom of Georgia, in 1929-1931. - 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine and head of the Political Directorate of the Ukrainian Military District, and since 1931 - 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee. - S.K.) and Gruzdek's secretariat with their reckless "grain procurement policy" brought a number of regions of Western Georgia to starvation. They do not understand that the Ukrainian methods of grain procurement, which are necessary and expedient in grain-growing regions, are inexpedient and harmful in non-grain regions, which, moreover, do not have any industrial proletariat. Hundreds of people are being arrested, including party members who clearly sympathize with the discontented and do not sympathize with the "politics" of the Georgian Central Committee. But arrests won't get you far. It is necessary to intensify (speed up!) the delivery of grain now, without delay. Without this, we can get grain riots, despite the fact that the grain problem has already been resolved in our country. Let them immediately... The PB will oblige Mikoyan to increase the supply of grain to Western Georgia... Otherwise, we will surely have a political scandal."*

And two days later, on August 19, Stalin ends the following letter as follows:

*"...Fourth. I propose to place the entire construction of new grain warehouses for tea growers and tobacco growers in western Georgia under the control of the RCT, send people to the places, involve the Zakchek, in particular, Beria, and ensure that all new warehouses are built and put into operation no later than beginning of November."*

Bread went to Western Georgia, warehouses were built quickly (since "connected" Beria). However, the general situation in Transcaucasia was far from favorable. And this was proved by Stalin's letter to Kaganovich dated August 26, 1931

of the year:

*"Hello, comrade Kaganovich.*

*I write about Transcaucasian affairs. Members of the Zakkraykom visited me the other day, secretaries of the Central Committee of Georgia, some workers of Azerbaijan (including Polonsky). Their squabble is incredible, and apparently it will not end soon...*

*I reconciled them somehow, and the matter has been settled for the time being, but not for long. Almost everyone lies and cunning, starting with Kartvelishvili. Beria, Polonsky, Orakhelashvili do not lie. But on the other hand, Polonsky admits a number of tactlessness and mistakes. The most unpleasant impression is made by Mamulia (Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia) ... The pre-SNK of Georgia Sukhishvili makes a comical impression - hopeless bastard...*

*If you do not intervene in the case, these people can foolishly ruin the case. They have already spoiled the deal with the peasantry in Georgia, in Azerbaijan. Without serious intervention by the Central Committee of the CPSU, Kartvelishvili and the Zakkraykom in general are powerless to improve things, if we assume that they want to improve things.*

*How to be}*

*Necessary:*

*1) Appoint ... at the end of September (for my arrival) a report to the Organizing Bureau ... on the state of affairs;*

*2) Clean them thoroughly at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau and remove a number of people like Mamulia;*

*3) Appoint the third secretary of the Zakkraykom (I suggest Meyerzon [head of the organizational and instructor department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. - S.K.]), giving him the appropriate order ...*

*Without such measures, the business in Transcaucasia will rot.*

*I. Stalin 26/ VIII-31".*

As you can see, even in the summer of 1931, there is no need to talk about any special favor with Stalin in relation to Beria. However, Stalin already firmly keeps him in mind.

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September passed, Stalin returned to Moscow. On October 19, a meeting of the Orgburo was held, and on October 31, the Politburo adopted a number of personnel decisions on the Transcaucasus. The chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Transcaucasia M.P. became the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee. Orakhelashvili, the second - L.P. Beria, and the third -

IN AND. Polonsky, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan.

Beria concurrently was appointed first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia.

Orakhelashvili became the 1st secretary of the Zakkraykom for the second time - he already he was in 1926-1929.

As they say, "not even half a year has passed" ... Or rather, less than eight months have passed, and on June 20, 1932, Stalin writes to Kaganovich, Postyshev and Ordzhonikidze: "Well, dear friends, another squabble. I'm talking about Beria and Orakhelashvili ... "

Yes, there was a serious conflict between the first and second secretaries. And one of the reasons could be found, guided by the old advice: "Look for a woman." In this case, it was the wife of Mamia Orakhelashvili, the 45-year-old beauty and obstinate Maria Platonovna Orakhelashvili, an old (since 1903) Bolshevik.

In October 1931, in Moscow, many leading Caucasians were strongly warmed up for gangsterism in the selection of personnel. However, Mamia Orakhelashvili did not have time to

to become the first person in Transcaucasia for the second time, as Maria Orakhelashvili became the People's Commissar of Education of Georgia.

Here are those on!

Although, on the other hand, is it appropriate for the "first lady" of Transcaucasia, and even with rare beauty, and with a solid pre-revolutionary party experience, to be out of office?

Spouses Orakhelashvili came, as they say, from the intelligentsia, and Mamiya even more - from the nobility. Beria, in the eyes of Maria Platonovna, was nothing more than an upstart, and even a dropout.

Well, could he be equal to her Mamiya, who graduated from the Military Medical Academy in 1908? In addition, among other things, Mamiya was a member of the editorial board of Pravda.

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And this Beria...

In short, on June 10, 1932, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia examined the issue of the grouping of Maria Orakhelashvili and others who "by spreading false rumors, they tried to oppose the Central Committee of Georgia to the Zakkraykom and discredit individual leaders of the Central Committee and the Tiflis Committee (in particular, Comrade Beria).

Beauty Maria was reprimanded and was relieved of her post. But she did not calm down, but went to Moscow, to the Central Control Commission to Yaroslavsky. And Mamiya wrote letters to Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, which Stalin forwarded to Kaganovich.

Beria did not write any letters to anyone.

STALIN, after reading Orakhelashvili's letters, informed Kaganovich:

*"... My opinion: for all the angularity in the "actions" of Beria , Orakhelashvili is wrong in this matter. Orakhelashvili's request must be refused... There is no need for him to leave. I'm afraid that Orakhelashvili's pride is in the foreground (they pecked at "his" people), and not the interests of the cause and positive work ... "*

So far, Stalin is not inclined to replace Orakhelashvili, and the letter of June 20 ends immediately after the text quoted above as follows:

*"Everyone says that positive work is going well in Georgia, the mood of the peasants has become good. And this is the main thing at work.*

*Hello. I. Stalin.*

I note that this statement by Stalin also characterizes Beria. Under the First Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia, Mamulia, the peasants were worried, and under Beria, who replaced him, their mood "became good."

That's what competence means!

Kaganovich, having familiarized himself with the essence of the claims and complaints of the Orakhelashvili spouses, in turn, in an extensive letter concerning many issues to Stalin on June 23, the eleventh paragraph also expressed his opinion:

*"... 11) In Transcaucasia, a new*

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*squabble. You are certainly right that a healthy start, especially in business terms, is on the side of Beria, Orakhelashvili reflects the aching, non-business circles of the asset ... "*

The BUSINESS "circles of the asset" were already entirely for Beria - normal people don't want to quarrel and don't be smart, don't tear their noses, don't beat their thumbs ... They want to work normally!

Moreover, the "positive" work in Georgia did not go well for many years, and then an intelligent person stood at the head of the business, and it turned out that the affairs of the solar republic were not so bad!

But an asset is an asset, and the old Bolsheviks are old Bolsheviks ... At the asset

- energy, the patriarchs - merit. And Maria Platonovna Orakhelashvili - also "rare beauty".

Speaking seriously, the ambitions and antipathies of Maria Orakhelashvili meant something seriously only for Mamiya Orakhelashvili. And for Beria, what was important in this conflict - as Stalin accurately caught it - was the business side. And ultimately it was a conflict between the growing competence of Beria and the decreasing competence of Orakhelashvili.

And to be absolutely precise, between the young and old party members of Georgia.

On July 13, Beria informed Kaganovich: *"I was twice with Comrade Koba and had the opportunity to inform him in detail about our affairs."*

And a month later, on August 12, Stalin wrote to the same Kaganovich as follows:

*"...3. Beria makes a good impression. A good organizer, businesslike, capable worker. Looking closely at the Transcaucasian affairs, I am becoming more and more convinced that in the matter of selecting people, Sergo is an incorrigible bungler. Sergo defended Mamulia's candidacy for the post of secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia, but now it is obvious (even for the blind) that Mamulia is not worth Beria's left foot."*

That's even how!

And the very logic of the situation makes Stalin come to you.

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water about the need to release Orakhelashvili from the Zakkraykom, which the first secretary himself insistently requested.

Who will replace him? Stalin reflects and continues:

*"Although Beria is not a member (and not even a candidate) of the Central Committee, he will still have to be nominated for the post of first secretary of the Zakkraykom, Polonsky (his candidacy) is not suitable, since he does not own any of the local languages..."*

This was written on August 12, 1932, and in mid-August Beria arrived in Moscow. He put several questions before the Politburo, and they were to be discussed at the next meeting on August 16.

The meeting took place, and on the same day Kaganovich notified Stalin:

*"Beria was with me. Indeed, he makes a very good impression of a major worker. We discussed a number of his questions today at the PB. In particular, they removed another 300 tons from Georgia. bread and other questions. We will give them buses at the expense of Moscow..."*

Yes, the "cold intriguer" Beria came to Moscow not to squabble, like Maria Orakhelashvili, but to intercede for the republic, to ask for a reduction in the grain procurement plan, for a seed loan, for the allocation of cars. Moreover, he substantiated all requests, otherwise no one would satisfy them.

He even managed to "chop off" something from Moscow, as we see! Specifically: 10 buses, 10 Ford cars and 8 trucks.

And here I must inform the reader that concern for the matter in which he is currently busy is generally a characteristic feature of Beria. Looking ahead very far, I will say that if, over time, Beria became the head of the country, then he would also take care of the whole country. After all, now *all of her* would be his business !

FORMALLY, Orakhelashvili was still the first secretary, but in fact people went to Beria, and, in addition to the problems of Georgia, the problems of the entire Transcaucasus were already falling on him. And he solved them. But many of these problems were all-Union. Especially Baku oil.

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Almost immediately after returning from Moscow, Beria, no doubt inspired by the prospects and support of the Politburo, takes the same Politburo into circulation and asks Moscow for something more serious than a dozen Fords. And not for Georgia, but for the oilmen of Azerbaijan.

In his letter to Kaganovich and Molotov, he asks to improve the technical supply of the oil fields, to supply additional pipes and transport, and to improve the food situation of the workers.

Consideration of purely industrial and social spheres in a single complex was also Beria's style. And he asks not only pipes, but also: 764 tons of meat, 56 tons of animal oil, 167 tons of vegetable oil, 64 tons of herring, 328 tons of cereals, 198 tons of sugar, 2 tons of tea, 172 tons of rice, 596 tons of flour, 67 tons cheese, 370 tons of confectionery, 65 tons of laundry soap, 545 thousand meters of "cotton" and "various manufactured goods" for 2 million rubles.

All of this is per block.

In addition, he proposes to equate oil workers in supply with Moscow and Leningrad.

On August 26, Kaganovich and Molotov sent a cipher to Stalin with a proposal to satisfy these requests, but ... But at the same time give to Beria, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Ruben, the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of People's Commissars Bagirov and the manager of the Azneft trust Barinov sent a telegram with a counter request - not only to fulfill the program of oil production of 500,000 tons given "from above" before the closure of navigation, but also to overfulfill it.

The draft telegram ended like this: "Grozny will let you down this year, we must with all the force to press on Azneft.

Stalin in the upper left corner of the encryption imposed a resolution:

*"Although you are overfeeding Azneft according to the "requirements" of the of any kind, I think that the telegram can still be received. I. St. "*

So, Stalin has already enrolled Beria in the number of "grabbers", but if Lavrenty Pavlovich would read this resolution, he would only be delighted.

After all, Stalin grumbled for the sake of appearances - so that the service would not seem like honey. And by he has already seen the essence - this "snatcher" can

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but also to give. Firstly, he tries not for himself, but for business and for people, not forgetting about one or the other.

And secondly, this "grabber" is not a talker. And if you give him what he needs, then in As a result, you will get what you demand from him!

On OCTOBER 9, 1932, the Politburo granted Orakhelashvili's request to release him from the duties of the first secretary of the Zakkraykom and appointed Beria as the first secretary, leaving him as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. And soon Beria became the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b). He reached the age of Christ and managed a lot in his thirty-three years. But even more he had to do - together with the country.

Mamiya Orakhelashvili left for Moscow to serve as deputy director at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. Soon Maria also drove off there - to the People's Commissariat of Education as the head of the Higher School Administration.

And Stalin went on vacation at the appointed time, and the correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich continued. And in it the affairs of Transcaucasia were periodically discussed and the name of Beria periodically appeared.

But now the word "squabbles" has disappeared from this correspondence.

But the words "ideas and suggestions" appeared there.

## Chapter 8

### PARTY LEADER OF TRANSCAUCASUS

PARTY Khrushchev bureaucrats who renamed Beria in the directive quarter of a paper for subscribers of the Great Soviet

encyclopedias in "Pasted between-22 and 23 pages" would not be bureaucrats if they approached their duties differently than they did. Having sent subscribers a recommendation to work with a razor or scissors, they lost sight of the fact that such a figure as Lavrenty Pavlovich cannot be cut *out of* history so easily.

And so, when I picked up, for example, the volume of the second edition of the TSB No. 12, signed for printing May 28, 1952,

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to look at the content of the article "State Defense Committee", I was almost sure that I would find Beria's name there.

I found it there, but more on that in due time.

And now I will inform you that, encouraged by the first success, I delved into other volumes (naturally, only those that appeared before June 26, 1953) and I can report that, according to the TSB data that eluded the Khrushchevites, by 1953 year:

a) in Armenia there were the Beriev region, the canal named after Beria, the park of culture and recreation named after L.P. Beria in Leninakan (volume 3);

b) in Georgia, the Abkhaz state farm "Akhali-Afoni", the Sukhumi Pedagogical Institute, the Tkvarcheli State District Power Plant (volume 1), the machine-building plant in Batumi, the shoe factory in Tbilisi, the collective farm in the Sukhum region, the Georgian Agricultural Institute, the Tbilisi Palace of Pioneers and Schoolchildren, bore the name of Beria and the Dinamo Stadium, also in Tbilisi (Volume 13).

In Azerbaijan, too, presumably, they did not forget about Beria - the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee did a lot for his oil industry, but I did not find any mention of this in the TSB. And then I was rescued, needless to say, by Antonov-Ovseenko, from whose book I learned that the name of Beria was given to a car repair plant in Baku and a large oil field.

He also reports that there was a Leninakan border detachment named after Beria and a theater named after him in Poti, the Khashuri electric locomotive depot, and the Agarinsky sugar factory. In general, Ovseenko's additions are an encyclopedic list

did not replenish much.

I do not think that all these (and, presumably, others not established by me) assignment of the name of Beria to factories and collective farms were his initiative. The spirit of the era was present in such acts. And not so unhealthy - for that time - the spirit, I must say.

Most often, this was not manifested by subservience, but by respect for those whose name the collective assumed. What were the bearers of these names to do? Refuse? But that meant offending, right? Especially in the Caucasus!

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One way or another, with the beginning of the thirties, Beria becomes the undisputed leader of the Transcaucasus. And the statement of volume 1 of the second edition of the TSB that "the implementation of the Stalinist plan for the reconstruction of Azerbaijan. oil industry with Bolshevik perseverance was carried out by students and associates ... Stalin - CM. Kirov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, L.P. Beria", fully corresponded to the actual state of affairs.

But Beria was actively engaged not only in oil. Suffice it to say that already in October 1933, Beria personally handed over to Stalin two notes - one about oil, and the other about rare metals in Georgia.

Beria proposed to include in the 1934 plan:

- construction of crackers and plants for primary oil refining;
- construction of the Makhachkala-Stalingrad kerosene pipeline;
- expansion of the Baku-Batum oil pipeline;
- carrying out exploration work on new areas in



Azerbaijan;

— construction of new vessels for the Caspian Shipping Company.

Here everything was considered as it should be - in a complex. And this was also the style of Beria. In fact, for the first time in the head of Transcaucasia, in a later language, it was not a pure politician, but a technocrat.

But not just a technocrat, but a technocrat of a new, socialist type, a technocrat-politician. That is, a statesman who is able to understand special problems and works to develop a meaningful and prosperous life for the masses. A figure who does not divide life into "production" and "social and cultural life", but sees their unity.

Beria's "rare earth" note was just as specific. It talked about Chiatura manganese, about polymetallic molybdenum and lead-zinc deposits, about the production of aluminum oxide.

And it's clear, dear reader, that Beria was neither a geologist, nor an oilman, nor a metallurgist ... He did not put forward the idea of new geological exploration ... He did not assess the need

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in a new oil pipeline or the prospects of polymetallic deposits.

But *if* earlier these ideas of various kinds of specialists were deadened by the incompetence of the same Mamiya Orakhelashvili, now they came to life with the competent support of Beria.

Manganese was mined at the Chiatura mines under the tsar... And under Orakhelashvili... But the scale, the volume of extraction, its methods—everything was now changing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Previously, with the same polymetals, things were stalled. And now it's moved from dead point. Thanks, I emphasize again, Beria!

Stalin believed that "this matter also needs to be moved forward," but it is more he was worried about oil, and on October 21, 1933, he wrote to Kaganovich:

*"The situation with Baku oil is bad. This year we are producing 15 mil. tons of oil. In the future, it is necessary to extract 21-22 mil. tons... Despite this, the Oil Directorate is asleep, and Sergo gets off with pious promises..."*

But now Stalin in Transcaucasia finally has a reliable person who himself is not sympathetic, and will not give to others, who knows how to see the whole "forest" of problems behind the "trees" of oil rigs. See both in perspective and in real time.

And - which is also very valuable - he does not wait for guidance, but is proactive and independent. This "eternal" partocrat Suslov will creak later: "We were not instructed," and Beria was "himself with a mustache."

Against the background of his readiness to take responsibility for the decision, Stalin could not help but be annoyed by the lack of independence of others ... On September 5, 1933, a cipher is placed on the table for Stalin in the south:

*"From Moscow 5/IX.33, 1 hour. 28 min. In. #18*

Tov. STALIN.

The Cominternists are asking to speed up the consideration of the answer of the Comintern English Independent Party.

If you have material, I ask you to urgently report your opinion ...

No. 18 KAGANOVICH.

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Stalin, directly on the decoding form, not without irritation, answered as follows:

*"Your HP is 18. I cannot and should not give an opinion on any and all questions raised in the PB. You could consider and work out the answer to the English Independents yourself.*

*Stalin."*

BERIA, on the other hand, did not need guiding "crutches". And why did he need them, when everywhere you look - piles of unresolved problems have accumulated in Transcaucasia, which were simply interesting to solve!

After all, it was not without reason that the ancients placed paradise in these places, it was not without reason that the Greeks went to the legendary Colchis for the Golden Fleece. Potentially, Transcaucasia was a fertile, flourishing land of fabulous beauty and fabulous wealth. But in order to have this fairy tale in reality, it was necessary to work hard.

By the way, about Colchis... In 1934, Konstantin Paustovsky wrote the story "Colchis", where among the main characters were engineers Kahiani and Gabunia - enthusiasts of draining swamps in the basin of the Rioni river, flowing to the sea along the Colchis lowland.

"In Colchis, the climate of Southern Japan and Sumatra," said one of the characters, the old man Pakhomov, "an abundance of heat, but meanwhile it is a malarial desert in the full sense of the word. Something like a tropical hard labor ... If not for the swamps, then we would block Java and Ceylon with their splendor and riches ... "

I do not have the opportunity to quote the book of the young Paustovsky extensively, but I suggest that those who wish to re-read it themselves - after all, even in the current "Rossiyanin" not all public libraries have yet been closed, and finding "Colchis" is unlikely to be difficult.

At the end of the book, Kahiani gives a speech. In response to his question - who was sick malaria, only "a little boy with a red tie" did not raise his hand ...

And Kahiani says: "But the value of our work is not only that we drain the swamps and create new land, that we destroy the old marsh vegetation at the root ...

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and plant a new one. This is not the only point of our work, comrades. It is also in the fact that we are creating a young, healthy generation ... "

Beria is not mentioned in Paustovsky's book, however, real prototypes Kahiani and Gabunii were people just from the "team" of Lavrenty Beria.

However, the drainage of the Rion swamps in the general Beria program for the transformation of Georgia still occupied a modest place.

In Abkhazia alone, it was necessary to speed up the construction of a mine in Tkvarcheli, the Sukhumi hydroelectric power station, the Black Sea railway, to develop the production of citrus fruits, tobacco, tea ... And on the other Black Sea edge of Georgia, in Adzharia, a lot of attention had to be paid to Batumi - a port, oil refining. .. And again citrus fruits!

Here is just one number. In 1932, 14 million citrus fruits, and in 1940 - 315 million.

And from the shores of the Black Sea, large and small mountain ranges covered with forests went deep into Georgia.

And all this needed smart heads and skillful hands of creators.

Mamia Orakhelashvili argued that large-scale collective farming is impossible in Georgia - it is inefficient on the slopes of the mountains ... He was for the preservation of corn crops and opposed the planting of citrus fruits - they say, the peasants need to eat.

That's right, but corn and wheat could be grown in the Kuban, bringing grain to Georgia. But tangerines and lemons ...

Beria thought, as mathematicians say, exactly the opposite. And this was explained not only by his broad outlook, but also by his principled orientation towards the development of Georgia as an integral part of a single, complementary, all-Union economy.

And this was not only about agriculture. March 2, 1932 Beria initiates a decision to reorganize the Supreme Council of the National Economy

Georgia with the transfer of republican enterprises of heavy industry to the authority of the USSR People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry. It would

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It was a brilliant and promising purely managerial decision. Now, on the one hand, Ordzhonikidze could more effectively organize the development of Georgia's industry, linking it with the all-Union, and on the other hand, Beria could concentrate more on domestic affairs, without, of course, avoiding problems and heavy industry. But it was also a wise political decision, deepening the integration of the Georgian economy with the all-Union one. And this led to the consolidation of Soviet society in other areas as well.

All sorts of Mdivanis thought differently ...

Beria spoke about this at a meeting of Tbilisi party activists on July 21-22, 1935, where he made a report "On the Question of the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia."

Here is part of the transcript of his speech:

"National deviationism was a rather versatile system of nationalist Menshevik views. It is known that the Georgian deviators tried to pass a decree on the "unloading" of Tiflis, the implementation of which would mean the expulsion of foreign elements, and primarily the Armenians.

Also known is the fact of "wild" - in the words of Comrade Stalin - the decree on the cordons with which Georgia was fenced off from the Soviet republics ...

Here are the documents:

1) March 31, 1922, signed by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Comrade. Makharadze and Deputy prev. Council of People's Commissars comrade. The following telegram was sent to M. Okudzhava: "As of this date, the borders of the Republic of Georgia are declared closed (*laughter from hall 6*) and further admission of refugees to the territory of the USSR Georgia has been stopped ...

2) § 1. Persons receiving permission for their relatives to enter Georgia shall pay 50,000 rubles for the issued permits. (*laughter in the audience*)...

§ 5. Persons who arrived in Georgia after August 13, 1917 and wish to obtain the right to permanent residence in Georgia, if their request is granted, shall pay 1 mil. rubles...

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4) ... Georgian citizenship is lost: a Georgian citizen if she marries a foreigner (*laughter in the audience*) ... "

You read this, compare it with today and involuntarily think:

"It's all sad, gentlemen, comrades" ... Yes, and vile!

With THIS famous report, which was soon published in the form of a no less famous pamphlet of the same name, one of the most high-profile purely political accusations of Beria allegedly of falsifying history "to please Stalin" is connected. Beria indeed stated that "the entire history of the Transcaucasian Bolshevik organizations, the entire revolutionary movement of Transcaucasia and Georgia from the first days of its inception are inextricably linked with the work and name of Comrade Stalin." And how many of the "old Bolsheviks" scoffed at this statement then, and types like Antonov-Ovseenko later.

But this is true.

And it's not even that already in 1905 Lenin highly appreciated Stalin's article, published in No. 11 of the illegal newspaper Proletariatis Brdzola (Struggle of the Proletariat) and immediately translated into Russian. And not even that the newspaper itself, at first called Brdzola, was founded back in 1901 (less than a year after Iskra) with the participation of Koba, and he in its first

issue published a program article "Editor's note". Brilliant, by the way, an article of a purely Bolshevik direction - even before the very concept of "Bolshevik" arose.

And it's not even the point that already in 1903 Koba was exiled for the first time to Siberia, to the Irkutsk province, that all the years before the revolution and after the revolution, Stalin followed Lenin without hesitation ...

The point is *who* Stalin became in the new Russia. After all, if we compare his post-October political and organizational scale, his talent with the scale of all these Mdivanis, then everything will immediately fall into place.

But after all, it doesn't happen that in youth - "while hearts are alive for honor" - was a so-so person, neither a candle to God, nor a poker to hell, did not show any outstanding leadership

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qualities, and then he took it and became the great leader of a great power.

Before Stalin and Churchill felt the desire to stand at attention. And here in front of Mdivani - if you imagine such a meeting for a moment - hardly ...

Or will someone deny this too?

Yes, and confirmation of the initially leading role of Stalin in the labor movement in Transcaucasia can be found, in addition to Beria's pamphlet, also in other sources. For example, on October 8, 1904, a new entry appeared in the card of the Tiflis security department: "Dzhugashvili fled from exile and is currently the leader of the party of Georgians, workers."

It is unlikely that the Tiflis gendarmes wrote this with the expectation of reinforcing Beria's arguments.

And one more thing ... How often they write that Beria wrote the pamphlet almost on Stalin's order ... But this is what Stalin was indignant about in a letter to Kaganovich, Yezhov (then head of the Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee. - S.K. .) and Molotov on August 17, 1935:

"I ask you to forbid the Zakkraykom, on the personal responsibility of Beria, to republish my articles and pamphlets of the period 1905-1910 *without my sanction* . *Motives: they were published sloppily, quotations from Ilyich are completely distorted, there is no one to correct these gaps except me* (just think, but what are the referents for? - S.K.), *every time I rejected Beria's request for a reprint without my revision, but despite it's the Transcaucasians uncereemoniously ignoring my protests. In view of this, the categorical ban of the Central Committee on republishing without my sanction is the only way out.*

I will not argue that always and everywhere in all the actions of the hero of this book only one impeccable chivalry is visible. Although the nobility of thoughts and deeds, it's like the freshness of Bulgakov's sturgeon: either it is, or it is not. And if we are guided by trustworthy documents and objective memories, nothing unworthy is found behind Beria.

By objective reminiscences, I'll note in parentheses, I also understand such reminiscences, the authors of which, in Beria's *emotional* assessment, did not go far from the same Antonov

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Ovseenko, but at the same time they involuntarily cite *facts* certifying Beria positively.

However, Lavrenty Pavlovich's persistence in asking Stalin to have his works republished is just a fact. And it is easy to assess it as a manifestation of the very toadying that his detractors passionately accuse Beria of.

But on reflection, one can understand that here we are dealing with the same competence - political, state, and human.

Well, actually!

On the one hand, by the mid-1930s, a new generation had grown up in Georgia, fully formed by the Soviet government and not familiar with those works of Stalin, which made him the leader of the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia and which proved his outstanding political and intellectual level.

On the other hand, it was in Georgia that a considerable number of "old Bolsheviks" (and even more so former Mensheviks, etc.) spread rumors about the secondary role of Stalin in the initial era of the revolutionary struggle.

Yes, there are rumors! Here is volume 19 of the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (the editorial board then included Bukharin, Pyatakov and a number of other prominent oppositionists).

The editorial work on the volume, in which the voluminous article "The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSRG)" was placed, ended on November 1, 1930. By that time, Stalin had already held the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for eight years.

So, in the historical outline of the article "SSRG" in the subsection "The Beginning of the Labor Movement and Social Democracy", the first name that occurs is F. Makharadze. The subsection contains a quotation from him, beginning like this: "Already at the close of 1894, the foundation was being laid for the first strictly Marxist group..." and so on. And this could already be regarded as a hint to the reader: the first to say the Caucasian "meow" was by no means Comrade Stalin, so his role in the development of the labor movement in the Caucasus is not so great.

So, the first name is Makharadze... But maybe Stalin will be mentioned at least later? No, his number is not even number two...

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For the second name mentioned in the subsection is Noy Zhordania... True, he is attested as the leader of the "right-wing opportunist" trend as opposed to the "orthodox Marxist" one, headed by "M. Tskhakaya, F. Makharadze, Soco Dzhugashvishi (Stalin), Al. Tsulukidze and others.

So, the issue of Coco Dzhugashvili was only the fourth ... And further, the activities of Jordania are again described at length. And only then the author of an article in the TSB, reporting that at the beginning of 1903 "the Union Committee was elected, in which the majority turned out to be on the side of the future Bolsheviks (Tskhakaya, Makharadze, Knunyants, Zurabov, Tsulukidze, Bochoroshvili, Stalin, etc.)" "graciously", through gritted teeth, states: "Comrade Stalin is beginning to play the leading role in the revolutionary wing of the Transcaucasian organization."

But then on sheets 582-598 (two sheets per page), in the subsections "Between two revolutions", "Organization of power during the February Revolution", in the next section "The October Revolution and the struggle for Soviet Georgia" (with the subsections "Secession of Transcaucasia from Russia", "Menshevik dictatorship in Georgia", "Bolshevik organization in 1918—

1920", "Peasant Uprisings of 1918-1921", "The End of Menshevik Power", "The First Steps of Soviet Power" and "Anti-Soviet Activities of the Mensheviks"), Stalin's name is missing altogether!

At all!

There is even a "renegade Dzhugeli" (is it because his name is consonant with "Dzhugashvili"?), but there is no Stalin.

It was so unexpected for me that I could not believe my own eyes and went through the text again ... No, that's right - Stalin is not mentioned no way.

By the way, neither Ordzhonikidze nor Kirov are mentioned there... But Jordania is mentioned more than once, and - of course: F. Makharadze, Am. Nazaretyan, S. Kavtaradze, Mravyan, Tskhakaya, Shaumyan and Dzhaparidze (the last two were shot among the 26 Baku commissars, so what is there - you can

mention and "be generous"), Okudzhava, Orakhelashvili "et al."

Stalin, it turns out, fell into the "other".

That's it, dear reader!

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And the "democrats" tell us that the activities of the centers of the anti-party opposition are inventions of the NKVD.

In the bibliography to the encyclopedic article mentioned above, there are no works by Stalin either, by the way. But there are works by F. Makharadze, E. Drabkina and some G. Natadze and S. Kakabadze.

And this is in the TSB, published in Moscow! One can imagine how things were before Beria - under the "Marxist patriarchs" like Mdivani, Eliava and Orakhelashvili - in Georgia itself!

So what were the young communists, Komsomol members of Georgia and just young Georgians supposed to think about the role of Comrade Stalin? But the pioneers were already growing up! Yes, pioneers! Those who were born in 1921, by 1935 had already reached Komsomol age.

Young people do not really believe allegations. And here - there are no works of Stalin, but the "recognized Bolsheviks" Mikha Tskhakaya, Philip Makharadze, Shalva Eliava, Mamiya Orakhelashvili are perplexed about him: "What kind of leader is this? »

And the former Mensheviks whisper that such a smart as Noah Zhordania, called Stalin nothing more than a barbarian.

And the unspoken question could not help but arise among the young: "So was Comrade Stalin the Bolshevik of Transcaucasia No. 1, was he the "Caucasian Lenin" - as Zarya Vostoka writes now?

All this was explained, of course, not by an accidental oversight - in the country then there was still a struggle between the Trotskyists and the Bolshevik core of the party, headed by Stalin. And the "objectivity" of the article in the TSB was one of the confirmations that in this struggle the Trotskyists and oppositionists (and they held, I repeat, solid positions in the TSB at that time) do not neglect any methods. Not without reason, after all, the authors of the "Georgian" article in the TSB not only "forgot" about Stalin every now and then, but also about Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Sergey Kirov, and, in fact, about Anastas Mikoyan ...

In fact, the opposition not only distorted the role of Stalin in the development of the labor movement in the Transcaucasus, but made an attempt to disavow both him and his concept of the country's development - with an emphasis on economic independence!

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And the youth was deprived of the opportunity to see an objective historical picture.

To some extent, Beria's report and pamphlet filled the information gap, but the best answer to all questions would be a reprint of these old articles by Stalin. This would also contribute to the political education of young communists, and would refute gossip.

After all, Stalin really deserved to be called the "Caucasian Lenin"! He deserved both as a practitioner of the Bolshevik movement, and as his ideologue.

So here, too, Beria turned out to be not a toady, but a mature politician, wisely taking care of the political education of the masses.

Is not it?

Stalin insisted that Beria, by decision of the Central Committee, was forbidden to print early works without his sanction. But it was Beria's efforts in this direction that initiated another, objectively very relevant, decision of the Central Committee - "to recognize

necessary complete edition of the works of Comrade. Stalin and instruct the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute ... to develop a plan for publishing.

Mamia Orakhelashvili was then the Deputy Director of IMEL. But he and the others so "ran away" to comply with the decision of the Central Committee that the first volume of the Collected Works of Stalin was signed for publication only after the war (the author's preface to the first volume is dated January 1946).

Such is the revealing detail of the "developed cult of personality"...

However, Mamiya Orakhelashvili was up to the scribbles of some kind of Koba! In the summer of 1935, he spent days and nights with Abel Yenukidze, who had just been expelled from the party, relieved of his duties as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Transcaucasia and staying in Kislovodsk as now authorized by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for the Mineral Group. In September, Stalin wrote from Sochi to Moscow:

*"Yenukidze is not aware of his fall, and he does not suffer from modesty ... he plays politics, gathers dissatisfied people around him and deftly portrays himself as a victim of inflamed passions in the party ..."*

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This is how the situation in the party and in the country developed! On the one hand, Stalin and Beria, pulling the cart of daily state work. And on the other hand: the "victim of Stalin" - the decomposed Yenukidze, and the "victim of Beria" - blabbed Orakhelashvili.

And this confrontation between the sovereign cause and irresponsible malice in the next few years in Transcaucasia and especially in Georgia only worsened.

YES, ACTUALLY, it never weakened there. After all, politically Georgia was the most complex of all the national republics.

The East is a delicate matter, we know that. But by the beginning of the 20th century, in Georgia alone, of all the other eastern regions of Russia, what I would call political intelligence was especially developed.

Central Asia remained politically virgin in the European sense. Azerbaijan experienced a strong cosmopolitan influence, since oil is also oil in Africa. True, in Armenia there were not so few home-grown nationalist politicians who had a chance in the all-Russian arena. But Georgia eclipsed everyone!

Zhordania, Gegechkori, Tsereteli - these were all-Russian "stars" of the first magnitude. How many "politicians" in Georgia tried to shine with at least their reflected light, but there were also those inclined to their own game - more nationalistic.

Alas, many leading Georgian Bolsheviks also had "star" ambitions. And just as Menshevism was popular among Georgians before the revolution, so now Trotskyism was popular there. Not in its political sense - the Georgian Bolsheviks were not very delirious about the world revolution, but in a psychological sense, so to speak.

Korney Chukovsky has an excellent collective psychological portrait of the Trotskyists, and this one is purely for himself, in his diary of 1933, where he wrote on January 28:

*"Trotskyists have always been hated for me not as politicians, but first of all as characters. I hate their phrasing, their posturing, their gestures, their*

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*pathos. Their leader himself was always aesthetically unbearable for me: hair, narrow beard, provincial demonism. A mixture of Mephistopheles and an assistant barrister ... "*

And this portrait was reminiscent of many Transcaucasian opponents of Beria.

In addition, there were enough opponents not only in Transcaucasia, which can be seen

at least from a Stalinist letter that left Sochi for Moscow on November 2, 1933:

*"Kaganovich. Molotov*

*Pravda's behavior towards the Transcaucasian party organizations is becoming strange. In oil, cotton, and Abkhazian tobacco, Zakkraykom and local party organizations have achieved most serious successes. There are corresponding reports in Pravda. And "Pravda" hushed up the facts and did not publish reports. Reports of Chuvashia, Udmurtia are published. And the report of the Zakkraykom is rotting in Pravda. Pravda praises Barinov, although Barinov is a brake, not an engine of oil production, while the merits of the Communist Party organization are hushed up. And this rotten incongruity is admitted by the organ of the Pravda party. I think Kahiani is to blame for this, who stood and stands against the current leadership in the Transcaucasus. It's time to put an end to this mess! It is time to ensure that the friends of the left-bourgeois radicals, Kostanyan, Aominadze and others, do not have leading posts in Pravda.*

*Stalin."*

Barinov is a 45-year-old manager of the Azneft trust, an old Bolshevik (by this time many of them were already beginning to show, to put it mildly, incomplete official compliance).

Kostanyan - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Armenia.

Kahiani is a member of the bureau of the editorial board of Pravda, but I will speak about him and Lominadze separately, but now I will only note: the scale of Kahiani's personality is already visible from the way he suppressed information from his supposedly native Transcaucasia, only to petty annoy Beria.

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But the insult was applied to three republics at once - to which Beria clearly drew Stalin's attention.

The essence of the conflict is seen transparently - Beria himself was always accurate, punctual, smart in thoughts and deeds, and demanded this from others. And the arrogant young Transcaucasian "leaders" (Kakhiani and Lominadze had worked in Transcaucasia for a number of years) who were more ready to talk than to do

pince-nez - their complete antipode.

And the personal antagonism was so strong that it did not disappear even after leaving "leaders" to other places of work.

BERIA himself was a professional - an intelligence professional, management professional, and therefore knew how to appreciate professionals.

And this is what happened in Georgia when he was the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee there. Nikolay Kozmich Zworykin, the brother of the famous electronics engineer, television inventor Vladimir Zworykin, worked in the republic for a long time and gained fame as a qualified engineer-designer of hydraulic structures.

The brothers had a bad social background: their father was a Murom merchant of the first guild, a steamer and a bread merchant. It so happened that Vladimir (later he will be called a gift to the American continent) ended up in the USA and was doing well. However, in the thirties he came to the USSR more than once, was inclined to accept the invitation of the government and stay. And only the confluence of a number of circumstances and the unkind advice of Zworykin's brother-in-law, the future academician-geologist Dmitry Nalivkin, deprived Russia of one of its

eminent sons.

Nikolai remained... And so, during the construction of the hydroelectric complex, a failure occurred, and as a result, Zworykin and his subordinates were convicted, nevertheless continuing to work. And as soon as the object was successfully put into operation, the criminal record was removed from the entire brigade.

This was Beria's style - not to avoid harshness, but not to allow cruelty, but



the more injustice. That is why those who became his trusted collaborators already

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would not want to deal with anyone else. We have a vivid example of this in the person of Vsevolod Merkulov-Merkulov was four years older than Beria. The son of an officer, he studied at the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of St. Petersburg University. In 1916, he was drafted into the army, and after graduating from the Orenburg ensign school in 1917, he managed to fight a little.

Since March 1918, the ex-ensign Merkulov has been unemployed in Tiflis, and in August he begins working as a teacher at a school for the blind. In Menshevik Georgia, they could not force him to serve in the army - this was not Russia, where both "Reds" and "Whites" were mobilized. He himself, it seems, did not really decide then who he should be.

But in September 1921, after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, Merkulov was accepted into the service of the Georgian Cheka. And soon Beria appears in Tiflis, and Merkulov enters his orbit already in the Chekist period of Beria's activity in Tiflis.

In October 1931, Beria was transferred from Chekist to party work, and he took Merkulov (a member of the CPSU (b) since 1925) from the GPU of Georgia to his place in Zakkraikom. But before that, as we already know, Beria's position was problematic. And this is what Merkulov wrote to him in 1930, at a difficult time, when Beria's relations with the then party leadership of Transcaucasia escalated.

*"Here we have rumors about your alleged imminent departure from Tiflis ... In connection with them, I have a deep request to you: do not forget me. In case you really decided to leave the Transcaucasus, I beg you to take me with you to where you will work. The city and position do not interest me: I agree to work anywhere ... "*

This request deserves our attention for three reasons ... Firstly, it characterizes Beria as a person and leader. Secondly, she characterizes Merkulov as a person. And, thirdly, it to some extent characterizes the then party Transcaucasian leaders and the general atmosphere in the "tops" of Transcaucasia.

Having said that, I will now explain in more detail...

Merkulov himself was a rather outstanding personality,

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had a good pen, wrote under the pseudonym "Vsevolod Rokk" ... Yes, he rose with Beria: assistant to the first secretary of the regional committee, head of the Soviet trade department of the regional committee, head of the industrial and transport department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia and deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from September 1, 1938 - 1st Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR Beria, and from December 15 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar Beria and Head of the GUGB.

However, it is impossible to compare Merkulov with a "sticky" fish. Beria just appreciated him before others, and this once again proves the personnel foresight of Lavrenty Pavlovich. But not only Beria considered Merkulov, Stalin himself appreciated the potential of his "protégé". After all, it was he who later appointed the Minister of State Security, Merkulov the Minister of State Control of the USSR ...

And if such a person was ready to follow Beria anywhere, then this can be regarded unambiguously: Merkulov was interested in working with a leader, with whom it was interesting to work. And this is a plus for both the boss and the subordinate. Moreover, the letter was written in 1930, when Beria was only

Chairman of the GPU of the Georgian SSR, and in the event of a transfer, he could hardly count on a post higher than the head of some regional department. And not necessarily in a very big city. And then, after all, few places were good with food, even in Ukraine. And the Chekists had a salary

not one of the greats...

Mamia Orakhelashvili and other "leaders" such a request of Merkulov indirectly certifies not in the best way. Indeed, from the mood of Merkulov it follows that the party leadership of Transcaucasia did not appreciate him, a clearly intelligent person, only because Merkulov was "Beria's man." The second option: Merkulov was bullied precisely because of his high business qualities. But only incompetent leaders can do this, which these Mamii were, however.

And since at that time a quite competent leader was at the head of the country, Mamiyam had to leave. Beria was rightfully raised in Transcaucasia to

command heights.

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In 1935, Stalin put forward the slogan "Cadres decide everything!". And one of the brightest personal confirmations of the correctness of Stalin's statement was Lavrenty Beria.

TO be more objectively convinced of this, let us return to the first period of full-fledged leadership of Beria in the Transcaucasus. I already wrote that he quickly reoriented agricultural production in Georgia to the cultivation of crops that only the mountainous and subtropical zone of Georgia could give the country: citrus fruits, grapes, tea, and tobacco. Already in 1933, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR noted in their resolution that the achievements of Georgia laid the foundation for the independence of the Soviet Union in the production of tea.

However, Beria did not start with tea, but with the fact that in December 1931 he liquidated the Georgian Collective Farm Center, replacing it with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. And unlike, for example, Kosior and Khataevich in Ukraine, he did not reduce, but even somewhat expanded the subsidiary farms of collective farmers in order to avoid the threat of starvation. And in parallel, the first secretary of the Zakkraykom did a lot of organizational work both in the office and when traveling to the villages. Plenums of the Georgian Central Committee were devoted to individual crops, congresses of collective farmers were held, exhibitions were organized, portraits of leading workers adorned the front pages of newspapers and magazine covers.

As a result, in January 1934, at the IX Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, he had every right to say this:

"A completely stable situation in the countryside of Georgia, the strengthening of collective farms, the growth of collectivization, the successful introduction of special and industrial crops ... and the conscientious fulfillment by collective farmers and individual workers of their obligations to the state have become a reality."

Here is the digital "background" of the above: in 1931, 36% of peasant farms were united in collective farms, by 1939 - 86%. At the same time, in 1936 the income of collective farms amounted to 234,992 thousand rubles, and in 1939 they exceeded half a billion.

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Alexei Topygin, in his book about Beria, states that "as an organizer of agricultural production, Beria turned out to be at a height that was accessible to very, very few." I will clarify this assessment by adding only one union to it: "And as an organizer of agricultural production ..."

For example, the same A. Topygin rightly states that under Beria, Georgia became a leader in the creation of the Soviet food industry in terms of canning fruits and vegetables, industrial winemaking, tea processing ...

Here, Beria's closest associate from the ZakChK, Vladimir Dekanozov, who became the people's commissar of the food industry of Georgia, also worked hard.

But Beria was no less competent in organizing the cultural revolution in Transcaucasia. In this case, I will refer to the data of A. Toptygin:

"In 1928/29, several resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were adopted on the construction of a higher school. In Georgia (where Madame Orakhelashvili was then working in the field of higher education. - S.K.) they reacted to this - several institutions were created, eking out, to put it mildly, a miserable existence ...

L. Beria treated these issues as a serious combat mission. Only at the end of 1931 and 1932, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia adopted six resolutions on various areas of public education (over the previous five years, this problem was addressed twice ... discussing the decisions of the plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks). The resolutions adopted during the Beria secretariat fit on 1-1.5 pages, but they were literally crammed with numbers, amounts, names of those responsible for execution ... Since 1932, Georgia has been moving to universal primary education for children and adolescents ... According to Thousands of Georgians are sent to study in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Saratov to the Komsomol recruitment ... By 1938, Georgia was one of the first places in the Soviet Union in terms of the level of education of the population.

Beria headed the Transcaucasus on the eve of the second five-year plan. And it was mutual luck for both Beria and Za

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caucasus. Beria got the opportunity for ever-increasing activity. Transcaucasia received an active leader capable of solving the big tasks ahead.

All-Union directives for the new five-year plan (1932-1937) were approved by the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which ended on February 4, 1932. And in March, the joint plenum of the Zakkraykom considered the main directions of the five-year plan for the development of the Transcaucasian Federation. The volume of industrial production in Georgia was to increase by more than five times, the production of ferroalloys - by seven and a half times, coal mining - by twelve times ...

IT WAS 1936.

At the end of this year, at the Extraordinary VIII Congress of Soviets, a new Constitution of the USSR - Stalin's - was to be adopted. But not only the legal base of Soviet power was being updated - the structure of the union state also had to change. The Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was abolished on the basis of the new Constitution. The Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian SSRs were directly part of the USSR as union republics.

The structure of economic management also changed - in the Union republics, people's commissariats of light, food, timber industry, grain and livestock farms were formed. And on October 17, Kaganovich and Molotov sent to Stalin in Sochi a draft of the corresponding resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

ZSFSR in this project, for obvious reasons, was not.

On the same day, Stalin answered by telephone:

*"Your project ... raises objections from Transcaucasians, for example, from Beria.*

*Formally, the TSFSR should also be mentioned in the list of union republics, but in 2 months the TSFSR will no longer exist, and of course, it is not worth creating people's commissariats in the TSFSR in order to liquidate them in two months. On the other hand, the absence of the TSFSR in the list of union republics may cause bewilderment ... "*

Stalin proposed to wait with the publication of the post-

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changes until the adoption of the new Constitution, but for now, to engage in the formation of republican people's commissariats in fact ... And at the end he added:

*"As for the project itself, it is, in my opinion, worded somewhat clumsily. It is inconvenient to order the union republics from above to form such and such people's commissariats. I imagined the matter in such a way that the union republics, each separately, would turn to the Central Executive Committee with the wishes to create such and such people's commissariats, and the Central Executive Committee would not object. But you did the opposite."*

It may seem to the reader that this is a trifle and that Beria raised a storm in a teacup ... And, perhaps, someone will say: "Just think, they didn't remember "his" Federation, and Beria immediately objected! And that it was Stalin who began to build a democrat out of himself - they say, you can't tell the union republics. He pointed them out! Moscow sometimes changed the first secretaries of the Central Committee in these very republics like gloves ... "

But it was not a trifle! And if you think about it, *from* this "trifle" came into 1953 and the strange death of Stalin, and the unexpected arrest of Beria.

And here's the thing.

Replacing First Secretary of the Central Committee Ruben from Moscow with Bagirov in Azerbaijan is permissible and acceptable, because from Moscow to the very outskirts, all communists must strictly obey the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

This is a party, the political vanguard of society, a union of like-minded ideologists who have voluntarily united.

And the union republics are Soviet power, they are the whole of society. And only the society has the right to decide for the society!

And the fact that Stalin (and Beria too!) saw this subtle difference showed that Stalin viewed the supremacy of the party in society not as something immutable and eternal, but as a measure necessary until Soviet power was strengthened and developed. .

And such an approach could hardly please the already emerging - so far only in its rudimentary forms - partocracy. Moreover, such a trifling, it would seem, "difference" in the approaches of Stalin and the party-state "top" of the USSR to the prospects for the development of the social system

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affected in the near future - in 1937, the year of the beginning of serious repressions.

But more will be said about this.

The reorganizations of 1936 in Transcaucasia had many aspects, starting with a change in purely administrative division and subordination and ending ... However, it would be necessary to start with the political aspect.

The Transcaucasian Federation had both a common Council of People's Commissars of the TSFSR and separate republican Councils of People's Commissars. With regard to the party leadership, it was the same: there was the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and three subordinate Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

Now the Zakkraykom was abolished, and Beria remained only the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia. On the one hand, it was like a downgrade. On the other hand, he could now focus on Georgia's problems. However, before that, the first secretary of the Zakkraykom still had a lot of trouble. After all, the preparation of any reorganization is not an easy task if it is carried out in a businesslike manner, and not in a businesslike manner.

Beria knew how to work and did not know how to imitate violent activity. Therefore, the year 1936 brought him many new tasks in addition to the already familiar ones - it was necessary to prepare the "separation" of the Transcaucasian republics. But here's what I want

notice ... Let's read Stalin's letter again and try to understand - why did Beria protest? In 2 months, the ZSFSR will no longer exist, and then what does he care about possible insults to Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are already almost "foreign" to him!

But Beria never worked "from now to now." He was a complete antipode of personalities like Suslov (if in the latter case one can speak of a personality), with his sacramental "we were not instructed." Beria subtly understood that, despite the almost liquidation of the Transcaucasian Federation, grievances could arise. And that's not good for business. And if so, then, Comrade Stalin, we should take this into account.

Comrade Stalin and took into account. After all, he also knew how to understand everything subtly and knew the power "little things".

The year 1936 flew by in troubles... The Transcaucasian Federation has gone into the past, and the coming 1937 was already the year of the twentieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

He was

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year of the centenary of the death of Pushkin, and the whole country was preparing for this date. The date was, although with a mournful meaning, but they prepared to celebrate it with an emphasis not on the fact that Pushkin was dead, but on the fact that Pushkin was immortal. And this one seems to literary anniversary had a serious political significance. Not only Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, but also Iosif Dzhugashvili understood the importance of the cultural front, especially when the country wins one victory after another.

Some people celebrated this date, however, in their own way. On the cover of one of the jubilee student notebooks, a knight at the crossroads was depicted. The contours of the intercepts of the scabbard of the sword were made up of letters, and the letters were on the badges of the horse's harness. In general, everything formed - upon careful study - into the slogan: "Down with the CPSU (b)".

Tbilisi was actively preparing for the Pushkin anniversary, but they were also preparing to celebrate the 750th anniversary of Rustaveli's poem "The Knight in the Panther's Skin". After all, the Georgians had someone and what to be proud of in literature! The treasurer of Queen Tamara, the sovereign feudal lord, Rustaveli in the XII century sang honor, justice, goodness, denied evil as a natural principle ...

The anniversary of Rustaveli became the same all-Union holiday as the anniversary of Pushkin, and although the scale of Rustaveli was undoubtedly great, the fact that the entire country loudly celebrated the anniversary of the creation of the Georgian was the merit not only of Stalin, but also of Beria.

Alas, the year 1937 was marked not only by glorious anniversaries... It also entered the modern history of the country as a year of serious dramatic events. The "democrats" call this period the "Great Terror," and the repressions between the summer of 1937 and the spring of 1938 were indeed more significant in scope and depth than in any other period.

BUT HERE were they really massive and, even more so, unfounded - this is a big question. And on it, as well as on other events of 1937, we, dear reader, will have to stop for a long time ...

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## Chapter 9

### "ORGANS", PLENUMS, CONSPIRACIES, REPRESSIONS AND ELECTIONS

"IN AUGUST 1938, Beria arrived in Moscow and on August 22 was appointed 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov. And soon the era of Beria began in the NKVD ... "- this was the beginning of the first version of the 9th chapter, which was originally called "NKVD sample 1939-1941."

But as I worked on it, I realized that at first it was necessary to say at least briefly about the predecessors of the NKVD, about the activities of the NKVD in 1937-1938 and even more.

early, and only then move on to later times.

Then it turned out that the topic "NKVD sample 1937-1938." adjoining the theme of the Constitution of 1936 and the first elections to the first Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And the 9th chapter began to be called "NKVD, the Constitution of the sample of 1936 and elections" ...

But even later, it became clear that it was necessary to somehow dwell on the topic of a military conspiracy, at the plenums of the Central Committee in 1937, as well as on some social trends that had fully formed by 1937.

The chapter grew, "budded off" chapter 10 from itself, finally took on the form that the reader will now get acquainted with, and acquired its final name. The one the reader has just read.

So we move on...

LAVRENTY Beria became a Chekist in 1921, during the era of the Cheka Dzerzhinsky. And on August 5, 1931, the authorized representative of the OGPU in the ZSFSR L.P. Beria was introduced to the board of the OGPU.

The Cheka is the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, organized at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on December 7 (20), 1917.

On January 23, 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to abolish Cheka and the creation on its basis of the State

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donative political administration (GPU) as part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR.

On February 9, 1922, Order No. 64 of the Cheka was issued announcing the abolition of the Cheka. However, the same Dzerzhinsky remained the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (he was from March 25, 1919 to July 7, 1923).

On December 30, 1922, the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR adopted the Union Treaty between the RSFSR (which then included the Asian national republics), the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR and the Transcaucasian Federation.

Clause 12 of the agreement stated:

"In order to establish revolutionary legality on the territory of the USSR and to unite the efforts of the union republics in the fight against counter-revolution, a united body of state political administration is being established ... under the Council of People's Commissars of the Union ..."

On November 2, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution on the organization of the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which was announced by OGPU order No. 486 of November 21, 1923. Paragraph 9 of this order stated that the OGPU of the USSR directs the work of the local bodies of the OGPU "through its authorized agents under the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics."

Around that time, the generalized concept of "organs" arose ...

Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky remained the chairman of the OGPU, and after his death from a heart attack, provoked by an emotional speech at the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on July 20, 1926, Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky became chairman.

The total staff of the central and Moscow city apparatus of the OGPU was 2,409 people as of December 1, 1929, but since the 1930s, the functions of the OGPU have expanded (it included police agencies, economic departments by industry, etc.).

On May 10, 1934, Menzhinsky died, and on July 10, 1934, by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, on the basis of the OGPU, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR was created, headed by the Chairman of the former OGPU, Genrikh Yagoda.

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Among other departments and departments (at first there were eleven,

including the GUPO - the Main Directorate of Fire Protection, and the OAGS - the Department of Civil Status Acts) as part of the NKVD of the USSR, the Main Directorate of State Security was formed with a staff of 1410 people.

The work of the GUGB was supervised by the people's commissar himself, and formally the position of the head of the GUGB did not exist.

By a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of October 7, 1935, special ranks were introduced for employees of the GUGB: commissar of state security of the 1st rank, commissioner of the 2nd rank of the GB, commissar of the 3rd rank of the GB, senior major of the GB, major of the GB, captain of the GB, senior lieutenant of the GB, lieutenant of GB, junior lieutenant of GB and sergeant of GB.

Special ranks were two steps higher than the army: the commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank was equal to the commander of the 1st rank of the Red Army, and from May 1940 - to the general of the army; the captain of the GB was equal to an army colonel, and the sergeant of the GB wore two "heads of the head" in his buttonholes - like a lieutenant of the Red Army.

On November 26, 1935, the title of "General Commissar of State Security" appeared, awarded to Yagoda (and later to Yezhov and later to Beria).

Ten months later, Yagoda was relieved of his post as People's Commissar, and on September 26, 1936, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov came to the NKVD -

Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Party Control Commission. Yagoda April 3

1937 was arrested and March 15, 1938 - after the trial of Bukharin - Rykov, where he passed as one of the accused, was shot.

Yezhov was relieved of his post by the NKVD on November 25

1938, April 10, 1939 arrested and February 4, 1940 shot.

The fate of these two people's commissars is explained by the insidious plans of Stalin in his struggle for sole power in the party, but this is not so. Although I do not deny that a certain plan arose from Stalin *in the course of the development of the situation*.

But I will tell about this when we come to August 1937...

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The repressions of the beginning and end of the 1930s have not yet been given a comprehensive objective assessment. Changing the state of affairs in this matter is beyond the scope of the book, but since when "democrats" say "Beria", they mean "repressions" (even if we are talking about repressions of the period when Beria was in the Transcaucasus), about this side of the matter would need something and say...

One of the main symbols of the Stalinist era, the "democrats" consider not Vera Mukhina's "Worker and Collective Farm Woman", created for the Soviet pavilion at the World Exhibition of 1937 in Paris, but the law, as they say, "on five spikelets", or the law from the "seventh- eighth", that is, dated August 7, 1932.

So, in the preface to the well-known reader "The Correspondence of Stalin and Kaganovich" it is stated that "under the conditions of famine, these measures were directed against the starving peasants, who, saving their lives, cut spikelets of bread for collective farm fields.

In fact, spikelets are not grain, but wheat, rye, etc., but "democrats" after all, buns grow on trees, so so be it ...

Let's not take into account the fact that it was Christ who could feed a horde of people with five loaves of bread, and you won't be fed with "five spikelets" of "bread", so they cut it off - if they already cut it off - not five of these notorious spikelets, but, presumably, more.

I am not being ironic here - my grandmother almost died of hunger in Ukraine in the Dnepropetrovsk region with her three daughters, so I know - there was hunger. And there were, alas, starving peasants.

However, according to the "democratic" authors of the same preface,

six months of the law from 07.08.32, on the basis of it, by January 15, 1933, 103 thousand people were convicted. "Of these (according to the developed data on 79 thousand convicts), 4880 people were sentenced, according to the same authors, to execution, and more than 26 thousand people to 10 years in prison" ...

Strange! Many millions were starving, but hundreds of thousands were condemned.

Strange and something else ... January 15 in Russia - it's winter. August 7 in it is already the end of summer, and the harvest of 1932

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By the time the law was promulgated, it seemed to be finished. In addition, the instruction "on the application of the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 7 / VIII-32 on the protection of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property" was approved only on September 16, 1932.

What are these "spikelets" and where at the end of 1932 did a hundred thousand convicts gather under the "law of five spikelets"?

The answer, dear reader, is found in the very name of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (the law "from the seventh to the eighth")! For there it was not about the five spikelets, of course, but about the protection of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property.

On July 20, 1932, Stalin, who initiated this decision, wrote to Kaganovich and Molotov:

*"Recently, firstly, the theft of goods on railway transport (they are embezzled for tens of millions of rubles) has become more frequent, and secondly, the theft of cooperative and collective farm property ... According to the law, these gentlemen (plunderers. - S.K.) are considered as ordinary thieves receive two or three years in prison (formally!), but in reality they are amnestied after 6-8 months. Such a regime .... only encourages them ... To endure such a situation is unthinkable. I propose to issue a law ... which would:*

*a) equated in their importance railway cargo, collective farm property and cooperative property with state property;*

*b) punished for embezzlement ... at least ten years in prison, and as a rule - death penalty...*

*Without these (and similar) draconian socialist measures it is impossible to establish a new social discipline, and without such discipline - it is impossible to defend and strengthen our new system ... "*

So, not for five spikelets, almost five thousand people were shot by January 15, 1933, but for millions (in total, of course) theft, including - factories and railways.

And everyone tells us about the "five spikelets".

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EARLIER I gave other examples, from which it should be clear that with the beginning of the first five-year plan, all the internal enemies of the new Russia revived and became more active. After all, the five-year plan was given to the country at a difficult price. On May 4, 1935, in a speech in the Kremlin Palace at a reception in honor of graduates of the Red Army academies (Pravda published it on May 6), Stalin recalled:

"We inherited from the old times a technically backward and devastated by four years of the imperialist war, devastated again by semi-impoverished, devastated country ... three years of the Civil War, a country with a semi-literate population, with low technology, with separate oases of industry, drowning in a sea of the smallest peasant farms - this is the kind of country we inherited from the past ... "

His audience knew how right the General Secretary of the Central Committee ... They knew that he



He was right when he went on like this:

"The task was to transfer this country from the rails ... of darkness to the rails of modern industry and mechanized agriculture ... The question was: either we will solve this problem in the shortest possible time ... or ... our country ... will lose its independence and turn into an object of the game of the imperialist powers ... "

The "academicians" of the Red Army listened to what the whole country would read in a day:

"It was necessary to create a first-class industry ... And for this it was necessary to make sacrifices and introduce the strictest economy in everything, it was necessary to save on food, and on schools, and on manufacture, in order to accumulate the necessary funds for creating an industry ... It is clear, that in such a big and difficult undertaking ... success can only be seen after a few years. Therefore, it was necessary to arm yourself with strong nerves, Bolshevik restraint and stubborn patience in order to overcome the first setbacks and steadily move forward ... "

Stalin was right a hundred times, but what was before his rightness to a fist deprived of good? Deprived of a normal piece of bread to the townsfolk? To a narrow-minded - albeit through no fault of his own - peasant in the village? Arrogant in his intellectual

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arrogance to the old specialist, internally hostile to the new Russia? And the new Soviet bureaucrat?

All of them were dissatisfied with the deteriorating quality of life. And this discontent tried to take advantage of (and strengthen it) various political forces - from the Trotskyists, who fought "against Stalin", to the anti-Soviet, who fought both against Stalin and against Soviet power in general.

So objective circumstances made certain repressive measures in the "reconstruction period" inevitable.

But this is the first half of the 1930s. How was it in the second half?

BEFORE me lies a book bound in black with crimson letters: "The Book of Memory of the Victims of Political Repressions in the Kalinin Region. Martyrology. 1937-1-938.

This is a sad document. But this is in contrast to the libelous collections of the document (although not without a touch of distortion in the introductory articles and in the comments). And it's easier to work with a document ... You can extract facts from it.

And they are worth bringing here. Thus, in the introductory article by G.P. Tsvetkov clearly and distinctly reports that soon after the murder of S.M. Kirov:

"The Judicial Collegium of the OGPU was replaced by a Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, endowed with the right of expulsion and exile, by imprisonment in forced labor camps for up to 5 years" (hereinafter, it is highlighted by me. - S.K.) .

I will interrupt the citation to clarify - in fact, even in the OGPU, in addition to the Special Meeting, since 1933 there was an institution of "troikas" that had the right to apply capital punishment. But it was every time really special cases. Each time a separate Politburo Resolution was adopted on the granting of such rights (for example, on the judicial "troika" of the OGPU embassy in Belarus; on the "troika" in the Leningrad Region "comprising comrades Kirov, Medved and Kodatsky" and on a number of "troikas" of the OGPU in some regions and republics).

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And now I will continue quoting the article by G.P. Tsvetkova.

"By order of the NKVD of the USSR of May 27, 1935, the NKVD of the republics, departments

territories and regions , **NKVD-UNKVD troikas** were formed , which were subject to **the rights of the Special Conference**. The troika **included** : the head of the UNKVD, the head of the police department and the regional prosecutor. By order of the NKVD of the USSR of July 30 ... regional, republican and regional troikas, whose members were approved by the secretary of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the head of the NKVD department and the regional prosecutor. In 1937, a commission was also formed consisting of the people's commissar of internal affairs and the prosecutor of the USSR (deuce).

**Threes** and twos (G.P. Tsvetkov for some reason uses the plural when speaking of "twos", although he himself said that there was only one "two" in the USSR and included two top officials of the state. - S.K. ) **were given the right to apply capital punishment**. Troikas and deuces could act accordingly (again, "twos" - was this G.P. Tsvetkov a loser, or what? - S.K.) of territories and regions. **These extrajudicial bodies were abolished in November 1938**. From that time until September 1953, **the only non-judicial body** operated in the state security bodies - the Special Conference (endowed, I remind you, only with the right of expulsion and exile, as well as imprisonment in forced labor camps, and **"increased" its rights "to VMN" only with the beginning of the war in 1941**. - S.K.).

Here's how simple and clear everything is: since November 1938, there were no "triples" in the USSR, that is, there were no extrajudicial bodies with the right to apply capital punishment.

And most of the "shooting" tales of "democratic" "historians", and even more so - "publicists" who claim that "the executioner Beria was replaced by the executioner Yezhov" (in that order, I was not mistaken!), Are not worth a damn.

Let's return to the "Martyrology of the Kalinin Region"... In the second introductory article, Professor Smirnov, Dean of the Faculty of History of Tver State University, writes:

"The survivors of the political terror of 1937—

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1938 repeatedly asked themselves and us the question: why, for what purposes did millions of Soviet citizens suffer innocently? No one can give a complete answer even now, but, of course, with the help of repression, Stalin strengthened his political positions as a sole dictator, and also solved all those political, economic and social problems that were accumulating in the state like mountains "...

For the historian, this passage is actually disgraceful, since it shows how his incompetence, and, alas, dishonesty ...

A scientist must not only collect facts, but also comprehend them. And even a historian devoid of a sense of historicity cannot fail to know that Stalin was not a dictator... That by the end of the 1930s, many of the problems that had accumulated in Russia over the previous three hundred years were just beginning to find their solution.

However, Professor Smirnov is not Antonov-Ovseenko. He is still a scientist, and therefore he further reports the facts, and reports them in such a way and in such a sequence that, in fact, he himself gives an answer to the question to which, in his opinion, "no one can give an answer."

And what does he say?

And here's what:

"In 1936, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, instead of G.G., who was relieved of his post and then shot, Beria was appointed by N.I. Yezhov ... The final sanction for mass arrests (this, alas, is a lie, and a lie for a historian is impermissible. - S.K.) was given by the February-March plenum of 1937, at which I.V. Stalin called for smashing and uprooting mercilessly "enemies

working class" and "traitors to our Motherland". Soon followed the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N.I. Yezhov "On the operation to repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements", approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 31, 1937.

Here we must immediately make a clarification ... The decision to carry out such an "operation" was not directly related to the main agenda of either the February March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, or even the June plenum of the Central Committee in the same year.

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And I will elaborate on this later.

Perhaps the attentive reader himself has already noticed some oddities in Professor Smirnov's information. The plenum ended at the beginning of March and seemed to have already "given sanction for arrests", and Yezhov issues an order only at the end of July (obviously, this refers to the operational order of the People's Commissar No. 00447 of July 30, 1937, and possibly his own operational order 00486 of August 15, 1937). Why such a delay?

Yes, because there was no "delay". And you have to lie to hide from us very dynamic and to this day well not covered events of that time.

After all, one more absurdity in Professor Smirnov's statements must be immediately pointed out - between Yezhov's order and the February-March plenum there was also a June plenum. So isn't it more correct to link Yezhov's order with the decisions of this plenum? (Looking ahead, I will say that to a certain extent it was so!)

And I want to warn the reader that "democratic" historians, either through thoughtlessness or deliberately, but combine into one TWO quite different processes - the mass repressions of 1937-1938 and the repressions in the Soviet military and party-state leadership in the same 1937 - 1938.

**I will repeat and highlight boldly: two rather different processes are mixed into one: the elimination of a possible "fifth column" in the lower classes of society and the elimination of a specific anti-state (formally - anti-Stalinist) conspiracy of the "tops".**

These two categories of repression coincided in time and were, of course, mutually connected - if only by their common direction against anti-socialist elements. But, nevertheless, in order to understand them, they must be clearly distinguished!

And in each of these processes it is possible to single out, by the way, at least two more... Let's say that the conspiracy of the "top" was in some of its manifestations rather "deaf" than organizationally formalized. But he was. It simply could not be - we will see it.

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Lavrenty Be

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Riya was - unlike many of his colleagues and party comrades - unquestionably competent. Even under the new electoral system, he would not have been rejected *by the masses* and would have been elected in any case. And so he not only responded to the draft constitution, but did it clearly and extensively. His article "The New Constitution and the Transcaucasian Federation" appeared in Pravda on June 12.

It was sustained completely in the spirit of Stalin's ideas, but the old Chekist would not have been himself if he had not warned:

"There is no doubt that attempts to use the new constitution for their own counter-revolutionary purposes will also be made by all the inveterate enemies of the Soviet government, primarily from among the crushed groups of Trotskyist-Zinovievites."

BERIA was, of course, right in his fears! On the eve of the June 1937 plenum, which will be discussed below, a telegram from Trotsky arrived from Mexico to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

"Stalin's policy leads to final defeat both internally and externally. The only salvation is a turn towards Soviet democracy, starting with the opening of the latest trials. I offer my full support along the way."

And he knew, after all, when to write - the entire party leadership gathered in Moscow! But he knew not from the newspapers. He had a strong connection with Moscow, he was!

Trotsky was still a strong factor - not in himself, but precisely as an inspiration to his like-minded people. It is like-minded people, not the masses  
The masses followed Stalin.

Feuchtwanger, who brilliantly comprehended the processes of 1937, also wrote brilliantly about Stalin and Trotsky. I will quote just one of his thoughts:

Trotsky is a dazzling individual. Stalin is the type of Russian peasant and worker who has risen to the level of genius, for whom victory is guaranteed, because in him the strength of both classes is combined. Trotsky is a rapidly fading rocket, Stalin is a fire that burns and warms for a long time.

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I note that Beria, after all, was the son of a peasant, who rose to the rank of an outstanding worker of intellectual labor. Although not raised, of course, to genius.

And here are Trotsky's recommendations to the Spanish Trotskyists in the Bulletin of the Opposition for 1937:

"Ten thousand, with firm and shrewd leadership, can find their way to the masses, wrest them from the influence of the Stalinists and the Social Democrats ... and ensure not only ... an unstable victory of the republican troops over the fascist ones, but also a complete victory of the working people over exploiters."

Trotsky recommended the same line of conduct to his supporters in the USSR.

In fact, this was not a strategy for victory - Stalin told HG Wells back in 1934 that any political vanguard is powerless without at least the tacit support of the masses. But "ten thousand" "Trotsky's falcons" could cause great harm to the country, because the situation was tense.

Let me remind you:

On March 31, 1937, Yagoda, then already People's Commissar for Communications, was arrested. However, arrests in the central and peripheral offices of the NKVD continued; in May, the main arrests took place among the highest command staff of the Red Army, Marshal Tukhachevsky, army commanders Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, commanders Primakov, Putna were arrested; in the summer of 1937, a military conspiracy trial took place, and on June 11, a verdict was announced in this case - death to death ...

A third trial was being prepared in March 1938 in the case of the "right-wing Trotskyist bloc" Bukharin-Rykov, at which Yagoda was also tried. At the same time, preparations were underway for the first elections to the Supreme Soviet.

This is how the main political affairs in the country stood by the end of June 1937, when the next plenum of the Central Committee opened in Moscow, initially scheduled for 20 June.

REALLY, it lasted from June 23 to 29, considered the draft "Regulations on elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR" and approved it. In the information message about the plenum, published

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Forged in Pravda on June 30, it was said: "Further, the plenum considered the questions: a) on improving the seeds of grain crops, b) on the introduction of correct crop rotations and c) on measures to improve the seeds of grain crops" ...

The "seed" issue was indeed considered at the plenum, and an appropriate detailed, quite business-like resolution was adopted on it,

published in print.

However, the main issue was, of course, the "election" issue, but there was no detailed public information on it. Little is known about this plenum, even transcripts are missing. Even the order of consideration of the issue was hidden, because the "seed" issue was considered not "further ...", but first.

And there were reasons for that.

An analysis of some of them with the involvement of many little-known data about those days was carried out in the book by Yuri Zhukov "The Other Stalin", which would be more accurately called "The Genuine Stalin", if we mean not so much the author's assessments as the facts he cites.

The annotation on the fourth side of the book says that Yuri Zhukov proves incredible things, namely:

*"Stalin wanted to begin the democratization of the country and hold free elections on an alternative basis, ensuring the advancement of new forces that had shown themselves in socialist construction; ... sought to remove from power the partocracy, which continued to live in the illusions of a world revolution, and partly reborn as a bourgeois; tried to remove amateurs from managing the economy, replacing them with new professionals brought up by the socialist system; ... to pursue a foreign and domestic policy, in accordance only with the national interests of the peoples of Russia and the peoples,*

united with the Russians into a single Union State.

I confess to the reader, while at the same time offering my apologies to Yuri Nikolayevich Zhukov, that all the words in this quotation in italics belong to me, and not to him. And with these adjustments, I share this view of Stalin.

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I hope that I have already said enough for the reader to agree with such an assessment of Stalin in the period of 1936-1937. But now I'll add something...

The party and Soviet bureaucrats have indeed become more and more insolent. For example, the practice of co-optation (introduction to an elected body without holding elections), despite the resolution of the February-March plenum of the Central Committee, did not stop. For example, the Chelyabinsk Regional Executive Committee resolved more than two-thirds of issues by "poll", and not at sessions, Sverdlovsk - 70%, Azov-Chernomorsky Regional Executive Committee - more than 80%.

Of the 20,000 decisions of the regional executive committee of the Western Region adopted since the beginning of 1936, only 500 were considered at meetings of the presidium, and the rest were adopted either by "poll" or simply after the signature of the chairman and secretary.

The last fact revealed three unfortunate moments at once:

- passion for regional "leaders" is not a matter, but paperwork (about 40 "papers" of regional significance per day!);
- the disinclination of the same "leaders" to the council, not only with the people, but even with their elected entourage;
- unwillingness of leading regional circles to change the situation.

And STALIN used the same method (there is always a double-edged sword!). Already in the second half of May, the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee Kabakov, Rudzutak, Eliava, Orakhelashvili (he), Ukhonov (besides them, also Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Eideman, Gamarnik) were withdrawn from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by a "poll" ...

And already in the course of the plenum, others were quietly withdrawn from the Central Committee - with exclusion from the party ... Including: Secretary of the Allied Committee

Central Executive Committee of the USSR Unshlikht, chairman of the Commission of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Antipov, former people's commissar of state farms Kalmanovich, first secretaries of the Kursk and Odessa regional committees Sheboldaev and Veger, first secretary of the Crimean regional committee Lavrentiev.

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The former chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia and secretary of the Zakkraykom, Kartvelishvili, left Transcaucasia back in 1933. He was the secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee, the Far Eastern Regional Committee, and from December 28, 1936, he became the secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee of the Lavrentiev Party (this is how Kartvelishvili began to call himself for some time now).

The "democrats" attribute the repression and Lavrenty Kartvelishvili to Lavrenty Beria. But let one of them explain how the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Beria, could decide the fate of the first secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the CPSU (b) Lavrentiev. Of course, Crimea is a sunny land, but it was not part of sunny Georgia.

However, these were only "flowers"... A sour "berry" was presented to many participants of the plenum by a member of the Politburo Commission formed on May 26, 1937 for the preparation of a new electoral law, Yakov Yakovlev (Epshtein). Recalling that the elections will be universal, equal, direct and secret, he stressed that elections, in full accordance with the current Constitution, should also be alternative!

#### *Alternative!*

After all, dear reader, in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era, it became the norm to have only one candidate on the ballots, although the Constitution allowed for several of them. And then, after all, it all began - the first elections were just ahead.

And according to the Constitution (I quote, by the way, the textbook "The Constitution of the USSR" for the 7th grade of the secondary school of the edition of 1953), the right to nominate candidates for deputies of the Council was enjoyed by "all public organizations and societies of working people: communist party organizations, trade unions of workers and employees (and there were more than a dozen of them, if we count the branch trade unions! - S.K.), cooperative organizations, youth organizations, cultural societies "...

And this is not counting general meetings at enterprises, collective farms, state farms and military units!

Yakovlev said:

"The Constitution of the USSR provides every public organization and society the right to nominate candidates for

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Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This article is of great importance; it was introduced at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin. Its goal is to develop and expand democracy. This article ensures genuine democracy in the elections."

What was said from the podium of the plenum was not just a sound, because further Yakovlev specified the general thesis:

"The district election commissions are entrusted with the duty to register and put on the ballot paper for the respective district all candidates for the Supreme Soviet, without exception, who are nominated by public organizations and workers' societies ..."

Further, Yakovlev explained that the refusal to register could be appealed to the Central Election Commission, that there were no special requirements for candidates, that an absolute majority was required to be elected to deputies.

votes, etc.

But that's not all!

Speaking about the work of the deputy sections of the local Soviets (that is, the commissions of the Soviets) called upon to control the executive committees, Yakovlev said:

"In those numerous cases when the sections show initiative, reveal shortcomings, demand correction, criticize the heads (departments of the executive committees. - S.K.), the heads often begin to upset them, stop going to the sections ... All our workers must understand that there are no people who could claim to be uncontrolled in work, that the control of any worker follows from the foundations of Soviet power, that only with the help of control from below, supplementing control and leadership from above, can the work of the Soviets be improved ... "

Perhaps some of the readers may find these words too general and similar to the non-committal party chatter that we heard from the Brezhnev-Gorbachev stands. But this is a closed (until 2005) transcript of the plenum of the Central Committee. This is not propaganda, not agitation. This - practical, so to speak, "debriefing" ... And at the same time - briefing and directive.

Therefore, in order to understand the emerging situation, it is important for us to know that Yakovlev also said this:

"It goes without saying that the practice of substituting laws

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the discretion of this or that group of bureaucrats is an anti-Soviet affair ... "

So:

"Party groups in the Soviets, and especially in the executive committees of the Soviets, have often turned into bodies that replace the work of the Soviets, into bodies that decide everything, and the Soviets only have to stamp a pre-prepared decision ... The conclusion from this: it will be necessary to enter the next party congress with proposal to cancel the paragraph of the Charter of the CPSU (b) on the organization of party groups in the Soviets ... "

The style of Yakovlev's report suggests a double authorship - both by Yakovlev himself and by Stalin.

Who was he - Yakovlev Yakov Arkadevich, or rather - Yakov Arkadevich Epshtein? He was clearly a talented man, but ambiguous and with a fate that was not very clear to me. Born in 1896, the son of a teacher in Grodno. He studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, but did not graduate - obviously due to going into politics, since 1913 he was a Bolshevik. Member of the October Revolution in Petrograd. Then - the whirlwind of positions and localities, standard for a professional revolutionary. He was the editor of the newspapers "Poor" and "Peasant newspaper", that is, he had both literary skills and style. And plus to that - and a head.

He had nothing to do with Trotsky, on the contrary, Trotsky periodically "pecked" him. After all, Trotsky was "leftist", while Yakovlev deviated "to the right." And at one time he seriously shied away - up to organizational actions. In December 1929, on the eve of the beginning of collectivization, he headed the newly created Union People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and all the "horrors of collectivization" are attributed to him, which, of course, is not true.

From April 1934, Yakovlev became the head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee, and from October 1936 he actually acted as chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee (formal chairman Yezhov even officially gave nine-tenths of his time to the NKVD).

Yakovlev was one of the co-authors of Stalin and Bukharin on the draft Constitution. Above the report at the June plenum

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Yakovlev, as I understand it, also worked a lot, but his general plan was, of course, Stalinist. And according to him, the Soviet government was to become precisely

Power.

The Kronstadt rebellion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1921 was held under the demagogic slogan "Soviets without communists." And now, Stalin's party, realizing the danger of establishing the power of the party of partocrats in the country, put forward, in fact, the slogan: "Soviets without partocrats, but under the ideological leadership of the communists!"

Here are those, grandmother, and St. George's Day! They came, they say, "masters of life" to the plenum!

This turn of affairs did not please the partocrats, the "victorious ones." But the disinterested old fighters were also not happy with Yakovlev's report - Stalin.

And then Molotov added:

"It must be understood, comrades, that our old criteria of old Party members are now insufficient in many respects. Comrade Stalin has recently told us all several times that our old assessments of people are now completely inadequate. He has a pre-revolutionary party experience ... participated in the October Revolution, had merits in the Civil War, then ... fought well against the Trotskyists and against the right ... But this is not enough ... At this time, we ... are required to. ... the leaders ... knew how to put forward new people to the places of obsolete rubbish, a bureaucratic or bureaucratic group of workers."

All the quotations from the speeches at the June plenum given above are not taken from anyone's memoirs. This is data from the archive, and specifically from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) Look, as they say, fund 17, inventory 2, case 616, sheets 5—224th...

I, of course, did not read this case myself - I was not admitted. But it is unlikely that the leading researcher of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.N. Zhukov messed up something in quoting.

Although there is a lot of confusion around the June plenum. And quite

consciously.

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After all, if you widely publicize the fact that Stalin intended already in 1937 year to democratize the country, then this ...

*This will put an end to any - Khrushchev's, Sovietological, "democratic" - concept of Stalin as a "tyrant", "satrap", "dictator"!*

And remembering the main theme of the book, I will emphasize: on similar concepts of Beria - too! After all, if a pack of partocrats and partocratic historians so brazenly, vilely and totally slandered Stalin for decades, then it is logical to assume that she slandered his colleague Beria in the same way!

By the way, at the plenum, the People's Commissar of Health of the USSR Kaminsky was withdrawn from the Central Committee - a Bolshevik since 1913, in 1920-1921 the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan and the chairman of the Baku Council.

A certain hack from history Fyodor Volkov in his capital-libelous work of 1992 "The Rise and Fall of Stalin" (among the reviewers were academician AM Samsonov and the writer Ovidy Gorchakov, who is much more inventive, whom we will still encounter) reported that Kaminsky de "died after he spoke on the advice of Stalin at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with the exposure of Beria as an agent of the Okhrana (already the Okhrana! — S.K.)".

It's funny that a few pages later, Volkov claims that it was the Georgian Bolsheviks who for a long time supposedly "told Stalin about his (Beria. - S.K.) dark past, that he was an" agent of international imperialism ".

That is, according to Volkov, it goes like this: the old Bolsheviks told Stalin, he



told Kaminsky, and Kaminsky told everyone, on which he got burned, - Beria shot him right there. Not being, however, still the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and being not in Moscow, but in Tbilisi.

If you believe K. Zalesky, the author of the biographical guide "Stalin's Empire", then Kaminsky at the June plenum allegedly turned to Stalin with the words: "The NKVD continues to arrest honest people," to which Stalin replied: "They are enemies of the people, and you are a bird the same flight.

Perhaps such a sparring took place - in any case, it adequately reflects the essence of the situation. However, on June 27, Molotov, in his report at the plenum, caused

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The opinion of Kaminsky and a number of other people's commissars called the inability of too many professional revolutionaries to cope with their direct official duties.

Specifically, Kaminsky failed to cope with the construction of maternity hospitals, nurseries and providing them with equipment. Molotov described his attitude to the matter as "completely bureaucratic".

June 25, 1937 - during the plenum - Kaminsky was arrested and March 8 1938 sentenced to death.

The reader may remark: "Even if he failed as the People's Commissariat for Health, do not shoot for it!" But Kaminsky was not just a people's commissar, but also an "old fighter" with experience in underground and propaganda work. And he was not so many years old - only forty-two ... Remaining at large and gathering together, such fighters could, after all, arrange a fight again. with Stalin. And the country did not need their struggle, but new maternity hospitals.

Then Kaminsky's speeches would come up at the Anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953 - in Khrushchev's speech. But we, dear reader, still have to get to this plenum.

In the meantime, the June plenum of 1937 is ending with us, and the last debate is flaring up at it. No one can essentially object to Yakovlev (that is, Stalin) or Molotov (that is, the same Stalin) - you can't argue against the truth!

It is also impossible to "reset" Stalin using the plenum. Stalin is firmly backed not only by the bulk of the Party, but also by the vast majority of the active part of the country. I emphasize - active! But it is she who determines the situation!

No, the partocrats cannot dump Stalin. And everyone understands this - both they and Stalin himself. And the dispute is not about the essence - the question of alternativeness, but about the most impartial form of counting votes - who will control it? Stalin casually threw a phrase about the fact that in the West, they say, in the conditions of a multi-party system, this problem does not exist, and suddenly added:

We don't have different parties. Fortunately or unfortunately, we have one party...

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I don't know whether these words of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were followed by a silent scene like Gogol's. I think it's unlikely ... Especially since Stalin immediately explained that as a temporary measure, it is necessary to involve existing public organizations for control, but not party ones, they say, we already have so much power in our hands. But Stalin's remark was noticed and remembered by many.

Preparations for the elections after the plenum were still in line with alternatives. At the end of August, the draft sample of the ballot included the following text:

"Leave on the ballot the name of ONE candidate for whom you vote, cross out the rest."

So why, instead of alternative or, as they said then, parallel, elections, the country received an "operation" of the NKVD?

Yu. Zhukov, who has already been mentioned more than once, believes, for example, that the partycrats provoked the repressions in order to prevent the implementation of the ideas of the "Stalin group". Like, Eikhe demanded the right to immediate execution by firing squad for his West Siberian region, and there, they say, off they go...

But the Moscow historian Zhukov had the opportunity to observe not only the rotten, but the initially rotten "elite" of the 70-90s. And so he thinks in terms of "struggle for power", "sitting", etc. He also measures Stalin by the standards of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov (Gorbachev here is "past the money", because *this one* did not fight for power, he *was brought* to power so that he would later *surrender* it - along with the country).

But Zhukov, of course, is mistaken! Comrade Stalin was not so simple and weak in order to succumb for a great life - in a matter of days after the end of the plenum - to the demands or provocation of some kind of Eikhe and so - hastily - give sanction for mass repressions in order to avoid de facto undesirable election results for Stalin .

In addition, the repressive "operation" after the elections did not end after all.

I think it was both easier and more difficult. How could (and even

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how obliged he was!) to reason in a particular situation, Stalin?

Most likely, so... Who should organize the election campaign in practice and in general, for the time being, carry out - albeit poorly - the day-to-day management of the country and the economy? Yes, these same party and Soviet bureaucrats, and even the hidden "rights" and "lefts" ...

You cannot replace all of them overnight - and the administration will collapse, and they will rebel. And instead of a powerfully gaining momentum of economic development, we get the devil knows what...

The bureaucrats will not ensure the organization of genuine alternative elections and sabotage them quietly. And if they are "pressed", such *candidates* can be selected and dragged through so that the whole country will have a headache from the newly elected Supreme Council.

Namely, a headache, and not the overthrow of Soviet power, as, I note in parentheses, happened with the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in 1991. It would not have been possible for anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinists to elect an anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist Supreme Soviet - public sentiments in general were not the same.

But to drag a certain number of political "buzoters" into the first Supreme Soviet - it was real. And what would happen? After all, the country needed not just a parliament, from the word "parle" ("to speak" or sharper - "talk"), but a normal working body that solves the pressing *business* problems of a socialist society. In a sense, it is a depoliticized body.

Depoliticized in the sense that there should not have been any *political* struggle within the Supreme Soviet of the USSR... Disputes should have been only about ways to solve the problems of *economic and social* construction.

It was possible to argue, but about how best to build socialism, and not about whether it can be built in one country, or whether it should be built at all. And bureaucrats voluntarily (trying to realize their political ambitions) or involuntarily (failing to effectively counteract direct or hidden enemies

socialism) could impose a politicized Supreme Soviet on the country.

And here the remaining Trotskyists got a chance, and

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"Right", and careerists, and latent anti-Soviet. And the partocracy, under the conditions imposed on it by Stalin, would hardly have wanted to neutralize them. And I wouldn't be able to...

On the other hand, the forthcoming elections inevitably activated the enemies of socialism at all levels (remember the statements of the Kalinin dispossessed kulaks?).

Stalin was not afraid of losing power. He was certainly not afraid of the threat of the fall of Soviet power in general, because there was no such internal threat - young Russia was for Soviet Russia. But Stalin feared even temporary instability, which, as *it turned out*, could be threatened by alternative elections.

On the other hand, since things were brewing in this manner, it was possible to use the situation to "clean up" the grassroots potential "fifth column". After all, it is known that in order to detect the firepower of the enemy, it is necessary to call him to activity. And such activity in anticipation of the election campaign has already been observed.

And it turned out that one way or another, the necessary Chekist "operation" against the "fifth column" was expedient to start right now. And the explanation was convincing to her - they say, the neutralization of the unfinished hostile "element" capable of disrupting the elections.

This "operation" had to be carried out under the old partocracy, the Soviet and economic bureaucracy. And only then (and even during the "operation" in the "lower classes") you can gradually clean up the failed and hostile "tops" "to the nail".

Mathematicians know: an integral that cannot be taken is taken by parts!

So Stalin decided to take it like that! So that later - as Molotov said there? - "to put forward new people to the places of obsolete trash, a bureaucratic or bureaucratic group."

So far, the idea of alternative elections had to be abandoned, but the constitutional possibility remained! And the idea could be postponed until the next election.

The first elections are on December 12, 1937. The term of office of both chambers of the Supreme Council is 4 years. This means that the next elections are on December 12, 1941. Fine! Besides

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time and personnel can be changed... And the young growth of socialism will grow stronger.

And if Eikhe, Khrushchev and others themselves demand immediate repressive measures, so much the better.

This is how Stalin might have thought. And he did not think long: the plenum ended on June 29, and the Politburo approved order No. 00447 of the NKVD on July 31. But it was still necessary to give requests "to the places" about how many people are supposed to be repressed there, get answers and determine the final quotas for the regions  
- these same "limits".

It was not a policy of struggle for personal power, but a policy of struggle for the country. Yes, there was a calculation here, but not selfish, but wise and necessarily tough.

A request was made to the republics and regions about the number of those whom, in the opinion of the "locals", it is necessary to repress in the course of a one-time "operation". The answers of the "places" were different (but almost all of them were accurate to units), and I will give only three:

	TO	To expulsion
--	----	--------------

	execution	
Georgian USSR (Beria)	1419	1562
West Siberian edge (Eikhe)	10 800	—
Moscow region (Khrushchev)	8 500	32 805

So what do we see here?

The "executioner" Beria issued quite reasonable and even moderate figures to the Central Committee: few should be sent, but there are "execution" candidates ... And how could they not be in such a complex republic as Georgia?! Let us recall the cannibalistic instructions of Noah Zhordania, bringing blood, tears and smoke of military conflagrations to Transcaucasia... Didn't many of those who could not fulfill these instructions in 1924-1925 still remain in Georgia, but who were not averse to fulfilling them anyway? at the right time?

Sometimes they falsely write that in 1937-1938 Beria destroyed the entire leadership of Georgia as an act of some kind of personal revenge. But in the Transcaucasian republics, that communist arrogance, the growth of which has already disturbed

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Lenin, and which made life so difficult for Stalin, had a particularly fertile base. After all, there weren't enough hands for everything, even Stalin in Moscow, as we see, could not always cope with the partocracy and was forced to go for its "cleansing".

It was not easier for Beria in Tbilisi, and I have little doubt that he, regardless of the possibility of repression (he could not foresee the sanction for which from Stalin and the Stalinist part of the Politburo, besides, he could not foresee in advance) was preparing reasonable personnel replacements for the "old Bolsheviks". Repressions solved this issue harshly, but quite effectively.

If anything catches the eye, it is, on the contrary, the low "execution" proportion in Georgia when compiling "proscription" lists: approximately 1 person per 2,400 inhabitants. And here also the obvious enemies of the Soviet power were included ... And "just" bandits - there were still enough of them in mountainous Georgia.

No, those from the Georgian leadership who later, during the years of wholesale rehabilitation, were credited as "innocent victims of Beria's vindictiveness", if they were personal enemies of the latter, it was only because they already interfered with the cause of Soviet power as the power of the creativity of the masses.

By the way, Mikoyan and Malenkov in the fall of 1937 "cleaned up" the leadership of neighboring Armenia no less abruptly than Beria. And what kind of "personal revenge" of Mikoyan, and even more so of Malenkov, could we talk about here?

Finally, if Georgia were to be drained of blood in terms of personnel, then where would the powerful growth in the volume of gross output in the republic come from in the period from 1937 to 1940? And it has grown by half!

And this was the result of both the creation - under Beria - of the economic basis for growth, and the work of young cadres of the Beria draft.

But Khrushchev, and Eikhe ...

Roy Medvedev, in his falsely "objective" biography of Khrushchev, hypocritically declared: "There was no evidence that Khrushchev took an active part in carrying out terror ... Khrushchev was not the driving force behind terror in Moscow ..."

As you can see, it was!

And such a retouching of Khrushchev's true nature is quite obscure.

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clear. The time will come, and the young Khrushchev referents, friends of the brothers

Medvedev, will push "dear Nikita Sergeevich" to take the first steps towards the creeping restoration of capitalism, which will then be supported by his inaction by the "energetic" Leonid Brezhnev and for which the "mysterious" Yuri Andropov will prepare the final personnel base.

There are no two kinds of partocracy, just like some very odorous substance.

As for Eikhe, let's say, Yu. Zhukov considers him one of the main initiators of mass repressions. However, after the 20th Congress, Eikhe was credited by Khrushchev with their "victims"... However, after this sacramental congress, even more amazing things became possible in Russia!

The "OPERATION" in the "lower classes" began on August 5 in accordance with the order People's Commissar of Internal Affairs No. 00447.

"Operation" in the "top" no one officially announced. But already in September 1937, arrests began among various first secretaries and people's commissars. And confessions began, followed by new arrests and new confessions.

There were also innocently slandered here, but I think there were much fewer of them than in the "lower classes". And much less than the "official" figures of the Khrushchev era tell us.

This is how I imagine the political essence of the period from the summer of 1937 to the spring of 1938.

During this period, indeed, the most extensive repressions were carried out in country. However, they were not the essence of the life of the country during this period.

In 1937, young Soviet guys rushed forward over Paris -

Worker and Collective Farm Woman Vera Mukhina.

In 1937, Shostakovich's 5th symphony was first performed and opened Mayakovskaya metro station, amazing in its innovative architecture.

In 1938, Kapitsa discovered the superfluidity of helium.

In 1937 - already after August 5 - the Murmansk fishing port, the Smolensk flax mill were put into operation, and in 1938 - the first stage of the Balkhash copper smelter.

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In 1937, the Soviet turbine with a capacity of 100 thousand horsepower at 3000 rpm.

In 1938, the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics of the Academy of Sciences was established.

This is all offhand, too, my dear reader! A complete list of only major achievements - economic, social, scientific, technical, cultural, military - of the country during these two years would make up a whole chapter.

LAVRENTY Beria was a highly talented person. But unlike Stalin, he was not a genius of social analysis and, presumably, he did not experience the disappointments of a genius. Yes, and these generations were different - the difference in age is twenty years, and in destinies - a whole era.

But psychologically, Beria was, of course, very close to Stalin - both were practical romantics, both were idealists, up to their necks loaded with real and laborious deeds of creating a new society.

Stalin said: "Cadres decide everything!" And in the party-state environment, raised to the heights of power by the revolution and the Civil War, Beria was one of the most prominent representatives of those who turned out to be indifferent to roast geese, but who, on the contrary, turned out to be greedy for work, who wanted to be among those cadres who "everything" and decided ...

Decide and work! To work both because it is interesting, and because with our work we serve the grandiose cause of the development of a great country. For Beria, this was not a beautiful phrase, but an everyday moral attitude.

That is why Stalin could not but include Beria in his inner circle

already in the near future. Soon he will be called to Moscow for a new, this time in Moscow, appointment to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

And the arrival of Beria to the highest floor of state power was conditioned objectively - by the demands of the era and the interests of the state.

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## Chapter 10

### BUSINESS IN THE COUNTRY, BUSINESS IN TBILISI...

RETURNING to Tbilisi from the plenum, Beria again plunged into those numerous economic problems, which became more and more as yesterday's problems were solved.

In August 1937, the Chekist "operation" began, which, of course, also affected Georgia. Since the repressive actions against a wide range of hostile elements - anti-Soviet, "right", Trotskyists and others, provided more and more investigative material and involved more and more names in the circle of investigation, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia had to deal, of course, with this side of the matter. . Beria was a Chekist for a long time, and his investigative experience simply could not help but be used by him in these approximately six months, when a thorough "cleansing" of the failed part of the party state "generals" and "officers" was going on throughout the country.

Having previously said something about the scope of repressions in Georgia, I will now report additionally that on July 8, 1937, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Georgia Goglidze reported to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Beria the following: from the total "limit" for repression in the first category (execution) of the "contingent of kulaks and criminals" in 1419 people, there are 338 people per criminal element registered through the Office of the Workers 'and Peasants' Militia, and 1081 people through the Office of State Security, and 463 and 1099 people for expulsion, respectively.

I note that such specific figures indicate that the Georgian NKVD included in the lists of repressed quite specific people with very specific sins. Moreover, extrajudicial execution of more than three hundred bandits immediately dramatically improved the crime situation, as did the expulsion of recidivist criminals from the republic. Repressions were also justified against counter-revolutionary forces, as was a harsh "purge" of dubious personnel. However, I do not intend to dwell on this side of the matter, critically analyzing

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"reliability" of the "democratic" nonsense about how the "sadist" de Beria just did not eat the prisoners under investigation alive. However, I hope the reader will be interested to know that if in the course of the "purge" of the party, which began in May 1933 and tightened after the assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934, 46% of party members were expelled throughout the country, then in Georgia with the first secretary Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) G Beria - 31.8% (about 18 thousand people). Moreover, during the "purge" Beria repeatedly spoke in the Georgian press with calls to treat those being checked carefully and respectfully.

2,394 people filed an appeal based on the results of checking party documents, of which 638 were reinstated, 424 were transferred from members to candidates, and another 315 people were reinstated as candidates.

These figures and facts show well whether Lavrenty Pavlovich was a "sadist." In addition to the above data, later *in a separate chapter* I will analyze in detail the most, perhaps, the most serious accusation against Beria - in the murder of the first secretary of the Central Committee by him personally.

Communist Party of Armenia Khanjyan, right in his office when Beria was the first secretary of the Zakkraykom in 1936.

Formally, the incident with Khanjyan (suffering from a severe form of tuberculosis and being an unbalanced person, he committed suicide) occurred a year before the start of a broad repressive action at the "top". But according to the technology of his "coverage" in the documents of the period of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the case of Khandzhyan is very typical for understanding the falsified approach to the problem of repressions that was established in the USSR after this congress. That is why I will stop there. But in due time.

Returning to the year 1937, I will say that no "cleansing" of personnel led to the disorganization of the economy - rather, one can say the opposite, both in Georgia and in the USSR in general.

And I, at first glance, moving away from the topic of Beria, but in essence continuing it, I will inform the reader something about one of the addressees of the previously mentioned correspondence between the two leaders of the CPSU (b) - about Lazar Kaganovich.

Konstantin Zalesky in his biographical dictionary

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claims that Kaganovich allegedly organized a pogrom in the People's Commissariat of Railways even before the start of the mass purges, arresting 3,000 people of "leading personnel" in the NKPS and destroying "the entire top and middle echelon of leading workers."

It is difficult to understand what K. Zalesky means by "NKPS" - the entire network of railways of the Union or the central apparatus of the people's commissariat? For the entire network, the number of those arrested - for those times when there were enough saboteurs alone - small. And if the central apparatus of the NKPS is meant, then in the mid-30s there were only three thousand people in it of "leading personnel", it was not a working apparatus, but a bunch of idlers.

One way or another, but before Kaganovich there was no order on the railways. He became People's Commissar of Railways on February 28, 1935, and here is what he told Stalin from Irkutsk in code on January 26, 1936:

*"I got acquainted with the work of the Krasnoyarsk hub and the locomotive repair plant. On the approaches to Chernorechenskaya, at the station itself and in Krasnoyarsk, dozens of trains had accumulated, delayed by moving to the east. Along with the ugly work of the operators, this was caused by the collapse of the locomotive fleet of the Krasnoyarsk depot. Half of all commodity steam locomotives were out of order due to a malfunction. The quality of repairs is ugly, often downright criminal. The depot and the plant are littered with wrecking elements... With the connivance of the grief of the communists, they started such a repair system that led to... damage to boilers, injectors and pumps. A group of Trotskyists was uncovered at the plant, engaged in wrecking in repairs, persecuting Stakhanovites, and degrading the workers. The party organizers and party organizations of the depot and the plant are working disgustingly, the party organizations are in the fold, the mood of the workers is unimportant. He took prompt measures ... transferred 15 steam locomotives from the reserve of the NKPS from Irkutsk ..."* etc.

Kaganovich on the spot found sensible replacements for the party organizers of the depot and the plant, he replaced the head of the Krasnoyarsk locomotive department with engineer Sokolov from the NKPS Locomotive Department ... And similar measures

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On the roads of the Union, he quickly won a strong business reputation among the railway workers.

And before him ... Let's say, Korney Chukovsky in 1933 handed over luggage in Batumi for *three and a half hours*. It is a pity that Konstantin Zalesky was not in this queue, just as he was not at that Armavir station in 1932, where the Chukovsky

for several days they waited for the arrival of the train, "perfectly marked" in the schedule.

Zalessky argues that the vast majority of contemporaries, they say, speak of Kaganovich as an extremely rude and deeply ignorant person. But I, reading his business letters, his memoirs (after all, they were not written to him by referents), over and over again I was amazed at how well this self-taught pure water mastered both word and logic. And he understood the problems of those industries that he headed.

Without serious work on oneself and without talent, nothing would have come of it. As for rudeness, from childhood I remember the story of my father's acquaintance, an old railway worker, about how Kaganovich, having accepted the report of the head of the station named Gapon and, after a corresponding question, having learned that he was not a namesake, but the brother of "that himself" priest Gapon, immediately asked: "How, you are not pressed here?" And he added: "If anything, contact directly to me"...

So Lazar Kaganovich was not rude to everyone. Although special politeness "Iron People's Commissar" really never bred. What was not, was not.

As for the work of the railways, in 1932 the freight turnover on them amounted to 169.3 billion ton-kilometers, in 1937 - 354.8 billion, and in 1940 - 414 billion. For three "post-repressive" years, growth by 17%. Very decently, and it is unlikely that this growth would have taken place if Kaganovich had really destroyed the entire upper and middle echelon of executives in transport.

In 1938-1940, 4.6 thousand kilometers of new roads were built (in the second five-year plan - 3.4 thousand), fixed assets of railways grew by 74% in three years, the locomotive fleet became the youngest in the world in terms of the average age of locomotives. The share of new freight locomotives of the FD (Felix Dzerzhinsky), SO (Sergo Ordzhonikidze), E series and passenger IS (Joseph Stalin) and

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"Su" approached two thirds, all electric locomotives were domestically produced, the share of heavy-duty cars increased to 30%.

This is all the same, after all, after Kaganovich "destroyed" in the NKPS "the entire top and middle echelons of executives.

GRIBOYEDOVSKY Colonel Skalozub said about Moscow: "The fire suited her"... Alas, the bitter irony of history was reflected in the fact that the repressions, rather, improved the quality of the economy. And they raised it not by injecting an atmosphere of fear, but by increasing responsibility, firstly, and by eliminating its conscious disorganizers and incompetent managers from the economy, secondly.

Yes, in all spheres of the country's life, the repressive "purges" also caught a number of honest Soviet people. Someone died like that - not because of the "bloodthirstiness of the shoulder cases of the NKVD masters", but because of the harsh realities of the class struggle, which was by no means invented in the Lubyanka. General Tsvetaev (then division commander), who was already released from investigation, whom I mentioned, ended his autobiography when he was reinstated in the Red Army:

*"... I consider the reason for my arrest the result of the enemy work of the counter-revolutionary element, which sought to undermine the power of the Soviet Union and the Red Army."*

Having experienced severe injustice, Tsvetaev understood this in real time, but for the military historian Cherushchev, who brought these lines in his book "From the Gulag to Battle", there are only "NKVD torture chambers". As if Yezhov and Beria, who replaced him, only thought about how to "drink the blood of innocent victims" ...



Actually, the very title of Cherushev's book has a slanderous connotation, because it tells about those military leaders who were released - as a rule, already under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Beria - from investigation, and not from camps. So they left in 1939-1940 not into battle, but again into the ranks of the Red Army.

But a conspiracy of the military elite, conspiracies in the party and state leadership existed, and to unwind everything

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their threads were extremely difficult. I will say more about this when the story goes about the initial period of Beria's activity as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

At the end of 1937, on December 12, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were held. Lavrenty Beria was also elected a deputy.

The idea of the failed alternative elections did not become known to the general public. However, some of its echo sounded in Stalin's speech at the election meeting of voters of the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on December 11, 1937, published the next day in Pravda.

I think that the modern reader, well-fed with pictures of "Russian" election campaigns, will be even more interested in getting acquainted with one fragment of this speech than Stalin's listeners.

He then said this:

"Comrades, I would like to give you advice, advice from a deputy candidate to his voters... If we take the capitalist countries, there are some peculiar, I would say rather strange relations between deputies and voters. While the elections are going on, the deputies flirt with the voters, fawn over them, swear allegiance, make a bunch of all sorts of promises. It turns out that the deputies' dependence on voters is complete. As soon as the elections were held and the candidates turned into deputies, relations change radically. Instead of dependence on voters, their complete independence is obtained. For four or five years, that is, until new elections, the deputy feels completely free, independent from the people, from his voters. He can go from one camp to another, he can turn from the right road to the wrong one, he can get entangled in some machinations of a not entirely necessary nature, he can tumble as he pleases - he is independent.

Ah, dear reader! Doesn't this remind you of something familiar to disgust? But that is not all!

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Stalin - and this part of his speech could only be fully understood by the party "generals", who were aware of the "pre-election" struggle in the "top" - said something else, and this was another of his direct advice to the people over the heads of the partyocrats:

"Can such a relationship be considered normal? No way, comrades! This circumstance was taken into account by our Constitution, and it passed a law by virtue of which voters have the right to recall their deputies ahead of schedule if they start to feint, if they turn off the road, if they forget about their dependence on the people, on the voters.

But this was said about the "party of partocrats", and not about the party of Stalin, in which Lavrenty Beria was an active "bayonet".

1938 BEGAN. The "operation" of the NKVD was still going on, but in this last Tbilisi year, when he was still the party leader of Georgia, Beria simply did not have the opportunity to devote too much time to KGB investigations.

The anniversary of Rustaveli's poem, the anniversary of Pushkin, celebrated in Georgia also loudly and gloriously, have passed. But these were still secondary concerns. At the first place

there were large-scale industrial projects ...

And the construction of a new Tbilisi! This one business could absorb all his time, especially since the problems of construction and architecture were for Beria like a first love.

Volume 53 of the first edition of the TSB in 1946 reported:

*"A new era in the history of T[bilisi] begins after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia (1921). T[bilisi] becomes the capital of the Georgian SSR and the Transcaucasian Federation. The rapid development of the city ... takes on the character of its complete reconstruction, carried out under the leadership of L.P. Beria "...*

So it was! In 1926, 294,044 inhabitants lived in Tiflis, and in 1939 in Tbilisi - already 519,175, almost twice as much!

I repeat: Beria knew the construction business professionally

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but he was prepared not only theoretically - his official dacha in Gagra was built according to his own project, which contained all the drawings and calculations. And he gave not only his heart but also his mind to the cause of the socialist reconstruction of Tbilisi,

knowledge.

The general plan for the development of the capital of Georgia was considered in June 1933 at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Tiflis city committee, where the main report was made by the first secretary of the Central Committee and the city committee L.P. Beria.

As always with him, in terms of reconstruction, a comprehensive, systematic approach was implemented, when the issues of architectural appearance are linked to the problems of all types of communications, rational placement of residential, administrative, public and industrial zones, reasonable redevelopment without losing the existing identity of the city. Suffice it to say that all the architectural sights of old Tiflis, including temples, have been preserved.

During the two five-year plans, 219 million rubles (not Putin's, but Stalin's) were invested in public utilities. The main highways and squares of the city underwent, as the TSB wrote, "a radical, sometimes very complex restructuring" ...

New residential area Vake... Beria Square... Kalyaev's rise, which connected the main working area with the center... Completely renovated railway station square... Three-kilometer-long embankment named after Stalin... New bridges, including the name bridge Chelyuskintsev... Circus and Dynamo Stadium named after Beria... A wonderful park of culture and recreation on Mount David, from where panoramas of Tbilisi and the Caucasus Range opened... New parks on the former Madatovsky Island and on the Funicular Plateau...

The funicular, built in 1936-1938, was the pride of both Tbilisi and Beria ... But you could be proud of the new powerful water supply system with Natakhtari spring water, and the new thermal power plant ... And the automatic telephone exchange ... And the large bath building near the sulfur springs... And the Botanical Garden... And the buildings of the Tbilisi Institute of Railway Engineers... And the campus of the Institute of Bacteriology...

And yet - the rebuilt tram lines, as well as the new

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for Tbilisi by public transport - bus and trolleybus.

In 1938, the construction of the ensemble of the Palace of the Government of Georgia was completed according to the project of Professor V. Kokorin. It was the largest building in Transcaucasia.

According to the project of Academician A. Shchusev, with the participation of architect P. Sardaryan, in the same 1938, a monumental building of the Tbilisi branch of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute was built.

This is what the years 1937 and 1938 were like for the capital of Georgia and for Lavrenty Beria... And in Tbilisi transforming before our eyes, in its socialist

the master plan of development, dear reader, not only business energy, but also the architectural talent of Beria were invested. This, too, must be remembered. And above all to the people of Tbilisi themselves.

He often came or came to the facilities under construction at night... It was easier to get an objective idea of the real state of affairs, and...

And, of course, to dream after the usual turmoil of the day, in the silence of the night about the unfulfilled ... About the title of architect that he never achieved.

In 1934 the Union of Architects of Georgia was established. This was a general trend in the USSR - the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee on architecture was adopted in 1932. But the fact that in Georgia, as well as in Armenia, in Azerbaijan, this case was not delayed was also due to Beria's interest. His opinion as secretary of the Regional Committee until the beginning of 1937 was certainly significant, and the fact, for example, that in 1938 a new, seriously revised general plan for the restructuring of Yerevan was adopted, proves Beria's attention not only to Tbilisi.

Formally, he never built a single building in his life. However, he nevertheless became an architect, but not of one ensemble - even the most grandiose, but an architect in the great restructuring of the whole society.

And he was sure that he would do a lot more in this matter ...

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YES, PEOPLE of the case in 1937, oddly enough, felt freer and more confident.

Even such a hater of the new Russia as the émigré historian Georgy Fedotov, in his "snapshot of Russia - by January 1, 1936" admitted through gritted teeth:

"...Stalin opened wide the door to life for professional practitioners...

Stalin's true support is that class which he himself called "noble" people... A party ticket and past merits mean little now; personal fitness ... - everything. This new ruling stratum includes... Chekists, commanders of the Red Army, the best engineers, technicians, scientists and artists of the country...

The new Soviet patriotism is a fact that is pointless to deny. This is the only chance for the existence of Russia ... "

But it was written by the enemy!

Open... Malevolent... Hating.

In the second half of 1937, Lazar Kaganovich was appointed People's Commissar for Heavy Industry. The new people's commissar had enough problems, and really "heavy" ones: downtime, accidents, persistent sabotage.

And Lazar Moiseevich began - although September 1937, terrible for the "democrats", began - not with repressions, but with what a truly businessman begins in a new place - with advice from people.

Kaganovich became People's Commissar on 22 August. And already on October 26, the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry convened the All-Union activists of workers in the metallurgical industry, prepared in September.

The results were not long in coming. In 1938, construction began on the first blast furnace with an oxygen plant, which doubled the furnace's productivity. In order to increase the productivity of rolling mills, ingotless rolling was introduced...

Professors Vologdin and Geveling developed a method of surface hardening of metal with high-frequency currents, and Kaganovich immediately became extremely interested in this. He,

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from his work in the People's Commissariat of Railways, he knew what it was - wear and tear

rails in operation, and the new method made it possible to drastically reduce it.

By the way, Professor Valentin Petrovich Vologdin (he was 56 in 1937) was one of the founders of the Nizhny Novgorod radio laboratory in 1918, in 1919 he created the world's first mercury rectifier with a liquid cathode, in 1927 he proposed using titanium dioxide to create artificial dielectrics ... A scientist, an engineer, who was formed by the old regime, he served Russia all his life to a ripe old age, in 1943 he received the Stalin Prize, was awarded the Order of Lenin. In 1948, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR awarded him the first gold medal named after A.S. Popov.

And no one has ever oppressed him, repressed him.

His older brother, Sergei, a Russian metal scientist, professor at the Donskoy (Novocherkassk) Polytechnic Institute, also worked honestly and without problems for Russia until his death in 1926, at the age of fifty-two.

Metal scientist Nikolai Vladimirovich Geveling, later major general of the aviation engineering service, holder of the Order of Lenin and four other orders, was born in 1897 and was sixteen years younger than Vologdin Jr. In 1924 he graduated from the Moscow Higher Technical School, since 1933 he was a professor at the N.E. Zhukovsky.

And also - no repressions, no arrests.

Not for what it was!

November 25, 1937 Kaganovich spends in Sverdlovsk an asset of workers of the already non-ferrous metallurgy, producing copper, aluminum, lead, tin, gold, and rare metals.

In March 1938, a separate meeting of workers in the gold industry was convened... A little later, the asset of the cement industry, twice the assets of the builders.

But the rest of the industries also received new impulses - fuel, chemical, energy, construction and building materials...

Kaganovich perfectly understood the importance of extensive geological exploration and made a good business acquaintance with the academician-geologist Ivan Mikhailovich Gubkin, and also held the All-Union Conference of Geologists.

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And in 1938, the All-Union Conference of Oil Workers was to meet in Baku. The people's commissar saw him off, but before leaving *Moscow*, Stalin had a detailed conversation with Kaganovich, who knew well both the Transcaucasus and the problems of the oil and oil refining industry.

Kaganovich was in Baku for two weeks. Beria was also there... He was deeply involved in the oil problems, while still the first secretary of the Zakkraykom, and his help was so great that Kaganovich noted it even decades later in his memoirs, published in 1996 (ninety-sixth). And such praise from such lips - taking into account everything that happened later - is worth a lot.

Is not it?

THE FIRST half of 1938, Beria was busy, as always, with the affairs of the republic. Freed since the beginning of last year from the need to distribute his attention and time between three regions, in 1937 he "rushed" especially powerfully, and the results were evident everywhere - in industry, in construction and agriculture, in culture.

Georgia exceeded the second five-year plan in all respects. And in terms of the number of students per 1000 people, it bypassed England and Germany!

The volume of industrial production from 1929 to 1939 increased more than five times, and in comparison with 1913 - more than fifteen times! Railways were electrified, new enterprises were built.

Tea plantations in 1913 occupied less than a thousand hectares, and in 1938 - more than 47 thousand. Up to 400 million lemons and tangerines were taken from citrus trees, and billions were already seen in the future. More than two thousand tractors worked on the fields of the republic. The swamps of Colchis were drained.

Georgia has become an all-Union health resort: Gagra, Sukhumi, Gulripsh, Tskhaltubo, Borjomi, Batumi ... Beria had a direct and understandable relation to the creation of a network of resorts, as well as to all major construction projects in general.

In 1938, the Georgian Institute of Physics was founded.

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Russian culture, and this was also one of Beria's direct initiatives.

Beria worked enthusiastically in Tbilisi, but Stalin in Moscow already had his own views on him.

## Chapter 11

### WHY EZHOV WAS REPLACED...

The STANDARD scheme of "democrats" in explaining the double replacement of people's commissars of internal affairs in three years is as follows ...

1) Yagoda created the "GULAG empire", carried out the "dirty" work 1930-1936 years of the first widespread repression.

2) Then he was removed to hide the first mass-de crimes, and on his Ezhov was given a place, dooming him to a future slaughter in advance.

3) Yezhov organized and carried out a "great terror" among the masses and also carried out mass purges of people objectionable to Stalin in the party and state leadership.

4) When this was done, the "executioner" Yezhov, hiding the "secret of Stalin's crimes", was removed and replaced by the "executioner" Beria.

Regarding the last link in this scheme, I note that Stalin could hardly have imagined that in the future his compatriots would fall so low that they would allow the Gorbachevs, Yeltsins, Yakovlevs to power and the Volkogonovs and Radzinskys to the media, and they would begin to vilely slander him . So there was no need for him to "hide the ends of crimes in blood". He did not hide anything, because there was nothing to hide - repressions in the highest echelon of power immediately become known not only in the country, but throughout the world.

Regarding the third link, we already know enough to remember about the role in the "grassroots" repressions not of Yezhov, but of Eikhe, Khrushchev and the entire partyocratic rati, and also about the need for repression among this "rati" itself ...

As for the first two links...

Here, for example, are the "secrets" of the notorious GULAG - the Main

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administration of the NKVD camps. There is one surname in his history - Yakov Davydovich Rapoport. Born in 1898 in Riga in the family of an employee, studied at Dorpat University. In January 1917, he joined the RSDLP (b), and this was the time when people joined the Bolshevik Party solely for ideological reasons. Since August 1918, he was an investigator, and then - the head of the department and deputy chairman of the Voronezh Cheka. In 1922, he was the secretary of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Chicherin, served in the Economic Department of the OGPU, and from June 9, 1932 he became the deputy head of the Gulag and since then has been engaged in one thing - built: the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the Rybinsk and Uglich hydroelectric complexes ... During the war he commanded a sapper army.

With the name of Major General of the Engineering Service Rapoport, we, although

in passing, we will meet again at the time of solving the atomic problem in the USSR, because he worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs both in the forties and in the early fifties. He was transferred to the reserve on June 6, 1953. Rapoport lived until 1962 and was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.

He knew about the "secrets", or rather, about the activities of the Gulag - from the very beginning of its organization, everything. And no one "removed" him. Rapoport was a capable organizer, well versed in technical matters. He did not get into "politics", although he valued himself highly. That is why he "survived" during all the purges of the NKVD, although the word "survived" is incorrect here, or rather, he remained in his place. Because he has always been there.

Also, without any problems under Yagoda, and under Yezhov, and under Beria - until 1947, he worked in various positions (head of work at the White Sea Canal, head of the BAMlag, which built the second tracks of the Trans-Siberian Railway, deputy head of the Gulag) Naftaly Frenkel. In 1947, at the age of 64, he retired due to illness and quietly, receiving a general's pension, lived in Moscow. He died in 1960, two years before eighty.

Both Frenkel and Rapoport worked. But many of their colleagues had, yes, political intentions, which is why they were subsequently repressed. However, they hardly had any "secrets" associated with the repressions of the late twenties and early thirties. Then at the new building

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there were so many real enemies inside and outside the country that there was no need for the United Main Political Directorate of Menzhinsky-Yagoda to "invent" conspiracies, acts of sabotage and sabotage. God forbid with the real something to deal with!

As soon as socialist reconstruction began - from the end of the twenties, the counter-revolution immediately became more active, and nothing else could be. Therefore, only

malicious slanderers.

Here he plotted. And he admitted this in his last word in court, rejecting only accusations of espionage: "If I were a spy, then dozens of countries in the world could close their intelligence services."

Moreover, Yagoda was first removed for purely business reasons, and he was suspected of conspiracy a little later. And the whole explanation can be found on two pages of "Correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich"...

September 25, 1936 Stalin and Zhdanov (the last one held the pen) sent a cipher to Molotov and Kaganovich from Sochi, where they wrote:

*"First. We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent to appoint Cde. Yezhov as promoted to the post of People's Commissar. Yagoda was clearly not up to the task of exposing the Trotskyite-Zinovievist bloc. The OGPU was 4 years late in this matter (given that the sabotage of the "old specialists" after 1930 went "to nothing", but the peak of the disorganization of the economy, sabotage and sabotage by the forces of the opposition fell on 1932-1933, then Stalin determined the time frame exactly - S.K.). All party workers and the majority of regional representatives of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs speak about this. Agranov can be left as Yezhov's deputy in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.*

*Second. We consider it necessary and urgent to remove Rykov from Narkomsvyazi and appoint Yagoda to the post of Narkomsvyaz. We think that this case does not need to be motivated, since it is already clear ...*

*Fourth. As for the CPC (Party Control Commission under the Central Committee. — S.K.), then Ezhov can be left concurrently as the chairman of the CPC so that he de172*

*he devoted nine tenths of his time to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and as the first deputy*

*Yezhov on the CPC could be nominated Yakovlev Yakov Arkadyevich.*

*Fifth. Yezhov agrees with our proposals.*

*Stalin. Zhdanov.*

*No. 44 25/IX-36*

*Sixth. It goes without saying that Yezhov remains secretary of the Central Committee.*

On the evening of the same day, at half past nine, Stalin dictated a note to Yagoda over the phone to Moscow: *"Comrade. Yagoda. Drug dealing is important. This is the People's Commissariat for Defense. I have no doubt that you will be able to put this People's Commissariat on its feet. I beg you to agree to the work of Narkomsvyazi. Without a good people's commissariat of communications, we feel like without hands. Narkomsvyaz cannot be left in its current position. She needs to be put on her feet. I. Stalin.*

Both the encryption and the note are purely internal, operational documents, not for the public. There was no point in keeping something back, casting a shadow on a clear day ... And therefore, all the stories about the removal of Yagoda and the appointment of Yezhov as an act of preparation for the allegedly notorious "great terror" can be sent to the dump.

Yagoda was then removed not with the aim of eliminating it altogether, but because, as Stalin believed, he *had failed*. But since Yagoda could not but fail, because his goal was a conspiracy, then four months after the new appointment he was taken to the reserve when suspicions arose. And on March 28, 1937, he was arrested. On April 27, Peterson was arrested, and something began to clear up for Stalin and Yezhov, a thread was pulled ...

Yezhov, appointed by the NKVD on September 26, 1936, was seen as a good candidate. After all, he really worked well in all the posts in which he found himself. And the atmosphere in the NKVD immediately after Yezhov arrived there can be judged by what Kaganovich wrote about it to Stalin on October 12, 1936:

*"...5) Yezhov is doing well. He set about firmly and vigorously uprooting the counter-revolutionary gangs.*

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*comrade, conducts interrogations remarkably and politically competently. But, apparently, part of the apparatus, despite the fact that it is now quiet, will be disloyal to him. Take, for example, such a question, which, it turns out, is of great importance for them, this is the question of rank. There is talk that Yagoda still remains the general commissar, that Yezhov will not be given this title ( January 27, 1937, Yezhov received it. - S.K.), etc. It's strange, but this "problem" matters in this device. When the question of the people's commissar was being decided, this question was somehow not raised. Don't you think, Comrade Stalin, it is necessary to raise this question? »*

And then Kaganovich adds:

*"As for the rest, we are trying to correct the shortcomings and errors that you point out, and we are working to the fullest traction. We are very glad that you are feeling well. Warm regards and best wishes to you.*

*Yours A. Kaganovich ... "*

After all, this was also not written for the public and not counting on future historians. This is current business correspondence, and it can be seen from it that the driving force of those days for Stalin and his faithful associates was not intrigues, but problems that had to be solved. And the fact that Yezhov himself was subsequently repressed was explained not by the principle: "The Moor has done his job, the Moor must go," but by his personal

qualities.

The famous aircraft designer Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev recalled a conversation with Stalin when he said: "Yezhov is a scoundrel! He was a good guy, a good worker, but he decomposed ... You call him at the People's Commissariat - they say he went to the Central Committee. You call the Central Committee - they say: he left for work. Sending to

to his house - it turns out that he is lying on the bed dead drunk. Killed many innocents. We shot him for it..."

By the way, at the time of his arrest, Yezhov was a widower - his wife committed suicide, and he loved his wife.

No, Yezhov was by no means a "fiend" and a gray apparatchik. I read with interest, for example, the transcript of his speech to young Komsomol members and communists mobilized for work in the NKVD on March 11, 1937.

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yes... It was not a paper speech, but it was an extensive, specific, businesslike and informative speech from the point of view of professional orientation.

At the beginning of it (and the conversation was "at home", and with people who were to work not so much in the central apparatus, but "primarily in big cities"), Nikolai Ivanovich said: "We with our apparatus rely on the majority of our country with all our tentacles. . For all our people..."

And later he repeated: "Our people's intelligence, we rely on broad segments of the population ... "In the end, they were told this:

"With the introduction of the Constitution (1936. - S.K.), many of our things that we are now doing casually (note the transcript "laughter in the hall." - S.K.), they will not be in vain. There is legality, so we need to know our laws, the investigator must know our laws thoroughly, then all relationships with the prosecutor's office will disappear. Our main fight with the prosecutor's office so far goes simply along the line of ignorance of the laws, ignorance of procedural norms ... "

I can't resist and will quote this, by the way, Yezhov's remark:

"Two friends, party members or non-members of the party, got together and began to tell ... but the Chekists are tempted to tell a story ... like a hunter, all sorts of fairy tales. I know, for example, from various Chekists, at least 15 options for capturing Savinkov ... "

You read this and think - how many such lovers of "hunting stories" have launched "misinformation" about Beria's service with the Musavatists?

Probably more than fifteen! YES, NOW the yard was no longer 1928, but 1938. The "operation" of the NKVD was coming to an end, and here it became more and more clear that along with the rotten forest, part of the healthy one had also been cut down.

However, how and who cut it?

On January 19, 1938, in Pravda No. 19, an informational message about ending "one of these days"

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Plenum of the Central Committee and the resolution of the plenum "On the mistakes of party organizations in the exclusion of communists from the party, on the formal bureaucratic attitude to appeals expelled from the CPSU (b) and on measures to eliminate these shortcomings."

"... The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks more than once demanded from party organizations and their leaders an attentive, individual approach to party members when resolving issues of expulsion from the party or the restoration of those who were incorrectly expelled ...", it was said at the beginning of the decision.

And then it was reminded of Stalin's calls for such an approach at the February-March plenum of 1937, of an even earlier letter of the Central Committee of June 24, 1936

of the year.

Then there were dense concrete examples in many regions of the Union, of which I will give two: in the Kuibyshev region of the RSFSR and the Kyiv region of the Ukrainian SSR:

"The Bolshe-Chernigov district committee of the CPSU (b) expelled from the party and announced



enemies of the people 50 people out of a total of 210 communists who are members of the regional party organization, while in relation to 43 of these expelled, the NKVD did not find any grounds for arrest ...

The former secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, an enemy of the people, Kudryavtsev, at party meetings, invariably turned to the communists who spoke with a provocative question: "Have you written a statement against anyone at least?" As a result of this provocation, politically compromising statements were filed in Kyiv against almost half of the members of the city party organization, and most of the statements turned out to be clearly wrong or even provocative."

Like this! The question is, who unreasonably expanded the scale of repression - the "executioner" Yezhov and his "helpers" on the ground, or the partocrats and hidden oppositionists?

Of course, in each case, the answers could be different - up to opposite. However, "information for thought" is available here.

But everything really was very ambiguous, dear reader. Then it was convenient for the party functionary Khrushchev to blame everything on the NKVD, on Yezhov, on Beria ... But professionals from the NKVD were often forced to

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we need to figure out what non-professionals from the "party" of self-seekers have done.

Although there was enough work for professionals. Here is another document - "Special report on counter-revolutionary manifestations on the part of persons expelled from the CPSU (b) during the verification of party documents in the Kursk region and in Georgia." And so it was not published in Pravda - due to the presence on it of the heading "Top Secret".

Head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissioner of State Security 2-First-rank Molchanov on February 14, 1936 informed Stalin and Yezhov about the situation in Georgia:

"There is an increase in the counter-revolutionary activity of those expelled from the party ... and especially the Trotskyites...

An analysis of the moods of those expelled from the party shows that some of them ... are starting to create counter-revolutionary groups, while the most embittered express terrorist sentiments.

In connection with the verification of party documents on the party organization of the SSR of Georgia, the NKVD arrested 460 people, including:

1. double-dealing Trotskyists - 136
2. members of anti-Soviet political parties - 157
3. crooks with membership cards - 167.

This is just a clear danger! But the special report refers to another ninety identified Trotskyists, a total of 550 people. Simple logic suggests that not every enemy "talks". Moreover, the dog that does not bark is the most dangerous, it just bites more decisively. And not everyone gets into the field of view of the "organs".

If we compare the "limit" requested by Beria in 1937 (1,419 people for VMN and 1,562 for expulsion) and the figures from Molchanov's message, then everything finally falls into place: Beria did not "execute" in Georgia, the need for such minimal repressive figures **was** objective. And the data of the SPO of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR confirm this.

Below, I give, practically without comment, a number of statements from the report on Georgia received undercover...

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"We have to wait a few months. Then the war with Japan will begin, the people will follow us and power will pass to us. (*Dismissed from the party*)

*Trotskyist.)*

"Out in the war. Then we, the old people, will be called, and the helm of leadership will pass to us." (Excluded *from the Trotskyist party.*)

"We have a large organization at the military shipbuilding plant. The entire Baltic Fleet is ours. We have a connection with Moscow, but we do not work the way we used to. Now we are more strict." (Trotskyist *Kalandadze, subject to arrest.*)

"I want to be in the party only in order not to lose authority among the people. Victory for the Mensheviks. Communists in Georgia cannot win." (Trotskyist *Gogotishvili expelled from the party.*)

What is funny is that Gogotishvili, who did not believe in communists, was nevertheless in the party in order to have authority among the people. *Recognition is involuntary, but valuable.*

"We won't be able to do anything in the city, we need to transfer work to the countryside ..." (Berdzenishvili, *arrested.*)

Yes, it was easier to "fake" a peasant... Then...

"I am not interested in the membership card. By means of a party card, I was in the know party secrets. (*Vashekidze, a Trotskyite expelled from the party.*)

"Of course, I don't want the death of Russia. I only support that the young generation of our party, which found itself at the head ... of the apparatus, be arrested and the leadership be transferred to the old Bolsheviks. (*Kalandadze, passed the party check.*)

"I hid from the party that I was a Trotskyist. We must endure, be careful, vote for their proposals. Clap your hands if you have to." (Seperteladze, *passed the party check.*)

And it was not just a "grumble" ... In stable, however, times, it was possible to give up on it, they say, everything will be limited to figs in your pocket. What about unstable ones? After all, such "doves" could do a lot of bloody troubles.

Here is an example already in the Kursk region: the composition of one of the organized groups of former "party members" in the Grayvoron district:

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1. Tishchenko, a kulak, worked as an instructor in the district committee.
2. Novomlinsky, a former kulak, worked as a garage manager at MTS.
3. Zakharov, former kulak, former chairman of the City Council.
4. Soloshenko, a former kulak, previously worked as the head of the district land department of the Grayvoron District Executive Committee.
5. Tverdokhlebov, former kulak, owner of a brick factory, former chairman of the city council.

6. Ustinov, expelled for bribery, former district prosecutor...

Good selection?

And all of them, as one, were ready, "without hesitation", "to join a gang, if it were organized somewhere."

This group, fortunately, was neutralized in time. And such a group in Kursk area was not the only one. There were similar groups in other areas.

Moreover, the introduction of enemies of Soviet power into the organs of Soviet power took place almost from the moment this power was established. So, in 1924, the future Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitry Medvedev (then he worked in the Odessa department of the GPU of Ukraine) with a group of Chekists and criminal investigation officers liquidated the Bim-Bom gang from Ukrainian kulaks and Jewish raiders (as we see, bandits do not suffer at all times). The first Filka Telegin, the professional robber Abram Leher and ... the chairman of one of the village councils Grigory Roshkovsky were at the head of the gang.

The bandits deliberately dragged "their own" to responsible positions in

local councils.

Someone was exposed in the 20s...

Someone - in the 30s ...

And someone was never exposed.

It was a potential "fifth column" in the "bottom" ... But it was also in the "top". So, objectively, there was enough work for the NKVD without falsifying cases. But subjectively, Yezhov as a worker, it seems, was no longer pulling.

By the way, he could really be one of the unwitting victims of the repressions of 1937-1938 in the sense that

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that at that time he was not only burdened by a huge administrative responsibility (for a strong manager this is not a reason to give up), but psychological responsibility.

He could not but understand that with the expansion of the scale of repressions, and even in conditions when they were most often preventive in nature (that is, not already committed, but potential criminals were repressed), condemnation of some innocents was inevitable. Yes, not just condemnation, but their death. And these, what can I say, terrible overlays were more likely in the "lower classes". That is, the account here was in the thousands, and even tens of thousands.

In the "tops", when investigating cases of conspiracies, sabotage and other things, there could not have been innocently convicted either, because there was no direct *material* evidence against anyone, even obviously guilty ones. Everything was based on confessions. This means that there could be reservations.

Finally, Yezhov could not fail to understand that the simplified order of the investigation cannot but corrupt part of the apparatus. Let not "brutal torture", but some physical measures of influence in the conditions of political and historical time pressure had to be used - in war as in war.

And at the same time, Yezhov, very likely, saw another, psychologically scary, moment: he and his people unwittingly create innocent victims, but not all enemies are identified at the same time - for objective reasons. You really get drunk here - if there is at least some kind of slack.

One way or another, Stalin increasingly came to the conclusion: Yezhov must be replaced.

But by whom?

Beria's candidacy arose naturally. He was well known to Stalin, had a solid and unsullied Chekist past, and proved himself well in the Transcaucasus and Georgia.

There are different versions about how the final decision was made: Stalin personally decided; someone specifically recommended Beria to him; someone prepared a list that included Beria, and so on.

I will not retell any version here, leaving

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this is an occupation for the creators of "historical thrillers", and I won't guess who the initial impulse came from in the matter of Beria's new appointment. But there is no doubt that it did not come from Lavrenty Pavlovich himself.

Remaining on the basis of exact facts, one thing can be said: by August 1938, Stalin's choice was made.

And this choice was a good one.

IN AUGUST 1938, Beria was summoned to Moscow.

Leaving his native places, he could be satisfied. For the land in which he was born, he worked with success. And now he had to expand the field of his activities to the scale of the whole country and even the whole world - given that foreign intelligence was also part of the NKVD.

*Initially, on August 22, Beria was appointed Yezhov's 1st deputy, and on 29*

*September - also the head of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD of the USSR. He replaced both the 1st deputy people's commissar and the head of the GUGB, his almost the same age - Mikhail Petrovich Frinovsky.*

Frinovsky, in fact, was simply the head of the State Security Department, because on March 28, 1938, the GUGB was somewhat lowered in status. However, Beria immediately insisted on restoring the former position of the Main Directorate to the State Security Directorate.

He was, of course, right - it was not a matter of personal ambitions, but of the prestige of the unit that was the core of the NKVD. And not even in prestige, but in opportunities, in rights ...

Frinovsky began to rise even under Yagoda, but under Yezhov not only retained his position, but also strengthened it, becoming the first deputy people's commissar.

At that time, every person "in plain sight" had a biography that was not quiet. However, with Frinovsky it was especially stormy. A year older than Beria, originally from Penza Narovchat, the son of a teacher, he graduated from a religious school, in January 1916 he entered the cavalry as a volunteer, in August he already deserted, joined the anarchists, participated in a terrorist act against Major General Bem.

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From March 1917 he worked as an accountant, in September he joined the Red Guard of the Khamovnichesky district of Moscow, in November he stormed the Kremlin, was seriously wounded. In March-July 1918, Frinovsky was an assistant superintendent of the Khodynka hospital. However, the reason for such a peaceful position was clearly recovery from the consequences of a wound, because in July he was already in the First Cavalry, rose to the rank of squadron commander there.

In 1919, Mikhail was transferred to the bodies of the Cheka, and soon he was assistant head of the active part of the Special Department of the Moscow Cheka. Then: operations to defeat anarchists and rebel detachments in Ukraine, the Special Department of the Southern Front, again the First Cavalry, the operational detachment of the All-Ukrainian Cheka ...

Until September 1930, he was commander and commissar of the F.E. Dzerzhinsky, and then until 1933 - the chairman of the GPU of Azerbaijan, from where he went to be promoted to the head of the Main Directorate of the Border Guard of the OGPU of the USSR.

While working in Azerbaijan, Frinovsky simply could not help but run into the OGPU plenipotentiary for the Transcaucasus, and later the first secretary of the Zakkraykom, Beria. And Beria was not just an experienced, but, of course, an outstanding psychologist and, of course, understood Frinovsky, as they say, "to the bottom."

Frinovsky in literature is usually attested as a kind of almost beast, and also ignorant, but I am sure that this simply cannot be. Physically, it really was a hero, on the face - a scar. He, the son of a teacher, could not be ignorant because the religious schools provided a good basic education. In addition, in 1927, Mikhail also graduated from the Courses for the Highest Commanding Staff (KUVNAS) at the Frunze Academy, and they also taught well there.

And the fact that he began his KGB work, being in the field of view of Dzerzhinsky himself, also means something. Dzerzhinsky is ignorant  
complained.

Psychologically, Frinovsky ... But psychologically, he was probably a person who combined discretion with "riskiness". Definitely a fighter. That is, as a friend

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he was priceless, like an enemy - very dangerous, and the fact that an adventurous streak could always wake up in him made him even more dangerous.

Again, in the literature, there are frequent statements that Frinovsky quickly "crushed" Yezhov, who was ignorant of Chekist affairs, and recklessly falsified the "fake" cases in the NKVD.

I think it is not. No, I do not want to say that in the OGPU and NKVD for some period there were no creators of "fake" cases (I did not forget about my statement to the contrary, but there are sad exceptions to any rule). Nevertheless, objectively, they could succeed more on the periphery than in the central apparatus. There, as I said, there was enough "fair" loading. On the periphery, however, also ... To verify this, let's go back to 1933.

Plenipotentiary of the OGPU in Belarus Leonid Zakovsky (actually - the Latvian Heinrich Shtubis) in October 1933 telegraphed to Moscow Yakov Agranov: "October 4, 1933 No. 50665  
*TOP SECRET*

*I. In Mogilev, a branch of the Polish Military Organization (POV) is opened and liquidated. The consciousness of the members of the organization: the depot locksmith, expelled from the party in 1931, REUTA, the sister of the famous k. - r. figure BELOGOLOVOY - SKOPOVSKAYA, more than 30 members of the organization recruited by priest YAROSHEVICH have been identified so far.*

*II. In Zhlobin, a branch of the POV, created by priest YAROSHEVICH, is also hiding. The arrested members of the organization BATURO and KUCHINSKAYA confessed to giving YAROSHEVICH information about the Zhlobin knot and military parts.*

*III. In the Osipovich district, a branch of the POV, priest MUSTEYKIS, is opened, liquidated. The consciousness created by the arrested ROZHNIKOV and BARTASHKEVICH establishes the emergence of the organization in 1924 ...*

*IV. Arrested in Gomel in the POV SESKEVICH case, Anton confirmed his involvement in the organization. He admitted that in 1929-1932 . on the instructions of the priest of the Academy of Sciences*

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*DREKUSA visited Poland, in 1932, while in Bialystok, he completed a 3-month reconnaissance and sabotage course.*

*V. On October 1, 1933, in Minsk, he was detained in Minsk, who fled to Poland in early 1933 on early demobilization from the army by the decoration (separated commander, sergeant. - S.K.) of the 5th artillery regiment of the 2nd division SUCHKOV. The consciousness of SUCHKOV establishes his cooperation in the Auninets reconnaissance dance and the creation of a residency in Minsk in the person of the decoration committee of the 2nd artillery regiment Georgy TROFIMOV, the instructor of the military construction site Ivan KULINICH. Arrested TROFIMOV confessed to espionage..."*

And so on, for a total of ten points.

This is not a "fake". This is the reality of the secret war against the USSR in those years.

Zakovsky, by the way, was himself arrested in 1938 on charges of having links with the Germans and Poles and shot. But the above document does not refute such an accusation. Firstly, it was not Zakovsky who opened the members of the POV, but all Belarusian Chekists. Secondly, the defeat of the POV was also beneficial to the Germans, reducing the influence of Poland on events in Russia. In itself, the message of the Belarusian plenipotentiary of the OGPU hardly needs comments.

Moreover, the accusation of Zakovsky-Shtubis was also not a "phony" one, most likely, despite Zakovsky's certainly glorious revolutionary past. By the way, in 1987 it was recognized that there were no grounds for reviewing his case (here, of course, simply vindictiveness could have affected

"democrats", but still ...).

Alas, even the book is not rubber. And I cannot cite, as an illustrative example of the fact that the degeneration of a number of Bolsheviks took place, also an extensive letter from a certain G., forwarded by an unknown addressee to the Moscow City Committee personally to Khrushchev. This "well-wisher", having received G.'s letter, considered it reasonable for himself to tear off the address on the first page and send the rest to the MK with a request "to sort it out, leaving me alone, alone."

From the MK the letter got to the NKVD, from where Deputy People's Commissar Agranov sent it to Stalin on September 5, 1935. Those interested can familiarize themselves with this curious document (p. 683, doc. No. 539) in the main publication of the Demokra Foundation

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tia" by A. Yakovlev — "Lubyanka. Stalin and VChK-GPU-OG-PU-NKVD. January 1922 - December 1936.

So, there is a lot of interesting things in this letter about, for example, Avel Yenukidze, who dreamed of "becoming a Russian Roosevelt", and about the dissatisfied old Bolsheviks - "p ... nah", who "should be organized", and about the plan to "remove that an odious figure who has now blocked even the sun.

Is it necessary to decipher whose "odious figure" Yenukidze had in mind? But who exactly was meant by the "old Bolsheviks - " p ... us ", the Chekists had only to establish. And, faced with the need to "unwind" the tangle of links of one such letter, to dump on your hump also a "linden"? What else is this from?

And there are more than a dozen such, no doubt, reliable and testifying to the acuteness of the moment in the collection mentioned above, I ask the reader to take my word for it.

But I have not yet finished with Mikhail Frinovsky, who allegedly outperformed the "ignorant" Yezhov in operational terms ... I doubt it even here. Of course, Nikolai Ivanovich could not immediately navigate in the subtle, say, intelligence matters. But in general...

In general, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov's biography was also not so to purely clerical!

A qualified Putilov worker, from 1915 a private of the 172nd Lida Infantry Regiment, he fought, was wounded, demobilized in 1916, and at the end of that year was again called up to the reserve regiment in New Peterhof. After the revolution - the commissioner of the Vitebsk station, and only later - a party worker. In Kazakhstan, he led the suppression of the Basmachi.

Work in the accounting and distribution department of the Central Committee and in the Party Control Commission also had a number of features that made it similar to the Chekist one. According to his former "patron" Moskvina, Yezhov had a poorly developed sense of proportion - he could not stop in time. Perhaps so, although such neat people as Yezhov, rather, suffer from the opposite - they do not know how to go far into the depths.

Transcripts of his speeches reveal, however, both intelligence and competence (by the way, his speech at

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February-March plenum of the Central Committee of 1937 very convincingly supplements the documents of the type of the letter "G." mentioned by me above).

And yet, in solving the problem of a constructive transformation of the NKVD, Yezhov confused, as he was confused in his own life.

THEREFORE, many things in the NKVD had to be changed by the beginning of 1939. Like - many. Firstly, during the "operation" of 1937-1938, one way or another, unsuitable for work in the NKVD for many reasons were revealed. There were also

dubious...

The same Frinovsky was removed from the NKVD shortly after Beria arrived there, but

arrested only on April 6, 1939 (and shot after a long investigation only on February 8, 1940). And he was arrested, apparently, just because his former adventurous streak had not completely died out. But he was not an "old p ... n" ...

Or here's another deputy commissar from the time of Yagoda-Yezhov - Yakov Agranov. The historian Gennady Kostyrchenko, in his highly informative book *Stalin's Secret Politics*, is strangely maliciously inaccurate in an obvious situation. He also refers Agranov to the victims of the new People's Commissar Beria. But Agranov was arrested on July 20, 1937, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR to VMN on August 1, 1938, and shot on the same day. And Beria appeared at the Lubyanka exactly three weeks later - on August 22.

I think that Kostyrchenko is inaccurate not by chance - and so, according to false "facts", the image of the "bloodthirsty" Beria is molded. After all, Kostyrchenko's monograph claims to be solid - it was published by the Foreign Ministry publishing house "International Relations" under the auspices of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In documentary references to Agranov, it is far from always reported that before becoming a member of the Bolshevik Party from 1915, he was a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party from 1912, in 1919 he was secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, in 1921 - secretary of the Small Council of People's Commissars. So both the Socialist-Revolutionary past and the

branched connections among the "elite" could well 186

whether to produce some political ambitions of Agranov. Yes, they produced it.

No, the "tops" of the NKVD were "thinned out" by People's Commissar Beria, most often not "Yezhov", but also "Yagodin", and even of an earlier origin - when the Trotskyists were not in camps, but in high offices ...

On the other hand, many of the "recruits" of the "Yezhov" draft already under Beria grew into intelligent workers. And the level of their education was quite "on the level". In due time, we will get acquainted with Vitaly Pavlov, a participant in Operation Snow. So he, like thousands of his future colleagues, came to the NKVD under Yezhov after graduating from the Siberian Road Institute. And no one subsequently "removed" him. On the contrary, they promoted

Elena Prudnikova, the author of an interesting book about Beria, writes (about the times, however, of the early 30s): "What is a typical Chekist of that time? .. In all positions, from bottom to top, there were full of illiterate and semi-literate nominees from the time of the revolution and the Civil War. So, the famous Zakovsky completed two classes, Agranov - four classes ... They were uneducated, cruel, unprincipled adventurers ... "

Vitaly Pavlov and his comrades - as representatives of the Chekist "bottom" - do not fit into this scheme. As for the "upper"...

I think that Prudnikova was led here by the desire to show Beria's "chivalry" "in contrast" with his "cruel" predecessors, and she uncritically reacted to the later negative characteristics of a number of prominent Chekists of the Cheka era—

OGPU and the first NKVD. But these characteristics are most often malicious distorted.

The same Agranov was well acquainted with Averbakh, Mandelstam, Pilnyak, Brik, Mayakovsky ... Now it is sometimes claimed that Agranov organized the "suicide" of the latter, which I personally do not exclude, just as I do not exclude that Averbakh and Osip Brik. But it is not necessary to speak of Yakov Agranov as a gray man. There was a "second bottom" in his nature, but he was, of course, an outstanding personality. For those who wish to further verify this, I can recommend a multi-page

years", written by Agranov and placed in the Red Book of the Cheka. God grant any system of such "ignorant" civil servants as 26-summer author of this review.

And let's not forget - Anton Makarenko, Dmitry Medvedev, Alexander Lukin, Georgy Bryantsev, the heroes of the writer Yuri German Ivan Lapshin and Altus are also Chekists of the twenties and thirties. So Beria and his "recruits" did not replace mediocrity.

Moreover! I am not sure that from the very beginning Beria was called by Stalin primarily to quickly replace Yezhov. For some reason, they do not pay attention to the fact that Beria was appointed not just the 1st Deputy People's Commissar, but also - namely, the head of the Main Directorate of State Security, which was also in charge of foreign intelligence. And just before the call of Beria to Moscow for a new appointment, the NKVD intelligence officers experienced three most serious emergencies.

Initially, the captain of the GB, Ignatius Stanislavovich Reiss, changed. The same age as Beria, he was born in Austria-Hungary, in Galicia, studied for some time at the Faculty of Law at the University of Vienna, and in 1917 joined the Bolsheviks. He was at illegal work in Poland, worked in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, and in 1931 he moved to the intelligence of the OGPU - the Foreign Department (INO). Based in Holland, he also operated in France. In July 1937, Reiss was recalled to Moscow, but he did not return, and on July 17 he published an open letter in French newspapers denouncing Stalin and also openly joined Trotsky.

Reiss liquidated a special group of the NKVD near Lausanne in September 1937. But Stalin's confidence in the Foreign Department of the NKVD was undermined.

And then came the second betrayal. In the autumn of 1937, the captain of the GB, an illegal resident in Holland, Walter Germanovich Krivitsky, also the same age as Beria, by the way, became a traitor and defector.

Krivitsky had a biography similar to Reiss: he was born in the Austro-Hungarian Podvolochisk, served in the Red Army Intelligence Agency, since 1931 - in the INO OGPU. Awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

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Krivitsky also went into all serious trouble, got in touch with Trotsky's son Lev Sedov, but most importantly, he "surrendered" the Intelligence Service to more than a hundred of our intelligence officers and agents.

Even relatively objective authors often blame all the losses of our foreign intelligence in 1937-1938 on Yezhov's bloody repressions. But after all, a hundred of our "exposed" scouts are on the account not of Yezhov, but of Krivitsky. And this is a lot. INO NKVD is not a field division, there is "and one soldier in the field."

And in addition to Krivitsky in July 1938, Alexander Orlov changed (he is also known in the NKVD and as Lev Nikolsky).

The senior major of the GB (almost a general!) Orlov knew a lot. He was a resident of the INO NKVD in France, Austria, Italy, an adviser in Spain (he fled from Spain to the USA).

Orlov-Feldbing was sent to Spain by his close friend Slutsky. In fact - saving from the scandal. In August 1936, right in front of the Lubyanka building, a young employee of the NKVD, Galina Voitova, Feldbing's mistress, shot herself to death. She could not bear the fact that he left her, refusing to divorce his wife.

Subsequently, Beria will be credited with many stories with women, all of which will be false. But here you are, dear reader, a real unseemly story with one of those who were part of the KGB environment, "cleansed" by Yezhov. Moreover, the protégé of Slutsky, breaking with his homeland,



took with him "as a memento" of her from the safe of the residency sixty thousand dollars, destined for operational purposes. At the current exchange rate, this is somewhere over a million.

So, on the one hand, although talented, Feldbing was an adventurer, about whom it is difficult to say today what he will do tomorrow. On the other hand, Slutsky was, I repeat, a close friend of Feldbing. And we are all surprised - how could we not appreciate such an undoubted clever woman as Slutsky and others like him, and also clever ones!

As for Feldbing-Orlov, in 1924 he was also subordinate to Beria - he worked as an employee of the Economic Directorate of the OGPU and head of the border guard of the Sukhumi garrison.

It is believed that Orlov saved his life, in his letter to

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Yezhov's name, warning that he would not "give up" agents - while he was still alive. But in general, in intelligence, only naive people can rely on the honesty of a "defector". So Orlov's betrayal can also explain the distrust of agents, which at first was already shown by People's Commissar Beria.

Not to mention the betrayal of Krivitsky ...

In short, it is possible that this triple betrayal also became one of the reasons for summoning Beria to Moscow. After all, he was not only an experienced intelligence officer, but also more than an experienced *counterintelligence officer*. And this, by the way, is very infrequently combined in one person.

PLEASE, one more consideration can be given ... If we compare the structure of the NKVD on January 1, 1938 (People's Commissar N.I. Yezhov) and on January 1, 1939 (People's Commissar L.P. Beria), we will see that since 1939 year, a new department appears - the Main Economic Department (GEM), and that on January 1, its position chief is vacant.

From September 4, 1939, it was occupied by the thirty-five-year-old Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's longtime collaborator in Georgia and for a long time, like Beria, a professional Chekist.

Kobulov actually created the GEM. And already in 1940 it included departments:

- industry,
- defense industry
- Agriculture,
- Goznak and refineries,
- aviation industry,
- fuel industry.

In addition, by January 1, 1940, the following were created in the structure of the NKVD:

- Boiler Supervision Inspection;
- consumer goods sector;
- Main Transport Administration with departments for railway transport, water transport, communications, highway construction, civil air fleet;

- Main military construction department;
- Main Directorate of Military Supply;

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— Dalstroy.

Everything was understandable: the economic tasks of the NKVD after the repressions of 1937—1938 objectively expanded. Having said this, I am by no means inclined to follow the standard "democratic cliché" - Stalin and the NKVD drove the people into the Gulag in order to build socialism by slave labor. However, the new tasks of the NKVD were indeed associated with a significant

an increase in the number of prisoners who had one or another national economic qualification (if my estimates based on the "Kalinin" data are correct, then the replenishment of the camps amounted to about half a million people).

No, it was not the NKVD that "forced" people into camps, but the harsh reality of the confrontation between the new and the old. However, it was impossible to simply feed this real labor force! Moreover, force is often, I repeat, qualified.

In short, the NKVD dramatically expanded its economic activities. And here, at the head of the NKVD, a man of broad abilities was needed. And Beria just showed himself to be a master of all trades. A master of intelligence and counterintelligence, he also proved his competence as a political figure, and - which was also very important - he showed himself to be a competent economic organizer.

However, dear reader, not all these considerations - for all their paramount importance - most likely influenced the choice of Stalin. I think other considerations were decisive, which will be discussed later.

said.

Beria did not remain Ezhov's FIRST deputy for long. On November 25, 1938, Yezhov was relieved of his post as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, while remaining People's Commissar for Water Transport, which he became *concurrently* on April 8, 1938. "Democrats" often lie about the fact that Yezhov-de was "transferred" to the NKVT only after being removed from the NKVD before the future de "slaughter", but, as we see, this was not So.

Only on April 10, 1939, Yezhov was arrested and, again, after a rather long investigation, he was shot four days before Frinovsky - on February 4, 1940

of the year.

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There are also many versions about the removal of Yezhov, as well as about the circumstances of his arrest. Savinkov, over which Yezhov himself taunted.

The two most common options are...

First: Stalin wanted to remove the "Moors" Yezhov and Yezhov himself, who knew too much, with the hands of Beria. Something similar was written by "general" Volkogonov (I must admit that his name, like the name of Edvard Radzinsky, I can not only pronounce, but even write without extreme disgust) ...

The second option: the eternal intriguer Beria also carried out an intrigue against his boss, as a result of which he was arrested on charges of intending to remove Stalin. It was this second version that was voiced in the memoirs of an outstanding figure in the NKVD-MGB, General Pavel Sudoplatov. We'll see him again...

So, Sudoplatov cited a story by the former secretaries of Beria Mamulov and Ludvigov, allegedly heard by him from them in the Vladimir prison in the fifties. Alas, Elena Prudnikova seized on this tale either of Sudoplatov, or of Mamulov-Ludwigov, or of the political correctors of Sudoplatov's memoirs in general.

This story is as follows: a fake, "opening the way for a campaign against Yezhov and the people who worked with him," was launched by two heads of the NKVD departments from Yaroslavl and Kazakhstan, incited by de Beria. They wrote to Stalin, claiming that "in conversations with them, Yezhov hinted at the upcoming arrests of members of the Soviet leadership on the eve of the October celebrations (that is, on the eve of November 7, 1938. - S.K.) . "

But this is nothing more than a bike from any point of view. Here, let's say, the logical side ... In Stalin's memory, last year's disclosure of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy on the eve of his speech was still fresh. Arrests of the highest leaders

thereafter a multitude was held. And if Stalin really received such a "signal", then Yezhov, regardless of the reality of his guilt, would have been, if not formally arrested, then actually isolated already in early November 1938. And, in any case, he would have been replaced by Beria as People's Commissar **immediately!** And this would not have caused much surprise to anyone, including Yezhov himself -

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his replacement by Beria was largely predetermined by the course of events.

And Yezhov was replaced only on November 25th.

Moreover, Beria also knew that his appointment as People's Commissar was, presumably, a matter of a matter of weeks. So why did he, who certainly knew about this, start a risky intrigue, drawing into it people he did not know well (after all, he did not yet manage personnel and could not place his people in the peripheral system of the NKVD)?

So is it worth referring to the prison "memoirs" of Sudoplatov and Mamulov with Ludwigov? The latter, by the way, was a relative of Mikoyan and could tell a lot of things about Beria - in order to free himself as soon as possible ...

And here we turn to the already chronological proof of the later origin of the "Sudoplatov" version. Yezhov was replaced on November 25, 1938, and the head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, Stepan Mamulov (Mamulyan), was called by Beria to Moscow only in December 1938 and became the first deputy head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR on January 3, 1939. By that time, Yezhov was no longer in the NKVD for more than a month. And even if we assume (which I personally do not admit) that the intrigue mentioned above took place, then it was carried out without the participation and, of course, without Mamulov's knowledge. Beria's former assistant, still in Zakkraykom, Ludwigov - he turned thirty-one in 1938 - all the more could not know anything, his number was even "third" then compared to Mamulov.

That is, the final conclusion coincides with the initial one: either Mamulov with Ludwigov, or the political correctors of Sudoplatov's memoirs are lying.

No, I more believe the testimony of the aircraft designer Yakovlev, according to which Stalin explained the removal of Yezhov by the decomposition of the latter ... I think that Yakovlev accurately conveyed Stalin's words about Yezhov, and Stalin was sincere in his confession. It was not Beria who "hooked up" Yezhov, it was just that Nikolai Ivanovich and Lavrenty Pavlovich were very *different* sizes.

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AND IF I HAVE REMEMBERED Yakovlev, I will cite one more of his reminiscences, which, in my opinion, allows me to better understand both Beria and the general atmosphere around him...

Yakovlev recalled:

*"A.A. Zhdanov once told me a joke about Stalin's favorite pipe: "Stalin complains: the pipe is gone. They say to him: "Take another, because you have so many of them." - "Why, that's my love, I would give a lot to find her."*

*Beria did his best: after three days, 10 thieves were found, and each of them "confessed" that it was he who stole the pipe.*

*A day later, Stalin found his pipe. It turns out she's just collapsed behind the sofa in his room."*

Further, Yakovlev summarizes: "And Zhdanov laughed merrily at this terrible joke."

Alas, Alexander Sergeevich did not understand the essence of the situation, but let's try to figure it out, dear reader, we ourselves, taking into account that Yakovlev wrote his memoirs already when only the lazy refused to kick Beria, and that

Memoirists' assessments are often influenced by generally accepted later assessments of the period they are reminiscing about. And these *assessments*, in contrast to *the facts cited by the memoirists*, who were *personally with them*, can be directly opposite to the essence of what happened then in reality.

So let's think...

What, Zhdanov, laughing about "this terrible anecdote", was a kind of a moral monster, devoid of an elementary sense of proportion, compassion, etc.?

Of course not! He laughed because such a story for him, who was well acquainted with the state of affairs and knew both Stalin and Beria well, was essentially absurd, without any real basis. That is, in the full sense of the word, anecdotal, but ...

But - what can I deny - witty.

Rethinking Yakovlev's story (having known it since my student days, I saw the situation in its true light only in the course of working on this book), I remembered another similar situation. Lenin once told an anecdote he had heard from someone with a laugh. They ask: "How will the Bolsheviks end?"

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Russian revolution? Answer: "Read the words "hammer sickle" backwards." Having done this, the reader will read: "Throne."

Lenin, telling this, laughed. So was he a hidden monarchist? No - he was just a spiritually healthy person, able to laugh even at the evil joke of the enemy - if it was successful.

Lenin, by the way, also took the book of the émigré satirist, "embittered, by his definition, almost to the point of insanity of the White Guard" Arkady Averchenko "Twelve Knives in the Back of the Revolution" and on November 22, 1921 published in "Pravda" a note "Talented book". So Lenin was a covert counter-revolutionary?

And the joke about Stalin's pipe?

BUT DAMN with them, with jokes and anecdotes! Let's try to follow the logic of Stalin. For example, A. Topygin, who I have mentioned more than once, believes that Stalin acted logically in choosing new cadres. "Let the logic of this person for us (it's "for us" instead of "for me", I understood poorly from A. Topygin. - S.K.) and unacceptable, - writes the author of "Unknown Beria", - but there was logic. And Topygin imagines Stalin's logic, alas, like this: "Select young people who are ready for him (?? - S.K.) and for the sake of saving their own heads for everything, smart and promiscuous (n-yes. - S.K.) in the means."

Unfortunately, the logic here fails A. Topygin himself. In his book, he cites a lot of documentary evidence that Beria behaved in his posts quite personally with dignity, rising up not due to intrigue or flattery, but due to outstanding business potential. And suddenly...

No, Stalin was logical in his personnel policy, but his logic and did not closely correspond to Alexei Topygin's ideas about her.

The point - among other things - is that today there is no longer any doubt about the authenticity of a certain significant fact: *even before Beria was summoned, Stalin several times offered the post of the NKVD to Chkalov.*

Why?

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Why to him? Chkalov is a man, first of all, famous all over the world, and not only in the Land of the Soviets. Moreover, in his country he was sincerely loved by the people and ... And he had an unblemished reputation as a knight.

So - this is **Chkalov**, Stalin originally intended to entrust the role

"destruction of those who knew Yezhov and his henchmen a lot"?

What nonsense! And taking into account the candidacy of Chkalov, we can say that Stalin needed a person at the post of the NKVD:

- a) honest and sincere;
- b) not having innocent blood on his hands, but resolute;
- c) hardworking;
- d) uncompromising;
- e) devoted to the people and personally to Stalin;
- e) able to understand economic problems.

But if we take into account that Stalin saw Chkalov in such a post, it becomes clear that at the head of the NKVD, Stalin needed a person who could undoubtedly and above all become an "iconic" figure! A figure capable of changing the image of the Chekist "office" after all the imaginary and real sins of Yagoda and Yezhov-Hero, beloved hero of the Soviet people, Hero of the Soviet Union in rank and in fact, his own person among both the technical and creative intelligentsia, clearly chivalrous, Chkalov could become such a figure... And not only a parade figure... However, Chkalov refuses...

And Stalin chooses Beria. He did not have the loud fame of Chkalov, but as a "workhorse" he was, of course, immeasurably stronger and more promising.

But if at first Stalin stubbornly "wooed" Chkalov to the NKVD, would he eventually stop at Beria if the leader of the Caucasus had a reputation in the country and at the "top" as an executioner or an intriguer? Don't think.

Beria had a well-known Chekist past, although quite old (he had retired from Chekist work even before the formation of the NKVD, during the time of Menzhinsky's OGPU). If there were intrigues in this past, they certainly

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on the other hand, they would have burdened Beria's unofficial reputation. However, they did not exist, just as there were no "sadistic" methods of conducting an investigation in Georgia, allegedly used or encouraged by Beria. And it was significant that the NKVD knew about the clean hands of Beria.

**So, in the light of the already failed appointment of Chkalov as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, the appointment of Beria, in my opinion, reveals the positive image of Beria to a greater extent than many archival studies.**

Already in our time, a number of slanderous versions have arisen regarding the fact that Beria was involved in the death of Chkalov, but this is precisely slander, on the analysis of which I will not dwell. And I will only remind the reader that Chkalov died on December 15, 1938, when, from any point of view, the question of his appointment to the NKVD was removed from consideration once and for all - from November 25, Lavrenty Beria stood at the head of the NKVD.

Beria is credited with a dual role in repressive politics after he came to the leadership of the NKVD. They say, on the one hand, when he began de softening. But, on the other hand, illegal repressions continued under him. This, of course, is another vile anti-Berian myth.

Even if we take the already mentioned and, in my opinion, questionable certificate, acting head of the 1st Special Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Colonel Pavlov dated December 11, 1953, where it is reported that in 1937-1938 681,692 people were allegedly sentenced to capital punishment, then from the same certificate we learn that in 1939-1940 to **A total of 4,201** people were sentenced to VMN .

There was no need for the Khrushchevites and the "democrats" to reduce the real "execution" figure related to the activities of Beria. Unless they could overestimate it, although in this case it is unlikely.

So, given that:

- anti-Soviet activity in these two years within the country has intensified due to the general aggravation of the world military-political situation;

- in these two years, Western Ukraine became part of the USSR

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on, Western Belarus, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the three Baltic republics - and everywhere, of course, there were irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power (the Banderaites alone were worth something!);

- in late 1939 - early 1940, the Soviet-Finnish war took place;

- the activities of pro-Western circles in the Caucasian and southern national republics intensified (after all, the Anglo-French in the spring of 1940 had plans to bomb Baku and Batumi);

- political banditry, including Basmachism, was not completely eliminated (it was completely eliminated only in 1945),

then the figure of four thousand executed for state crimes looks surprisingly moderate.

However, more than that!

There could be no question of any unreasonable repressions (excluding the inevitable in this area involuntary "overlays") in the NKVD of Beria for a very significant reason! I am surprised how those who argue the opposite "lose sight" of the fact that a week before the removal of Yezhov and the appointment of Beria, on November 17, 1938, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On arrests, prosecutorial oversight and investigation." The tone and essence of the resolution were tough, the addressing was quite specific:

"To the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and Autonomous Republics, to the heads of the UNKVD of territories and regions, to the heads of district, **city and district** (highlighted here and below by me. - S.K.) of the NKVD departments.

Prosecutors of the Union and Autonomous Republics, Territories and Regions, District, **city and district** prosecutors.

To the secretaries of the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional committees, regional committees, district committees and **district committees** of the CPSU (b).

The resolution noted the great work of the NKVD in 1937-1938 to cleanse the USSR "of numerous espionage, terrorist, sabotage and wrecking personnel from Trotskyists, Bukharinites, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, bourgeois nationalists, White Guards, fugitive kulaks and criminals," as well as "on spy smashing 198

sabotage agents of foreign intelligence who made their way into the USSR in large numbers from behind the cordon under the guise of so-called political emigrants and defectors from Poles, Romanians, Finns, Germans, Latvians, Estonians, "Harbinians", etc.

Further, it was frankly admitted that:

"Mass operations to crush and uproot hostile elements, carried out ... in 1937-1938 with a simplified investigation and trial, could not but lead to a number of major shortcomings and distortions in the work of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office ...

The main shortcomings identified in recent work bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office are the following:

Firstly, the NKVD officers completely abandoned intelligence work, preferring to act in a more simplified way, through the practice of mass arrests, without caring about the completeness and high

as an investigation.

The workers of the NKVD are so unaccustomed to painstaking ... work and have so entered the taste of a simplified procedure for the proceedings that, until very recently, questions have been raised about granting them so-called "limits" for carrying out mass arrests ...

Secondly, the biggest shortcoming of the work of the NKVD bodies is the deeply rooted simplified investigation procedure, in which, as a rule, the investigator limits himself from the accused confessing his guilt and does not at all care about supporting this confession with the necessary documentary data ... "

Further, both the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office got it ... And the style unambiguously betrayed the hand of Stalin.

Dear reader! Such a statement in an official document, which tens of thousands of functionaries should have been guided by, was an unprecedented action on Stalin's part! However, it is quite logical: after all, the "operation" of 1937-1938 was unprecedented, and the perversions committed during its implementation were also unprecedented. This means that the measures to correct them should have been the same.

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And they were. The operative part, inter alia, stated:

"1. To prohibit the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office from carrying out any mass operations of arrests and eviction ....

2. Eliminate judicial troikas created in accordance with special orders of the NKVD of the USSR, as well as troikas at the regional, regional and republican departments of the Republic of Kazakhstan (workers' and peasants' - S.K.) police ...

From now on, all cases, in strict accordance with the current laws on jurisdiction, should be submitted for consideration by the courts or the Special Conference under the NKVD of the USSR.

3. When making arrests, the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office should be guided by the following:  
... b) when requesting a sanction for arrest from prosecutors, the NKVD bodies are obliged to submit a reasoned decision and all materials justifying the need for arrest ...

d) the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office are obliged to prevent arrests without sufficient grounds.

Establish that for each wrong arrest along with the NKVD the prosecutor who gave the sanction for the arrest is also liable..." and so on.

The last sentence of the decision was:

"The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks warn all employees of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office that for the slightest violation of Soviet laws and directives of the party and government, every employee of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office, regardless of persons, will be subject to severe judicial responsibility."

I do not rule out that it is not so that the widely known resolution can cause some shock: "How, and this is Stalin ?! And this is 1938?!"

The objections of the "democrats" are well known: the tyrant Stalin acted as usual! At first, he sanctioned mass terror, and when it was carried out, once again (as during collectivization) he presented himself as a champion of justice. But let me be given an example from the history of any nation in any era when a tyrant would publicly admit the mistakes of the authorities! And not just recognized in words, but initiated

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shaft a wide process of liberation of the innocent victims, not being afraid, by the way, that these liberated, having taken a sip of dashing, will now become his enemies.

Stalin, after all, risked his authority - the officials knew

that the repressions could not be sanctioned without Stalin's decision, and now he not only directly scolded them, but also indirectly admitted that he was wrong.

Could a tyrant do this?

Finally, if the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee were an act "to the public", then it would be possible to confine ourselves to words in combination with the release of some of the convicts, but to preserve the repressive mechanism itself. And he was abolished! Troikas were liquidated at all levels! And the Special Meeting at the NKVD of the USSR is only in Moscow for especially important matters of national importance. And - without the right to issue "execution" sentences.

So what kind of illegal and unrighteous repressions could we talk about after such a decision? What prosecutor would now succumb to the "pressure" of the NKVD, *not risking* being convicted by the troika, but risking being put on trial for failing to comply with a strict party-state directive?

No, a thoughtful analysis does not leave a stone unturned from the attempts of the "democrats" to make the Jesuit Loyola out of the Bolshevik Stalin, and Malyuta Skuratov out of the Bolshevik Beria.

The decision was not published. However, already its broad addressing - right down to the "grassroots" apparatus - in advance programmed a wide familiarization of the country's public with the essence of the matter. That is, they would not have been able to shut up and "put on the brakes" this directive "on the ground". In addition, the document was strictly directive! And there were hardly many willing to take the risk and neglect such a directive.

## Chapter 12

### NKVD SAMPLE 1939 - 1941

HERE against what political and legal background, on November 25, 1938, Beria became a full-fledged people's commissar of internal affairs of the USSR.

So where did he start? And from the fact that the very next day he signed an order on measures to implement Decree 201

Niya SNK and Central Committee of November 17. The new people's commissar demanded from the NKVD bodies subordinate to him at all levels the immediate cessation of mass operations. The practice of arrests on the basis of so-called "albums", "certificates" and "memorandums" was forbidden. It was explained that in cases of state crimes reasoned decisions should be drawn up, etc.

***And on January 1, 1939, Beria introduced a previously unprecedented element into the new structure of the NKVD - the Bureau for Receiving and Considering Complaints.*** It will exist for a year, and this proves that such a bureau was created to deal with complaints relating specifically to cases of 1937-1938.

However, for a long time we have not remembered Beria's anti-biographer Antonov Ovseenko... What did he write about the actions of the new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR?

And here's what:

"Beria by all means supported the illusion of climate warming. On his orders, prisoners were allowed to use board games in their cells and books...

So what about the camps? At the end of 1938, in the camps of Vorkuta, those prisoners were summoned whose term expired in the spring of the following year. They read out the resolution of the OSO and announced new dates ... And in March they called again. It turns out that those papers are the result of a mistake. Now the Yezhovschina is over, they will be released into the wild in accordance with the law.

*There were several such lucky people in each OLP (separate*



camp point. - S.K.) ...

What has changed in the fate of sixteen million languishing in countless prison camps?

Like all other political campaigns, this one soon withered away.

demagogic smoke..."

Alas, apart from the standard "democratic" ratio of lies (10:1) in the number of prisoners, we will not find anything here, and therefore I, perhaps, will not quote this "biographer" further, although on some occasions I will return to him much later.

The reality was, of course, not idyllic, but completely different. Beria quickly figured out (he smashed everything

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rallied quickly) with the main blockages of the righteous and the unrighteous, which was done under Yezhov, and already in 1939 more than two hundred came out of the NKVD camps thousands of people.

And when Beria was at the head of the NKVD, no mass repressions were ever carried out. Although this does not mean that the repressive activities of the NKVD bodies were completely stopped. This simply could not be, because in harsh times, harsh measures against anti-state elements are characteristic of any system.

And harsh times came, and this was due not to the cruelty of Stalin and Beria, not to the desire for Stalin's sole power, but to the objective conditions of the current historical existence of Russia and the world. So Beria was not going to be some kind of all-forgiving "Jesus" and could not. Especially in the matter of investigating and suppressing conspiratorial tendencies. Due to his high competence as a counterintelligence officer, he was clearly aware that although the "personal", so to speak, base of anti-Soviet conspiracies was seriously undermined by the purges of 1937-1938, it was hardly completely destroyed. Beria had to deal with this problem as seriously as before - Yezhov.

Colonel-historian Suvenirov complains that Tukhachevsky and his accomplices in the first days, they say, after the arrest, "slandered" dozens of people. But the question is - why did Tukhachevsky or Uborevich name major general such and such, and not lieutenant general such and such? After all, from their marshal and army commander heights, did they care who to name? "Aha! Colonel Souvenirov will say. —

That's what we're talking about! They called at random - who did they remember! There was no conspiracy."

No, that doesn't happen in real life. And Beria, even without psychological analysis, knew how it happens! And he understood that in the investigation of cases of conspiracies, material evidence, direct evidence, could not be found. There were no video recordings then, and only idiots can record anything on paper. And the only thing the investigator disposes of these are the testimonies and confessions of the persons under investigation. Testimony only! And testimony can be deliberately contradictory, unintentionally contradictory, inaccurate, and so on. It's very hard to figure things out here.

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Another thing is that you need to figure it out.

Moreover, the information, according to the investigation, is extremely secret - leaks are unacceptable here. And the sphere is special, if we mean the military conspiracy. Indeed, during the war, only two or three unidentified traitors (at the level, say, of the high command of the border military districts) can cause a strategic collapse!

*When investigating a general political conspiracy, the security of the entire state is also at stake. Beria understood this and therefore could be tough even when someone was formally considered innocent. However, the process*

the return of many arrested commanders to the ranks of the Red Army is one of Beria's first services to the country in the position of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, as they said then.

Of course, merit!

And here we need to clarify something.

USUALLY, as examples of the "arbitrariness" of the NKVD of the 1939 model, that is, the NKVD already under Beria, the "democrats" cite all sorts of memories - they say, one general said, and another old Bolshevik confirmed, etc. However, it is not for nothing that lawyers have an expression: "He lies like an eyewitness" ... Even a hundred of the most "terrible" testimonies prove nothing when studying the phenomena of the life of the whole society. We need summary statistics.

And there are objective figures given, say, by the military historian N. Cherushev. In his book "From the Gulag to the Battle," he writes that none of the commanders who were fired or arrested, and then released and reinstated in the ranks of the Red Army, knew the true extent of the repressions in the Red Army.

Strange, of course... If the repressions were as total as the "democrats" claim, then their huge scale could hardly be a secret, especially in the military environment. And such a statement by a military historian raises doubts: "Were these repressions so great?"

Well, now we know them, including thanks to the same N. Cherushev! And he claims: "...these numbers are impressive!"

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And they can really impress, dear reader! They impressed me, so much so that when I bring them up now, I myself do not believe that they are true. They are very "penny".

But N. Cherushev is a politically correct historian, he does not know any other term than "dungeons of the NKVD". And he will not underestimate the data, reporting them, especially with reference to the Russian State Military Archive (fund 37837, inventory 18, file 888).

So, with the arrival of Beria in the NKVD, the process of liberating the military did not noticeably intensify immediately, but only by the end of 1939, which, of course, speaks of a careful study of investigative cases. After all, before deciding - to release a person or not, it was necessary to understand - is he guilty or not?

And as of January 27, 1940, the number of command personnel restored in the Red Army in ranks from division commander to junior lieutenant from among those released was 1579 people.

Is it a lot or a little?

But let the reader decide this himself after getting acquainted with the data of N. Cherushev on the number of dismissed command and command staff in 1937 and 1938.

So, in two years, the following were fired from the Red Army (of which they were arrested):

	1937	1938	Total
Komkorov	35(30)	17(16)	52(46)
Im relevant	25(11)	1(1)	26(12)
Komdivov	73(54)	50(42)	123(96)
Im relevant	84(14)	22(15)	106(29)
Kombrigov	124(65)	140(100)	264(165)
Im relevant	194(36)	85(49)	279(85)
Colonels	362(141)	535(352)	897(493)
Them relevant	513(108)	461(231)	974(339)

Total	1410(45) 9)	1311(806 )	2721(1265)
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That is, at the level from commander to colonel in the Red Army, only 1265 people were arrested!

And we are told about tens of thousands, almost hundreds of thousands!

Of these 1265 people, by January 27, 1940,

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129 people were imprisoned, but not all of those arrested were later repressed.

Moreover, as I have already said, there were fewer repressed lieutenants and captains in the Red Army than repressed colonels.

So where is the mass beating of military personnel here, if at the end of 1938 the staffing of the command and command staff of the Red Army was equal to 240 thousand people and by 1940 had increased to 358 thousand people?

Now it is clear why, as N. Cherushev reports, none of the commanders dismissed or arrested, and then released and reinstated in the Red Army cadres, knew the true extent of the repressions.

They did not really notice them - after all, there were almost no arrests, at the mass level. Arrests and executions were significant only in the highest echelon of the command staff, but there, after all, the conspiracy was concentrated! In addition, many army commanders of various ranks had already turned into something similar to their "obsessed" civilian brother-partocrats.

The masses of the army were practically not touched by repressions, and therefore they "did not realize" their scale in it - after all, there is always a great movement of command personnel in the troops ... Someone was fired for drinking, someone went to the reserve, someone - to another part, but someone - you hear, was arrested ...

Let me give you a hypothetical (alas!) example from our life today... Let's imagine that in some middle-class city of Pereputkinsk, without much fuss, "authorities" arrest three-quarters of the city administration... Even if it is headed by its head, the microoligarch Nedoputkin. And in addition - about fifty local businessmen, functionaries, etc.

Yes, two or three hundred thousand inhabitants of the city will not notice this! What difference does it make to them - Nedoputkin, Besputkin, Rasputkin? Things are still going wrong.

Of course, in 1937-1938, not only scoundrels with and without buttonholes were arrested, but also a number of worthy people. However, I am not talking about this now, but only about the analogy in the psychological side of the matter.

So, even Yezhov cannot be accused of organizing a pogrom in the Red Army. And Beria, I repeat, it is necessary in direct merit

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put the restoration of justice in relation to several thousand (including lieutenants, captains, majors) honest red commanders.

In the Great Patriotic War, they will be very useful to the country.

By JANUARY 1, 1939, the structure of the NKVD had not yet acquired that expanded restructured form that the structure of the already purely Beria NKVD had by January 1, 1940. However, contours were outlined - I spoke about this. And this was also characteristic of Beria. He has always been an excellent organizer - this is recognized today even by those who hastily add at the same time: "but his hands are still up to the elbow in blood."

What does it mean to be a great organizer? This is, firstly, to know the business assigned to you or be able to understand it and then develop an effective structure for managing it, as well as the structure of its

functional division.

Secondly, you need to be able to understand the existing personnel situation and select those personnel who will fill the "squares" of the scheme and will work under your leadership.

Thirdly, one must be able to demand, but also be able to help those who need help in time, and, if necessary, to replace unfit or failed employees in time.

In addition, one must be able to and, as they say, inspire people. And not chatter from the stands, but caring for them.

Beria knew how ... And once again confirmed this when he came to the NKVD.

For any smart manager and leader, the personnel issue is always the main one. Cadres really decide everything, but only when they are competent cadres. Here, too, he began vigorously. And already on January 27, 1939, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 2nd Rank Shchadenko, issued Order No. 010 on the early release and secondment of a number of graduating and junior students of the military academies of the Red Army to the NKVD of the USSR.

Schemers and tyrants do not like to deal with either advanced people or the military. The former are too often independent

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we, the latter, are too often honest. And the fact that Lavrenty Beria called under his banner not only young engineers like Vitaly Pavlov, but also young "academic" commanders, also proves that he was not what the partycratic "democratic" made him in the eyes of society after 1953 "party".

He dealt with the personnel issue a lot in his first "commissariat of internal affairs" months. Under Yezhov, from October 1, 1936 to January 1, 1938, 5229 operational officers left the bodies (but only 1220 of them, by the way, were arrested). In return, 5359 new employees were hired. And not all of them were fired already with the advent of Beria.

Nevertheless, in 1939, 7,372 operational workers (22.9% of their total composition) were dismissed from the NKVD system, and 14,506 people were hired for operational security work, of which 11,062 were on party and Komsomol vouchers.

Dismissal, even from the NKVD, is not necessarily an arrest. The famous security officer Dmitry Medvedev, forty years old, was transferred to the reserve for health reasons on November 3, 1939 (three weeks before Beria was appointed people's commissar), and returned to the scene with the outbreak of war, which was sanctioned, of course, by Beria.

Konstantin Zalessky, in the Stalin's Empire reference book, claims that Beria de "almost half updated the NKVD apparatus, replacing Yezhov's associates with people personally indebted to himself."

Such a statement is quite typical for the slanderous Beriada. Any, even obviously stupid and absurd, infamy can be said about Beria, and you can be sure that they will believe her. Such an impenetrable black wall around the true fate of Beria was built by the joint efforts of several generations of falsifiers of this fate. Here, too... Nearly a dozen and a half thousand people "personally obliged" to the people's commissar? Excuse me, Konstantin Alexandrovich, you can lie, but is it really worth lying so openly?

I will inform you, by the way, that the total staffing of the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR as of January 1, 1940 amounted to 32,642 people. These are Chekists, and policemen, and firefighters, and others, including here 259 full-time units of the song and dance ensemble (if I'm not mistaken, it

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the future dancer of all masters, Igor Moiseev, and the future favorite of the "democrats", the "Tagansky" director Lyubimov, labored.

But since the time of Menzhinsky, the Chekist leadership included such, for example, Jews as the head of the Gulag Naftaliy Frenkel, Yakov Rapoport and others ...

In the "personnel" period of 1939, Beria also established good business contacts with Georgy Malenkov, who was then in charge of the Department of Leading Party Personnel in the Central Committee. Malenkov himself was one of the candidates to fill the post of Yezhov, he had experience of "purges" - in 1937, together with Mikoyan, he replaced most of the party apparatus in Armenia, which by that time had greatly degraded in this southern republic.

Two years younger than Beria, Malenkov could be classified as a "technocrat" - he began his studies at the Moscow Higher Technical School, from there he went to the front in 1919, returning, he continued his studies. However, without completing it, at the beginning of 1925 he was appointed technical secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. Sometimes they write about some later "tandem" of "technocrats" Malenkov and Beria, and in due time it will become an obvious fact at first glance. But they were still different people, which will then be very acute and manifest itself. But then Malenkov and Beria worked quite amicably, including on restoring order in the new "economy" of Beria.

Beriev's (although in part they can be called "Malenkov's") "purges" of the NKVD apparatus and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army have long been overgrown with slander - as, in fact, everything related to Beria in general.

But here are five fates (taken almost at random in alphabetical order) ...

1. Kilachitsky Georgy Ivanovich (Lawyer, Georges, Volsky, Rashevsky), b. 1887, Warsaw. Russian. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1932, member of the Polish Socialist Party "Proletariat" (1904), in February 1908-1910. sentenced to 6 years hard labor, since 1913 a zemstvo activist.

Worked in the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Far Eastern Republic (1920-1922), in the administration of Is

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Regimental Committee of the International Workers Aid Organization (IDWO).

At the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters since April 1926. Illegal resident in France, left the country after being followed by the police.

Regimental commissar (1936), head of department at Central School

training of commanders of the headquarters service of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army.

**2. Kolesnikov (Moskalenko) Ivan Antonovich**, b. 1897, Novosotenskaya volost (now Ostrogozhsky district of the Voronezh region). Ukrainian. He graduated from the teacher's seminary in Ostrogozhsk (1916), the Alekseevsky military school in Moscow (1916). Member of the First World War, second lieutenant. In the Red Army since September 1918. Member of the RCP(b) since October 1919.

Assistant to the military commissar of the Novosotensky military registration and enlistment office, chief of staff of the brigade, assistant chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the Volga Military District (1922-1927). He graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army (1922) and the Oriental Faculty of the Academy. Frunze (1927-1930).

Employee of the Intelligence Agency (1930-1937). Was abroad for seven years. Since 1937, at the disposal of the Intelligence Agency for the 5th department.

**3. Konstantinov Vladimir Mikhailovich**, b. 1903, Irkutsk. Russian. Member of the Civil War in the Far East. Member of the RCP(b) since 1921. Instructor of the organizational department of the Irkutsk Provincial Committee (1922-1923). In the Red Army since 1921. He graduated from the Japanese Department of the Diplomatic Faculty of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies (1927).

Secretary of the military attaché in Japan (1927-1933), completed a course at Waseda University.

At the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters since August 1933, he graduated from the Oriental Faculty of the Academy. Frunze (1938). After graduating from the academy

1st Secretary of the Embassy in Japan.

**4. Kravchenko Fedor Iosifovich** (Klein, Tycoon, Pancho), b. 1912. Krasnodar Territory. Russian. Member of the revolutionary movement in Uruguay, where he lived from 1913 to 1929.

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In the Red Army since 1936, a participant in the war in Spain, translator of the Chief Military Adviser D.G. Pavlov (before the war - the commander of the Western Special Military District, in the fall of 1941, was shot for the loss of command and control).

**5. Kremer Semyon Davidovich** (Alexander, Sergey), b. 1900, Gomel. Jew. From workers. In the Red Army since 1918. Member of the Civil War. Member of the RCP(b) since 1919. Graduated from the Communist University. Sverdlov (1922) and the main faculty of the Academy. Frunze (1934).

At the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters since August 1933. From January 1937 - Secretary of the military attache at the USSR Embassy in England ...

Try to guess - what was the further fate of this "magnificent five"? The correct answers are...

The first - Kilachytsky, was repressed on June 14, 1937.

The second - Kolesnikov, was repressed on March 14, 1938.

The third, Konstantinov, was arrested in the fall of 1938 and in 1939 sentenced to death. In 1940, for the translation of a Japanese strategically important document, the death penalty was replaced by 20 years in prison. Transferred from Butyrskaya prison, first to Ufa, then to Khabarovsk. He worked with secret Japanese documents in cooperation with hundreds of Japanese specialists who arrived in Khabarovsk from all over the country. Released in 1954, rehabilitated in May 1956. Conducted scientific activities, under the pseudonym M. Airsky, Doctor of Historical Sciences (1961). Died 09/08/1967.

The fourth - Kravchenko, from 1938 to October 1941 - an illegal intelligence agent in Mexico. Member of the Great Patriotic War, performed tasks as part of the Leo reconnaissance group, commander of the detachment named after. Ivan Bohun in the partisan formation of A. Fedorov (1942-1943). Major. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1943. Hero of the Soviet Union (1945). Illegal resident in France (Toulouse, 1945—1949). Reserved since 1951. He died in Moscow on November 19, 1988 and was buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery.

Fifth - Kremer, until August 1942 through Ursula

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Burton-Kuchinskaya (Sonya) kept in touch with the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs in London, then until July 1943 he was head of the western department of the Military Institute of Foreign Languages. Since July 1943 - at the front, in 1944 the commander of the 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade, seriously wounded. Major General of Tank Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union (1944), commander of the 5th Guards Mechanized Division (1945-1956). Reserved since 1956. He died in 1990 in Odessa.

That's it, dear reader! Outwardly - absolutely similar, up to certain moment, fate. And so different.

Here is another fate of the already "pure" personnel Chekist, the same age as Beria, Colonel Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov (Vaupshas).

The son of a Lithuanian peasant, he lived, as they say, a bright and stormy life, in the 1920s he fought in Western Belarus, fought in Spain, and was

illegal.

During the Great Patriotic War, Major Gradov commanded the "Invincible" special detachment in Belarus, and in 1944 Lieutenant Colonel Vaupshasov became a Hero of the Soviet Union...

Vaupshasov was one of the last to leave Spain, in March 1939. By the way, no one tried to "recall" him from there in 1937 - like the same Orlov Feldbing. And no wonder! The official biography of Stanislav Vaupshas was impeccable - its purity was confirmed not by a questionnaire, but by the nature of a knight and a soldier of the people.

May 19, 1939 Vaupshasov through France arrived in Kronstadt on the same steamer "Ulyanovsk", on which Dolores Ibarruri arrived in the USSR.

At the end of 1939 he was in the Finnish war. And then - again a year and a half of illegal work in Europe, from where Stanislav returned in the fall of 1941. After fighting near Moscow as part of the NKVD Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, in the spring of 1942, Major Gradov left the front line with an operational special group - on skis, near Minsk.

Many years later, Vaupshasov wrote the book "At the disturbing crossroads", and Here is what he writes about the spring of 1939:

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"Having returned from Spain, for some time I got used to a peaceful life, to noisy and prettier capital, to a quiet household.

I spent my vacation near Leningrad with my wife...

Upon my return to Moscow, I began working in one of the departments of the NKVD. He lived in a family, went to work along his native Moscow streets, admired the brilliance of the capital and the business bustle of a huge city ... "

As you can see, no one pulled Vaupshasov with checks. For him personally, this meant that he was trusted. For us, dear reader, this can serve as proof that the NKVD of the 1939 model did not suspect everyone who returned from business trips abroad. However, this did not mean that Beria believed everyone without verification - we will see this later ...

A lot can be said about the GENUINE role of Lavrenty Pavlovich in relation to the Soviet special services in 1938-1939 and later, and about the malicious manipulation of this role - there are countless examples of lies.

For example, Viktor Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB in 1982-1988. He is one of that "cohort" of the Lubyanka officials, on which the blood of the Soviet Union, which gave the power to reprisal Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and then to the "democrats" with the "oligarchs".

On September 2, 1988, already in the position of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he gave an interview to Pravda (in which by that time there was not only news, but also the truth) and stated:

"As a result of false accusations, more than 20,000 Chekists became victims of repression. Highly professional workers devoted to the Communist Party."

But Igor Pykhalov, in his book "The Time of Stalin: Facts Against Myths", with reference to the Central Archive of the FSB, cites information about the number of repressed OGPU-NKVD officers for 1933-1939. And we'll take care of it now!

It should be noted that giving *such* a summary certificate is already doing juggling. And why so, soon

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I will explain (perhaps the reader guessed what was the matter, already himself).

The reference information is:

Year	Arrested
1933	738
1934	2860
1935	6249

1936	1945
1937	3837
1938	5625
1939	1364
Total:	22 618

We observe a strange leap in 1934: the number of those arrested almost quadruples at once!

Why?

Yagoda was and remained the head of the department, and he was inclined to cover up the sins of his employees - the farther, the more. At that time, no special conspiracies were revealed. There were also no instructions from above to intensify repressions.

Where does such growth come from?

Everything is explained simply: By the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on July 10, 1934, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR was formed on the basis of the United State Political Administration of the USSR. And now Yagoda was subordinate not only to the Chekists themselves and the worker-peasant police with a criminal investigation, but also additionally:

- Main Fire Department;
- Department of acts of civil status;
- Department of forest protection...

And this is a sharp expansion of the quantitative composition of peripheral structures with a decrease in their personnel quality (bribes are possible in the registry office, firefighters are not always at the height of readiness and sobriety, foresters can float the wood "to the left", etc.).

The functions of leadership of the paramilitary fire brigade were transferred, however, to the OGPU already in the autumn of 1932 (then a special department was created). But the scale itself

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firefighting activities greatly expanded precisely with the formation of the GUPO.

In addition, by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of October 27, 1934, all correctional labor institutions of the People's Commissariat of Justice (houses of detention, isolation wards, correctional labor colonies, forced labor bureaus) were transferred to the GULAG of the new NKVD of the USSR. After all, the "democrats" have it - like a prison, so immediately the Gulag, but in fact, until October 27, 1934, these were different things. Now, in the Gulag, the number of arrested employees was bound to increase - in prisons, criminals sometimes come across on both sides of the cell doors.

And, finally, with the formation of the NKVD, the states grew - both central and peripheral - directly to the Chekist and militia structures of the NKVD. This means that, in full accordance with the laws of statistics, the number of those arrested and punished for various sins has also increased.

All this, taken together, gave such a leap by *the end of 1934*.

In 1935, the first full year of the existence of the NKVD, the figure increased by eight and a half times compared to 1933, the last year of the "pure" OGPU! And here, too, everything is explained. Now the firefighters, foresters, prison guards and registry office registrars who have been at fault have given a full-fledged increase in statistics, and Yagoda had to clean up new employees by putting things in order in the same fire department.

1936 brought a quite expected "plateau" - stabilization was achieved. Employees of the peripheral structures of the new departments of the NKVD



forced to pull themselves up - discipline has increased.

The years 1937 and 1938 gave a new, albeit smaller, increase as part of the general increase in repression. By the way, the fact that even in these two years the level of 1935 was not reached once again indirectly proves the not-so-massive nature of the supposedly "great terror" both in the Chekist department and in the country.

But the first full "Beria" year, 1939, gave a sharp decline in the number of arrests. Which is also understandable - Beria never liked extra blood and extra cars.

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After all, Antonov-Ovseenko and General Volkogonov have him as a "monster", "ghoul", "executioner", etc.

I think it is now clear that the total figure of 22,618 people includes not only security officers, but also police officers, firefighters, personnel of the border, internal and escort troops and personnel of the "civilian" structures of the NKVD.

Actually, Gennady Kostyrchenko reports that from October 1, 1936 to January 1, 1938, 1220 Chekists were arrested. And this figure fits well into the overall figures for the NKVD, and also correctly correlates with the increase in the number of arrests in the NKVD, which we are seeing compared to 1933.

The author of the consolidated FSB reference slyly "made up" for the NKVD with its overgrown functions only one year of the "pure" OGPU, and thus made a clever substitution in the minds of those who will get acquainted with the certificate.

The arrested employee of the OGPU - although it may be a stealing accountant from the Administrative and Economic Department - is in the minds of the majority of Chekists. And the combination in the certificate of the OGPU and the NKVD into something unified provides the majority with confidence that all those arrested, noted in the certificate, are Chekists.

I have to admit - well done! But a lie is a lie... This truth can never be exposed in any way - that's why it is true. And it is possible to expose a lie, although it is not always easy to do so.

But we exposed it, dear reader, didn't we?

THIS is how much you can understand by analyzing just two columns of numbers!

But all the viciousness of the slander against Beria can also be illustrated by examples of direct falsifications, to which the same Igor Pykhalov first drew attention and which I will now cite.

In 1995, the weekly "News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence" (No. 15-16, p.4) wrote about the scout Fyodor Karpovich Parparov:

*"On May 27, 1938, Parparov was arrested at the direction of Beria and was under investigation until June 1939. os*

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*released due to lack of corpus delicti (espionage)."*

In the same 1995, the Foreign Intelligence Service published a brief biographical guide "Veterans of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia" (they even feared the name of the USSR in the SVR of the Yeltsin model. - S.K.), and it states:

*"On Beria's instructions, by the middle of 1938, almost all foreign intelligence residents were recalled to Moscow, many of them were distrusted, and they did not return back" (p. 161).*

And in the biography of intelligence officer Grigory Sergeevich Syroezhkin it is said that in 1938 he "in a private conversation expressed an opinion about the innocence of Tukhachevsky and other military leaders, whose cases were concocted by Beria and his henchmen" (p. 140).

In May 1938, Beria still cut the ribbons on the doors of brand new, just freed from scaffolding, buildings in Tbilisi. And give directions

about the arrest of Parparov, as well as any of the intelligence officers in general, could not. But he gave instructions on his release after the check and enrollment - like others who passed this check - into the cadres of foreign intelligence.

For the same reason - the lack of attitude to the affairs of the Lubyanka in 1937 - Beria could not "cook" anything in relation to Tukhachevsky.

It seems, however, that the traditions of poor-quality writing and slandering of Beria in our post-Stalin intelligence have deep roots. There was such - he is now being certified as outstanding - scout Dmitry Bystroletov. They certify him, and certainly as a victim of Beria's de arbitrariness.

In fact, this seemingly really professional does not look like such in his memoirs. For example, he himself writes that during his arrest, "albums with photographs taken ... in Africa, Europe and America were confiscated from him - almost three thousand of the best photographs collected during eighteen years of uninterrupted wanderings around the world."

Reading this, I was dumbfounded. And if all these pictures were confiscated during his arrest *abroad*? Same for any investigator.

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valuable material! That's the conspirator! And by the way, a student of Artuzov and Slutsky ...

Nevertheless, this person was, as far as I can imagine him, really outstanding, and he could sometimes give really outstanding results, he was very bright and artistic. They say about such people, not without reason: a brilliant adventurer.

Born in 1901, since 1925 - in the INO OGPU, illegal. In 1938 he was arrested, sent to a camp, in 1954 he was rehabilitated, but for some reason he was no longer involved in work. He died in 1975 in Moscow.

In 1969, at the direction of Andropov, he was given a separate apartment, and Bystroletov took up literary work. He also worked on memoirs, which were not begun in the writer's, by the way, Peredelkino, but back in 1939 (!) in the Norilsk corrective labor camp (!).

In 1993, the publishing house "Border" published a book of his "memoirs" "Feast of the Immortals", the computer typesetting of which was completed in 1990-1991 by officers of the KGB of the USSR. In the preface, a certain Sergei Milashov reported that Bystroletov, they say, was still lucky, because: "... many of his colleagues ... were destroyed by Yezhov and Beria's henchmen."

Bystroletov had a light and lively pen, but, alas, and very - as we will see now - deceitful. He himself reports that he was arrested *on September 18, 1938* - even under the "executioner Yezhov", but all his troubles happened under the "executioner Beria". And he describes his ordeals, life in a common cell, and so on, of course, in the "Beria dungeons." I will give only two fragments of his "revelations" ...

*"We pushed our way to the window and climbed onto the bunk.*

*- This is a famous person, the former general designer of our aircraft, Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev, - Kotya said in a whisper and pointed with his eyes at the tramp lying next to him.*  
*- He was at the interrogation at night ... Andrei Nikolaevich ... we must move forward ...*

*Under the rags, someone growled, but did not move" (p. 18).*

Tupolev (by the way, he became the General Designer of the aviation industry in December 1956) was indeed arrested - on October 21, 1937. I won't

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to get into the essence of this arrest now (it did not happen completely from scratch), but the facts are such that already from the beginning of 1938, the Special Technical Bureau (OTB) under the NKVD of the USSR began to work successfully, albeit in isolation mode, where

included separate design bureaus of Tupolev, Petlyakov and Myasishchev. Therefore, in the fall of 1938, Dobroletov could not see any Tupolev on the bunk. He could not see him at all on the bunk in any common cell.

*"One afternoon the door opened slightly, a man in a bloody shirt entered the cell, staggering, shouting: 'I'm from Lefortovo! Brothers, there is no executioner Bear in St. Petersburg: he is under arrest!' and fell to the floor. Deep triangular wounds gaped on his back, torn meat protruded from them, fragments of ribs were visible. Having shown us the wounded man, apparently for intimidation, the guards soon dragged him out..." (p. 36).*

The head of the Leningrad department of the NKVD, Philip Medved, was indeed arrested twice. The first time he was arrested in December 1934 "for a criminally negligent attitude to his duties" after the murder of Kirov and was given 3 years in the camps. Before the second arrest, Medved worked in the leadership of Dalstroy in Kolyma. In May 1937, a new investigation was launched on newly discovered circumstances, and on September 7, 1937, he was again arrested, and in November 1937 he was shot "in a special order."

So, hardly anyone could report as news about just his arrest - a year after the execution. And, of course, he didn't report ... Neither with the "triangular wounds" on his back, which Bystroletov allegedly "saw" *through* the "bloody" shirt, or without them. The question is: did the employees of the KGB of the USSR, who completed a computer set of this dashing "cooking" in 1990-1991, not know that they were dealing with fables?

A year before his death, Bystroletov burned the materials of the "Feast of the Immortals" he kept. And you can understand why...

BUT HERE is really a documentary story... Born in 1909, the stately handsome man Alexander Korotkoe was certainly an outstanding illegal intelligence officer. Having started working at the Lubyanka in 1928 as an elevator operator, in 1933 he

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went on his first business trip abroad. He was recommended to intelligence by V. Gerson, Yagoda's personal secretary. In Paris, Korotkoe began under the guidance of the defector Orlov-Feldbing... As you can see, the "pedigree" is not the best, although it was not Alexander's fault.

Short worked in France under the operational pseudonym Stepanov until the end of 1938. Upon his return to Moscow, he is promoted and awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

And on January 1, 1939, the "aces" of the INO NKVD, recalled from behind the cordon, gather in Beria's office. I am familiar with several descriptions of this "historical meeting", and, I think, it is not by chance that a major Chekist "rank" of post-Stalin times, Lieutenant General Vitaly Pavlov, in his memoirs, dates it "one of the January days of 1940 (the fortieth. - S.K. ) of the year", and from the context it follows that this is not a typo or a typing error.

*But the meeting took place at the beginning of January, precisely 1939 (thirty-ninth), which is dated exactly (I will inform you soon how). And at this meeting, Beria attacked the "aces", sharply accusing them of double-dealing. Korotkov also got it. He behaved, however, like the rest, with dignity, he did not justify himself, but swept aside all the accusations.*

To illustrate how one can trust "documentary fiction", especially with direct speech, I will quote an excerpt from the book by Vladimir Antonov and Vladimir Karpov (as I understand it, authors from Lubyanka): "Secret informants of the Kremlin", published in 2000:

*"Turning to Alexander Korotkov, Beria said:*

*" You were recruited by the Gestapo and therefore you are leaving the organs ..."*

But here I have a facsimile of the statement "AM Korotkov, former sec. (foreign intelligence. - S.K.) G.U.G.B. NKVD", written by him in the name of the "People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Beria" and dated 9 January 1939 (that's where I get the exact date of the January meeting with Beria).

The spelling of the original is preserved:

"8.1.39 I was announced about my dismissal from the authorities (and according to Antonov and Karpov comes out, what about this to him

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personally announced by the rude and "provocateur" Beria directly on January 1. - S.K.). Since during the ten years of work in the bodies I tried to give all my strength and knowledge to the benefit of our party, I do not feel any guilt before the party and I was not tainted with anything in the KGB and public work, I think that I did not deserve this dismissal.

I started working in the authorities in 1928 as an elevator operator, for a year I worked as a clerk at 5 o'clock. G.U.G.B, and in 1930 he was appointed assistant. authorized.

In 1933 he was sent underground to France <...>.

In 1936 he was again sent abroad to Germany to work on technical intelligence<...>.

... I went abroad only because of the desire to bring benefit with my work there, and I think that not one person who knows me can confirm that I am not a hoarder and that living abroad does not attract me<...>.

As for my wife, despite the fact that she has relatives abroad, despite her long residence there, despite the compromising materials against her father, who died in 1936, I am fully confident in her devotion to the party and can bear any responsibility for her. In addition, she showed herself well as an employee in the department and in the Komsomol organization.

I perfectly understand (unlike those who slander Beria. - S.K.) the need for preventive measures, but an individual approach is being carried out somewhat, it turns out that I deserve such distrust, which causes my dismissal from the bodies. At the same time, I don't know of simpletons behind me that could be the reason for depriving me of the honor of working in the authorities. To find yourself in such a position is extremely difficult and insulting.

I ask you to reconsider the decision on my dismissal

January 9, 1939 Short.

This move by Korotkov, already famous in the latest literature on intelligence, is often portrayed as desperate. To me it seems logical. Moreover, clearly proving that Short (and he was also a good psychologist), after

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personal, although not very joyful, acquaintance with the new people's commissar, I believed that *this one* would understand!

Korotkov was supported by his colleagues, who turned to the GUGB party committee. Beria called him for a conversation, and after it he signed an order for his reinstatement at work.

Not by an elevator, dear reader, and not by a clerk... GB Lieutenant Korotkoe is almost immediately sent on short-term business trips to Norway and Denmark to restore mothballed ties.

In July 1940 he again goes to Germany...

Like this!

And they tell us that Beria never trusted anyone. But would he have been able to do so much in his not very long life in various fields of activity, if he had not trusted people and in people, if he had not trusted them?

Another thing is that he checked them - when there was a need. But this is how an intelligent and honest person should act, who is fully responsible for the work performed.  
they care.

I will give another example of his attitude towards illegal immigrants, indicative of establishing a truthful view of Beria, and I will probably limit myself to this, because if you quote them all, one way or another made public, you need to write a separate chapter.

Arnold Deutsch was born on May 21, 1904 in Vienna, and in January 1932, he, a member of the Communist Party of Austria and a former courier of the Comintern, arrived in Moscow with his wife Josephine and soon began working in the INO OGPU.

I note that at that time only 150 people worked at the INO, half of whom were abroad. If we take into account that in six years - by 1938 - these figures could not increase sharply, then we can understand what the fables about "hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers" destroyed by the "executioner" Beria and his "henchmen" are worth. There were only two or three hundred of them, including foreign agents-foreigners, for everything, of which Krivitsky "surrendered" a hundred.

In order for the reader to understand what Deutsch meant to our intelligence, I will tell you that it was he who created and raised the "Cambridge Five", made up of Kim Philby, Donald McLean, Guy Burges, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. But this was far from his only success.

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In September 1937 Deutsch and his family (wife and daughter born in London) returned to the USSR. And they didn't let him into any "meat grinders", although his biography, it would seem, disposed of this (he also worked with Bystroletov in London). Nevertheless, no one touched Comrade Stefan. On the contrary, in 1938 he, his wife and daughter received Soviet citizenship.

Before the war, Deutsch never received a new assignment - he had previously worked in the English direction, and there one betrayal of Krivitsky mixed up many cards. However, Beria did not lose sight of him, and with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Deutsch was again called up for a "quiet" war. Argentina was assigned to him as a place of work, but Stefan's group did not reach her - the Donbass steamer, on which she sailed to the starting point of the foreign route, was sunk

German cruiser.

Beria believed him because Deutsch was real, convinced communist, and at the same time - also an undoubted *Soviet* patriot.

And NOW let's get back to Vitaly Pavlov's "mistake" in the date of the January meeting with Beria ... Let me remind you that the meeting took place on January 1, 1939, and Pavlov dates it to the beginning of January 1940. He wrote that "in the middle of 1939, an order was received from People's Commissar Beria to recall to Moscow the entire personnel of Akhmerov's residency. This order was an unexpected and heavy blow for us, as it undermined our main information base in the United States.

However, Pavlov is simply lying! He cannot fail to know the exact chronology of events, because he himself reports that a few days after the January meeting, Akhmerov (and also Zarubin and Grigoriev) were sent to the American department under the command of ... Pavlov.

Pavlov interprets this as a deliberate humiliation of the most experienced professionals by the petty tyrant Beria, but in reality it was a completely reasonable quarantine, allowing, among other things, to assess the true moral and volitional qualities of those being tested. Looking ahead, I will say that all three then worked hard and usefully for the country in new business trips abroad.

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However, why did Pavlov put the date of the meeting back a year? And here's why ... If Akhmerov was recalled in the middle of 1939, then this is on Beria ... This is he

unreasonably interrupts the normal work of the residency of Akhmerov, whom he rudely scolded in January 1940.

But Akhmerov was already in Beria's office on January 1, **1939**, which means that he was recalled in the summer of **1938** - even under Yezhov! That's why it was necessary to correct the dates - to once again pour dirty ink on Lavrenty Pavlovich! Posthumously ... And - for the umpteenth time ...

We will return to Akhmerov, Pavlov and their colleagues, but now I must say that, having taken the reins of power in the NKVD, Beria had to deal not only with foreign personnel, but also with the peripheral apparatus within the country. For example, already at the end of December 1938, he received an order from the Politburo to investigate the reliability of the data on the conspiracy of the "Zionist" organization of teachers headed by a certain Lenginer in the Moldavian ASSR (Moldova was then part of the Ukrainian SSR).

This case began - as it turned out, falsified - even under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Oleksandr Uspensky. From the beginning of the 30s, he was a member of the leadership of the Moscow Department of the OGPU-NKVD, then he was the head of the NKVD Department for the Orenburg Region. In January 1938, Khrushchev, who had been appointed Acting First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine and who knew Ouspensky well from his work in Moscow, took him to Kiev with him.

Ouspensky - a hot and chaotic guy - was prone to falsifications (which, it must be said, suited Khrushchev) and at first developed a stormy activity in Ukraine. But the matter went to the approval of Beria as People's Commissar, a decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of November 17 was being prepared ... And when Beria summoned Uspensky to the People's Commissariat in November 1938, Uspensky feigned suicide on November 14 and fled to the Urals. Five months later, on April 15, 1939, he was arrested in the Chelyabinsk region, in Miass, and in early 1940 he was shot. Other falsifiers of the Lenginer case were also shot. But the very fact that the Politburo dealt with this "linden" shows that such cases were not the norm.

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BERIA always looked at all the problems that turned out to be within his competence, comprehensively and proactively. He did not have time to become the head of the Zakkraykom, as he immediately prepared a note on rare metals.

He did not have time to become People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, as he showed interest in the state and organization of government high-frequency communications (HF communications). And already in January 1939, Merkulov, who headed the GUGB, submitted to him a report on measures to improve the reliability and security of high-frequency lines.

In the same January, a draft reorganization of this business is being prepared, because that, as Merkulov wrote, "there is a lot of confusion in this area of work."

The audit showed that the technical capabilities of the country here are great. Equipment for automatic classification of telephone conversations of the EU type was created (after the names of the creators, engineers Yegorov and Staritsyn), the first lines were laid.

The case was "spinning", but neither shaky nor rolls. In 1938, three consecutive Decrees of the Council of People's Commissars were adopted, but qualitative changes began only under the new people's commissar. After all, any "confusion" is for a specialist to unravel them Lavrenty Beria. And where he led the business, everything accelerated, as in a fairy tale. But the secret was simple - Beria worked himself, was never late for anything, was accurate, knew how to quickly understand the problem and - most importantly - knew how to use the potential of specialists and trust them.

And for any professional, there is no greater happiness than working under the supervision of someone who gives him the opportunity to give his all and go further and

higher, to new professional achievements and success! Not without reason, in one Soviet film, the boy wrote a school essay, consisting of one phrase: "Happiness is when you are understood."

Here Beria knew how to understand his subordinates. But, of course, those who deserve such understanding. Therefore, if the reader remembers, young Merkulov wanted to work with him, and only with him!

By the beginning of 1939, 58 HF stations were operating in the USSR, serving 290 subscribers. And they worked without proper coordination. During 1939 the number of HF mills

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The number of broadcasting stations was increased to 78, broadcasting points to 28 (including 8 backup ones), and the number of subscribers increased by one and a half times, reaching 430.

In one year!

In 1939 stations were opened in 24 cities of the USSR. By July 1940 from 103 communication lines for 50 were installed scramblers, and their number grew.

Beria was well aware that reliable operational secret communications - the most important thing, and, developing high-frequency communications in the national interests, he made full use of its capabilities for the department subordinate to him. In March 1940, the "List of subscribers of government (HF) communications" was published. So, 9 out of 40 Moscow subscribers belonged to the NKVD. And across the country, out of the 286 names and positions listed in the "List", 149 had a direct relationship with the structural units of the NKVD!

But more and more leaders, and above all the defense industries, were getting into the taste of the new connection. In the autumn and winter of 1940, Beria carried out Stalin's personal instructions to organize secret communications with the enterprises of the People's Commissariat for Armaments. The devices were installed in the office of People's Commissar Vannikov, at factories No. 2 in Kovrov, No. 66 in Tula, No. 74 in Izhevsk. Moreover, the director of plant No. 2 became the only subscriber of the new point, and the head of the city department of the NKVD had to use the Ivanovo HF station for a long time.

The war will begin, and Beria, among the many military concerns, will find time to help the fronts in providing, in addition to the planned HF communication lines, additional lines, depending on the situation.

I WANTED to write: "By the second half of 1939, the results of the hard work of Beria and his closest collaborators began to show, and a certain stabilization set in" ...

But then I remembered - what kind of stabilization is there! On the contrary, there was more and more "parking". And this was explained not by the mistakes and miscalculations of Beria, but by the acceleration of the world and European political process - "de

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"mocratic" West was clearly leading the way to war. And he really wanted to draw the Soviets into it, either by attacking them himself, or ...

Or by provoking Germany to do so.

personnel, economic, intelligence problems. Yes, Beria the problems of foreign policy, more and more menacing and large-scale rising before Soviet Russia.

In the spring of 1938, Germany carried out the Anschluss of Austria - with a mass enthusiastic reaction from the Austrians themselves, but with a very "sour" reaction from the outside world. In the autumn of the same year, the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, populated mainly by ethnic Germans, became part of the Reich. In principle, it was an act of restoring justice and the right of nations to self-determination, violated by the Versailles "peace" treaty. Such a strengthening of Germany was also not encouraging, especially since in the spring of 1939 the Germans entered Prague. Slovakia

separated, declared independence, and the USSR established with it diplomatic relations.

But the West did not need peace. 17 April 1939 on London Radio Sir Bernard Peers spoke. He already knew Russia!

72-year-old professor of Russian language, literature and history, director of the Royal College of Slavic Studies, director of the Institute of Slavic Studies in London and publisher of the Slavonic Review, from 1909 to 1917 - secretary of the Anglo-Russian Committee, in 1914-1917 he was seconded to the Russian army, in 1917 was at the disposal of the British ambassador to Russia.

And so Peers criticized the Comintern, but in every way extolled Stalin and argued that Tukhachevsky paid with his life for treason against Russia, becoming an agent of Germany. Here I note that Tukhachevsky paid with his life for many things, including for unworthy arrogance, for arrogant manners, for the fact that he and the "commanders" close to him called military bands to their dachas for private concerts. But that's the way it is...

On April 20, 1939, a good friend of Peers, former tsarist émigré diplomat Yevgeny Sablin, former first secretary of the Russian embassy in London, referring to Peers' speech, wrote on April 20, 1939 to his permanent addressee, Vasily

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Maklakov, Ambassador of the Provisional Government in France, former diplomatic representative of Kolchak. Denikin, Wrangel:

*"There is no doubt that he (Pearse. - S.K.) is recommended from above to greatly exaggerate in the sense of the importance that Russia has for maintaining peace in the South-East ..."* and added:

*"I think that the venerable Bernard Ivanovich overdid it in all his statements. All this could be said with less, I would say, sycophancy. But, obviously, it will be difficult without Russia ..."*

The NKVD had a well-established intelligence network among the emigrants, and these lines were soon read in the Lubyanka. However, the West did not really count on an alliance with Soviet Russia at that time, and Peers' speeches were aimed at something else: to complicate (and even better - to disrupt!) The emerging process of rapprochement between the USSR and Germany.

But such speeches themselves were an indicator of the aggravation of European contradictions as a result of the provocations of "democratic" Europe, behind which stood the already unchanging and indispensable Uncle Sam. And this already caused a regime of constant combat alert for the NKVD and its head, called upon:

— to ensure the protection and impenetrability of the world's longest state borders;

- to ensure the protection of the country's top leadership;
- identify and neutralize all manifestations of the "fifth column" within the country;

- identify and neutralize very possible anti-state conspiracies, manifestations of sabotage, etc.;

- provide states abroad: information and intelligence activity

— to carry out counterintelligence activities in all its scope;

- to ensure the protection of public order by the police and the fight against criminality;

- carry out penitentiary activities of the state;

- to conduct a number of large national economic projects,

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carried out using the labor of prisoners with the simultaneous involvement of civilian workers and specialists ...



I'm not talking about the fire department and registry offices. After all, they also took some time and strength from the people's commissar, although he did not supervise them. And there was also the social sphere, to which Beria was not indifferent.

And new problems loomed ahead.

At the VERY beginning of May 1939, Stalin finally decided to make the foreign policy of the USSR rational. And this was impossible under the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov.

On May 3, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, became People's Commissar, and Dekanozov became his deputy. And already on May 4, the arrests of a group of Litvinov's leading employees followed. The Molotov-Dekanozov "tandem" began to operate in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Vladimir Grigoryevich Dekanozov was a year older than Beria, was born in Baku and had known Lavrenty since 1918. In June 1921, he was transferred from the oil company to the AzChK, to the department for combating banditry. There have always been serious personnel in the OBB - bandits are bandits. And the fact that, despite Dekanozov's very small height, he worked at the OBB, says something. Even then, Beria and Dekanozov became close, which is also confirmed by the official biography of the latter: service in the AzChK, then in the GruzChK, then in the ZakChK.

Of course, Beria promoted him, but he always promoted people according to their business qualities. And what is called the "personal devotion" of the promoted was a natural reaction of a man of action to the attention of his boss, also a man affairs.

On March 21, 1937, Dekanozov became chairman of the State Planning Committee of Georgia and deputy chairman of the Georgian Council of People's Commissars, while also being the minister of the food industry of the republic. It is sometimes written about him that he was distinguished by an exorbitant craving for luxury, but this is unlikely ... Beria himself did not differ in it, and would not have brought this closer to himself in Tbilisi. And I certainly would not take such a "tail" with me to a new place. And Beria at the end of 1938 called him

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to Moscow and on December 2 he was appointed head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) and 5th (intelligence) departments of the GUGB. On December 17, 1938, Dekanozov also became Merkulov's deputy for the GUGB, but soon, as we already know, he was transferred to the USSR NKID.

Let me remind you that all the movements of Beria's employees across Georgia to Moscow could not take place without the consent of the now allied Central Committee. As for the appointment of Dekanozov to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs , then it couldn't happen without the direct sanction of Stalin. But Dekanozov came to the NKID, of course, on the recommendation of Beria. And it was not the arrival of a "Beria inspector-executioner" in the diplomatic department, as the "democrats" put it. According to veterans of the diplomatic service, Dekanozov was highly erudite, well-read, polite and cultured in communication. So, in his person, Soviet diplomacy received a completely competent leader.

A very rapid turn of the USSR began from a hopeless orientation towards a bloc with the Anglo-French to an understanding of the need to normalize relations with Germany. The result, as is known, was the Non-Aggression Pact concluded on August 23 during a blitz visit to Moscow by Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Many in the world were shocked. In Japan - an unprecedented case - the conclusion of a bilateral treaty by other powers led to the fall of the cabinet of Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma.

The same Pact became the psychological point of the three-month Japanese-Soviet conflict in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River. Starting on May 28 with the invasion of Japanese troops into the territory of Mongolia, it ended by August 28.

Such turbulent events, including the August Anglo-French-Soviet

military negotiations in Moscow needed adequate intelligence support, so this alone guaranteed Beria a more than busy work schedule.

On September 1, 1939, the German-Polish (and not World War II, as is usually believed) war began. Poland collapsed almost instantly. On September 17, the Red Army entered the Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian lands, and soon Western Ukraine and Western Belarus became part of the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR. Today one sometimes has to read that the USSR and Ger

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mania carried out the new division of Poland. But is Ukrainian Rivne or Lutsk really Poland? Or Belarusian Baranovichi and Molodechno?

For the NKVD, the reunification meant a new and huge additional burden, and by no means of an "executionary" nature. It was Khrushchev and his protege in the NKVD, Ivan Serov, who set about speeding up the "Sovietization" of the Western Ukrainian regions in a manner reminiscent of an executioner. And one little-known fact immediately shows who Khrushchev was and who Beria was.

Kost-Levitsky, the former head of the former "independent" Ukrainian People's Republic, lived peacefully in Lvov. By order of Khrushchev, Serov arrested him, and Kost-Levitsky, who was already over eighty, was transferred from Lvov to Moscow and imprisoned. This action greatly undermined our actions among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, but Khrushchev reported to Stalin that he had neutralized the potential prime minister of the Ukrainian government in exile.

And then Beria intervened. First, he instructed his experts on Ukraine to evaluate the advisability of keeping Kost-Levitsky in custody. The recommendations were as follows:

- the old man, as harmless, immediately release, apologize to him and send him back to Lviv, where he can be accommodated with maximum comfort;
- Kost-Levitsky, in turn, should facilitate the sending of an influential and representative delegation from Western Ukraine to Moscow to negotiate a special status for Galicia within the Ukrainian SSR;
- to grant Galicia a special status.

Beria immediately sent a note to People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov with these proposals, and Molotov agreed with them. Kost-Levitsky was released and taken home in a separate special wagon. But Khrushchev managed to disrupt the rest ...

And here, perhaps, for the first time, fate demarcated the positions of those two figures whose future conflict had already determined

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the future is not of small Galicia, but of the whole vast country. But we will talk about this much later.

Returning to the autumn of 1939, it should be noted that the department of Beria, in addition to solving political problems, had to organize the police in the reunited territories, catch bandits, reorganize the fire department, and create registry offices.

Repressions and deportations from Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to the interior of the USSR, of course, were also part of the tasks of the NKVD of Beria. But how else! It wasn't just a new frontier zone! These areas in the fairly near future could become combat areas. And only state criminals could allow the existence of a mass "fifth column".

And Stalin and Beria were statesmen.

However, an analysis of the figures of repressions of 1939-1940 in Western Ukraine and Belarus shows, by the way, that the "democratic" figures are overestimated in Belarus by about ten times (the usual lie coefficient

"democratic" "general people"). This is despite the fact that in Western Ukraine, for example, there was a strong nationalist underground even under the Poles. And with the establishment of Soviet power, the nationalists did not curtail their work, but intensified it, because now a new aspect appeared in it - an anti-Soviet one.

There was also the problem of Polish prisoners of war. And this was also a task for Beria. Moreover, one of the "perestroika" accusations of Beria in organizing the Katyn tragedy and executions near the village of Mednoye, Kalinin Region, is connected with the captured "lords".

Well, let's see if there is much truth in this accusation...

ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1939 People's Commissar L.P. Beria, commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank, issued order No. 0308:

1. *On the basis of the regulations on prisoners of war, to organize a Directorate for prisoners of war under the NKVD of the USSR.*

2. *Approve the attached staff of the Directorate of Prisoners of War.*

3. *Appoint the head of the Directorate for prisoners of war*

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*ny major comrade. Soprunenko P.I. and commissar of administration - regimental commissar comrade. Not good...*

4. *Organize the following 8 POW camps:*

1) *Ostashkovsky - on the basis of the premises of the former children's colony of the NKVD, on Stolbnoye Island, on Lake Seliger (Kalinin Region) for 7 thousand people, with an increase to 10 thousand people by October 1;*

6. *To approve the chiefs and commissars of the camps:*

1) *Ostashkovsky: major comrade. Borirovets P.F. - chief, Art. political instructor comrade Yurasova I.V. - Commissar...*

I cite data only for the Ostashkov camp quite deliberately. The "Katyn" fake is widely known, and its exposure can be found in Yuri Mukhin's books "Katyn Detective" and "Anti-Russian meanness", to which I refer the reader. But I will inform you in addition that in the literature you can find a facsimile reproduction of the first sheet of Beria's alleged note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks about Polish prisoners of war. So, Stalin's "visa" was falsified there extremely carelessly, and this immediately catches the eye, as well as the fact that the "visa" comes with an inclination from top to bottom, and not from bottom to top - as always with Stalin.

Smolensk Katyn is known, I repeat, widely. The village of Mednoye is less known. At the beginning of the article placed in the "Book of Victims of Political Repressions of the Kalinin Region" by the director of the State Memorial Complex "Mednoye" B.N. Yeshchenko and researcher E.N. The model says this:

"On October 19, 1996 (No. 1247), a Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On the creation of memorial complexes at the burial sites of Soviet and Polish citizens who were victims of totalitarian repressions in Katyn (Smolensk region) and Medny (Tver region)" was published ...

But about 50 years had to pass before the name of the Tver village Mednoye sounded from the lips of the President of the Russian Federation M.S. Gorbachev, members of the Government of Russia ... "

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Dear reader! I didn't describe myself... In this already known to you "Book of Memory..." on page 604 it is written exactly that. And what a "typing error" here! And the initials correspond, and the surname ... But with the position, however, a slip.

It would seem that there is nowhere to go further in "historical discoveries", but page 605 outdid page 604:

"... At the beginning of 1940, about

6500 Poles.

Beginning on April 4, 1940, the prisoners of the Ostashkov camp were transferred step by step in groups, day after day, from the camp to the Soroga railway station, from where they were taken under escort in prison cars through Likhoslavl to the city of Kalinin. From the railway station, prisoners of war were transported to the regional department of the NKVD along the street. Sovetskaya (this is in the center of the city. - S.K.), where death from a bullet awaited them.

S. Tokarev, the former head of the NKVD in Kalinin, spoke in detail about the course of the executions during interrogation. Every night, 250 people were shot in the cellars of the modern building of the medical academy in Kalinin. The execution group used mainly German pistols of the "Walter" type (why it was necessary to do this in March 1940 of the year, B.N. Yeshchenko himself is unlikely to explain. - S.K.).

At dawn, cars with the bodies of the dead were sent along the Moscow - Leningrad, in a remote area of 32 km Mednoe. There, on the territory of the dachas of the Kalinin NKVD, on the outskirts of the forest, there was a pit already prepared by an excavator, about 4 m deep, capable of holding 250 bodies ... "etc.

The technology of "killing" is described here, frankly, idiotic, and the route invented no smarter - just look at the map of the Kalinin region.

If everything were so in reality, then all the Kalinin women would gossip about the "top-secret" action. And if the Poles were already decided to be "removed", then the easiest way would be to do it right on Stolbnoy Island, where the camp was located, or in the forests near Seliger. And even in Lake Seliger itself ... Without the cost of ton-kilometers.

But the way it is written is more effective for the public, already with

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tired of looking at thrillers as a chronicle. And what to take from the "scientists" who confuse Gorbachev with Yeltsin? Of course, they are two pairs of boots, but not knowing your "heroes" to such an extent!

Although ... Although there is strictly documented evidence that in the Ostashkov camp in 1940 a uniform disgrace really happened. I will prove this now by *fully* citing another order for the NKVD -

No. 678 of August 12, 1940.

*"August 12, 1940*

*Inspection of the economic activities of the Ostashkov camp for prisoners of war found:*

- 1. The camp management spent state funds for food, building materials and other materials not for their intended purpose.*
- 2. Despite the instructions of the Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR for prisoners of war, in The camp practiced free meals for riders.*
- 3. During the absence of the head of the camp, Major Comrade. Borisovets assistant chief of the camp lieutenant, militia comrade. Polovanyuk organized a group drinking party and appeared drunk in the camp area, thereby discrediting himself.*

*I order:*

- 1. For spending state funds for other purposes the head of the camp, major comrade. Borisovets to announce a reprimand.*
- 2. Assistant to the head of the camp, police lieutenant comrade. Reprimand Polovyanyuk and remove him from work in the camp.*
- 3. The issuance of free food to all employees, except for the guard and fire brigades, is prohibited.*
- 4. Prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages and beer in the camps.*
- 5. Commissar of the camp senior political officer comrade. Yurasov for not taking measures to suppress illegal actions and to expose the poor preparation of political educational work in the camp.*

*Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR*  
**CHERNYSHEV.**

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There is no doubt about the source of the information - a completely "democratic" collection of documents from the series "Russian Archive. Great Patriotic War", published by the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, volume 24 (13) "Foreign prisoners of war of the Second World War", ed. TERRA, 1996, 1000 copies, pp. 33-34.

This is how things were in the Ostashkov camp in the summer of 1940 - already **after** the Tver "EBN", together with its employee, completely "devastated" it in the early spring of the 40th ...

So the Germans still shot the Poles in Medny. As in Katyn ...

By the way, once again about the "Walters" ... The NKVD executors did not need German pistols in any case ...

The area of the village of Mednoye was in the zone of German occupation, more precisely, in the frontline zone, and in Medny itself, according to my information, the Germans were from October 13 to 17, 1941. And the fighting went mainly to the north-west, near Maryino. Somewhere between Ostashkov and Medny could be at that time in the occupied territory and part of the Poles from the island of Stolbnoy. However, the Germans could shoot from the "Walters" in 1941 and not the Poles, but shoot them in Polish uniform, burying the corpses really in the area of the NKVD dachas - as in Katyn! — with a long shot...

After all, the Germans expected to win. And then it was possible to bring "democratic" journalists from all over the world to the place of the "atrocities of the NKVD" and "convincingly" demonstrate what, they say, the fate of the Reich saved their country.

But the Germans were kicked out from under Kalinin back in 1941, so the "Copper" idea burst. And it was necessary, when the corpses "reached the standard", to be content with only the "Katyn" option - until the Germans were also kicked out from under Smolensk.

Therefore, you should not shake the "note of Beria", it is another fake in the piggy bank of the "antiberiad". Of course, he never shot any Polish officers of the NKVD. Although, perhaps, it was worth a lot ... Already in 1942, being part of the Anders army that was being formed in the USSR, the "arrogant gentlemen" behaved vilely. March 14, 1942 Beria in a report to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee

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Stalin, on the course of formation and the moral and political state of the Polish army on the territory of the USSR, cited data obtained by intelligence and informing through.

So, a certain Colonel Dombrovsky declared:

*"I will calm down only when the Bolshevik general in my estate  
will work with a wheelbarrow twice as much as what I worked in the Soviet camp ... "*

And no one arrested or shot this "Pan Pulkovonik" and others like him **even then** .

It's a pity!

On September 28, 1939, Reich Minister Ribbentrop and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov signed the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Border in Moscow. For Beria and his People's Commissariat, this meant, among other things, a lot of work to equip the new border. But even on the old borders it was restless - starting from the north, from the Soviet-Finnish border.

It is believed that the last point in the peaceful relations between the USSR and Finland was the day of November 26, 1939, when several artillery shells exploded near the border village of Mainila on Soviet territory.

Since the border troops are also the NKVD, to this day one has to come across hints that, they say, there were some provocations by Beria here. Without developing this topic, I will say that the Finns were shooting. They then generally behaved simply recklessly! And the configuration of the border was such that heavy artillery from the Finnish border could fire on Leningrad. I'm not talking about the flight time of the bombers to the northern capital.

We had to "thank" for this Tsar Alexander I, who in 1811 established the border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Russia with the transfer of part of Russian territory to the Grand Duchy. Now Stalin had to correct his mistake. And since the Finns were absolutely (the reader can believe me) deaf to the calls of both reason and the surprisingly patient Russian leader, the USSR had no need for some kind of provocation, giving *casus belli*

(reason for war).

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Although there have been incidents. And after the shelling in Mainil Beria signed an informational message, the beginning of which I will quote:

*"No. 5278/B November 28, 1939*

*Today, November 28, 1939, at 5:10 pm, the border detail of outpost No. 17 -*

*The lake of the 35th Murmansk border detachment ... on the isthmus between the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas was suddenly fired upon by an ambush of Finnish border guards who were on our territory ... "*

The outfit accepted the battle, and the outpost threw a support group of 10 people, led by the chief of staff of the border troops of the NKVD of the Murmansk district, Major Prussky, to the site of the skirmish. As a result, 3 Finns were taken prisoner, two went to the territory of Finland.

On the same day, the Finns deepened into our territory in the zone of Restikentsky border detachment.

The Soviet-Finnish negotiations have long reached an impasse, or rather, they were brought there by the Finns themselves (I wrote about this in my book *The Fuhrer's Kremlin Visit*). And the subsequent development of the situation on our part was not only logical, but the only justified from any point of view. On November 30, full-scale hostilities began. And the "winter" - as it was called in Finland - the war dragged on until spring.

On December 21, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov wrote to Stalin and Molotov:

*"Koba and Vyacheslav!*

*The thing is rubbish! The roads are in the rubble, the infantry does not act at the front as an organized force, but dangles back and forth like a mass almost uncontrollable by anyone, which, at the first shot that rings out, scatters in disarray through shelters in the forest ... "*

However, according to the results of the war, the military observer of *The Times* rated the Red Army as a whole highly, wisely noting that the Russians added a lot during the war. And so it was - the "Mannerheim Line" with its "millionaire" pillboxes was broken in early 1940, and on March 12, 1940, peace was signed. But at that time, when Voroshilov wrote a bitter letter to Stalin and Molotov, Beria's border guards helped the army hard.

I'll tell you more about this.

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In Europe, the war was still going on - until May 1940, "strange", without fighting. However, on May 10, "Day X" came for the Germans. An offensive was launched into Northern France, and soon the entire Allied defense collapsed. The Germans entered Paris, the British fled through Dunkirk.

And the USSR solved the "Baltic" problem... Back in the autumn of 1939, we signed agreements on mutual assistance with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. On them

Soviet troops entered the territory, but there was no question of any "Sovietization". However, the successes of the Germans changed the situation dramatically. Germany was strengthening in all positions, and it was not worth giving up the Baltic "flank" to it. And the Baltic elite was not averse to turning away from the Russians and going "under the wing" of the Germans and Finns.

Or the English! Since April 1940, instead of one envoy for the entire region, England appointed separate envoys to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for each republic. At the same time, they were also consultants in the "national" Foreign Ministries. Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Lithuania V.G. Pozdnyakov reported in cipher to People's Commissar Litvinov that there were 40-50 British agents in Riga, whom England had thrown into the Baltic states, including hoping to "push" them into Germany. It ended, however, with the fact that in early August 1940 the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs became part of the USSR. Even earlier, we regained Bessarabia and annexed Northern Bukovina ...

I will not dwell on these plots and on the analysis of the problem of repressions and deportation from the new union republics, although I will tell you something about this in the next chapter. I can, however, give a few details at once.

After the Lithuanian nationalists finally received "their" state in 1919, a Lithuanian peasant who came to a state institution was often shouted: "Speak Russian, we don't understand Lithuanian." And it was not Russians who shouted, but ... Poles.

In "national" Latvia, one could stumble upon a German in a similar situation, even though the Russian tsars at one time undermined German landownership and created a powerful layer of Latvian "gray barons" - kulaks.

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In "national" Estonia, in the Russian villages of the Pechora District, young people sang communist ditties, and the peasants were ready to go to collective farms. And the Estonians oppressed them for it. So there were grounds for "cleansing" in the Baltics.

THE ACCESSION of the Baltic republics gave rise to two counter flows of migrants from the Memel and Suwalki regions to the Lithuanian SSR and "German citizens and people of German nationality" from the three republics to the "fatherland". All this did not pass Beria's attention.

By the end of March 1941, 5,251 families, or 21,343 people, were received from Germany from Germany, including 11,995 Lithuanians, 9,223 Russians, 55 Belarusians, 20 Ukrainians, and 36 Poles. By the way, I don't know why, but then only 1 (one) Jew wished to move to the USSR.

But among the 10,472 people who left Latvia for the Reich, in addition to 9851 Germans, there were 436 Latvians, 9 Lithuanians, 7 Estonians.

44,434 Germans, 5,091 Lithuanians, 36 Latvians, 14 Estonians moved from Lithuania.

From Estonia - 5306 Germans, 514 Estonians, 10 Latvians.

As you can see, not only ethnic Germans got the opportunity to leave, but also others (including 1 Georgian, 1 Spaniard, 1 Tatar).

Some Germans also left the deep regions of the USSR, and among the "political emigrants" there was a certain return movement, which proved that the repressions against them were not the result of inventions of the NKVD. So, on February 28, 1939, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Georgy Dimitrov, sent the following cover letter to the NKVD:

*"Dear comrade Beria!*

*I am sending you the enclosed letter from the representation of the Communist Party of Germany to the ECCI for your review. You, of course, know better what measures should be taken on this issue by the NKVD.*

*With comradely greetings,*

G. Dimitrov.

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A letter from Walter Ulbricht was attached to Dimitrov's "accompaniment", which began like this:

*"Dear comrade Dimitrov!*

*In recent months, several wives of those arrested have returned to Germany with the help of the German embassy. These enemies are now sending letters to those of their acquaintances who are supposed to be recruited to return to Germany ... "*

Ulbricht cited a number of specific names and facts: "A certain Baumert lives in the residential building of the Electrozavod, who in private conversations conducts anti-Soviet propaganda" and "has extensive connections in Moscow"; the Czech Kate Raab "sends money to the arrested Germans in the camp near Saratov, sends it to Khabarovsk, and receives it at the German embassy," etc.

Ulbricht ended quite definitely:

*"We believe that it is necessary to decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not to grant permission to leave. Now the situation is such that such enemies have the right to reside in Moscow.*

*Please bring this to the attention of the relevant authorities so that they can take whatever action they deem necessary.*

*With communist greetings, Party Representation of the KKE to the ECCI,  
Ulbricht".*

The "democrats" "hang" repressions in the Comintern, which they actually hate, on Yezhov and Beria. But what, Dimitrov and Ulbricht worried in vain? After all, they were not shy bazaar women, but experienced underground workers and, therefore, people experienced in both intelligence and counterintelligence matters.

And the SITUATION in the world became more and more tense. On August 22, 1940, Pravda reported that on August 20, Leon Trotsky, at his villa in the elite district of Mexico City, Coyocan, received a fatal blow with an ice ax from a certain Jean Mortan Van den Rhein. However, it was 27-year-old Spanish communist and NKVD officer Ramon Mercader del Rio.

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The blow with an ice ax put an end to the protracted history of Trotsky's subversive work against the USSR. After the conclusion of the 1939 Pact, he wrote in the American magazine Liberty:

*"The Kremlin has harnessed itself to the wagon of German imperialism... Until Hitler is strong - and he is very strong, Stalin will remain his satellite.*

Less than six months later, on January 17, 1940, on the table of SS Obergruppenführer Ribbentrop (the Reich Foreign Minister also had such a title), Oberführer Likus from the "personal headquarters" of the Obergruppenführer put a report from London :

*"Trotsky, with the help of the British, will have to return to Russia in order to organize a putsch against Stalin ... "*

But Stalin also knew this. And Lavrenty Beria was summoned to the Kremlin. The result of the discussions there was the operation to eliminate Trotsky. In itself, it is of little importance for our topic, but the name of a person, which I have already mentioned and about whom it is time to say more in detail, is closely connected with it.

GB Major Pavel Sudoplatov was only thirty-three years old in 1940. And for the first time he was in Stalin's office three years ago, when Yezhov brought him there. Then an ordinary operative officer of the NKVD, who worked illegally among Ukrainian nationalists abroad, Sudoplatov received an extraordinary task - to eliminate one of the leaders of the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN) Konovalets.



Deputy Director of the Russian State Military Archive Vladimir Ivanovich Korotaev and his colleague Viktor Konstantinovich Bylinin in volume II of the "Proceedings of the Society for the Study of the History of Domestic Special Services" for 2006 testify: "During his relatively short life, the OUN leader managed to enter into "business relations" with a number of foreign special services - German, Austrian, Lithuanian, Finnish, English, Italian, Japanese..."

As you can see, the strings of connections with numerous intelligence services were by no means invented in the NKVD, but existed in reality... After all, friends and colleagues of Konovalts lived not only on the other side of the border of the USSR, but also on *this one!*

A dangerous and influential enemy, Konovalts had already been sentenced to death in Ukraine for authorizing and personally leading the execution of revolutionary workers at the Arsenal plant in Kyiv in January 1918. Grigory Petrovsky recalled this at a meeting in the Kremlin. But the sentence was carried out as a result of a carefully designed operation in Rotterdam on May 23, 1938 by Sudoplatov.

By the way, when after the act he walked along the boulevards of Paris already, he read in Russian emigre newspapers about his boss Yezhov as a man doomed to soon fall victim to a campaign of purges. Before the arrest of Yezhov was a year, before the execution - two. Much, much intertwined then, my dear reader, into a many-fold tangled ball ...

However, we are now in August 1938, when Sudoplatov, who returned to Moscow, was summoned to the new head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, Beria, about whom he only knew that "in the 20s he headed the GPU of Georgia, and then became secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Georgia".

As you can see, Sudoplatov was little interested in the status of political figures and was incompletely informed about Beria's biography, which, however, was not a disaster.

In 1997, the most interesting (alas, not always accurate and reliable) memoirs of Pavel Anatolyevich were published for the first time, which also describes his first meeting with Beria. True, Sudoplatov is somewhat confused in chronology ... According to his memoirs, it turns out that in July 1938 he arrived by steamer in Leningrad, immediately left for Moscow by night train and was received by Beria the next day.

But Beria became head of the GUGB only on August 22, 1938, so Sudoplatov could not have been in his office, located next to Yezhov's reception room, before this date. However, this obvious aberration of memory is not essential for the main thing - the description of Beria, given by a person who knew him personally well. And it is worth being told to the reader almost without cuts:

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"My first meeting with Beria lasted, it seems, for about four hours ... Beria asked me question after question, wanting to know about all the details of the operation against Konovalts and about the OUN from the beginning of its activities ...

From Beria's questions, it became clear to me that he was a highly competent person in matters of intelligence work and sabotage. Later, I realized: Beria asked his questions in order to better understand how I could fit into Western life ... "

Here I will temporarily interrupt Sudoplatov's story in order to note: he did not seem to understand that Beria was interested not so much in his personal adventures as in general the atmosphere of European life with which Beria, who worked as a Chekist in the Transcaucasian direction, was familiar, of course. , Badly. And now he had to quickly get into the course of European intelligence work, and he

took advantage of the opportunity to learn and understand as much as possible about her.

The same must be said about information on the OUN. For the "Transcaucasian" Beria, this problem was new. And what kind of a professional is he who does not use every opportunity for self-education!

"Beria asked," Sudoplatov continues, "did I pay attention to the number of exits, including the spare one, at the safe house, which was located in the suburbs of Paris. He was rather surprised that I did not do this, because I was too tired. From this I concluded that Beria had experience in the underground, acquired in the Transcaucasian Cheka ...

Being nearsighted, Beria wore pince-nez, which made him look like humble servant...

He was dressed, I remember, in a very modest suit. It seemed strange to me that he was without a tie, and the sleeves of his shirt, by the way, were of quite good quality, rolled up. This circumstance made me feel a little uneasy, as I was wearing a well-tailored suit: during my brief stay in Paris, I ordered three fashionable suits, a coat, and several shirts and ties. The tailor took measurements, and behind things

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Agayants (later a well-known intelligence officer, a general who had cover in Paris as the third secretary of the embassy. - S.K.) came in and sent them to Moscow by diplomatic mail.

I did not omit the detail with Sudoplatov's costumes because it once again indirectly confirms the aberration of his memory. If after his arrival (even in August) he had been called to Beria immediately, he would hardly have had time to get his Parisian new clothes at the NKID or Lubyanka. So, there was a certain time gap between the arrival and the meeting.

And, not in reproach to Pavel Anatolyevich, I will say that in his place, Beria, in spite of any fatigue, would certainly not forget to check the ways of a possible withdrawal from the turnout. But the costumes would hardly be ordered.

Beria also showed interest in the sabotage work in Spain of Chekist Vasilevsky, who at one time served under Beria in the counterintelligence of the Georgian GPU.

Sudoplatov also noted that Beria spoke Russian well with a slight Georgian accent, and behaved "extremely" towards the interlocutor.

politely".

It is interesting that in another place Sudoplatov wrote the following:

"Beria was often very rude in dealing with high-ranking officials (when, as I understand it, they deserved it. - S.K.), but with ordinary employees, as a rule, he spoke politely. Later, I had to make sure that the leaders of that time allowed themselves to be rude only in relation to the leadership, and with ordinary people, members of the Politburo (Stalin's. - S.K.) behaved emphatically politely.

I note that Stalin addressed everyone, as a rule, as "you", and by inertia this Stalinist and Beria "you" survived, weathered under Khrushchev. And even under Brezhnev, and especially under Gorbachev, the universal boorish "you" took root ... However, the opposite would be surprising.

At the end of the meeting—and this is very characteristic of Lavrenty Pavlovich—he granted Sudoplatov a five-day

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leave so that he could visit his mother in Melitopol and his wife's parents in Kharkov. The "monster" in the descriptions of the slanderers, Beria was actually caring and attentive to those who did the same thing with him.

BUT A READER who is well acquainted with memoirs on Soviet intelligence may object to me. And in refutation of information about Beria's courtesy, he can refer, for example, to the memoirs of retired Major General Yelisei Tikhonovich Sinitsyn, who at the turn of the 60s and 70s served as deputy head of the First Main Directorate (intelligence) of the KGB of the USSR.

On the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war, he was a legal resident of the NKVD intelligence in Helsinki with a very solid diplomatic cover as a temporary chargé d'affaires - for this, the full-time NKVD plenipotentiary was temporarily recalled.

Something similar has already happened - a major Soviet intelligence officer Rybkin (we will meet his wife Zoya Rybkina-Voskresenskaya) in the spring of 1938, on Stalin's personal instructions, conducted secret negotiations with the Finns under the same cover, for which purpose Asmus' envoy was temporarily withdrawn.

An engineer by training (in 1934 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Chemical Engineering), Sinitsyn joined the NKVD intelligence service in 1937 on the party "Yezhov" recruitment, graduated from the School for Special Purposes, worked under cover in the Soviet consulate in Lvov even before the annexation of Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR.

Of course, Beria sent Sinitsyn, but Molotov was listed as his legal boss. And suddenly Sinitsyn receives a telegram: "Immediately leave for Moscow for a report. Molotov.

"Urgent" is not "immediately". In addition, Sinitsyn - in his own words - I was surprised: why is Molotov calling, and not Beria. But he left on the same day and immediately upon arrival he went not to the NKVD to the Lubyanka, but to the NKID, to Spiridonievsky ...

After listening to the report, Molotov released Sinitsyn (who  
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I knew him as Eliseev), saying that he could go "to Comrade Beria" ... Further, I convey the direct story of Sinitsyn:

"Ten minutes later (after Molotov's report. - S.K.) I was already at Fitin's (head of INO. - S.K.) and noticed that he was excited about something.

- Where do you go and why didn't you immediately come to the people's commissariat? he asked angrily. I began to explain ... when suddenly a sharp voice was heard over the intercom, but a scourge:

"Did that fool come to you?"

To this voice, Fitin jumped up from his chair as if stung and replied:

- Appeared.

- Together with him to me ...

When they entered the office, Beria was reclining on a leather sofa and sullenly, through his pince-nez (how else could he, a short-sighted one, look! - S.K.) silently examined us. Then, moving over to the table and sitting heavily in an armchair, he suddenly shouted, looking at me:

- Do you know who you are? - After a short pause he added: - You are a big fool.

I was silent.

Apparently, it seemed to him that I reacted weakly to his remark, grabbed pencil and shouted even sharper:

— *You're a big zero with a dot.*

At the same time, he drew a zero on a piece of paper, the pencil broke from the great pressure, and he abruptly threw it on the table in my direction. I immediately realized that my report to Molotov was to blame for such an outburst of the people's commissar, and I wanted to say why it happened. But Fitin, stepping on my foot, signaled to be silent ... "

And here I will interrupt Sinitsyn's story in order to draw the reader's attention to this ... The memoirist did not forget to note that Beria threw the pencil on the table in his direction ... Although somewhere in the other direction Beria, sitting at the table, nothing to discard and could not, except perhaps on the floor. Sinitsyn was sitting opposite him. But here is the fact that Beria invited them with Fiti

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nym **to sit down at the table** (not in front of the people's commissar did Fitin step on his subordinate's foot!), Sinitsyn forgot! And it is clear why - then there is no complete image of Beria as an unrestrained boor ... But let's move on:

"I did not consider it right to silently listen to Beria's scolding and ... said that I had not reported to Comrade Molotov important information, personally received the day before yesterday, about the situation on the Karelian Isthmus and about new weapons in the Finnish army.

Beria somehow strangely looked at me inquiringly and shouted sharply:

"Tell me everything you didn't tell Molotov about...

After listening carefully to what I said, Beria ... said:

- Remember, you have one people's commissar!

We left the office. In turn, Fitin didactically said:

- You probably understood that Beria's anger was caused by your report to Molotov, and not to him. In all cases, you were obliged to first report to your people's commissar. Don't repeat this mistake...

So, is Beria still a tyrant? Here is a direct witness. And not Antonov Ovseenko, and Honored General of the KGB. But is everything here so smooth?

Sinitsyn died on March 31, 1995 (at the age of 86), and his memoirs were signed for publication on November 29, 1996, a year after the author's death. Moreover, at the beginning of the book there is a standard, in fact, for the Declassified Lives series, a postscript about the fact that the publishing house is not responsible for the facts set forth in the book. That is, bribes are smooth. Well, it's reasonable...

But we will act wisely if we approach some of the facts presented with caution. Let's say, did Sinitsyn really do something wrong with Beria? Undoubtedly! He makes the reservation that after Molotov's summons, he informed his people's commissariat as well. But the exact date of departure was not reported to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, why was he in Moscow on the platform

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not the station and not one of *the* colleagues was waiting, but an employee of the Scandinavian department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

What, Sinitsyn, could not, having received a call from Molotov, immediately notify the Lubyanka and leave on the same day (which he did) for Moscow, informing the NKVD of his arrival not to the NKID? And immediately upon arrival, go there, report first of all to Beria, and only then ask him for permission to go to Molotov.

Yes, Captain GB Sinitsyn not only could do it, he *had to* do it! NKID is a front. And work is the NKVD! It was not Molotov who sent him to Finland, but Beria. And first of all, at least the head of INO Fitin should have learned about all emergency situations!

Molotov did not stab the "temporary attorney" "Eliseev" in the ass. "Urgently" - does not mean on the same day, so that Sinitsyn had the opportunity (in terms of time) to first clarify the situation "at home", in the Lubyanka, and only then "in ten minutes" to be at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. But, as I believe, Sinitsyn wanted to please Molotov ... What if you become a permanent member of the NKID from temporary employees! What if Vyacheslav Mikhailovich takes "Eliseev" from the NKVD from Lavrenty Pavlovich to himself ... In the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, it's calmer, more free ...

So Sinitsyn, recalling this old story, could not help but shift the emphasis to the side, unseemly for Beria.

It is necessary to trust Sinitsyn's assessments with great caution, and because he, like most of his high-ranking colleagues, behaved during the years of the "catastrophe" in a not very worthy manner and swam along those muddy waves that the "democrats" drove with might and main ...

So, he himself writes that while working in the Lvov consulate, he heard from local residents after the start of the German-Polish war: "Our end is coming. Why is the Soviet Union handing us over to the Germans?" And he (perhaps, by the way, the political correctors of his memoirs) had the conscience to write that he didn't know that "our troops are being sent to Poland to capture part of its eastern provinces by agreement between Stalin and Hitler." This is Sinitsyn about the reunification of Ukrainians with Ukrainians and Belarusians with Belarusians, the fundamental necessity of which was recognized even by the imperialist Curzon back in 1919

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year and confirmed the Supreme Council of the Entente at a conference in Spa in 1920!

So "...not a voice, but a scourge", "jumped up as if stung ...", "...reclined and gloomily examined", "sitting down heavily ...", "...shouted out", etc. . - that's right, artistic details to ensure the reader's proper perception of the image of Beria ...

But the fact that Lavrenty Pavlovich was rude and bitingly called his "zero with a dot", I believe! First of all, you can't imagine...

And secondly, then Sinitsyn behaved like a fool indeed. And it was necessary to reason with him accordingly, that is, quickly and harshly. After all, Beria and Sinitsyn still had a lot of work to do, and the subordinate chose a non-business line of conduct.

Moreover, having enlightened and received important information from him, Beria ... immediately took Sinitsyn with him to the Kremlin, to report to Stalin! So the possible explanation does not go away that Beria, they say, wanted to curry favor with the leader, and Sinitsyn confused his cards, gave Molotov the opportunity to jump ahead. If this were the case, if Beria were an intriguer and a scoundrel, then after listening to "Eliseev", he would simply leave for the Kremlin without him and attribute all the merit of obtaining valuable information to himself. After all, no one, including Molotov, knew that this fresh information was brought by Sinitsyn.

But for Beria, the matter was important. And it was more useful for the cause, so that Stalin would hear everything without broken telephones, and could ask Sinitsyn. Here Beria brought him to Stalin ...

YES, THE FACTS reported by the memoirists about their personal communication with Beria can somehow be relied upon. But very rarely you can rely on their own overall estimates. So, Sudoplatov wrote in his memoirs that if before Yezhov's arrival in the NKVD there was no investigative unit (the operative worker who worked with agents and informants also conducted an investigation into the case of the arrested person, prepared an indictment, etc.), then, they say, when Yezhov and Beria was created

special

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the investigative unit, which, as he claims, "literally knocked out testimonies from the arrested ... which had nothing to do with reality."

Here there is an unlawful combination in one of two different NKVDs - Yezhov and Beria. Moreover, Sudoplatov writes about what he himself had nothing to do with - he was not an investigator, but a scout.

In reality, there was no Investigative Unit of the NKVD under Yezhov! It was created (at first headed by Bogdan Kobulov) already by People's Commissar Beria, and Stalin himself sanctioned this innovation on December 12, 1938. And this is how a member of the Society for the Study of the History of Russian

special services Professor Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov: "This was the first step in the many years of existence of the Soviet special services, when the functions of search and investigation were separated in the interests of their qualified conduct."

This incident, dear reader, is typical! Beria, as a sin, is credited with what in fact is his merit. Including - and a merit before the justice not trampled by lawlessness.

Although, for the sake of justice, I will inform you that for the first time this question was really put before Stalin by Yezhov. In April 1937, he wrote a letter to Stalin, where at the end there were the following lines:

"The investigator, accepting an undercover file from any operational department of the GUGB for implementation, will demand sufficient weighty and legal grounds for arrest, and ensure that the undercover file transferred to him is sufficiently finalized and documented."

No, and from Yezhov - on closer examination - "bloodthirsty executioner" does not work.

PAVEL Sudoplatov in his memoirs (and possibly the political correctors of his memoirs) often abuses direct speech, including putting it into the mouth of Beria. With rare exceptions, I do not believe in the authenticity of direct speech in memoirs at all, and even more so in cases concerning Beria. But the way Beria reacted to one of

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situations at the end of 1938, Sudoplatov conveyed, I think, correctly - both textually and in spirit.

At 4 o'clock in the morning on the eve of the October celebrations, he was awakened by a call from the head of the secretariat of the Foreign Department, Kozlov, who announced an urgent summons to the Lubyanka and the arrest of the head of the INO, Passov.

Having met Sudoplatov, Kozlov led him to Merkulov, then deputy head of the GUGB, and he went along with Pavel Anatolyevich to Beria.

The People's Commissar announced in an official tone that Passov and Shpigelglas had been arrested for deceiving the party and that Sudoplatov should immediately take up the duties of the head of the INO. Sudoplatov, possibly due to lack of sleep, objected that he, they say, could not enter Passov's office, since he sealed.

Beria's answer was short, specific, intelligible and brilliant: "Remove the seals immediately, but remember for the future: do not fool me with such nonsense. You are not a schoolboy to ask childish questions."

Three phrases - just something!

But Beria immediately:

- a) makes Sudoplatov understand that he is now a person endowed not only with high responsibility, but also with considerable rights;
- b) determines the style and essence of their future relationship: not to waste time on trifles, but to immediately take the bull by the horns;
- c) urges the subordinate not to be afraid of responsibility - they say, if you are here giving in to the seals on the doors of the office no longer of Passov, but of your own, then how are you, brother, going to solve serious matters?
- d) he also gives a scolding to a subordinate, but so swiftly, without scolding and without humiliation, that all that remains for him is to finally wake up and immediately get involved in work in full force.

This is the highest class of competent management that Beria demonstrated everywhere and always. And I will immediately cite one more story, dating back to 1940 and told again by Sudoplatov. For those,

who is

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krenne believes in the image of Beria - a "monster" and a "ghoul", it may seem incredible, but it actually happened.

Here is how it was...

At the end of June 1940, Northern Bukovina was annexed to the USSR, and Sudoplatov (naturally, with the sanction of Beria) sent a group of Captain GB Adamovich to Chernivtsi, which included, by the way, William Fisher, who became famous much later under the name of Rudolf Abel. Fischer was fired (just fired!) From the NKVD for his connection with the defector Orlov Feldbing, but after checking, Beria again accepted him into the cadre.

Adamovich was supposed to instruct four agents sent overseas, and Fischer was to teach them the basics of radio communications. Adamovich also had a set of photographs of intelligence officers operating in Warsaw, Danzig, Berlin and Krakow under the cover of diplomatic structures, trade missions, and journalistic work, with whom the agents were supposed to contact. And suddenly, after arriving at the place, Adamovich disappeared, as Ivan Serov, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, found out. He immediately reported the incident to Khrushchev without informing Beria.

And here is Sudoplatov in Beria's office, furious that Sudoplatov did not track the situation with Adamovich. A call is heard on the HF - Khrushchev is calling from Kyiv. And Sudoplatov has the opportunity to hear how the Ukrainian first secretary begins to reproach Beria for allegedly interfering in the work of the Ukrainian NKVD, firstly, and secondly, for sending the "traitor" Adamovich to Ukraine. "According to" Khrushchev, he had already "ran over to the Germans."

In response to Khrushchev's scolding, Beria gently and politely replies that Major Sudoplatov, the deputy head of intelligence, is standing nearby, and he can explain everything. After that, he hands over the phone to Sudoplatov.

Khrushchev, not listening to the explanation that Adamovich is a competent worker who knows Poland well, rudely interrupts Sudoplatov and declares that he will break his career if he persists and "covers bandits and scoundrels." And then hangs up. This is the author of the future rotten "thaw", beloved by the Democrats.

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The unloved "executioner" Beria dryly and officially gives Sudoplatov two days to search for Adamovich, warning: "If you do not follow the instructions of a member of the Politburo, you will bear all responsibility ..."

The fever of the emergency search begins, but two days later it is empty. And then Sudoplatov did what, perhaps, he should have started with - he called Adamovich at home, his wife ... And the wife, flattered by the attention of her husband's superiors, thanked for the care and said that her husband was already feeling better ... He lies at home for two day with a concussion, and, thank you, they came to him from the NKVD polyclinic.

So, it turned out that Adamovich...

No, dear reader, I just can't do it like that... I'll first take the advice of the Golovan alien Shchekna from the Strugatsky novel and ask: "Read carefully, understand correctly, remember for a long time" ...

It turned out that Adamovich ... got drunk in a station restaurant in Chernivtsi, got into a drunken fight in the toilet, received a severe blow to the head, lost an envelope with photos of agents (he was later found at the station by local NKVD officers), managed to get on a Moscow train and drove off home without telling anyone what happened.

And now Sudoplatov is again in the chief's office.

"Reporting to Beria," he recalled, "as usual in

At the end of the day, I reported that Adamovich... was in Moscow.

- Under arrest? Beria asked.

"No," I replied, and began to explain the situation.

We were alone in the office. He cut me off rudely, using words that I did not expect to hear from a member of the Politburo (Beria was actually a candidate for membership at that time. - S.K.). Enraged, he described circles around his huge office, shouting curses at me and Adamovich, calling us blockheads, irresponsible suckers (and what else to call them? - S.K.), compromising the NKVD in the eyes of the party leadership.

- Why are you silent? he stared at me, suddenly interrupting his tirade.

I replied that I had a terrible headache ... "

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In the "democratic" screenplay about Beria, after such an answer Sudoplatov should have followed approximately the following remark of Beria:

"Oh, do you have a headache?" Yes, I'll tear it off for you now, along with x ..., through the window I'll throw it away and grind it into camp dust...

In life, everything was different:

"Then immediately, now," Beria threw, "go home ...

The next morning, Beria's secretary called. He was extremely brief and businesslike - the people's commissar ordered to stay at home for three days and be treated, adding that the owner was sending me lemons received from Georgia.

This, dear reader, is not an accidental lordly favor, but the norm for Beria. Many years later, already at the head of the uranium problem, at the request of the leading theoreticians of the project, Yuli Khariton and Yakov Zel'dovich, to take a vacation, in addition to a permit visa, he instructs them to get a good treatment.

And Adamovich? He was simply expelled from the authorities, having been fused somewhere to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Sudoplatov somehow ran into him in the early 50s at a theatrical premiere in Moscow.

Beria was implacable towards enemies. Adamovich turned out to be just a scoundrel, and Beria just got rid of him. After all, it was not Khrushchev, with his penchant for tyrannical cruelty, who insisted on executions even when Beria saw the possibility of a commutation of the sentence.

Beria really was extremely attentive to those who deserved it. When Mercader was arrested in Mexico, Beria announced to Sudoplatov, who led the operation to eliminate Trotsky, that no means would be spared to protect Mercader, and lawyers would have to prove that what had happened was the result of internal Trotskyist squabbles.

But if Beria were the monster that the villains expose him to, then the decision would be the opposite - to remove Mercader who did his job, otherwise he would suddenly start talking. In more than two decades, the most democratic democrats in the most democratic country in the world, by the way, will do so first with the alleged assassin of President Kennedy Lee Oswald, and then with the real

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Oswald's killer, Jack Ruby. About Ramon Mercader, on the instructions of Beria, who acted even after his departure from the affairs of the NKVD, they took care of him in prison and beyond.

And in order for the reader to better understand how in delicate cases only an oversight, talkativeness can become fatal, I will report that the identity of Mercader was established by the special services in 1946 after one of the prominent figures of the Spanish Communist Party escaped from Moscow to the West. And to that about the role of Ramon in the execution of Trotsky, Mercader's mother, Caridad, told in the evacuation in Tashkent. She was convinced that her acquaintance would keep everything a secret.

But now - not only did not hold back, but deliberately and vilely betrayed. So



the mistrust that Beria often showed in intelligence matters was justified - sometimes simple chatter in such a case can turn into an involuntary crime even against his own son.

But Beria knew how, as we already know, to believe. And those whom he believed, as a rule, were worthy of his trust. Alexander Korotkov also proved to be worthy of him... In 1940 he again worked actively and in July he was sent to Germany on a monthly business trip, which dragged on for almost half a year. In December, he again returned to the Reich, and a letter was sent to the "legal" resident of the NKVD in Berlin, Amayak Kobulov, whose deputy Korotkov was appointed:

*"His main task for the first time, according to Comrade Pavel's instructions, will be working with the Corsican and working out in detail all his connections..."*

*At the same time, you should use him as your main assistant in all organizational and operational internal affairs of the residency ... to intensify all work in your office ... "*

Beria was Pavel's comrade.

And he really was a senior comrade for those of his employees who were ready to work the way he did - living the assigned work.

STANISLAV Vaupshasov in his memoirs quoted one of Hemingway's favorite heroes: "There are fifty years of undeclared wars ahead, and I signed an agreement for the entire

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term". Vaupshasov was a professional Chekist. Beria too. But all his life Vaupshasov did one of his KGB affairs, and Beria had several of them, major life affairs, each of which could be called the main one. And the KGB line in his life did not become the only guiding one, although here he managed a lot both as an operative worker and as an organizer and reformer of the Soviet special service.

However, his main successes were visible in the sense that they were achieved in the open spheres of the country's life - in its direct socialist construction. It went on more and more successfully, and not only plants and factories, power plants and new cities were built. A new man was also built.

In this nation-wide construction, the role and importance of Beria by 1941 had already become very significant - soon he would also be appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. And, taking on an ever greater burden of duties, he did not work to increase his personal fortune, not for the opportunity to receive rare pleasures that few people could afford, but worked for the sake of creating a powerful state subject to its peoples. And just like him, then millions and millions of his fellow citizens worked.

In 1935, Arkady Gaidar wrote one of the brightest works of world literature - the story "The Blue Cup". And in 1938, he also finished the screenplay based on his 1934 story "Military Secret" and attributed to him some advice to the director, where the main character Natka Shegalova was said like this:

"NATKA SHEGALOVA - just grew up. She is a smart person. She has a sense of slight irony, and it manifests itself not only in relation to others (which is common), but also to herself.

She is a cultured Soviet girl - one of which there are not so many now, but in three or four years there will be a lot.

1938 + 3...4 = 1941...1942.

So, in 1942, the prospective situation in the country was to be determined by young boys and girls, fully formed by the new system. It was a generation

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no longer the first enthusiasts, but a generation of children of the first enthusiasts. Stalin counted on them as a support for the unshakable power of the state. They would have been able to secure alternative elections at the end of 1941 and break the "partocracy", and they would not have allowed anyone to manipulate their minds and question their right to be masters of their destiny and their country.

IN 1940, visitors to the main pavilion of the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition, the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition (the predecessor of VDNKh), were greeted by a huge inscription above the entrance to the pavilion: "I envy our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, who are destined to see Russia in 1941, walking ahead of the enlightened world.

*Vissarion Belinsky, 1841.*

This was not an entirely accurate quote, Belinsky wrote in 1840: "We envy our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, who are destined to see Russia in 1940 - standing at the head of the educated world, giving laws to science and art, and accepting reverent tribute from all enlightened humanity."

But the organizers of the exhibition could well forgive some inaccuracies for the sake of brevity and greater focus on the future. Regarding the main thing, everything was said for sure: the next year, 1941, could fully justify many of the hopes of the "furious Vissarion", expressed by him for a hundred years back.

### Chapter 13

#### SANDWICHES FOR TUPOLEV AND WIFE FOR THE RESIDENT

The country developed rapidly and confidently. Everyone - except perhaps the ancestors of the current "democrats" - recalling that last peaceful year many years later, sighed: "Yes, we began to live before the war." .

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One of the heroes of the story "With greetings from the front", written by the excellent Soviet writer Valentin Ovechkin in 1944, foreman Krapivka, sighed:

"Eh ... what a wonderful life we had before the war, but we did not appreciate it as it should. Just think: two and a half kilograms of herring cost, take as much as you want, even a barrel. Astrakhan, with a hall, as thick as an arm, a back like a piglet, lard flows from it. And the Don, the highest grade, four-fifty, marinated, with bay leaves? In any store you look, the shelves are cracking with products. Sausage of all sorts: amateur, tea, Warsaw, Krakow, sausages, sausages, canned food, balyk, smoked meats. And drinks - at least fill up: from plain white, to those liqueurs, inclusive, in earthenware jugs that, as soon as you open the cork, the smell spreads throughout the room, as if perfume had been poured. Yes, everything was cheap! Three fifteen white quarters cost. No cards, no queue.

And after this quite realistic description, Krapivka added:

"And what kind of pies did the meat-packing plant sell with us, with liver, for thirty-five kopecks each! And frozen Siberian dumplings - two and fifty kilograms! .. "

Not everywhere, of course, this picture was observable before the war, but things were going so that one more peaceful five-year plan, and Russia, a country of predominantly risky agriculture, would solve the food problem. And at the same time, not only domestic radios, but also domestic televisions could appear in Russia - even though the first inventor of television, Zworykin, *lived*, alas, overseas.

Having raised to quite good heights the industry of group "A", that is, the production of means of production, the country could now already say "B" - in the sense of developing this group of production of consumer goods.

People understood a lot during this unprecedented decade in the history of Russia...

And even the one who is still three or four years old  
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ago he had some or other sins before Russia, looking back, shrugged his shoulders, remembering himself of the past.

By writing this, I mean Andrey Nikolaevich Tupolev ...

On October 21, 1937, he, a leading Soviet aircraft designer well known to Stalin, was arrested by the NKVD, then headed by Yezhov.

In 1936, only in the Kremlin office of Stalin, Tupolev was three times - July 14, December 14 and December 31. However, less than a year later, Tupolev, the chief engineer and deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR, was "taken".

In the country, both before his arrest and after his arrest, specialists from various industries were arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment (engineers and scientists were rarely shot, but, as a rule, they had the opportunity to continue working in their specialty). But the case with Tupolev turned out to be unique in the sense that dozens of his employees were arrested and spent several years with him "in special conditions".

Around the topic of engineering "sharashka" lies - both "sincere", associated with the deformation of the memories of memoirists, and maliciously malicious - there is a lot heaped up. Even, for example, A. Toptygin groundlessly asserts that the intelligentsia did not enjoy special honor with Stalin and he supposedly tolerated it only because without it you can't fulfill the five-year plans and you won't prepare for war. And Tupolev, they say, is a typical example here.

No, not typical, but, I repeat, unique. But I will touch on this story insofar as it is associated with the name of Beria. After all, if we take the official version on faith, Lavrenty Pavlovich does not look very nice: he seems to be not a "ghoul", not an "executioner", but hardly a decent person. So the story with the designer Tupolev must be stopped ...

On December 27, 1954, he sent a letter to Khrushchev:

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*"Dear Nikita Sergeevich!*

*In accordance with your consent to assist us in the matter of rehabilitation, I am sending you a list of employees of my design bureau who were repressed by the NKVD in 1937-1938 and released ahead of schedule, with the removal of a criminal record, by the decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.*

*Appendix: list on 9 sheets, MB No. 4552.*

*Tupolev.*

And on February 23 (wow!) 1955, the head of the administrative department of the Central Committee Dedov, the first deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR Baranov and the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR Serov informed the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade N.S. Khrushchev:

*"Tupolev and other prominent workers in the aviation industry were arrested by the NKVD of the USSR in 1937-1938. The NKVD did not have specific materials for prosecution at its disposal, and the entire investigation was based only on the testimony of those arrested who had slandered each other.*

*From Tupolev, for example, testimonies were received that he had created an anti-Soviet group from among the employees of TsAGI, the members of which ... allegedly*

*engaged in sabotage ... and wreckingly designed almost all aircraft.*

*Soon after the arrest of Tupolev, all the leading employees of TsAGI were also arrested - Myasishchev, Petlyakov, Nekrasov and others. During interrogations, all these persons testified that they allegedly were engaged in organized anti-Soviet activities. Subsequently, the majority ... rejected the previously given testimony as fictitious ...*

*In 1938, all these persons, without being convicted, were sent to work in the Special Technical Bureau under the NKVD of the USSR ... With the arrival of Beria in the NKVD, in order to create the appearance of using specialists for the good of the cause, he fraudulently achieved before the authority (that is, Stalin. - S.K.) condemning 307 aviation specialists in absentia for various terms, indicating that "the consideration of these cases is inappropriate, because this will distract specialists from their work and disrupt the work plan of the Special Technical Bureau "...*

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*Having cited these obviously far-fetched and completely untenable arguments, Beria at the same time falsely asserted that the guilt of the arrested specialists in committing state crimes was allegedly proven, and noted that a summons ... to a court session would not give anything, since they had been in mutual relations for a long time communication and agreed on the nature of the testimony to be given ...*

*In May 1940, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court considered cases in absentia on the arrested specialists and determined their punishments..."*

*Well, then it was reported that "investigative materials were falsified as a result of the use of ... measures of physical coercion."*

So, what, did the documents catch Beria on an unseemly fact ?! It turns out that the author was mistaken in assessing Lavrenty Pavlovich so positively? And he, it turns out, is not without sin, and he is capable of meanness, and what kind of meanness, and even in relation to what people!

However, it is not so simple, dear reader!

Tupolev was arrested on October 21, 1937 and from the beginning of 1938 he headed the Central Design Bureau No. 29 of the NKVD of the USSR. That is, by the spring of at least 1938, there was a workable team. And the arrests went on and on. Deputy Chief Designer D.S. Markov was arrested on November 6, 1938! Then TsKB-29 was already working with might and main, and the planes were already sent for flight tests! So why arrest Markov? After all, he did the same thing before and after the arrest - he worked for Tupolev ?!

But if we look at the chronology of the arrests, something starts to become clear.

On October 21, 1937, Tupolev was arrested. October 27 - V.M. Petlyakov, November 1 - Deputy Chief Designer G.A. Ozerov, December 2 - Academician B.S. Stechkin, January 10, 1938 - academic consultant A.I. Nekrasov and Deputy Chief Designer Cheremukhin, January 12 - Deputy Chief Designer V.M. Myasishchev, etc.

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This series of arrests, separated sometimes by days, sometimes by weeks, speaks not of mutual slander, but of gradual, forced confessions, not as a result of physical pressure, but as a result of an investigation, confrontations, etc. Those who conducted the investigation into the Tupolev case noted already decades later, by the way, that the person under investigation was difficult: he would sign the protocol, and the next day he would refuse to testify. This is generally called "confusing the investigation." But no one ever calls someone's last name at random - there is always something behind it. And if it's still at random - if only "they didn't beat", then what's the difference, how much

stipulate! There were dozens of them, these names, in the memory of each arrested person. And they arrested 51 people for everything, including Tupolev himself. And even then not in overnight.

How do I know the exact number of those arrested? And from Tupolev's letter to Khrushchev, in the appendix to which data on 51 (fifty one) employees were given on 9 sheets.

Someone may notice: they were arrested in 1937, while Tupolev wrote the letter in 1954. During this time, many could simply die. But, firstly, not everyone died in the same massive way. And secondly, such an explanation does not work! The list of Tupolev's application for the rehabilitation of employees includes, for example, Vladimir Mikhailovich Petlyakov. However, he tragically died in a plane crash in 1942. But they did not forget to include him in the list of 51 employees.

So, the nomenklatura Khrushchev trinity lied. Not three hundred and seven people were detained by the NKVD, but fifty-one. Moreover, almost all of them were arrested before the appearance of Beria at the Lubyanka, and they were only condemned by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court already under Beria. The high party bureaucratic "trio", however, claims that it doesn't matter - because of the intrigues of Beria. But why did the Military Collegium condemn the "innocent" by no means "chokh"! After all, if Beria was behind this and everything was clear, then they would have taken it and carried out all the sentences in a day or two. They condemned something in absentia, without calling the accused to the court session ...

And sentences are sometimes separated by time almost a year, and the points of Article 58 are not the same for all convicts. So, Deputy Chief Designer Markov was sentenced on May 14, 1939 to 15 years.

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Deputy chief designer Ozerov and Cheremukhin May 29, 1939 - by 10 years.

Deputy Chief Designer Bazenkov May 28, 1940 - by the age of 5. And Deputy Chief Designer Minkner and Academician Stechkin were convicted three days after him, on May 31; the first - by 5 years, the second - by 10 years.

Deputy chief designer Myasishchev and Petlyakov were sentenced to 10 years May 29, 1940 on the same day as Tupolev himself, who received 15 years.

No, the Khrushchevites are lying. They lie, and here's another reason ... What did it mean to create a modern aircraft even before 1938? This meant only spending on design:

fighter - 90 ... 100 thousand man-hours;  
attack aircraft - 100 thousand man-hours;  
bomber:  
twin-engine high-speed - 220 thousand man-hours;  
twin-engine long-range - 320 thousand man-hours;  
four-engine - 470 thousand man-hours;  
flying boat  
twin-engine - 320 thousand man-hours.

And the construction of two and a half (half is broken on a static stand to test the strength of the structure) copies of an experimental, for example, four-engine bomber, is one and a half million people.

hours.

In addition, the aircraft does not exist without an engine. And, according to the logic of the Khrushchev notes, in addition to the arrested pilots, it was necessary to arrest the country's leading engine engineers. That is, if Beria, having come to the NKVD, really had broad plans to move forward our aviation through the efforts of the "slave labor" of its creators, then he would have to invent a dozen

anti-Soviet organizations and imprison thousands of people from various design bureaus.

They, in fact, worked in various design bureaus, including draftsmen, without whom there were no high-quality drawings at that time (they were completely drawn by draftswomen on tracing paper). But the aircraft developers worked as usual. And *only a part* of their leaders temporarily and for real sins was in a *special regime*. For example, after October 21, 1937, Tupolev did not appear in Stalin's office.

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soon ... And how was it with his closest long-term colleague Alexander Alexandrovich Arkhangelsky, who in many ways is "ANT" (an abbreviation from Tupolev's initials, which for a long time served as the name of the aircraft developed by his design bureau)? Well, Arkhangelsky appeared in Stalin's office after October 21, 1937 - at Stalin's meetings with aircraft designers in June 1939, in June 1940. And who, if not Alexander Alexandrovich, would be supposed to "sit" next to Tupolev, if Beria really cherished insidious "aviation" plans?

Arkhangelsky, however, was sitting. But at the table of working meetings, within the framework of his usual working day. And then he left for home.

But that's not all!

All the convicts did not work with picks in Kolyma, but with pencils behind drawing boards on the top floor of a Moscow building on Radio Street. However, Tupolev and many others were released (not rehabilitated) only after the start of the war - by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 19, 1941. Although the sentences were for 10 years, for 15. True, both those who sentenced and those who were sentenced knew for sure that no one had such terms in prison will remain.

Someone will say: "Yeah, when it was locked up, they immediately released me!" But the point is not even that, having released, the criminal record was not removed from anyone. The fact is that Myasishchev and Petlyakov were released much earlier than Tupolev, and released before the start of the war - on July 25, 1940. Also - by the decision of the Presidium of the Armed Forces!

On May 29, 1940, Petlyakova and Myasishchev were "soldered" for 10 years, and two months later they were already released! Here are the "schemer" Beria! And after all, it was he, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, who interceded for them before the Supreme Council!

Itself, it turns out, tried hard to put the designers behind bars, and then or...

It's kind of strange...

But that's not all!

Tupolev has always been distinguished as a leader by egocentrism - at one time he crushed for themselves whole original const

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guide teams. Of course, this can be explained decently, beautifully - they say, the patriarch brought up a galaxy, etc. But for a very long time, he did not let out long-fledged students on an independent flight. And only the arrest of Tupolev immediately led to the emergence of a number of independent design bureaus, which immediately began to work more than successfully and maturely.

So, the famous "ANT-25" (after "Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev") should actually be called "POS" - after the actual head of the development Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi. And in 1938 his separate design bureau was organized. And immediately gives an excellent short-range bomber "Ivanov", attack aircraft "Su-2" and "Su-6". For the last Sukhoi aircraft in 1943 he received the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree.

And the ANT-42 aircraft was Petlyakov's development, and then it was called the Pe 8. Its first "full-scale" flight took place on August 11, 1937, and the first backup flight took place in July 1938. And just in the "imprisonment" Petlyakov actually gained freedom for independent work. It was there that he launched his outstanding bomber "Pe ~ 2", which at the end of 1940 had already begun to be mass-produced.

The ANT-41 torpedo bomber is actually Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev. In 1938, he also became the chief designer of an independent design bureau and immediately gave the project of the world's first long-range high-altitude bomber "DVB-102" with a pressurized cabin and remotely controlled weapons. For the creation of this pioneer aircraft, Myasishchev in 1942 received the gratitude of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, and the Design Bureau - the Stalin Prize.

Why, Tupolev himself in the "imprisonment" picked up the pace. In the spring of 1940, he received the task of designing the future Tu-2, and in January 1941 he was already tested.

No, Beria did not send anyone specially on trumped-up charges to prison. But if such work was carried out in his department (begun in the NKVD before Beria), then he organized it in such a way that everything was accelerated not by the force of fear, but as a result of optimal management and the creation of the conditions necessary for work.

It was not easy for me to deal with these accusations of

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address of Lavrenty Pavlovich, my dear reader! It's like approaching a dense forest... From a distance - a solid wall. You come closer - you begin to distinguish individual trees, gaps ... And there, you look, and the path is marked, you can go further.

Yes, and it is necessary! After all, someday we must deal with our own history without fools - once and for all. The name of the same Tupolev has been sacred to me since childhood. And will remain - despite all his real sins and vices - *respected*. He was a very large professional and human figure.

However, one cannot transfer the real dirt from the guilty to the innocent (I mean Beria). So the guilty cannot be washed away. Only the truth is washed away.

Tupolev was by no means then a staunch supporter of Soviet power, he was rather a fellow traveler, and in some ways - *then* - an anti-Soviet. And at some point, he "wrongly" pulled younger people along with him. After all, even the Khrushchevites in their note admitted that "subsequently, only the "majority" retracted the previously given testimony as fictitious. Not everyone, it turns out, refused?! So, it was a sin?.. For example, Academicians Nekrasov and Stechkin were finally released only on February 27, 1943.

But as soon as Beria saw that the young Myasishchev and Petlyakov, who worked enthusiastically in prison, could work even better without the tutelage of the NKVD (and without Tupolev's "guardianship"), he immediately insisted on their release. However, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites had to create a "monster" out of Beria ... And the false note of Dedov-Baranov-Serov worked just for this purpose.

But that's not all!

The trinity's note to Khrushchev stated:

*"The audit ... established that many of the aircraft designed by Tupolev and other TsAGI employees, about which the investigation obtained evidence as being made by saboteurs, were manufactured in mass production and at one time were considered first-class ("TB-3", "SB", etc. )... »*

The argument about Tupolev's innocence based on the fact that his planes were mass-produced is actually for the defective. Subtle sabotage for that and subtle sabotage,

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to make everything look normal. As for the supposed excellence...

Once upon a time, the plane of the Wright brothers looked first-class.

But here is a classic - "The history of aircraft designs in the USSR until 1938."

Vadim Borisovich Shavrov:

"This aircraft (TB-3. - S.K.) ... is one of the most outstanding not only for its time ... It was the world's first four-engine cantilever monoplane bomber with engines installed in a row in span in the toe of the wing...

For 1930-1931, the TB-3 aircraft was a big step forward and stood at the height of technical perfection...

For 1931 - no doubt! And for 1941?

The Germans already in 1935 had the Junkers-88, Heinkel-111 projects, the British - the Lancaster ... The Americans in the same years developed both the Flying Fortress concept and the first Boeing-17. And Tupolev pulled and pulled the "bagpipe" with low-speed modifications of the "TB-3". And by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, TB-3 was not only outdated, but it was *criminally* outdated. With all the records set on Tupolev's aircraft in the 30s, in 1941 we had only one massive long-range bomber - Ilyushin's DB-Zf (Il-4). Plus the outstanding, but very expensive "Pe-8" by Petlyakov and the massive front-line bomber "Pe-2" by Petlyakov.

Fact is fact! The planes of the well-known German designers Willy Messerschmitt, Hugo Junkers (who died in 1936 at the age of seventy-seven), Ernst Heinrich Heinkel (the same age as Tupolev, by the way), as well as the planes of the Focke-Wulf company, successfully fought throughout the war, and were conceived in the mid-thirties.

"Personally" the same Tupolev aircraft fought only one - "Tu-2". And its development was started by Tupolev, when he involuntarily became the chief designer of TsKB-29 of the NKVD.

Objectively, the technical and organizational policy of Tupolev was if and not wrecking, then - on the verge of it

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go. After all, he was the main ideological figure in the Soviet aircraft industry since 1930!

Chief designer of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), head of the Department of Aviation, Hydroaviation, Pilot Construction (AGOS) of TsAGI ...

Deputy Head of the Central Design Bureau (TsKB) TsAGI...

Deputy Head of TsAGI, Head of the Design Department of the Pilot Construction Sector (KOSOS) of TsAGI ...

And, finally, the chief engineer and deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry of the USSR.

Here are Tupolev's positions from 1930 to 1937. And the results of the activities these positions? Well, I will quote the aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev:

"If we compare the main types of Soviet aircraft that were in mass production ... in 1939 with the same German ones, then this comparison will not be in our favor.

Fighters "MiG", "YAK", "LAGG" ... appeared in prototypes only in 1940.

Comparison of the SB bombers (Tupolev - S.K.) with the Yu-88 is also not in our favor ...

The Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber appeared with us ... only in



1940.

Interaction aircraft with the ground forces, similar to the German dive bomber "Junkers-87" ... was not at all ... "

These were the results not only of Tupolev's suffocating monopoly, but also, by the way, of the criminal military-technical policy of Tukhachevsky, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments. And in order to meet the war on the new technology, it took huge and urgent organizational efforts of many, and above all, Stalin. In 1940, more than 300 decisions and resolutions were adopted on aviation issues. In 1941 - 488.

But it was from 1938 that the rapid rise of Soviet aviation began, and it quickly acquired a completely modern look.

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It is not for nothing that the first book of Shavrov, the classic of aviation history (the creator of the Sh-2 serial amphibian), is called "The History of Aircraft Designs in the USSR until **1938**", and the second is "The History of Aircraft Designs in the USSR. **1938** - 1950 years."

For the "democrats" 1938 is the year of repressions. For Soviet aviation - year of renewal.

And the fact that some of its creators found themselves in the conditions of a "special regime" that year and lived "in a barracks position", under guard, was not Beria's fault. After all, I, my dear reader, have not yet said everything about the lies of the Khrushchevites ... They all knew perfectly well without any notes of 1955 ... At the Anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee, when no one was talking about Beria, Molotov said:

"There are also such former wreckers who gave us good aircraft designs and subsequently so resolutely abandoned their anti-Soviet past that they turned into major figures in our industry as advanced design engineers" ...

Someone will object that this may not be specifically about Tupolev!

But, first, about Tupolev, because the notes to the transcript say, what is meant, including "A. Tupolev, V. Petlyakov, V. Myasishchev and others."

Secondly, I cited part of *the corrected* transcript of Molotov's speech, taken from the collection "Lavrenty Beria" published by the A. Yakovlev Foundation. But there is also *an uncorrected* transcript, and in reality Molotov said (under Khrushchev, of course) the following:

"Tupolev sat as a pest, and now he is making planes for us. When he saw how things were going, that he had to work for this government, he began to work, and God bless him, let him work for himself.

He is no longer the same person, a new person ... "That's it! From the high podium, Tupolev was directly called a pest! Former ... And no one objected to Molotov - why are we here, Vyacheslav Mikhalych, we are erecting Beria's slander on Andrey-light Nikolaich ... This is all Beria, Beria, Beria ...

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After all, Lavrenty Pavlovich was no longer in the meeting room, who could conclusively confirm the correctness of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich.

But when Beria was a member of the top leadership of the state, he did not tyrannize the designers arrested **before him**, but, on the contrary, tried to make the "special regime" for them as working as possible. And I, finishing with Tupolev, will say something about this ... Or rather, I will cite the memoirs of an aerodynamicist from TsAGI Apollinary Konstantinovich Martynov.

Once he was called by acting. Head of TsAGI Potepkin, said that the next day Martynov would have to visit the Tupolev group for consultations, and added: "You will see your former friends and acquaintances there. don't worry and

Don't worry. The conversation will be strictly businesslike, and no other topics will be touched upon.

The conversation was in the TsAGI Moscow building on Radio Street, and Martynov **even he didn't have to get out from under the roof** - he just went up to the fifth floor ...

"I was taken to a large room," Martynov recalled, "and introduced to Major Kutepov ... who, apparently, was the head of the group.

He was very polite and considerate. I was told that a dive bomber (the future Tu-2. - S.K.) *was being designed*, the work was in the research stage ... The first consultation with my participation would take place immediately ... And indeed, soon Tupolev entered the room, Ozerov, Sokolov, Sterlin, Isakson and two other faces I didn't know... I was very excited. After all, in front of me were my teacher and a number of comrades with whom I had worked for many years, and all of them, as People's Commissar M.M. Kaganovich (brother of AM Kaganovich. - S.K.), were state criminals. All of them have changed a lot, especially Ozerov, who turned from a fat man into a thin man. The exception was A.N. Tupolev, who remained as we always knew him ... If everyone seemed somewhat depressed, then Tupolev behaved as if nothing had changed, laughed in

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his usual manner and behaved rather familiarly towards the officers ... "

Contacts became regular, and in the meantime, TsAGI moved to the village of Stakhanovo (the future city of Zhukovsky), where a powerful research complex was built at an accelerated pace. And now Tupolev came there. Martynov writes about it this way:

"At the appointed time, a car drove up to the doors of the laboratory, from which A.N. Tupolev and two officers, one of them was Kutepov. They proceeded to my office on the first floor. Everything was already prepared on the table: graphs ... and calculations ... But the clock showed three. Andrey Nikolayevich put aside the charts and said with a merry laugh: "Stop! My head hurts and I can't work anymore. Get used to eating regularly. Before, it used to be that you didn't eat until two in the morning, and nothing, but now I can't. Let's eat".

I said that, unfortunately, I could only offer him tea with sugar, and immediately ordered tea to be prepared. But one of the officers accompanying Tupolev got up and, without saying anything, left the office. He was absent for fifteen or twenty minutes and entered the office with bags containing provisions: bread, butter, sausage and something else. Tea with sandwiches was arranged, and Andrey Nikolayevich ate with gusto. "Well, now let's get on with the job," Tupolev said, and we're back to our schedules."

And here is how the new Commissar of Aviation describes Tupolev of those days industry Shakhurin:

"... Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev arrives, energetically enters the office, and in all his appearance - inexhaustible optimism and strength ... Andrei Nikolaevich came to me as if he had just arrived at the people's commissariat from home after dinner. Dressed simply: in a sweatshirt made of harsh material. A conversation begins, and he immediately jokes, laughs ...

I also observed it at the airport. He behaved there like a master, like a real chief designer ... "

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Such is the true portrait of the "victim of Beria's intrigues." And that's why I dwelled on the story with "sandwiches for Tupolev" in such detail, because we, dear reader, from time to time, as it were, are conducting an investigation. And any investigation

- these are facts that are constantly compared with other facts and constantly comprehended and rethought in the light of new and new facts and (or) logical arguments.

Dedov, Baranov and Serov, together with those who prepared a note for them for Khrushchev, actually slandered Beria. And in order to understand this, it was necessary to expend some effort. For me - for obtaining and analyzing facts, and for you, dear reader - for their assimilation and already your own analysis.

After all, I can say something else, recalling that Stalin at first "wooed" Chkalov to the NKVD. Valery Pavlovich organically could not become double-minded, hypocritical. And if medieval bloody actions were really going on in Yezhov's NKVD, including in relation to the aircraft designer Tupolev, could Stalin have come up with the idea to involve the great pilot with his direct, open nature in the "dark secrets of the Lubyanka dungeons"? Your will, dear reader, but the balanced answer here can be one: "No!"

Now, having dealt with, I hope, the "aviation" insinuations against Beria, we can move on - to new facts and to a new analysis of them.

ALREADY KNOWN to us Vitaly Pavlov in his post-perestroika memoirs of 1996 wrote:

"By the beginning of 1941, foreign intelligence was able to largely recover from the terrible blows inflicted on her by the Yezhov-Beria purge.

Considering that from November 25, 1938, Beria was the people's commissar and all significant processes in the NKVD (except perhaps the activities of the Department of Civil Status Acts and the Fire Department) were under his control, this statement by Pavlov looks incomparable!

After all, foreign intelligence was recovering "from the terrible  
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ditch inflicted on her by the Beria purge, "under the leadership of Beria himself! Isn't that right, dear reader?

Again, Pavlov writes that the "purgings" of the central apparatus of the NKVD, "especially its foreign structures, carried out in 1937-1939 by People's Commissars Yezhov and Beria" led to the fact that "out of about 100 employees, only two dozen remained in the INO. Some areas of work were completely bare."

To say this is to say something like this: "Russia during the reign of Sophia and Peter the Great became one of the leading European powers.

But if even the average high school student knows that Sophia and Peter are, as they say in Odessa, two big differences, then it turns out that even the KGB generals are not forbidden to lump Yezhov and Beria together.

I'm not talking about the fact that the vast majority of repressions in foreign illegal and legal structures of the INO NKVD falls on the era of Yezhov. Beria, on the contrary, carried out a partial reverse process here as well. But we must not forget about a hundred illegal immigrants, "surrendered" by Krivitsky.

After all, the Britons and the Yankees did not report to the Lubyanka - who he "lit up" for them, and who did not. And what about residents Reiss-Poretsky and Orlov-Feldbing? After all, their agents, their fellow residents, liaisons - this, after all, also automatically fell under suspicion. If it were otherwise, Beria and Merkulov would be just idiots.

And they weren't.

By the way, in the completely "democratic" United States, the concept of "security risk" has long existed. "Security" is "security, confidence, protection, guarantee, securities" ... Well, a "risk", it is also a risk in Africa.

**The crisis in intelligence was not provoked by Beria - he got the crisis already formed.** And it was formed not so much by Yezhov as

Krivitsky, Reiss, Feldbing (and there was also, for example, such a major traitor as the commissioner of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank, Yagoda's protégé, Genrikh Lyushkov, who fled to the Japanese on June 13, 1938, left by me outside the story). Moreover, the scale and consequences of this crisis are inflated precisely with the aim of blaming everything on Beria.

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But here is the testimony of the outstanding Soviet intelligence officer, Bulgarian Ivan Vinarov. I took it from his book "Fighters of the Quiet Front", published in Russian in Bulgaria in 1987.

*"With the fall of the Republic (Spanish. - S.K.), our work in Paris, of course, stopped. At the beginning of 1939, Galina and I packed our suitcases for the journey. Pyotr Grigorov (Vinarov's colleague in residency. - S.K.) left for the United States with important assignments. But in general the group remained. There were deeply concealed our employees in France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain. Having entered the new operational organization, during the war years they selflessly fought against the "new order" ... "*

Vinarov, however, was a scout of the Red Army Intelligence Agency. But it was also Soviet intelligence! The foreign cadres of the Intelligence Agency were preserved, and despite a number of betrayals, the personnel of the NKVD intelligence were also preserved. Not to mention the Special Group, which was run directly by the people's commissar.

Vitaly Pavlov, on the other hand, reports that much later than the death of Stalin and the "exposure" (yes!), as he writes, Beria came across a report on the work of foreign intelligence in the archives for the period from 1939 to April 1941, where he read the following:

"... by the beginning of 1939, as a result of the exposure (here is the word to the place. - S.K.) of the enemy leadership at that time of the foreign department, almost all residents abroad were recalled and removed from work. Most of them were then arrested, and the rest were subject to verification.

Firstly, in reality, everything was far from being so bleak for the intelligence activities of the NKVD. And secondly, sorry, but how else?

It was Vitaly Pavlov and his colleagues who turned out to be so, to put it bluntly, unprofessional "burdocks" that they allowed the traitors to both come to power in the Soviet Union and destroy it. Beria built and strengthened it.

He also strengthened foreign intelligence. But before that, he **checked her**. Alas, both the very history of the verification process and the motives of Beria (at first as the head of the GUGB, and then as an all-powerful people's commissar) are usually distorted in order to

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giving these actions of Beria a negative meaning. Although from Beria everything was logical here.

Let us recall at least the scouts Alexander Korotkov, Pavel Sudoplatov ... The latter, by the way, was not recalled for verification and returned to Moscow in a planned manner, so to speak. However, they also checked it.

Let me remind you that in early November 1938, Sudoplatov was appointed acting head of the INO GUGB. He was "acting" three weeks, then he was replaced by Dekanozov, and that - on May 13, 1939 by Pavel Fitin. Vitaly Pavlov, describing the meeting with Beria, when Fitin was appointed, misrepresented everything, saying that Fitin-de was appointed "instead of the arrested Passov." True, he makes the reservation that he himself was not at the meeting and knows its course from the words of his comrade Rogatnev (later a talented Chekist). But should Pavlov know the procedure for changing his own bosses? However, the way he described everything, the image of Beria looks quite definite: a boor, humiliating distrust of honored people.

Not the most worthy way describes the situation and Sudoplatov. However,

perhaps he did not understand everything - he was a militant, a scout, but he would hardly have turned out to be a counterintelligence officer. I'm not saying this to him in condemnation, it's just that militant operatives have a different psychology. Sudoplatov writes:

"Beria, in a conversation with each employee ... tried to find out if he was double agent, and said that everyone is now under suspicion.

So he said it to people directly! He tactfully - as far as possible - made it clear to the scouts that there was no need to be offended, that they did not personally suspect him, that this was temporary. Unless, of course, the scout is clean.

As a result, under People's Commissar Beria, unfairly repressed intelligence officers, consider it was not! I say "count", because intelligence is, alas, a delicate matter.

Beria acted in general very humanely. It is a pity that neither Sudoplatov himself, nor his wife, the beautiful Emma, who called Beria "Prince Shadiman" after the insidious hero of Anna An's novel that had just appeared 276, did not understand this .

Ton's "Great Mouravi". In addition, at the party meeting of the GUGB in the fall of 1938, his colleague from Kharkov, the Armenian Gukasov, publicly proposed to Sudoplatov to "consider suspicious connections". And they, these connections, judging by the testimony of Sudoplatov himself, indeed sometimes were

"Togo"...

Three years later, Gukasov behaved heroically in our embassy in Berlin after the start of the war. Having started a fierce fight with the Gestapo, he was severely beaten, but the cipher clerk managed to burn the code books during this time. So Gukasov was not a scoundrel.

But Sudoplatov was worried to his heart's content. After the accusations made by Gukasov and others, the party bureau decided to expel Sudoplatov from the party, and the general party meeting of the GUGB in January 1939 had to approve this decision.

Such a detail: the decision on Sudoplatov by the party bureau, at a meeting of which at least the new head of the GUGB Merkulov, and possibly the people's commissar Beria himself, was present, was made with one abstention. Deputy head of INO Dekanozov - Pavel Fitin said that he, as a new person, did not know Sudoplatov and could not judge him. Sudoplatov assesses such behavior as honest and decent. But after all, Beria also appreciated him: soon it was Fitin who received a promotion and was appointed head of the INO.

The party meeting of the GUGB was postponed. It seems that Beria, having become People's Commissar, has already figured out something, but not everything yet. And until the end of all the checks, I decided not to heat up the atmosphere. He was smart!

But after a few months, Sudoplatov's check ended and the following happened, by Sudoplatov himself and described:

"Beria unexpectedly called me to his place and offered to accompany him to a football match at the Dynamo stadium. He did not give any explanation - it was an order. Played "Spartak", a team of trade unions, and "Dynamo", a team of the NKVD. In those years, each meeting of these teams was an event in itself. At first I decided that Beria wanted me to be present during his conversation with

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agent in a restaurant ... When we arrived at the stadium and got out of the car, I followed Beria at a respectful distance, since Kobulov, Tsanova, Maslennikov and other deputies immediately approached him, immediately surrounding their boss. Turning around, however, he made me a sign to come closer and walk side by side - so I found myself in the government box. Beria introduced me to Malenkov and other party and state leaders ... The very fact of my presence on the government platform made it clear to Kruglov, Serov, Tsanova

and others that it is time to stop spreading rumors about my suspicious contacts, connections and some materials that compromised me that were available in the investigation unit. They had to make sure that from now on I belong to the category of trusted people in the eyes of the country's leadership ... "

And again, Sudoplatov did not appreciate Beria's act, even many years later. But Beria:

a) without starting official verbal explanations with anyone, he clearly and substantively showed at the same time to everyone who needs it that from now on he trusts Sudoplatov;

b) effectively eliminated for the future all possible misunderstandings on this check;

c) again, without verbal outpourings that would put Sudoplatov in an awkward position, first of all, showed him that all his problems were behind him.

And after all, he did this by inviting the militant terrorist Sudoplatov, let's not forget, in government box!

Why not? The check is over, Beria is convinced that Sudoplatov is worthy of trust. So why not show it to everyone both spectacularly and effectively (even in terms of saving time on relevant conversations!).

I don't know, as a reader, but personally I admire the intelligence, tact and subtlety of Lavrenty Pavlovich. This, I assure everyone, is not given by sober experience alone. In order to resolve a delicate situation in this way, you yourself must have a vulnerable and proud soul. And, of course, a huge psychological experience.

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BUT HERE, KGB General Vitaly Pavlov did not find good words for Beria, describing both from personal impressions and from the story of Rogatnev (who died heroically, however, during the war), "as Beria deliberately carelessly shoved honored scouts touched by gray hair into different units. In short, according to Pavlov, Beria is undoubtedly a boor, and even a non-professional.

But, let's say, "carelessly pushed" Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin (he was far from gray hair on the day of the meeting at the forty-fifth year of his life) in 1941 left as a resident in the United States, became a major general. He died in 1972, before reaching the age of eighty-two.

And a little later, I will focus on another resident who successfully operated in the United States - Iskhak Akhmerov, also allegedly "carelessly shoved" by Beria ... He, by the way, was 38 years old in 1939, and he had a completely brunette hair without gray hair.

In fact, General Pavlov, accusing Beria of unprofessionally and indiscriminately exposing the American direction of the work of the NKVD, is lying once again. Let's say, for a long time and successfully worked in the USA, an agent-group leader Zvuk - Yakov Golos. He was born in 1889 in Yekaterinoslav in a working class family, passed the external course for the full course of the gymnasium, worked in an illegal Bolshevik printing house, was exiled to an eternal settlement in the Yakutsk province, from where he fled to the USA and settled there. The voice was included in the illegal network of the NKVD in 1933. In 1935 he sent his wife and son to the USSR, in 1937 he came to Moscow himself, met with Slutsky. If everyone was suspected, then Golos should have been summoned in the first place (and he would have come), arrested, and so on. However, Golos worked quietly under Yezhov, and worked the same way under Beria.

Further, in the United States - which Pavlov could not have been unaware of - apart from Akhmerov, and after Akhmerov, foreign intelligence resident Gaik Hovakimyan successfully worked. No one recalled him either, he acted under the guise of an Amtorg engineer, in 1940 he became a graduate student at the New York Institute of Chemistry, where he defended his dissertation. Hovakimyan had 14 agents in touch at that time, not counting group agents. So Beria was not so unrestrainedly "thug" in

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at the end of the 30s, foreign intelligence, as several generations of "democrats" hammer into our heads and as General Pavlov assures. And rather, the opposite should be said in this regard.

As for Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov, he had a biography - at least shoot a movie. A Tatar from Troitsk, Chelyabinsk Region, born in 1901, he drank life as a boy: he worked as a furrier, was a courier, an errand boy in a haberdashery store, an apprentice electrician, and a baker.

And in 1920 he was a deputy of the Kazan Council, in 1923 he graduated from the 1st State University (future Moscow State University) and became deputy director of the Moscow Pedagogical College.

Then - the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, work in Bukhara and Turkey, again Moscow, the Institute of Red Professors. In 1932, Akhmerov was enrolled in the staff of the INO OGPU, received his first operational pseudonym Jung and went to China ... In 1934 he returned to Moscow, and there they began to prepare him for work in the USA.

In 1936, Akhmerov's American illegal residency had six employees and 10 sources. Sometimes, acting as a textile manufacturer, he was called either William Grunk, or Michael Green, or Michael Adamets, or someone else. And here...

And here Akhmerov fell in love ... In fact, the subject of his sighs was quite professionally suitable - one of the residents of the station, young, beautiful, with connections in the White House apparatus, Helen Lowry (operational pseudonym Tanya). In addition, Helen was the niece of the General Secretary of the US Communist Party, Earl Browder. And she answered her Russian boss in return.

The time for falling in love coincided with Akhmerov's planned call to Moscow to report on the work done. And here Akhmerov personally sends a report to People's Commissar Beria with a request to allow marriage with Tanya and come home with her. Beria's reaction was extremely negative and violent. And since Beria did not differ in duplicity, this indirectly refutes the future dirty slander about him as a sexual maniac.

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The Chekist profession undoubtedly left its mark on the formation of Beria as a person. A good security officer cannot be a womanizer. When Ivan Serov boasted that, with Khrushchev's sanction, under the guise of a novel, he was able to hook the famous Polish opera prima Bandrowska-Turska on an undercover "hook", and then it turned out to be a bluff (in terms of recruitment), Beria, according to Sudoplatov, "began to scold Serov for how much in vain, threatening to dismiss from the authorities in disgrace, calling him a petty womanizer.

I think it was a sincere reaction ... To drag a woman into bed for operational purposes is professional. But messing around with women is against the profession! On this, many men "burned out", which means that the Chekist can "burn out".

So Akhmerov's report automatically programmed Beria's distrust of its author. Well, actually! Beria knew Akhmerov only on a personal matter. And what could he think, having familiarized himself with it?

And here's what...

An attractive man, from the age of 21, has a stable and enviable social position and for so many years he has not got a wife in the Union ... And now, at the age of under forty, he urgently wanted to marry behind the cordon ... How is this to be understood? Isn't it a helicopter? Isn't it a womanizer? Did they give him this beauty? Niece of the top communist in the States? So what! We have a prince as agents

Radziwill is listed and many others from *their* higher circles.

Here is the logical reaction of a professional! And Beria was a high professional in both intelligence and counterintelligence - in contrast to the then, still inexperienced Pavel Fitin, who began to assure his boss that Akhmerov was "good" ...

But here, too, Beria acted humanely ... He did not immediately forbid marriage - what if a person really has a great feeling and will break his fate with a refusal? But he instructed Fitin to investigate in detail and prepare a detailed certificate on Akhmerov, which Fitin did. Only after studying it did the people's commissar give the go-ahead... But upon his return, Akhmerov was indeed demoted to the position of an ordinary employee of the American foreign intelligence department. And the two year trials began.

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But it would be amazing if it were otherwise! Moreover, part of Akhmerov's agents was transferred to the "legal" residency, and part was mothballed, which is a fairly common practice.

Yes, in a difficult situation for foreign intelligence, many (but not all!) Old career intelligence officers expressed political distrust. Beria even accused them, as Pavlov writes. Yes, he accused, as a rule, unfairly. But this was a smart and precise psychological move on the part of Lavrenty Pavlovich. Even then he had an excellent understanding of people, after all, he was both a counterintelligence officer and a party leader, besides ... He had already developed an eagle view of people. And - the ability to evaluate a person in total, according to the questionnaire and according to personal impression.

Moreover, he did not do without questionnaires at all. And it was not a matter of spiritual narrowness - he did not suffer from it. It was a matter of professionalism - as a professional, he also checked documents. But as a *high* professional, he also arranged a psychological test for all the intelligence officers who arrived.

It must be admitted that everyone who returned to Moscow withstood it with dignity! But after all, one must also admit that Beria, having made sure, both objectively and according to personal subjective data, of the honesty of his illegal immigrants, again included them in the work! The same Akhmerov, after the start of the war, received the most important task and again left for the United States with his wife.

And the fact that Beria could continue to express some external distrust to someone, once again proves his professionalism as an intelligence officer. After all, he knew his illegal immigrants - they could sometimes behave no less capriciously than opera prima donnas. After all, they, too - and for similar reasons - were not alien to the shortcomings of bright artists.

And just during Beria's tenure as the supreme head of both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence of the USSR, our intelligence acquired that phenomenally successful form that provided the country with not just outstanding results, but reliable results! What in intelligence is perhaps the most important.

Yes, many of the most valuable sources (the same "Cambridge Five") were acquired before Beria.

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Yes, a number of prominent illegal immigrants came to intelligence before Beria.

But it was Lavrenty Pavlovich who, firstly, managed to figure out the "mess" that had been brewed before him, including Krivitsky and his company, and secondly, managed to put intelligence work on a solid long-term basis. Intelligence began to carry out special recruitment, the level of training in the NKVD schools improved qualitatively. And, I think, I will not be mistaken in saying that **thanks to Beria, the country finally received the powerful intelligence of the Soviet state, and not intelligence imbued with the "spirit of the Comintern."** Now even the ideological cadres of intelligence did not work for the coming world revolution, but for a real one.



socialist country. Another thing is that later the intelligence service, filled with party nominees by the minister-partocrat Ignatiev, began to degrade. Especially after the removal of Beria.

I think that a series of betrayals at the beginning of 1954 was not accidental, but, as they say now, "significant" - without any threat of any reprisals for the out-of-band workers. In January 1954, Yuri Rastvorov, an operative from the Tokyo residency of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, went over to the Americans.

February 18, 1954

Captain Nikolai Khokhlov.

In February 1954, Major Pyotr Deryabin defected to the CIA in Vienna. A native Siberian, a four-time wounded front-line soldier, he worked in the government security structures in the early 50s and could get an idea of who is who in the Kremlin.

In April 1954, Vladimir Petrov, a resident of the KGB of the USSR in Canberra, remained in Australia with his wife, an employee of the residency. Petrov started back in the INO OGPU in 1933, and his escape was directly connected with the death of Beria. Yes, having seen the light and seeing the difference between Beria and the Khrushchevites, some of the intelligence officers prophetically realized that the country was doomed in the long run.

In the late 50s, this series continued. Moreover, it is characteristic that back in 1954, Deryabin pointed out Anatoly Golitsyn, who actually went to the West in December 1961 from Helsinki, as a potential defector. Cause

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leaving, he called the rejection of the atmosphere of undercover intrigues that reigned in the KGB.

Soviet intelligence passed the test of the war, but more and more withstood the test of Khrushchevism ...

#### Chapter 14

### **INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOR STALIN AND AUTOMATED FOR BORDER GUARDS**

Since 1941, the state socio-economic publishing house began to publish reference calendars, and the first in this "project" was, of course, a reference calendar for 1941.

Having opened it, among a good hundred biographical notes on Alexander Parkhomenko and Jack London, "Benjamin" Franklin and Ivan Franko, Modest Mussorgsky and Sholom Aleichem, Leibniz, Curie-Sklodovsky, Schumann, Lomonosov, as well as Zhdanov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev ( "Member of the Politburo, faithful son of the Bolshevik Party, pupil and closest ally of the great Stalin"), Mikoyan, Shvernik and others, we will also find on page 48 a biography of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

"Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was born on March 29, 1899 in the village of Merkheuli (Georgian SSR) into a poor peasant family. Comrade Beria joined the Bolshevik Party in March 1917 in Baku. In 1918-1920, during the reign of the Musavatists and Mensheviks in Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria carried out active underground work in Baku and Georgia. In 1920 Comrade Beria was arrested by the Menshevik government of Georgia. At the insistence of S.M. Kirov, who worked at that time as the plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Georgia, comrade Beria was expelled from Georgia to Soviet Azerbaijan. Since 1921, Comrade Beria has been in leadership work in the Soviet intelligence agencies. Since November 1931, he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia, and in 1932, the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU(b).

As head of the Bolshevik organizations in Georgia and Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria showed Leninist-Stalinist perseverance and intransigence towards enemies

people in

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struggle to carry out the general line of the Bolshevik Party. A great merit belongs to Comrade Beria in exposing the Trotskyist-Bukharin falsifiers of the history of Bolshevism. His well-known book "On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia" is a most valuable contribution to the history of the Bolshevik Party.

From the end of 1938, Comrade Beria was the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. From XVII congress - a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, since March 1939 - a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Tov. Beria is one of the most prominent leaders of the CPSU (b) and the closest students and associates of Comrade Stalin.

For military and revolutionary merits, Comrade Beria was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Lenin and the Orders of the Red Banner of Labor of the Georgian and Azerbaijan SSR.

Tov. Beria is a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

However, in the curriculum vitae of the calendar (and I quoted it in full) it was not explained that although Comrade Beria had been People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR since the end of 1938, but since February 3, 1941, he was not quite the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, which he was until February 3, 1941.

And not even the same one!

The range of his state duties more and more went beyond the provision of external and internal state security. At the Plenum of the Central Committee on March 22, 1939, Beria was elected a candidate member of the Politburo. And his tasks increasingly moved into the sphere of governing the whole country with all the diverse complex of its problems.

Among other things, this was expressed in a very serious reorganization of the department headed by Lavrenty Pavlovich. On January 30, 1941, he was awarded the special rank of General Commissar of State Security, equivalent to the army rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union (with the elimination of special ranks of State Security Officers in the USSR on July 6, 1945, Beria began to wear directly marshal epaulettes).

But already on February 3, 1941, Beria was appointed Deputy Chairman Council of People's Commissars, retaining

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behind him is the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. And on February 3, 1941, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a separate People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) was allocated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).

The new NKVD included all the previous structures, except for the GUGB and military counterintelligence. That is, the "national economic" departments, the penitentiary sphere, the police, border, internal and escort troops, as well as fire and paramilitary guards, registry offices and others, including the Central Council of the Dynamo Voluntary Sports Society, remained subordinate to Beria.

All structures of the former GUGB were transferred to the NKGB. The military counterintelligence - the Special Departments - was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy with the formation of the corresponding 3 departments in the NGOs and the NC of the Navy. In a time of peace for the USSR, but already wartime for Europe and the world, such a reorganization was logical.

"Pure" security officers were able to focus on their natural and ever-expanding tasks of intelligence, counterintelligence and information analysis.

The "specialists" began to obey the army and navy leadership, and this increased the responsibility of the latter and made the former relatively "their own" for the Armed Forces, which previously considered the Special Departments as spies

NKVD. As a result, the quality of detecting hostile elements and agents of potential adversaries in the troops has increased.

And Beria?

He, as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, now had enough to do without the NKVD. From April 1941, he began to oversee the people's commissariats of non-ferrous metallurgy, coal, oil and timber industries. However, even in its "main" People's Commissariat, the old problems of protecting important state and industrial facilities, railway junctions, airfields, telephone and telegraph stations, banks acquired a new quality ... It was necessary to strengthen the protection of the state border, solve the problems of new territories ...

He did not transfer the People's Commissariat of State Security into the wrong hands.

46-year-old Vsevolod became People's Commissar of State Security  
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Merkulov has been an ally of Beria since 1922 when he was still working in the Chekist bodies of the Transcaucasus, and then working in the Zakkraykom and in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia.

In his memoirs, Sudoplatov writes about the invariably "polite and calm manner" of Merkulov's behavior. However, we also have a more detailed description of him, moreover, from the other side of the barricades.

In 1953, the book "My Ringside Seat in Moscow" by the Hungarian ex-diplomat Nikolas Niarady, "who chose freedom", was published in the West (it can be translated as something like "My Rotation in Moscow"). About Merkulov, this Niaradi wrote this:

"Here is a paradox: a man of amazing kindness and at the same time bestial cruelty; severe and serious, but at the same time very witty; has angelic patience, on the one hand, and smokes 40-50 cigarettes during the working day, one after another. An official of such a high rank that ambassadors are drawn to attention in front of him, but at the same time he is naturally modest and shy, and when he speaks, a genuine timid smile wanders across his face. It was Merkulov who personally oversaw the physical liquidation of almost two million Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians, who were killed with heartless, inhuman skill. But he also looks like a gangster sobbing over Brahms' Lullaby, full of purely Russian sentimentality, especially in relation to children. Once, when we already knew each other quite closely, he somehow, with paternal pride and almost with tears in his eyes, showed me a photograph of his son, a soldier.

The Hungarian was familiar with Merkulov, this is obvious - the portrait is quite bright and visible. But just as there is no love without sadness, so there is no "democrat" without lies. Let's not deal with what kind of ambassadors were pulled in front of Merkulov "to the line" - Vsevolod Nikolayevich did not hold such posts where it was necessary to collectively communicate with ambassadors ...

As for "bestial cruelty", "gangster" and "physical liquidation  
almost two million Estonians, litas 287

tsev and Latvians, killed with heartless, inhuman dexterity", then we need to figure it out.

Firstly, by the time the Baltic States joined the USSR, all these three peoples in total did not number more than four million people. "Halving" them overnight is really a task for the new Attila...

But here is the document - the memorandum of the NKGB Merkulov to the Central Committee No. 1687 / M dated May 16, 1941, in which the People's Commissar forwarded for consideration a draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the "cleansing" of the Baltic states. The project was presented to Stalin signed by Beria, and the resolution adopted on its basis read, in particular:

"1. Allow the NKGB and the NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs to arrest with confiscation of property and send them to camps for a period of 5 to 8 years, and after serving their sentence in the camps, exile the following categories of people to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years:

a) active members of counter-revolutionary parties and members of anti-Soviet nationalist White Guard organizations;

b) former guards, gendarmes, senior officers of former policemen and jailers, as well as ordinary policemen and jailers who have compromising materials;

c) former large landowners, manufacturers and high officials of the former state apparatus of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia;

d) former officers of the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and White armies who have compromising materials;

e) a criminal element who continues to engage in criminal activity"...

As you can see, paragraph 1 dealt with an urgent "cleansing" of an obvious "fifth columns."

Paragraph 2 of the decree provided for the expulsion for 20 years of family members living together or dependent on the repressed.

It also provided for the exile of "persons who arrived from Germany in order repatriation, as well as Germans who signed up

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for repatriation to Germany and those who refused to leave, in respect of which there are materials about their anti-Soviet activities and suspicious connections with foreign intelligence services.

But point 3 I will give with special pleasure in full - it's very amusing in the light of Niaradi's "horrors":

"3. To allow the NKGB and the NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs to administratively deport prostitutes to the northern regions of Kazakhstan for a period of 5 years, previously registered with the former police bodies of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and now continuing to engage in prostitution.

In parentheses, I will inform you that they were deported in the amount of 760 people, as well as 2162 criminals (these three thousand "victims of Merkulov-Beria" "democrats", of course, also add to the general "martyrology" today).

The resolution ordered to send to the Baltic States, to help local authorities, Commissar of State Security Comrade Merkulov and his deputy Comrade Serov, as well as Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Abakumov.

For "use in conducting operations and investigations" 208 cadets of the Higher School of the NKGB of the USSR were sent to the republics, by nationality - Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.

On the border of Lithuania with Belarus, temporarily, "for the period of preparation and conduct of the operation", a barrier zone was established with the allocation of up to 400 border guards for this purpose.

The operation was scheduled to be carried out within three days, and it was carried out from 14 to 17 June 1941.

Its results are as follows:

	Arrested	evicted	Total
	5664	10 187	15 851
Lithuania	5625	9546	15 171
Latvia Estonia	3178	5978	9156

In total - 40,178 people, including whores and bandits, which is 2.0089 percent of the figure of the "democratic" Hungarian. That is, for "who chose freedom"

a person is not a problem and the lie ratio is 50:1.

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And it's because I calculated the percentage of repression in relation to Niarady's nonsense. However, the repressed included not only Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, but also other nationalities, including the White Guards who settled in the Baltic states, so the calculation must be carried out for the entire population. And then it turns out that in the small Baltic, which after the Civil War became just the same big anti-Soviet, and even anti-Russian reserve, no more than one out of a hundred and fifty inhabitants was repressed. And **not one of them** was shot! The maximum measure is 8 years in the camps.

Niarady's lie in relation to Merkulov is also a lie in relation to Beria. And it is just as vile and total as all the slander against them in general - both the Khrushchevites of all times and peoples, and the "democrats", and the "historians" of the "Radzin-Volkogonov-Ovseenkovsky" circle.

So, from February 1941, Merkulov became solely in charge of the state security organs, including foreign intelligence. And now it was no longer Beria who sent reports based on intelligence reports to the top leadership of the country, starting with Stalin and Molotov, but Merkulov.

Beria now only received them. And this point must be emphasized! Since February 1941, it was not Beria who was in charge of foreign intelligence issues!

Moreover, in general, information from various sources came to the USSR in such quantity - we will soon see - that even the most reliable intelligence telegram from any one source would not change the overall picture - both from the standpoint of information and from the standpoint of disinformation. And in connection with what has just been said, it is necessary to touch upon the problem of Richard Sorge. She is also strongly associated with the name of Beria, although I am not sure whether Beria even knew about his existence. Ramsay-Sorge collaborated with the Intelligence Agency of the General Staff, started as Berzin's man, but was not a full-time agent, he did not even have a military rank. And military intelligence traditionally did not share sensitive information with NKVD intelligence. I think it was not only the rivalry of the special services, but also a number of betrayals, both in

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one "office", and in another ... But no one wanted to expose their intelligence networks to an extra possible blow.

One of the persistent myths is this: Stalin and Beria did not listen to Sorge.

But, firstly, this is in the cinema after receiving an emergency intelligence telegram, everyone becomes "on the ears". In life, such telegrams, which often turn out to be false, are enough in the special services of all countries of the world. And senior management responds to single "signals" accordingly. The array of information as a whole is important, and for a certain period. And providing this to one scout is beyond the power in principle.

Secondly, regarding the "Sorge telegram", we will soon find out something.

Sorge was an outstanding intellectual - there can be no two opinions. Moreover, I would not even call him a journalist in the classical style. A nature journalist is basically a reporter: he came, he saw, he wrote. Sorge was an analyst, and his newspaper articles from Japan could hardly be read, for example, by a secular lady looking for *a sharp little one*. These were full-fledged, containing not so much even information as assessments and forecasts,

analytical reports.

But Sorge was also a poorly organized person, he even had a bad conspiracy - the group members went on picnics together! In addition - numerous connections with women and very frequent alcohol. Sometimes

the scout is forced to play an admirer of alcohol - a drunkard is always suspected

less (if, of course, he drinks "on his labor"). But Sorge did not play, and one case proves this categorically.

Sorge loved the motorcycle and rode it around Tokyo with a very intense road traffic. Driving fast is not a sin, although a professional has the right to risk his life only in justified situations. Not the worst sin was the fact that Sorge often got behind the wheel drunk. But the fact that in such a state he could carry with him something that reveals him as a scout,

This...

Well, it is clear how it can be assessed!

Once the failure almost happened precisely because of *this*

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*th* ... Sorge drove "under a hundred", crashed into a roadside stone and was in a serious condition in the hospital with ... microfilm in his pocket. He had enough willpower, without losing consciousness, to urgently call the radio operator Max Clausen and pass the "compromising evidence" to him. In Moscow, they did not find out then about the "glitch" with the film, but, of course, they found out about the accident.

Would you, dear reader, believe such a *resident* without hesitation even if you believed him as a *person*?

Personally, I don't.

As for his famous telegram:

*"June 15, 1941*

*An attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 along a wide front,*  
in fact, it simply did not exist!

By the way, it is absolutely not similar to real intelligence telegrams in style and design, but, I repeat, it simply did not exist! June 16, 2001 in the "Red Star" published the materials of the "Round Table" dedicated to the 60 anniversary of the start of the war, where SVR Colonel Karpov said:

"Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in the Khrushchev era. Such "fools" are launched simply: one of the authors of publications about Sorge came up with these radiograms for a red word, and the rest picked it up with reference to it - and the province went to write ... Then they added psychology, came up with a vengeful Stalin ... "

Karpov's confession completely reveals the technology for creating another "fool" - regarding Beria's pre-war "camp-dusty" visas, cited in dozens, if not hundreds of publications. Only the "vengeful Stalin" in them is replaced by the "vengeful Beria" ...

YES, IT'S TIME for us to take a critical look at the famous anti-Beria fakes about Beria's position regarding the timing of the start of the war. I don't know who was the first to put them into circulation, but Sergo Beria in his book about his father cites these alleged "documents", rightly calling them falsifications, based on the "documentary" story by Ovid Gorchakov "On the Eve, or the Tragedy of Cassandra" ...

Gorchakov had a pen even more lively than Dmitry

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Bystroletov. And his fantasy was professionally developed already in the sixties ... Then the "cool" counter-propaganda militant Grivadiy Gorpzhaks "Gene Green -

untouchable". Famously riveted from many clichés, he is in a very tabloid manner exposed the "intrigues of the CIA." I must admit that I once read it excitedly ...

So, "...diy" and "Gor ..." are Gorchakov's contribution to the collective pseudonym (Gri[gorius] Va[silius] [Ovi] diy Gor[cha-kov] Pozh[enyan] Aks[enov])...

They say: find out who his friends are, and you will understand who he is ... Therefore, a couple of words

about Gorchakov's co-authors on slapping and slapping the image of Gene Green. Vasily Aksenov is the same current writer Aksenov, whose mother is - unfortunate "victim of Beria", "Echelon" - Evgenia Ginzburg, and who himself - "Island of Crimea" and more. Grigory Pozhenyan is a below average poet. But - with claims to incomprehensibility.

Gorchakov is... Well, Gorchakov is like Gorchakov... He is certified as a scout and presented as "Major Whirlwind", although the plot of the well-known series is primarily the story of military intelligence officer Yevgeny Stepanovich Berezhnyak... However, the point is not in the moral qualities of one of the members of the trinity writers, but in what they or some of their fellow writers attributed to Beria ...

And this is what is written:

From the memorandum of L.P. Beria I.V. Stalin:

"June 21, 1941 ... I again insist (this is Beria allegedly writes to Stalin in similar terms! - S.K.) on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov, who continues to bombard me with "disinformation" about the allegedly impending attack on the USSR. He said that this "attack" would begin tomorrow. Major General V.I. Tupikov, the military attache in Berlin, also radioed the same. This stupid general claims that three Wehrmacht army groups will advance on Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv ... The head of the intelligence department, where the Berzin gang had recently operated, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, complains about Dekanozov and about his Lieutenant Colonel Novo

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Brantsev, who also lies that Hitler concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border. But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise plan: in 1941 Hitler will not attack us!"...

These lines have been walking around the world for more than a decade. And everything in them is taken into account correctly - in full accordance with the laws of the "genre" and taking into account the official falsification of history by the Khrushchevites.

Here I take the thick first volume of the six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, published by Voenizdat in 1961. After all, there is no such surname in the name index - Merkulov (Beria will be mentioned twice, but about this separately). There is an OUN member Melnik, there is a German political emigrant Merker, followed by an American diplomat Messersmith and the next one is Mehlis...

And in the subject index to this volume, among the people's commissariats, not a single The NKVD, not the NKGB... Even the People's Commissariat of Nonferrous Metals is marked, but the NKGB is not.

And about the NKVD, whose border troops were the first to meet the war - not a word. By the way, "Border Troops" is not in the index either. Yes, it is understandable: suddenly someone will ask the question - but in whose jurisdiction were they?

The same picture in volumes 3 and 4 of the twelve-volume History of the Second World War. 1939-1945", published by the Military Publishing House in 1974 and 1975: Beria is not present, Merkulov is not, the NKVD is not, the NKGB is not, about the actions of the border troops - three short paragraphs in two volumes with a total of 1038 pages.

So the mass Soviet reader (although can one call the reader of encyclopedic publications a mass one) did not know either about the division of the people's commissariats, or about the subordination of Beria's border troops, or about the withdrawal of intelligence from under his subordination, - as well as many other things. But any Soviet intellectual "smoking room" knew for sure: "The NKVD intelligence missed the war, because Beria destroyed all the intelligent intelligence officers before the war." However, this is how many "smoking rooms" "think" today. Although from February 3, 1941 to July 20, 1941 (when the people's commissariats were again united under Beria's hand), the **NKVD did not have foreign intelligence! NOT**

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WAS!!! But who knows and remembers this? Moreover, intelligence officers in 1940-1941 years, no one destroyed.

It was in such an informational vacuum that the Gorchakovs-Gorpozhaks launched their anti-Beria "ducks". And they - contrary to the laws of nature - went on a long flight, lasting, alas, to this day.

And now I ask the dear reader to be patient. Because we are now going to do a boring thing - *a line-by-line* analysis of Gorchakov's fabrications.

It is obvious that the style of "Beria's note" is not the style of an official document. Anyone who constantly writes business papers automatically develops a very specific vocabulary, constructs phrases in a certain way. And this is more or less common for any country, for any institution, for any language. And here we have a typical rollicking style, characteristic of the creators of detective stories that hit the cheap effect. Well, in fact, the mere use of the purely slang expression "disinformation" in this supposedly document of national importance betrays a forgery.

Explanations of positions with surnames are also unreliable. Stalin was, of course, aware of the position even of Tupikov, and even of Dekanozov and Golikov - especially. Moreover, only with the name of Dekanozov (the well-known Beria) there are no initials, which is understandable: Dekanozov is a symbol for the author of a fake, and the initials of the rest must be clarified to give the appearance of reliability, and at the same time explain to the reader (not Stalin) who is being discussed. But here is the obligatory for such documents "t." I forgot the name of the forger. But then they wrote exactly like this: "comrade Dekanozov", "comrade Golikov", without initials.

Gorchakov, the master of a lively pen, could not resist the flat pun "stupid general Tupikov," but the real Beria was not so stupid as to use such expressions in a report to Stalin. This is the same overlay of Gorchakov, as well as "bombing", "radio", "Berzin's gang", "me and my people", "wise destiny"...

Gorchakov needs to convince the reader of the low servility of the "executioner" Beria to Stalin, and he puts into the mouth of his "Beria" (before that, allegedly impudently "insisted" on Dekanozov's recall) the absolutely impossible not only

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for him, but also for anyone from the leadership of the USSR in general, the appeal "Joseph Vissarionovich" instead of the well-established "vol. Stalin." But the strict "t. Stalin" is out of style, and the author of the fake subtly uses the sycophantic - in this case - "Joseph Vissarionovich" ...

As for "Lieutenant Colonel Novobrantsev, who also lies that Hitler concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border," someone like him has been noted in history. I am not familiar with the plot of Gorchakov's "documentary" story, but I do not rule out that it was written just about Vasily **the Rookie** (to be precise), because in May 1941, while temporarily acting head of the intelligence department of the 6th Army headquarters, he sanctions distributed "Intelligence Report No. 8", which spoke of Germany's preparations for war.

In fact, such tricks should be strongly warmed up, because on the part of the Rookie it was, albeit unintentionally, but a provocation on a national scale. However, he was only removed from his post and sent to ... the Reconnaissance Department's rest house in Odessa. And on June 22, 1941, he was appointed ... already a full-fledged head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the same 6th Army.

It's funny, but the incident with the Rookie indirectly proves (although there is enough evidence and direct evidence) that the top leadership of the USSR, including Beria, knew very well already in May about 170 divisions, and much more than that, which for



ordinary head of the army intelligence department was a secret with seven seals. Therefore, the Rookie was not punished, because he only showed zeal not according to his position and not according to reason. There is no intelligence without discipline and strict obedience to the Center, but you will not find geniuses for all army intelligence departments, and the Rookie, after all, graduated from the Academy of the General Staff.

Therefore, they did not give him a neck, but gave him a little rest - before the war. And since he was quarantined before the start of the war back in May, only Gorchakov's "Beria" could refer to him on June 21, 1941.

What else is fun! In Gorchakov's fake, Dekanozov is attributed to hypervigilance. And in the biographical directory of Zalessky, Dekanozov is charged with the fact that he

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"I could not assess the situation and remained in the dark about the aggressive plans of A. Hitler."

Although, in fact, both the first and second statements are false. Dekanozov was not categorical in either direction, more inclined, however, to the position of his longtime colleague, resident Amayak Kobulov, to whom the Germans, for the purpose of strategic disinformation, set up a double agent Berlinks, who had the code name Lyceist in the NKGB. So Dekanozov could not "bombard" anyone with any "misinformation" about the imminent German offensive - he succumbed to the "misinformation" of the Lyceum student, who assured the opposite.

But the one who thinks that Stalin could build the entire state policy on information from some one resident, even the Berlin residency, is stupid and stupid. In addition, on the direct instructions of the Center, Alexander Korotkoye, known to us, from March 1941 intensified work with Harro Schulze-Boysen -

The foreman who gave accurate information. And this information arrived on time to the right place, to the desks of the country's leaders, which I will talk about later.

As an introductory "saying", I will remind you of the second, no less famous, "sensation" placed in Gorchakov's book ... He gave it like this:

"On the old folder where these reports are stored, the fund, inventory, file are numbered in faded purple ink. When you open the folder, a resolution written with pressure with an eternal pen catches your eye: "Recently, many workers succumb to impudent provocations and sow panic. The secret collaborators of Yastreba, Carmen, Almaz, Verny, for systematic disinformation, should be wiped into camp dust as "accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany. Others must be given a strict warning." Signature: "L. Beria. June 21, 1941".

Now let's get a grasp of this concoction ... I will immediately notice that, it turns out, this "Beria" is familiar with the word "disinformation" and even uses it on a document that seems to be for internal use. But in a serious note to Stalin, for some reason, he used jargon ("disinformation"). But in general

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the style is not sustained here either - and this "Beria" in a businesslike resolution suddenly begins to rally: "accomplices of international provocateurs", "to quarrel us with Germany" ...

Moreover, this "Beria" puts the date, and not in the way that the real Beria would put it. For Beria, the following dating option would be characteristic: "21 / VI". It is on such trifles that falsifiers "pierce".

Further... There are no "secret collaborators" in intelligence, "sexists" - this is from the "democratic" vocabulary. And professionals have "operational workers" and "agents". But after all, the code names Hawk, Carmen, Almaz, Verny are absent in the history of intelligence. Moreover, if they existed, then the indication

Gorchakov's "Beria" about their "erasing into camp dust" before the start of the war would not have had time to fulfill. And the next day, these "diamonds" would not have had a price ... But there were no "diamonds" themselves.

And oh, this notorious "camp dust"! She appears in the writings about Beria so often that a dense smoke (or dust?) screen has formed that hides the truth. It is unlikely that Lavrentiy Beria could have such an expression in his dictionary ... After all, the "democrats" firmly associate his name with the Gulag, and after all, from 1931 (when the formation of the Gulag began) to August 1938 he was in party work. And at the post of the NKVD, he released more people from the camps than sent them there.

But even so, let him speak and write so (although he did not do it!). In any case, on June 21, 1941, he could not impose any "camp dusty" resolutions for the simple reason that the First Main Directorate - former INO NKVD, belonged to the NKGB since February 1941.

After February 1941, Chekist scouts of the People's Commissariat of State Security were Merkulov's subordinates! Is not it? So what kind of administrative visas of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Beria in relation to them can we talk about?

Beria could not write anything like this on June 21, 1941, and because by that day it was clear not only to him, but also to Stalin: peacetime is counted, if not by hours, then by a few days!

A little later I will acquaint the reader with extracts from

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only *some* genuine notes with intelligence data sent by the People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and Beria.

However, first I will cite three notes by Beria himself (the first - almost completely!), Recalling that from February 3, 1941, he did not lead the intelligence of the NKGB, but was the highest leader of the border troops of the USSR.

And thanks to his efforts, by 1941, the frontier troops created *their own* border intelligence, which did not have the "cream of society" as agents, but which, on the other hand, was helped by simple train drivers, oilers, switchmen, modest settlers and residents of border towns ...

They collected information like ants, and, collected together, it gave the most objective picture of what was happening. The result of the work of this "ant intelligence" was reflected in the notes of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria to Stalin.

The documents are based on the 1995 collection "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table", published jointly by the FSB of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the Moscow City Association of Archives, bold text is mine everywhere. So...

"Memoir of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

L.P. BERIA I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV

AND TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE S.K.TIMOSHENKO

ON THE TRANSFER OF THE GERMAN TROOPS

TO THE SOVIET BORDER AND VIOLATION

AIRSPACE OF THE USSR.

"No. 1196./B April 21, 1941

*Top secret*

From April 1 to April 19, 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the general government.

In the border zone of Klaipeda region:

299 Two infantry divisions arrived, an infantry regiment, a kaves  
cadron, an artillery battalion, **a tank battalion** and a company of scooters.

To the Suwalki-Lykk area:

Arrived up to two mechanized divisions, four infantry and two cavalry regiments, **tank**  
and **sapper battalions**.

To Myshinets-Ostrolenka area:

Arrived up to four infantry and one artillery regiments, **tank**  
**battalion** and battalion of motorcyclists.

To the Ostrov - Mazowiecki - Malkinya - Gurna area:

One infantry and one cavalry regiment arrived, up to two artillery battalions and **a**  
**company of tanks**.

To the Byala-Podlyaska area:

One infantry regiment arrived, **two engineer battalions**, a cavalry squadron, a company  
scooters and an artillery battery.

To the Vlodaa-Otkhovok area:

Arrived up to three infantry, one cavalry and two artillery  
regiments.

To the Holm area:

Arrived up to three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, a cavalry regiment  
and **a sapper battalion**. There is concentrated  
**over five hundred cars**.

To the Hrubieszow area:

Arrived up to four infantry, one artillery and one  
motorized regiments and caved cadron.

To the Tomasov area:

The headquarters of the formation arrived, up to three infantry divisions and up to three hundred tanks,

To the Pshevorsk-Yaroslav area:

Arrived up to an infantry division, over an artillery regiment and up to two  
cavalry regiments.

The concentration of German troops near the border took place in small units, up to a  
battalion, squadron, battery, and **often at night**.

In the same areas where the troops arrived, **a large number of**  
**ammunition, fuel and artificial anti-tank obstacles**.

In April, work on the construction of fortifications intensified.

300 **For the period from 1 to 19 April, German aircraft 43 times**  
**violated the state border, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth**  
**of 200 km.**

Most of the planes were fixed over the areas: Riga, Kretinga,  
Taurogen, Lomzha, Rava-Russian, Przemyśl, Rivne.

Application: scheme.

*People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.*

On June 2, 1941, Beria sent a note (No. 1798 / B) to Stalin personally:

"The border detachments of the NKVD of the Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Moldavian  
SSR obtained the following information about the military activities of the Germans near the  
border with the USSR.

**Two army groups** concentrated in the areas of Tomasov and Lezhaysk . IN

In these areas, the headquarters of two armies were revealed: the headquarters of the 16th army in the  
town of Ulyanuv ... and the headquarters of the army in the Usmierz manor ... the commander of which is  
General Reichenau (requires clarification).

On May 25 from Warsaw ... the transfer of troops of all branches was noted. Movement

troops occurs mainly at night.

On May 17, a group of pilots arrived in Terespol, and at the airfield in Voskshenitsa (near Terespol) one hundred aircraft were delivered .

**The generals of the German army carry out reconnaissance near the border:** on May 11, General Reichenau - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe town of Ulguwek ... May 18 - a general with a group of officers - in the Belzhets region ... May 23, a general with a group of officers ... in the Radymno region.

**Pontoons, canvas and inflatable boats are concentrated in many points near the border. The largest number of them was noted in the directions to Brest and Lvov.**

In addition, information was received about the transfer of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest in the direction of the borders with the USSR ...

*Reason:* telegraphic reports of districts.

*People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.*

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Three days later, on June 5, Beria sent Stalin another note (No. 1868/B) on the same subject:

"Border detachments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian and Moldavian SSR additionally (our No. 1798/B dated June 2 of this year) the following data was obtained:

*Along the Soviet-German border*

May 20 this year in Byala Podlyaska ... the location of the headquarters of the infantry division, the 313th and 314th infantry regiments, the **personal regiment of Marshal Goering and the headquarters of the tank formation are noted.**

In the area of Yanov-Podlyasky, 33 km north-west of the city of Brest, **pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges.**

May 31 at st. Sanok arrived **a trainload of tanks.**

On May 20, up to a hundred aircraft took off from the Modlin airfield .

*Along the Soviet-Hungarian border*

In the city of Brustura ... there were two Hungarian infantry regiments and in the Khust area - German tank and motorized units.

*Along the Soviet-Romanian border*

**During** May 21-24, they proceeded from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border: through st. Pashkans - **12 echelons of German infantry with tanks;** through st. Craiova - two echelons with tanks; at st. Three echelons of infantry arrived at Dormenashti and at st. Borshchov two echelons with **heavy tanks** and motor vehicles.

At the airfield in the Buzeu area ... **up to 250 German aircraft were noted.**

In Dorokhoi Uyezd, the gendarmerie and local authorities proposed to the population within five days, arrange a bomb shelter near each house.

*The General Staff of the Red Army has been informed.*

*Reason:* telegraphic reports of districts.

*People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.*

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There is no doubt that Beria, even in the half-month remaining before the start of the war, sent Stalin the accumulating data as they were obtained by the agents of the border troops of the NKVD.

But these notes are no longer made public. Perhaps, in order not to disgrace all sorts of Gorchakovs there ... After all, almost Major Whirlwind collaborated with such a pillar of "democrats" as Vasily Aksenov himself. But the collection contains thirty notes by Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and Beria in the period from March 11 to June 5, ten notes by Merkulov's deputy, Bogdan Kobulov, from June 6 to June 15 (Merkulov was then preparing a "cleansing" of the Baltic states) and another note by the returnee *from the Baltic States* Merkulov dated June 17.

This is already intelligence data from the NKGB from behind the cordon, as well as from sources in Moscow's foreign circles, including the German embassy. It is unlikely that their quoting can seriously add anything to what the reader already knows, but I will give something. For example, Merkulov's note No. 1612/M dated May 14, 1941 addressed to Stalin, Molotov and Beria began like this:

"We are sending an undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from Berlin.

People's Commissar

state

security of the USSR Merkulov.

*Reason:* message from Berlin No. 156 dated May 9, 1941.

based on the materials of the Sergeant, the Corsican and the Old Man.

Message from Berlin

A source working at the headquarters of the German aviation (Sergeant Major Schulze Boysen. - S.K.), reports:

1. At the headquarters of the German aviation, preparations for the operation against the USSR are carried out at the most accelerated pace. All data indicate that the performance is scheduled for the near future. In conversations among staff officers, May 20 is often referred to as the date the war with the USSR began. Others believe that the performance is scheduled for June. In the same circles

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ut. That Germany would first present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding greater exports to Germany... 2.<...>

5.<...>

*Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin.*

That's how, by the way, everything was not easy for Stalin and his associates. When will the war start - in a week or in a month? How does it start - suddenly or on demand?

And if with demands, maybe the war can be avoided, despite the obvious concentration of troops?

How to decide what to do here?

Moreover, Sergeant Major Harro Schulze-Boysen, Corsican Arvid Harnak and Old Man Adam Kukhof all reported honestly. They worked for the USSR and after the outbreak of the war, they were discovered by the Gestapo, arrested and executed in 1942-1943.

But so far there has been no war. Time passed, Germany did not try to make any demands, but it increased its troops near the borders of the USSR, as Beria constantly reported.

And gradually it became clear that the actions of the Germans were not a show of force (and what would it give Hitler without pressure on the Kremlin through diplomatic channels!), but preparations for an imminent and finally decided war.

That is, the chatter of several generations of "historians of the Central Committee of the CPSU", and now "historians" "Rossiyanin" about the strategic surprise of Germany's attack on the USSR, can be safely sent to the dustbin of history along with similar "historians". Strategically, Stalin and the country were ready, as far as one could be ready in a country that was still slurping bast shoes ten years ago.

Over ten years of tremendous work, a very modern defense industry and the Armed Forces were created ... All the state security structures, by joint efforts, uncovered the plans and forces of the aggressor in advance. The army was being re-equipped ... Just in case, the troops were systematically moving closer to the borders.

Surprise could only be tactical - unknown

it was exactly when all this force would move forward. However, EXACTLY this could not be said by any Sorge! Even if he stood behind the Fuhrer! Hitler postponed the timing of the offensive in the West almost two dozen times! Yes, and in the East - more than once. And the military leadership was obliged to exclude tactical surprise at the expense of quite possible measures. And they should have been taken, first of all, by People's Commissar Tymoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, commanders of the border military districts and their deputies for the branches of the military.

The strategic surprise of the attack was also impossible for the Germans because, in addition to the data of the agents of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB, at the disposal of Merkulov (and until February 3, 1941 - Beria, and before him - at the disposal of Yezhov) there was also a personal, so to speak, agents of the people's commissar, which is not registered with the INO. It was especially conspiratorial, its Moscow apparatus was small. So when they talk and write about losses - whether imaginary, whether real, intelligence as a result of the repressions of 1937-1938, then you need to understand that we are talking here most often about personnel directly from the Foreign Department (INO) of the GUGB.

And the data of the "highest" intelligence was also excluded for Stalin and the country strategic surprise.

But that's not all! At least four days before the start of the war, Stalin already knew for sure that the war would begin in a matter of days. And if you consider that June 22, 1941 was:

- a) the longest day of the year
- b) Sunday
- c) the anniversary of the surrender of France in 1940 (and Hitler was no stranger to mysticism),

then this very day, most likely, was supposed to be the day the hostilities began.

*I think Stalin took all this into account, because less than a week before the start of hostilities he conducted his personal strategic sounding of the situation, which convincingly showed him that the war was a matter of a few days.*

But more on that later...

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NOW is the time to talk about those border troops, about which both capital, multi-volume Soviet works on the Great Patriotic War and World War II forgot to say a hundred times well-deserved kind word *in the proper form*.

Although ... Although before that - a small digression to the side about HF communications. It is little known that when the NKVD was divided into two people's commissariats in February 1941, the department of government HF communications initially remained in the NKGB (in the 4th department of operational equipment), but a month later, by a joint order of the NKVD / NKGB No. 00332/0066 dated March 26, 1941 This branch again returned to the NKVD.

And this is significant for Beria - his attitude to communication fit perfectly into the future classic formula C3 (Commands-Communications-Control).

On February 26, 1941, a new structure of the NKVD was announced. The People's Commissariat created a Special Technical Bureau (headed by V.A. Kravchenko), where the department of high-frequency communications entered.

Having achieved the return of high-frequency communication structures to his people's commissariat, Beria, of course, proceeded not from departmental interests - it was objectively more common for the new NKVD to continue to oversee existing and create new secret communication lines, which became an effective element of state and economic management. Yes, and for the operational needs of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, protected from listening to high-frequency lines were needed more than for the NKGB.

As for the border guards, they were also meant to stay in the NKVD, so to speak, it was written. And for the border troops, Beria, as People's Commissar, did a lot in just three incomplete pre-war years.

Of course, the best traditions of the Soviet border guards were not laid down Beria, and before him. But he developed them, starting with the fact that in 1939 the magazine "Pogranichnik" began to be published, which quickly became popular.

An ideological weapon, however, is effective when backed up by an effective organization and appropriate material weapons. I have said more than once that Beria was a brilliant manager. And any new business he

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he accepted it as a competent manager ... He also approached the improvement of the organization of the protection of the state border (and at the same time, he, a natural Chekist, did not forget about the organization of intelligence work in the border troops).

Below I will quote the book of the retired major general "Border and War" of the 1993 edition of Sechkin. Despite the front-line past of this border guard officer, I don't have much respect for him - he even reproduces Gorchakovsky-style fakes about his former people's commissar (referring to No. 6-

th Znamya magazine for 1990), and writes about the recruit as follows: "V.A. The recruit (unlike the false major Vikhr, Sechkin spells this name correctly. - S.K.) ... of course, he had reliable information about the preparations ... for an attack on the Soviet Union, but this information did not reach the top leadership (yes. - S.K.). Then, at his own peril and risk, the Rookie sent to the troops a report on the true state of affairs on the border - the famous report No. 8, which also lay on the table to Stalin and Beria "...

In the light of what we already know, dear reader, these "revelations" of Sechkin are not impressive. But the more valuable are some of **the facts** he cites. And they are:

"In February, a decision of the Council of People's Commissars was adopted (in 1993, the former member of the CPSU Sechkin did *not consider it necessary to mention that it was a decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.* - S.K.), which from the Main Directorate of Border and Internal troops was allocated as an independent Main Directorate of Border Troops. The creation of a special body with clearly and precisely defined tasks and district administrations on the ground had a favorable effect on the organizational strengthening of the border troops as special troops designed to guard and protect the state border of the USSR ...

During 1938-1939. a complete reorganization of the units of the border troops was carried out; the headquarters of units and formations were reorganized according to a unified management scheme from top to bottom, **intelligence agencies of units and formations of the border troops were also created according to a unified scheme**

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(emphasis here and below is mine. - S.K.); all departments of commandant's offices were reorganized in two main model states (land and coastal) <...>, the existing communications units were formed and re-formed <...>, motorization of transport units was carried out, <...> formed ... 7 maritime schools, 7 service dog schools and a communication school were reorganized.

The technical reconstruction of the troops, **the re-equipment of the land border units with modern small arms** ... the development of border aviation, the introduction of engineering and technical means into the protection of the border made increased demands on ... the training of commanding officers and political personnel.

By the beginning of 1941, command and engineering personnel for the border troops were being trained in 11 military educational institutions of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

There is not a word about Beria here (if Sechkin mentions him, it is only to smear him with black paint). But in all this, the handwriting of Lavrenty Pavlovich is immediately visible: a clear structure, the development of technical means, training, reliable communications, motorization ...

And - let's not forget - intelligence! Mass intelligence, at an extremely low level, intelligence, in fact, carried out by ordinary people, by the people themselves, and therefore the most reliable and **reliable!** Such intelligence, as I have already said, is appropriate to call "ant" - an individual ant carries a little, but in the end a huge anthill grows!

The fact that in 1941 the border detachments collected such intelligence information, which both the INO GUGB, together with the GRU of the General Staff, could envy, is the merit of Beria! He perfectly placed such intelligence back in the ZakChK, and then in the ZakOGPU, so he knew its significance for the effective protection of both the borders and the security of the state, not in theory.

But the merits of the "border guard" Beria are not limited to the creation of border intelligence. **It would not be an exaggeration to say that Beria's reforms determined the general appearance of the Soviet border troops for decades!**

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In the literature (for example, in the "Orders of the NKVD of the USSR 1934-1941" published in the "Catalogues" series in Novosibirsk), it is noted that two-thirds of the orders of Commissar Beria for the troops concern the border troops of the NKVD. Moreover, there were also such orders as "On the allocation of an additional 150 horses at the disposal of the GUPV", that is, these were specific, business instructions. At the same time, every week Beria was presented with reports on the political and moral state of the border troops, signed by the head of the Political Directorate of the Border Troops, divisional commissar P.M. Mironenko.

The results of the attention and care of the new people's commissar quickly showed up - not only the special, but also the purely military training of border guards grew, although by definition they were not called upon to fight as army men. And here - Beria's border guards fought, and how! By the end of 1939, their combat effectiveness was so good that in the Finnish war, which was replete with downright criminal miscalculations of the army, the situation sometimes developed anecdotal.

The joint directive of People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria No. 16662 on September 14, 1939, that is, before the start of hostilities, it was provided that with their start the border troops were operationally subordinate to the command of the Red Army until the units of the Red Army reached the line of 30-50 kilometers in - deep into Finnish territory.

By mid-December, many units of the 9th Army reached this line, but the military commanders still demanded that they be allocated to support units of the border troops. And it ended with the fact that on December 17, the chief of staff of the border troops of the NKVD of the Karelian district, Colonel Kiselev, sent a report to the headquarters of the 9th Army, in which he tactfully but firmly reminded the army generals that the business of the border troops was to protect the state border, and not break through a heavily fortified defense.

Yes, and Beria's subordinates, of course, can hunt through the forests for Finnish snipers, Kiselev hinted, but it would be time for Voroshilov's subordinates to master this science as well.

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BORDER GUARDS knew how to fight, and Beria made sure that they knew how to fight even better and fight with the best weapons. One of the unpleasant surprises of the Finnish war for us was the massive use of Suomi assault rifles by the Finns. There were samples of them in the People's Commissariat of Defense even before the war, but in the course of hostilities both new captured assault rifles and the possibility



get an idea of their effectiveness in combat.

However, none of the high military officials - neither the old People's Commissar Marshal Voroshilov, nor the People's Commissar Marshal Timoshenko who replaced him, nor the chief of armaments of the Red Army, Marshal Kulik, nor the chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov, ever appreciated the machine guns. Kulik, as he believed that machine guns, they say, are "weapons of the police and gangsters," but the Russian three-ruler, they say, will not let you down, and after the Finnish campaign he did not change his mind.

Therefore, the army did not make mass industrial orders for machine guns, although there were good domestic developments in the USSR. Actually, the first small arms, called "automatic", an automatic rifle with a magazine capacity of 25 rounds, was developed by the Russian gunsmith General Fedorov back in 1916. By the way, in 1928, 11 years before the establishment of the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, he was awarded the title of Hero of Labor in the USSR.

Alas, even after the Finnish war, the army did not favor machine guns. In 1940, with the well-established weapons production, the industry of the USSR produced only 81.1 thousand submachine guns (as automatic weapons were officially called). And soon after the start of the Great Patriotic War, they were urgently ordered to make them almost like bed workshops - factory production could not satisfy the needs of the army, which finally understood what it was in a maneuverable battle - machine guns!

But the correct conclusions long before the war were made by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade Beria. And he ordered as many machine guns for the border troops as the cost estimate of the Main Directorate of the NKVD Border Troops allowed.

By the beginning of 1941, only in the Ukrainian border district there were armed with 300 heavy machine guns,

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more than 600 light machine guns and quite a few machine guns. And besides - about **500** cars.

Perhaps the reader remembers how Beria fought for buses for Tbilisi, being the secretary of the Zakkraykom. Now he took care of the mobility of the border troops.

Five detachments of the Belarusian border district had 200 heavy machine guns, about 400 light machine guns, about 6.5 thousand self-loading rifles and 2.5 thousand machine guns.

Moreover, in 1940, to strengthen the fire capabilities of the frontier posts, an additional 3,515 submachine guns (machine guns), 1,200 self-loading rifles and 110 heavy machine guns were allocated, and in March - April 1941 - 357 RM-50 company mortars, 45 heavy machine guns and 18 anti-tank rifles .

This was what General Sechkin called "re-equipment of land border units with modern small arms", while "forgetting" to mention that such rearmament was the result of the perspicacity of People's Commissar Beria.

The relative saturation of the border troops with automatic weapons before the war many times exceeded the army's indicators. And with the outbreak of war, the NKVD sometimes had to share its supplies with the army, although Beria's subordinates themselves needed them to fight with the same Germans!

During 1939-1940, the personnel of the border troops increased by 50%, and at the beginning of 1941, "not preparing for war" Beria also seeks an additional increase in their numbers, bringing it to 100 thousand people on the western border within five border military **districts** : Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kiev

Special and Odessa.

There were eight **border** western districts: Murmansk, Karelo Finnish, Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian and Black Sea. Moreover, 47% of the number of all Western border troops were concentrated in the Belarusian and Ukrainian border districts. This already suggests that Beria saw the direction of the possible main blows of the Germans no worse than Zhukov, who was later advertised.

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And how could one not see them, how could one not foresee the possible development of events, passing on to Stalin the information that Beria passed on to him?

And could Beria not see the pre-storm situation if he knew exactly such statistics ... In the first quarter of 1940, among the very numerous border violators (and it was violated by smugglers and godfathers on opposite sides of the border who decided to visit relatives), 28 German agents, in the second quarter - 43, in the third - 64, in the fourth - 99, and in the first quarter of 1941 - already 153.

Of course, Beria understood everything and prepared the border troops for defense in advance.

BORDER GUARDS were prepared for war better than the army by the very essence of their service. If the army fires live ammunition at the enemy only with the outbreak of war, then the border troops are always at war. And for them, the Great Patriotic War began long before June 22. For example, in April 1941, a reconnaissance group crossed the border at the 86th border detachment section ... Sixteen people dressed in the uniform of the Red Army engineering troops ... After our border guards met with them, a uniform battle began. As a result, 11 saboteurs were killed, 5 were taken prisoner.

This was not an isolated case - from April to November 1940, 38 gangs and armed emigrant groups totaling 486 people were liquidated in the Ukrainian border district alone! In general, on the eve of the war, more than 500 armed incursions into Soviet territory were repulsed.

Yes, the border was prepared in advance. In the monograph A.I. Chugunov "The border is fighting" it is said about this as follows:

"As for the border outposts, commandant's offices and detachments, in a short (pre-war! - S.K.) time they managed to equip light-type defensive structures: dugouts, trenches, communication passages, bunkers, trenches, which made it possible to create relatively strong nodes of resistance during the fighting on the front line.

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Would all this be possible without the sanction of People's Commissar Beria? And would he have given this sanction if, like his subordinates, he had not seen a very high probability of the outbreak of war already in 1941? After all, communication passages and trenches are not equipped a year before the start of the war.

## **Chapter 15**

### **THE EVE...**

DECEMBER 27, 1940 the new People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Timoshenko, who replaced Marshal Voroshilov, issued Order No. 0367, which read:

"Order NPO 1939 No. 0145 required mandatory camouflage of all newly built operational airfields. The Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army was to carry out these activities not only on the operational, but also on the entire airfield network of the Air Force. **However, none of the districts paid due attention to this order and did not comply with it** (highlighted by me everywhere. - S.K.).

It must be realized that without careful camouflage of all airfields, the creation of false airfields and the camouflage of all materiel in modern warfare, the combat work of aviation is inconceivable. I order:

3. All airfields ... must be sown, taking into account camouflage and in relation to the surrounding area, by selecting the appropriate herbs. At airfields, simulate fields, meadows, gardens, pits, ditches, ditches, roads, in order to completely merge the background of the airfield with the background of the surrounding area.

By July 1, 1941, complete the camouflage of all airfields located in 500 km strip from the border.

9. Inspector General of the Air Force to establish control and report on the progress of work monthly.

*People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR*  
*Marshal of the Soviet Union*  
*S. Timoshenko.*

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As we can see, the top leadership of the Red Army did not at all orient it towards a quick and necessarily successful offensive war, but called for comprehensive defense against a possible attack.

Further ... What does the term of the order "by July 1, 1941" mean?

This means that if the commission appointed by the people's commissar to check the execution of his order No. 0367 of December 27, 1940, flew over the entire 500-kilometer strip from the border on July 1, then ideally, instead of airfields, it should have seen from the air "meadows, vegetable gardens and pits.

But this also means that all the main camouflage work should have been completed by mid-June. And there were all the possibilities for that - the order was given long before the spring time, when it was necessary to sow grass.

Alas, the order of People's Commissar Timoshenko No. 0367 of December 27, 1940 was not carried out in the same way as the order of People's Commissar Voroshilov No. 0145 of September 9, 1939 (thirty-ninth!) was not carried out.

And if you stand on the positions of "democratically" advanced "historians", then you can't blame anyone but the fiends of Stalin and Beria, who destroyed the "flower of the Red Army". And Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation twice Hero of the Soviet Union Aviation Lieutenant General Yakov Smushkevich and Head of the Air Force Main Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Hero of the Soviet Union Aviation Lieutenant General Pavel Rychagov have nothing to do with it. After all, they were "innocently" shot after the start of the war on the orders of the same "bloody executioner" Beria, and only the whistleblower of this "executioner" Nikita Khrushchev rehabilitated them in 1954.

In fact, Timoshenko gave the order, but clearly forgot to demand that it be carried out in terms of the monthly reports of the Inspector General of the Air Force. Otherwise, the order would have been executed! And so in order No. 0042 of June 19, 1941, People's Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov stated:

"On the masking of airfields and the most important military installations, so far nothing significant has been done.

Airfield fields are not sown, take-off stripes are of the same color

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the terrain is not painted, and **the airfield buildings, standing out sharply with bright colors, attract the attention of the observer for tens of kilometers.**

The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft at airfields with the complete absence of their camouflage and the poor organization of airfield services with the use of unmasking signs completely unmask the airfield ... "

As follows from the same order, the leadership of the Air Force did not bother to arrange false airfields by June 19, 1941 either. And about the crowding of technology, you can

judging by the photographs of our aircraft destroyed on the ground, taken by the Germans in 1941. Burnt, destroyed planes in these photos stand wing to wing, and even in two rows.

So, after *such a thing*, is it really necessary to be surprised that the war began the way it did? started? And is Stalin guilty of the fact that it started like that?

But many ground generals, in terms of criminal neglect of the affairs of service, did not go far from aviation generals. And this was mentioned in the same order No. 0042 of June 19, 1941:

Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also *targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air*.

**Tanks, armored vehicles, commander's and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection, and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground.**

Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military objects."

Moreover, dear reader, this is not all that I have to report on situation on the eve of the war ...

BUT YET, let's go back a little to see once again how it was no longer the border guard Beria who "prepared" for the war, but the scout Beria ... From February 3, 1941, the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov was in charge of foreign intelligence. But until February 3rd

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was only Beria's deputy and head of the GUGB of the NKVD. That is, until February 3, 1941, Beria was ultimately in charge of KGB intelligence, and not a single serious intelligence action was possible without his sanction.

Only People's Commissar Beria could give the go-ahead to those operations that Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya-Rybkina later recalled ... A brave Russian beauty, a colonel in foreign intelligence, she began work in the late 20s and before the war was part of the leadership of the German branch. Books can be written about her, but she wrote about herself and about intelligence - "Under the pseudonym Irina."

Unfortunately, this book is not free from numerous inaccuracies (in the descriptions of events before the war, for example, the military counterintelligence SMERSH, created only in 1943, begins to appear, etc.). Even more regrettable is that the book is not free from more serious flaws. However, Voskresenskaya Rybkina is a really bright figure of the first row. And she knew a lot, participating in many ways ... She also worked with two very well-informed enemy intelligence officers who were in the Polish Lvov prison and ended up in our hands after September 17, 1939, when the Red Army occupied the territory of Western Ukraine.

In the middle of 1940, the head of the 5th (INO) department of the GUGB of the NKVD, Pavel Fitin, instructed Rybkina to "unwind" an experienced Abwehr agent arrested by the Poles, the staff captain of the tsarist army, Alexander Sergeevich Nelidov. At first he resisted, but eventually gave in. Nelidov took part in the headquarters military games of the German General Staff and provided a lot of valuable information, but I remembered him and Rybkina because the whole operation, although it took place within the NKVD internal prison at Lubyanka, could not begin, as I already said, without preliminary discussions with Beria. Rybkina is silent about this, but it simply could not be otherwise.

Even more necessary was the sanction of Beria for the operation with the ace of the 2nd (intelligence) department of the Polish General Staff Sosnovsky. A talented, brilliant resident of Polish intelligence in Berlin, he led a secular life and had excellent agents in the highest spheres, most of which were his own.

mistresses. Alas, among them were

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stavy" Himmler. Sosnovsky was arrested, but the Poles managed to exchange him for two major Abwehr agents. However, only in order to transfer the ex-resident from a prison in Berlin to a prison in Lvov.

Sosnovsky "talked" especially effectively. Through our agent in the Gestapo, who was in charge of Sosnovsky's development (perhaps it was Leman Breitenbach), all the details of many of Sosnovsky's intimate intelligence adventures were known. And the Pole was taken to the Lubyanka in a double development. Rybkina conducted an interrogation, asking about the details, for example, the recruitment of the wife of a responsible employee of the German Foreign Ministry, Sosnovsky evaded, stating that he did not remember anything. Then Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin, who himself was a super-ace of intelligence, sitting silently in the corner, began to speak for Sosnovsky ... He "remembered" everything: bills in restaurants, addresses of villas where dates were held, numbers and brands of cars ...

And so - in several positions, in the sense - mistress agents.

It ended up that Sosnovsky, amazed by the awareness of the Russians, completely "split" ... But after all, this whole combination without Beria's sanction would have remained only an ingenious and risky (yes, yes!) Paper plan. Yes, just a plan, if the people's commissar had not agreed to its implementation. And he agreed, because he himself was a brilliant professional.

Operations with Nelidov and Sosnovsky continued after the separation, but from July 20, People's Commissariats in February , 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB again 1941 were united under the leadership of Beria.

And how differently he disposed of the fate of the two wards of Rybkina. Sosnovsky was shot. It was, alas, an absolutely necessary step in the conditions when the Germans approached Moscow. But Nelidov...

Nelidov ... was released and offered to move to neutral Turkey, which he knew well, as an intelligence officer of the NKVD. In such a proposal there was an accurate psychological calculation and the ability to understand - to whom and when you can trust and entrust an important matter.

Rybkina also kept silent about the role of Beria in deciding the fate of Nelidov. But who except for the people's commissar, could finally sank

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to position the direction **beyond the cordon** in the conditions of the successful offensive of the Germans **by the former trusted employee of Admiral Canaris**, who knew Nelidov well personally?

And we are told that Beria de "trusted no one."

FROM THE SCOUT OF Beria, let's return to the border guard Beria.

There is one clear and convincing evidence of, on the one hand, what Beria's border troops were like on the eve of the war, and on the other hand ... On the other hand, this evidence will serve me as a kind of saying to the story that Stalin did everything before the war, what is required of the head of state before a close war, as Beria did everything, but the generals ...

There is such a book - "I am a fighter", written by Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union Georgy Nefedovich Zakharov. Before the war, he commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District. Being then in the rank of colonel, Zakharov already had experience of fighting in Spain (6 aircraft personally shot down and 4 in a group) and in China (3 personally shot down).

A quote from his book (bolding mine throughout) would be extensive, but I could not cut anything in it - every phrase is important here. "... Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was **either**

### seventeenth or eighteenth of June

forty-first year - I received an order from the commander of aviation of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.

I flew out on the U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division, Major Rummyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border,

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slowed down, resting against her ... and ready to overflow over her at any moment.

The number of troops recorded by us by eye, at a glance, did not leave me any other options for reflection, except for the only one: war was approaching.

Everything that I saw during the flight was superimposed on my previous military experience, and the conclusion that I made for myself can be formulated in four

words: "from day to day."

We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane on **any suitable** site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, **silently saluted** (that is, he knew in advance that our plane with urgent information would land soon! - S.K.) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30-50 kilometers, **sat down again**. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard **waited silently** and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok and landed at the location of the division of Sergei Cherny ... "

That's how clearly the service was organized by Beria's border guards! This is the first thing that immediately catches your eye. However, wherever he became the head of the matter, clarity and order quickly became common practice. Not because of fear, but because of the effective organization and knowledge of each of his place in the general ranks. And from the border "secret", Zakharov's report immediately went to the outpost, from there to the headquarters of the border detachment, from there to the headquarters of the border circle, and he telegraphed to the Main Directorate of the NKVD Border Troops ...

In normal cases, the next report lay down on the People's Commissar's desk after some time. But the case with Zakharov was not just special, but unique in the full sense of the word. In the true history of the war, it should be described in bold type and capital letters, and why this is so, the reader will soon understand ... Or perhaps he already understood.

The intelligence information of the border troops (and we know that it was accurate and extensive) was presented twice a day

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border guards not only according to the internal "hierarchy" of the NKVD, but also to the headquarters of the military districts, the operational departments of which immediately transferred it to the General Staff. But did the General Staff and district headquarters draw conclusions from this information? Zakharov writes:

"In Bialystok, Deputy Commander of the Western Special Military District, General I.V. Boldin conducted an analysis of the recently completed exercises. I briefly reported to him on the results of the flight, and on the same evening, on a fighter provided to me by Chernykh, I returned to Minsk ... "

Strange!

For example, the author of the capital opus "Western Special" Ruslan Irinarkhov routinely accuses Stalin of the fact that his opinion about the impossibility of war completely blocked any initiative to change the disposition of troops. But it turns out that near the border, in the ZapOVO, in June 1941, even exercises could be carried out! So what are the stories about the fact that Stalin was so afraid of giving the Germans a reason, that he demanded from the military that they sit quietly like mice and not stick their noses out anywhere? Therefore, they say, they met the war in underpants ...

I don't know how General Boldin disposed of Zakharov's information, but with the outbreak of war, he, commanding the operational group of troops, cut off from the main forces of the Western Front in the area of the Bialystok salient, successfully led it out of encirclement. On the other hand, Pavlov, the commander of the ZAPOVO, reacted, to put it mildly, inadequately to direct evidence of a military, with rich military experience, commander of an aviation division ... And for the last time I give the floor directly to Zakharov:

"Commander of the Air Force of the district, General I.I. Kopets (June 22, 1941, he will shoot himself. - S.K.) listened to my report with the attention that testified to his long-standing and complete trust in me. Therefore, we immediately went with him to report to the commander of the district (front). Listening, General of the Army D.G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The intonation of the commander frankly replaced the word

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"exaggerate" to "panic" - he obviously did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.

And we are told that Stalin "did not believe Pavlov's warnings."

And HERE, I'll perhaps shock the reader, stating that since June 18, 1941, Stalin, in fact, no longer needed anyone's warnings. **He knew for sure that the war would begin very soon. And "told" him about it himself ... Hitler!**

Zakharov, as I understand it, sincerely does not remember when he flew on the instructions of General Kopts - on June 17 or 18. But I, who did not fly with him then, am inclined to believe that he flew on June 18! In any case, not later ... And he flew **on Stalin's instructions**, although, of course, he himself did not know about this, just as Kopets did not know this either.

I invite the reader to think: why, if the task was given to Zakharov by the aviation commander of the ZapOVO, that is, a person from the department of People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, reports from Zakharov were everywhere accepted by border guards from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, headed by People's Commissar Beria? And they accepted silently, without asking questions: who, they say, are you and what do you need?

But why were there no questions? How come?! In a tense border atmosphere, an incomprehensible plane is landing near the border, and the border patrol is not interested: what, in fact, does the pilot need here?

This could happen in one case: when on the border under each, figuratively speaking, the bush was waiting for this plane.

Why were they waiting for him? Who needed, and even in real time, Zakharov's information? I am sure that there can be only one explanation: **not later than June 18, 1941, Stalin conducted a personal strategic sounding of Hitler's intentions.**

Imagine again the situation of that summer...

Stalin receives information about the impending war from illegal immigrants and legal overseas residencies of Merkulov from the NKGB, from illegal immigrants of General Golikov from the GRU of the General Staff, from military attachés and through diplomatic channels. But all this may be a strategic provocation of the West, which sees the USSR in the clash

and Germany's own salvation.

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However, there is intelligence of the border troops created by Beria, and now it is not only possible, but necessary, to believe her information. This is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that only it can be reliable. And this information proves the proximity of the war.

Similar (and independent!) information also comes from the intelligence departments of the border army districts. And she, too, can and should be trusted. But how to check everything finally?

The ideal option is to ask Hitler himself about his true intentions. Not the Fuhrer's entourage, but his own, because the Fuhrer more than once, unexpectedly even for the environment, changed the deadlines for the implementation of his own orders!

**And on June 18, Stalin turned to Hitler about the urgent dispatch of Molotov to Berlin for mutual consultations.** I emphasize, dear reader, that I am reporting not a hypothesis, but a fact! Stalin did indeed make such an offer to Hitler.

Hitler refuses.

Even if he started to delay with the answer, it would be for Stalin proof of the imminence of war. But Hitler refused at once.

And Stalin understood: this is war. And for the final check, he sends Zakharov to intelligence, or rather, gives the appropriate orders, including Beria here.

Information about Stalin's proposal to Hitler is found in the diary of Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Reich Ground Forces. This standard source for any historian of the war was published by the Order of the Red Banner of Labor by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1968-1971, and on page 579 of volume 2, among other entries on June 20, 1941, there is the following:

**"Molotov wanted to speak with the Fuhrer on 18.6."**

One phrase...

But this phrase, which authentically fixes the fact of Stalin's proposal to Hitler about Molotov's urgent visit to Berlin, **completely turns the whole picture of the last pre-war days!**

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Fully!

For the first time, this phenomenal fact, which had somehow eluded my attention earlier, I discovered in a brilliant study by Arsen Martirosyan: "The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason? Truth of Stalin" (M.: Yauza, EKSMO, 2006), for which I am very grateful to him.

So, it is possible that the date of June 18 - as proposed by Stalin, but rejected by Hitler - was indicated by Halder upon his knowledge, but Stalin made the proposal itself on the 17th in the evening, after some significant conversation with Merkulov and Fitin, about which - a little Later.

After Hitler's refusal, one did not have to be Stalin to draw the same conclusion that Colonel Zakharov did and which can be formulated in four words: "from day to day."

And Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Defense to ensure urgent and effective aerial reconnaissance of the border zone from the German side. And he emphasizes that reconnaissance should be carried out by an experienced high-level aviation commander. Perhaps he gave such a task to the commander of the Red Army Air Force Zhigarev, who visited Stalin's office from 0.45 to 1.50 on June 17 (actually, already on the 18th) of June 1941, and he called Kopts in Minsk.

Could Kopets have chosen a better candidate than Colonel Zakharov?



On the other hand, Stalin instructs Beria to ensure immediate and without interference with the transmission of information collected by this experienced aviator to Moscow.

That is why Zakharov, along the entire route of his flight, in the zones of several border detachments, under each bush, was waiting for a border detachment, without even asking what kind of plane it landed in the border zone. After all, he landed on "suitable sites" not on his own initiative. He, of course, was told in advance that all information in real time must be periodically transmitted through the border guards, making landings every 30-50 kilometers.

And be sure to periodically, and not once at the end of the flight! Because, firstly, the time was running out! In real time, Stalin himself was waiting for information from Beria. At

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speed "U-2" (later renamed "Po-2") at about 120-150 kilometers per hour, the time factor on the 400-kilometer route was already

meaningful.

And secondly ... Secondly, at some point the Germans could have shot down Zakharov. And then at least part of the operational information would have reached Stalin through Beria anyway.

She has come to a full extent. And by the evening of June 18, Stalin knew exactly and definitively: the war was on the nose.

It is possible, however, that the reconstruction of events I have given needs to be changed in some ways (especially if Zakharov did not fly on the 18th, but on the 17th), that is, perhaps at first there was Zakharov's flight, and only after him - Stalin's appeal to Hitler. A parallel combination of these events is also possible. But their interrelation and mutual conditionality in the real, I emphasize, time scale is undoubted.

Realizing that Hitler had nevertheless decided to go to war with Russia, Stalin immediately (that is, no later than the evening of June 18) began to issue appropriate orders to the NKVDs, the NKVD and the NKVD.

This could not but be noticed in one way or another by another's eye, which is also confirmed in the note to Stalin, Molotov and Beria, sent by Merkulov on June 21, 1941.

The note contained the text of a conversation between two Moscow foreign diplomats that took place on June 20. Exact data regarding their citizenship in the text of a note published in the collection "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table" was confiscated by the Foreign Intelligence Service even in 1995! However, the conversation itself is important for us now, part of which I give below:

«.....: When did your lieutenant general arrive?

.....: Yesterday. He saw Timoshenko and Zhukov.

.....: <...> Were you with him?

.....: I was with him.

<...>

.....: But he didn't ask anything? Timoshenko knew that he would not receive a suitable answer from your general... But here everyone is worried - war, war.

.....: Yes. Yes. The Russians have found out.

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Yes, the Russians did!

And they learned in advance because the efforts of many large and small intelligence officers, undertaken in recent months, were crowned by Stalin's personal probing!

In the light of this sounding, the TASS Statement of 14

June 1941 that "according to the USSR, Germany is just as steadfastly observing the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, according to Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are deprived any soil...

Stalin, by the TASS statement of June 14, seemed to anticipate his subsequent a proposal to Hitler for the immediate dispatch of Molotov to Berlin.

That is, it was the first phase of sounding.

The proposal for an urgent visit by Molotov was the second phase.

Hitler's refusal became a "litmus test".

The flight of Zakharov and information from him, taken by the border guards of Beria and immediately transferred by the latter to Stalin, put the last point.

Now it was necessary to immediately instruct Timoshenko, Zhukov and Navy People's Commissar Kuznetsov to urgently put border troops and fleets on alert without much noise and wait for developments.

As they grew, on June 21, Stalin authorized a second directive.

That is, as Yuri Mukhin and Arsen Martirosyan had previously stated, the first directive on readiness for an attack was sanctioned by Stalin on the evening of June 18 - immediately after Zakharov's flight.

I emphasize that what the reader has read, I cannot confirm with anything other than what I have already reported. The reconstruction of events from June 14, when the TASS report was published, towards the evening of June 18, when Colonel Zakharov flew to Bialystok, is the result, first of all, of a logical analysis, which was not easy for me. It stretched out for, perhaps, a couple of years and ended only in the course of work on this book. And let the reader himself make a conclusion about the reliability of my reconstruction.

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Personally, I think that it fully reflects what actually happened. And at the same time, it reveals the true role of Stalin and Beria in those days. They turned out to be fully competent at that hour - each at his own level. Unlike so many others.

Moreover, Beria at that time was twice at his best: firstly, as the organizer of the "ant" intelligence of the border troops, which ensured the collection of strategically important and **absolutely reliable** (in general) information, and secondly, as the organizer of the operational transfer of Zakharov's information to Stalin.

There are other, indirect, however, confirmation of my reconstruction.

So, Admiral Kuznetsov in his memoirs "On the Eve" writes:

"... The TASS report of June 14 sounds especially illogical now that we know how Hitler reacted to it. On June 17, that is, literally three days later, he gave the order to begin the implementation of the Barbarossa plan at dawn on June 22. Looking through the reports from the fleets, one can be convinced of the increased activity of the Germans at sea from this fateful date - June 17 ... "

However, everything is just logical here! If the TASS report was probing (and it was), and on the 17th the second phase of Stalin's probing was carried out with a proposal for a visit by Molotov, then Hitler, after his refusal, should have immediately sanctioned Barbarossa definitively. He wasn't stupid either. Reich troops are made. The Fuhrer may still have hesitated, but when he saw that Stalin was putting him in the situation of the "moment of truth", he immediately realized that immediately after his refusal, Stalin would have to take urgent measures in the border military districts. And this means that the factor of surprise attack is under threat.

And Hitler gave the final order.

And there is a very interesting, also working for my reconstruction,

evidence from the other side is in the memoirs of Luitpold Steidle, the former commander of the 767th Grenadier Regiment of the 376th Infantry Division of the 6th Paulus Army. On the eve of the war, Steidle commanded a battalion

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regiment stationed in the area of the Bialystok ledge, and reports this:

"On June 18, my regiment was ordered to requisition 600 horses and carts in a precisely marked area within 24 hours. The action was sudden and at first it was presented as a police and veterinary event ... Now each company received an additional horse-drawn transport. The aim was to guarantee the highest degree of mobility... away from the main roads...

However, almost no one believed. that the situation is so serious. And in the past, it happened more than once that Hitler got his way through military demonstrations (as we see, Stalin, before his direct sounding, had objective reasons to hesitate in assessing Hitler's plans. - S.K.) ... The division headquarters knew almost nothing about enemy, nor about how our command assesses the situation in

in general..."

So, here, as a certain milestone, approximately the same (June 17-18) pre-war day is called. I think this is no coincidence.

The LAST thing that remains for me to say here about the events of the last pre-war week is a few words both about the information support of Stalin in those days, and about his later informational betrayal by his former comrades-in-arms. That is, about the long-term, in recent years, even more strengthened lies about the fact that Stalin "missed the war".

In refutation of this lie, something has been said above. But I will give one more example of how even personally quite worthy people, either out of ignorance, or inability to broad generalizations, or weakness of character, or because of the meanness of the political correctors of their memories, actually betray their Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, as they betray they and his colleague Beria.

For example, on the back of the first flyleaf of Voskresenskaya's book, published in 1997, there is a photograph of her in uniform, in a hat, and under the photo there is a text ending with a facsimile of the author's signature.

Here is the text in full:

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*"Our specialized group was instructed to analyze the information of the entire foreign residency regarding the military plans of the Nazi command, and prepare a memorandum. To do this, we selected materials from the most reliable sources, checked the reliability of each agent who gave information about the preparation of an attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union (how "effective" such a check was can be judged by the fact that it did not reveal the double role of the Lyceum student. - S. TO.)...*

*Our policy brief turned out to be quite voluminous, and the summary is short and clear: we are on the brink of war.*

*On June 17, 1941, according to the latest reports from the agents of the Sergeant Major and the Corsican, I completed this document with excitement. The closing chord was:*

*"All German military measures to prepare for an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time."*

*I emphasize that it was June 17, 1941.*

*Iosif Vissarionovich got acquainted with our report and threw it away. "It's a bluff! he said irritably. - Don't panic. Don't get busy*

*nonsense. Go ahead and figure it out better."*

It's not presented as fiction, but as a historical fact. And from here you can see exactly that Stalin, as he has been presented all these years ... A tyrant, stupidly, stubbornly not wanting to see the obvious and irritably throwing away "uncomfortable" information, the truth of which will be so tragically confirmed in four days ...

An even more dashing version is given in the book by A. Sukhomlinov "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria", which I will talk about in detail later. It has such an allegedly Stalinist visa: *"To Comrade Merkulov. You can send your source from the headquarters of the German aviation to e ... mother. This is not a "source", but a misinformer ... "*

Further, A. Sukhomlinov writes: "Stalin not only wrote obscene words, but also underlined them twice. All this is in the archives..." Well, after Khrushchev and Gorbachev, you can really find a lot of things in the archives that never existed on a real scale of the Stalin era. But archives are different archives. Therefore, it is still sad that such

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"Sensations" can appear even after not rehashings, not fabrications, but documents are published. And here it is - reliable. I mean the collection I mentioned, Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table, which appeared on the shelves two years before the publication of Voskresenskaya's book and ten years before A. Sukhomlinov's book. And in this collection on pages 161-162 you can read the document that Zoya Ivanovna quoted, shamelessly distorting everything, alas.

Firstly, it was not some kind of consolidated memorandum based on the materials of "all foreign residencies", but only Merkulov's accompanying note No. 2279 / M to Stalin, Molotov and Beria dated June 17, 1941. Attached to the note was another intelligence report from Berlin, compiled on the basis of reports by the Sergeant and Corsican No. 4261 and No. 4262 of 16.VI.41.

In parentheses, I note that the falsifiers of the Gorchakov model, inventing the mythical "secret collaborators" - Almaz, Karmen and others - who allegedly "bombed" Beria with "misinformation" and were listed on his alleged visa on June 21, 1941, did not dare to include real Foreman and Corsican. But they just constantly reported on the impending attack, including in reports dated June 16, 1941. And those words that Voskresenskaya ascribes to herself as *her* final summary, in fact, were the first item in the message of the Sergeant-Schulze-Boysen. Hence the wording, which is somewhat unusual for our ears: "measures ... to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR ..."

The message from Berlin itself was, by the way, not the most informative and contained a number of important, but secondary information against the background of what was happening. The value of the work of Boysen and Harnack, of course, does not detract from this. The scout sends everything he learns to the Center, and to rank the information - case of analysts of the Center.

As for **the real** Stalinist reaction to this note by Merkulov, I will almost completely quote the text relating to it from editorial note 120, posted on pages 232-233 of the collection of documents mentioned above:

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"Having familiarized himself with the intelligence report, Stalin on the same day (that is, June 17. - S.K.) summoned the People's Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov and head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina. The conversation was conducted mainly with Fitin. Stalin was interested in the smallest details

about sources. It seemed to Fitin that he had fully and accurately told about the Corsican and the Petty Officer and explained why intelligence trusted them. Stalin remarked: "Go, clarify everything, double-check this information again and report to me ..."

Information about how the conversation went on June 17 comes from Fitin. And they paint us a completely different Stalin, a genuine one - not a stubborn one, but an extremely responsible and cautious statesman.

Note 120 further states that the result of Stalin's order given on 17 June was a document prepared on 20 June 1941 by foreign intelligence and known as the "Calendar of messages from the Corsican and the Starshina from September 6, 1940 to June 16, 1941." It contained all the basic information that warned of the upcoming war, indicating from whom and when the informants received this information. Resurrection had in mind, most likely, it was him. However, in note 120, for some reason, there is no indication of whether this "Calendar" hit Stalin's table on June 20. After all, he directly ordered that the results of the recheck be reported to him, and it is unlikely that Fitin could have ignored this order in that situation.

The collection of documents also contains Merkulov's notes to Stalin, Molotov and Beria No. 2294 / M and 2295 / M dated June 18, No. 2422 / M, 2431 / M, 2433 / M dated June 21, as well as notes signed by Deputy Merkulov - Bogdana Kobulov, No. 2342/M of June 19, Nos. 241 I/M and 2412/M of June 20, 1941

of the year.

All these notes, reporting on information obtained by undercover agents in Moscow diplomatic circles, also unambiguously spoke of an imminent war. And I ask the reader to pay attention to two points.

Firstly, the fact that two days - June 19 and 20 - notes to Stalin left NKGB signed by non-commissar Merku

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fishing, and Kobulova. Second, there are large gaps in increasing numbers of NKGB intelligence notes cited in the collection of the SVR ... Judging by this, the total number of materials coming "upstairs" grew like an avalanche, in full accordance with the aggravation of the situation.

But the collection does not contain a single note by Beria himself with the data received by **his** intelligence - the border troops, after June 5, 1941. But the intelligence information of Beria also grew like an avalanche, and Beria could not help but send new notes to Stalin. It seems that the compilers of the SVR collection simply did not have the courage - against the backdrop of all the "dusty camp" insinuations - to completely whitewash Lavrenty Pavlovich on this issue, citing such notes dated mid-June.

Although, as I suppose, **after June 18**, Beria no longer sent any notes to Stalin, because there was no need for additional information to Stalin personally - the Fuhrer personally became Stalin's informant.

Merkulov (by the way, his absence in Moscow during the hot days of June 19-20, when Kobulov replaced him, remained incomprehensible to me for a long time) and Kobulov did not know about Stalin's personal probing and regularly continued to overwhelm him with first-class, but in fact - no longer essential information **for Stalin personally** .

Beria, both as a candidate member of the Politburo and deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and as a particularly trusted employee of Stalin, knew everything. And he no longer wasted time preparing notes, but together with Stalin he was preparing for war.

It is also understandable why Stalin showed no interest in Fitin's Calendar. He, too, is already outdated, not having time to be compiled. Although the note on June 17 played a positive role.

By the way, the episode with Merkulov and Fitin, relating to June 17, is very

fits well with my overall reconstruction of Stalin's actions that day and the following days. Stalin got acquainted with information from two Berlin agents more than once, and they correctly supplemented the overall picture that Stalin put together from the entire flow of information going to him. But Merkulov's note—

Fitina dated June 17 could finally push Stalin to the last

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phase of his personal probing of Hitler. He had Chekists that day before Zhigarev, commander of the Air Force. So, it is possible that Stalin called Zhigarev after midnight just in order to give him an urgent task on a "field" check of "headquarters" information.

There is another important piece of evidence coming from General Sudoplatov. Of course, he is not always accurate, but in this case his information is extremely significant and, with the exception of some minor details, is clearly correct. So, Pavel Anatolyevich recalled that on the day when Fitin returned from the Kremlin, Beria summoned Sudoplatov to his place. At that moment, Beria was not directly subordinate to Sudoplatov through the people's commissariats, but from the reconstruction of the situation I built, it should be clear to the reader that then it was no longer up to formal departmental affiliation, besides, Beria was also deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

And General Sudoplatov already on June 17, 1941, received from Beria an instruction to organize a special group of experienced employees to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage actions in case of war. Moreover, one of the tasks of the group was to counter the possible attempts of the Germans to organize a provocation on the border, such as the one that the Reich secret services staged on the eve of the German-Polish war - the "capture by the Poles" of a radio station in the German city of Gleiwitz.

That is, according to Sudoplatov, it turns out that Beria (and Stalin, of course!) - unlike Timoshenko and Zhukov - began to prepare for war no later than June 17, 1941. The same Sudoplatov, by the way, recalled that on June 21, General Maslennikov from the command of the border troops did not hide his disappointment when he learned from Sudoplatov that his special group would be ready no sooner than in ten days.

And now about the two-day absence in the capital on the very eve of the war of the People's Commissar for State Security (!) Merkulov, who had just returned from the Baltic states. I think this absence is explained by the fact that Stalin, having ordered the troops, sent the People's Commissar of the State Security Service to another strategic inspection on the border.

The final conclusion is as follows: by June 18, a close attack

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Germany's position was no secret to the country's top leadership, either strategically or operationally. I fully agree with A.B. Martirosyan, who, by the way, also made a good analysis of the difference between strategic and tactical surprise.

It is hard not to agree with his conclusion that at the beginning of the war we often dealt not with the bungling of many military men, but with their direct betrayal! In any case, the way the marshals and generals met the war, and not Stalin and Beria, can only be called a crime.

The references of marshals and generals to the "demagnetizing" influence of the TASS Statement of June 14 can only convince simpletons! Any political public statements and to a small extent cannot be a guide to action for the military. For a competent, real military man, only an order is such a guide! And the generals of the Red Army could not (?) even fulfill the orders of the NPO to disguise ...

From the end of the spring of 1941, every senior commander and general in the western military districts had to be like a tight string. And, in any case, this was the responsibility of the personal "teams" of Timoshenko and Zhukov in Moscow, Pavlov in Minsk and Kirponos in Kyiv. But we have already seen how they "prepare" for war...

I can also tell you something else ... "Something" not because there is nothing more to report on this subject, but because I am not writing a book about failures before the war, this topic should be built into the main story about Lavrentiy Beria.

But here is the chief of staff of the KOVO, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev reports on January 2, 1941 from Kyiv to the General Staff:

"Mob[ilization] stock of ammunition in KOVO is extremely insignificant. It does not provide for the troops of the district even for the period of the first operation. <...> The main [main] A[rtilillery] Directorate] does not fulfill its plans. Instead of 3684 wagons planned for the second half of the year according to the directive of the People's Commissar of September 20, 1940 No. 3684, only 1355 wagons were delivered to the district, and without the needs of the district in terms of types of ammunition.

etc.

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The "clerk" generals from the General Staff, in the best clerical traditions, forward Purkaev's report to the GAU, and from there, in the best clerical traditions, again, in February 1941, a reply comes:

"... The amount of ammunition supply to the district according to the plan for the 2nd half of the year [19]40, based on the directive of the General Staff, was calculated only for partial satisfaction of the district's needs in [19]40.

The delivery plan was completed by 34%. etc. with the reassuring notice that, they say, during 1941 we will ship everything.

Shipped!

But how did the General Staff prepare the People's Commissar's directive, planning in advance to satisfy the district's needs only partially? Moreover, this need was satisfied by only a third! And after that, people's commissar Timoshenko, industry, the Central Committee, personally Comrade Stalin, did not tease, but they cheerfully reported: "The armor is strong, and our tanks are fast ..."

The country really gave the army strong armor of the latest fast T-34 tanks (before the war there were more than one and a half thousand of them in the troops - a mighty force!), But the generals in the pre-storm time planned combat training in such a way that ordinary tankers did not have the opportunity to use this technique in master as soon as possible. And we had the same thing in the Air Force, led by the "victims of Beria" Smushkevich and Rychagov.

By the way, just as the clerks in buttonholes prepared for war, so they later, having already acquired shoulder straps, wrote about the war in official capital works. I'll say more about this...

Alas, we have much, much obscurity in the coverage of the pre-war half of 1941, and especially the last pre-war and first war weeks. For example, the famous "merit" of the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov in the timely bringing of the fleets to "readiness No. 1" ... Nikolai Gerasimovich always insistently emphasized that he did this on his own initiative, without Stalin's sanction.

But it seems that Kuznetsov is being disingenuous...

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It is a fact that the fleets were more or less ready for the German attack. But the unauthorized issuance by the People's Commissar of the Navy of the order to bring the Navy into combat readiness is far from a fact. As well as the influence itself, by the way, of this order on the readiness of the fleets. There are "Notes of a participant in the defense of Sevastopol" classified since 1943 by Captain 1st Rank A.K. Evseev, of which

it follows that full combat readiness No. 1 in the Black Sea Fleet was declared *after* the first German bombs exploded on the Primorsky Boulevard of Sevastopol.

Well, okay, let Kuznetsov give the order on time, but they simply did not have time to fulfill it on the Black Sea. But how could the People's Commissar take such a step *before the outbreak of hostilities* without a direct order from Stalin? After all, what is it - ready #1? This is the "Big Gathering" signal in the bases of the fleet, the combat alarm on the ships, the brave Red Navy men and lieutenants in white tunics, white trousers and white shoes fleeing from dismissal! In Sevastopol, in Odessa, in Leningrad, in Riga, in Tallinn...

And this commotion is being watched by agents of the Abwehr ... Yes, just citizens of the Third Reich, who, by chance or on official business, ended up in, say, Tallinn. And suddenly take the war and do not start on June 22.

Let's say Hitler would still postpone for a week! He was not going to tinker with us until the autumn thaw, he expected to complete everything before the fall and could donate another week for one reason or another.

And what would we have then? Most likely - at least - a note from the Ausamt Reich to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. What's the maximum? As a maximum - the very reason for the attack, which Stalin was so afraid of.

That's it!

No, this kind of action in the country can go sideways! How can they go sideways and unauthorized initiators of such actions. Therefore, it is unlikely that Kuznetsov acted on the eve of the war *at his own peril and risk*.

In other words, the analysis of the actions of the People's Commissar of the Navy proves that the army and navy received Stalin's first sanction for preparatory measures at the same time - around June 18th. But was it done on time?

even

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People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR Admiral Kuznetsov? And even more so by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Zhukov?

But when on June 21 Stalin once again authorized full combat readiness, Kuznetsov informed the fleets about the introduction of readiness No. 1. And the army team again "pulled the rubber".

Referring again to the memory of General Sudoplatov, it can be noted that on June 20, 1941, his old comrade-in-arms, General Eitingon, told Sudoplatov that he was unpleasantly impressed by a conversation with the commander of the Western Special Military District, General Pavlov, an old acquaintance of Eitingon back in Spain. Eitingon, calling Pavlov, in a friendly way asked the commander which border areas should be paid special attention in the event of a war, but Pavlov in response "said something ... unintelligible." He believed that "no special problems will arise even if the enemy manages to seize the initiative at the very beginning on the border, since he has enough forces in reserve to withstand any major breakthrough" ...

Writers like Grivadiy Gorpzhaks slander Beria, but the stupid and tragic misunderstanding of the situation was revealed, as we see, by the "innocent victim of Beria" - General Pavlov.

But is it "stupid" and "misunderstanding"? Are we not dealing here with the eructation of the Tukhachevsky-Uborevich conspiracy? After all, why did Hitler strike through Belarus when, by all accounts, he needed Ukraine? Having occupied it with a huge mass of troops, he could count on a lot. And Hitler struck through the Pinsk swamps ... Is it because he knew -

it is here that the traitors will disorganize the resistance to him?



Already after it was written, I talked with my friend and colleague, Belarusian Anatoly Nikolaevich Pokalo ... And he remembered how thirty years ago his fellow villagers, who were already adults in 1941, told him that on the eve of the war they were warned : on Sunday, "maneuvers" will begin and they will be thrown from aircraft

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barrels of burning fuel oil. And in the aviation unit, which was based near the village of Kuplin, Pruzhany district, Brest region, all machine guns were removed from combat vehicles, leaving only three aircraft on duty.

Who soothingly "warned" about the "teachings"? On whose orders were the machine guns removed?

In Pruzhany, a modest but expressive monument was erected to the deputy commander of the air squadron of the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant Stepan Mitrofanovich Gudimov, who made an aerial ramming on June 22, 1941 at 5 hours 20 minutes. Isn't that why Gudimov was forced to go on a ram that he didn't have a single cartridge on board during takeoff?

Ordinary people are ordinary people. They don't want to falsify history. And, perhaps, this ingenuous story proves more convincingly than other studies: it was in the ZAPOVO under the command of General Pavlov that, in addition to numerous bunglers, there were many direct traitors.

Who, by the way, generally had then more or less complete information about the situation? The circle of people in Moscow who were fully aware of it was extremely small: Stalin, his closest political entourage, directly involved in the events (actually Molotov and Beria) and his closest military entourage.

The circle of top officials in the three border special districts, who had the opportunity to see the situation of the last days before the war as a whole, was also, in general, small.

**Baltic OVO:** commander F.I. Kuznetsov; the chief of staff in volume 1 of the "History of the Great Patriotic War" edition of 1961 is not indicated; member of the Military Council P.A. Dibrov; army commanders: 8th - P.P. Sobennikov and the 11th - V.I. Morozov.

The district commander Kuznetsov was removed on June 30, 1941, then he fought without much brilliance. However, there is convincing evidence that he somehow prepared the troops for war.

The chief of staff - not taken into account by the official "History ..." edition of 1961, but in reality - Lieutenant General P.S. Klenov, born in 1892, in July 1941, dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army, date of death - July 10, 1941

of the year.

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Dibrov, a member of the Military Council, held secondary positions during the war. positions.

The commander of the 8th Army, Sobennikov, had a dubious military fate, was demoted to the rank of colonel, and was sentenced on probation. The commander of the 11th Army, Morozov, also fought not in the best way.

Western OVO: Commander D.G. Pavlov; chief of staff V.E. Klimovsky; member of the Military Council A.Ya. Fomins; army commanders: 3rd - V.I. Kuznetsov, 10th - K.D. Golubev, 4th - A.A. Korobkov.

The district commander Pavlov was shot in 1941. The chief of staff of the Klimovskys was shot in 1941. A member of the Military Council of the Fomins, after the start of the war, was hopelessly demoted.

Commander of the 3rd Army Kuznetsov fought valiantly, Hero of the Soviet Union. The commander of the 10th Army Golubev left the encirclement in 1941,

fought. Korobkov, commander of the 4th Army, was shot in 1941.

Kyiv OVO: commander M.P. Kirponos; chief of staff M.A. Purkaev; member of the Military Council N.I. Vashugin; army commanders: 5th - M.I. Potapov, 6th - I.N. Muzychenko, 26th - F.Ya. Kostenko, 12th - P.E. Monday.

The commander of the Kirponos district died in the autumn of 1941.

Chief of Staff Purkaev, highly praised by Zhukov, since April 1943 year commanded the troops of the non-belligerent Far Eastern Front.

On June 28, 1941, Vashugin, a member of the Military Council, shot himself.

Army commander Potapov was captured in the summer of 1941, returned to his homeland in 1945, passed a special check in the NKVD and in December 1945 was reinstated in the Red Army.

The commander of the 6th Army, Muzychenko, was captured in the summer of 1941, returned to his homeland in 1945, passed a special check in the NKVD, and in December 1945 was reinstated in the Red Army.

Army commander Kostenko died in the spring of 1942.

The commander of the 12th Army Ponedelin was captured in the summer of 1941, then was sentenced to death in absentia,

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in 1945 he was returned to his homeland, after an investigation that lasted until 1950, he was shot.

That is, there were almost no living reliable witnesses of what was happening **even immediately after the war**. And what was there in the districts after June 18, 1941, is now most likely impossible to establish at all - after the Khrushchev and Volkogonov pogrom in the state archives.

But the list given by me, I think, only adds doubts.

And how did Beria's border guards meet the war? Well, let the author of the monograph "The Border is Fighting" published in 1989 by the Military Publishing House A.I. answer this question for me. Chugunov:

"The last night before the invasion for the border troops of the western and northwestern sectors was in fact no longer peaceful. On the evening of June 21, many outposts, border commandant's offices and detachments, by order of their chiefs, left the barracks and occupied defensive structures prepared in case of hostilities.

But then another question arises: "And who gave orders to the bosses"? And what does "...many" mean?

What, at some outposts, the chiefs said to their subordinates: "What, guys, the night is warm, starry, can we sit this night in the trenches? You can see the stars better from them! ", But at some outposts the night was cloudy, and there in the trenches - to admire the stars, didn't you sit down?

No, such a responsible order as the order to take combat positions in the evening could come to the outposts only from Moscow, from the people's commissariat. And only the Commissar himself could give such an order. That is, Beria. And, of course, for the entire western strip of the border.

True, there are reports that the border guards were not at all forbidden to occupy defensive structures. Okay, so be it! But who was the initiator of this state of affairs (in fact, permission to act according to the situation), if not People's Commissar Beria? And could he give such a "carte blanche" without the knowledge and consent of Stalin? And could Stalin have limited himself to the border troops of the NKVD and beyond

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be about the Red Army and the RKKF? After all, the actions and everyday life of the frontier troops are visible to the opposite side.

So the information of A. Chugunov proves once again: Stalin also knew about war, and the rest knew. But someone took action, and someone for some reason - no!

However, the well-known border guard general Sechkin claims the opposite: they say that the border units "did not receive such an order (to occupy defensive structures. - S.K.) even when at 22.00 22.6 the General Staff ordered the western border districts to enter operation of the plan to cover the border.

But, alas, dear reader, Sechkin must be trusted very selectively. When he reports something objectively positive for Stalin and Beria (without linking it, however, with their names), then you can trust him. But in others cases...

Not to mention his reproduction of anti-Beria fakes dated June 21, 1941, Sechkin is able to maliciously distort and even invent "facts" himself. So; he, referring to the "democratic" "historian" V. Anfilov, wrote something that others like him later rewrote from him more than once, and which has long become one of the stable anti-Stalinist (and anti-Beria, of course) myths.

Anfilov and Sechkin claimed that "the head of the combat training department, Lieutenant-General V. Kurdyumov" "at a meeting in December of the fortieth year" said: "The last check carried out by the infantry inspector showed that out of 225 regiment commanders involved in the collection, only 25 people were graduates of military schools. The remaining 200 people

these are people who have completed junior lieutenant courses and come from the reserve.

Comments on such a sensational fact were not required, the conclusion suggested itself: here they are, the results of the "defeat of the Red Army" by Stalin and Beria. But this "fact", as they say, did not correspond to reality. That is, it was a lie!

Anfilov launched his "duck" in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper on June 22, 1988, Sechkin gave it a second wind in 1993 in a book signed for publication on October 20, 1992. And therefore, neither one nor the other could assume that 14

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On April 1993, the TERRA publishing house will sign volume 12 (1) of the Russian Archive, which opens the multi-volume edition of documents of the Great Patriotic War. The volume is completely devoted to the materials of the Meeting of the top management of the Red Army on December 21-23, 1940 and contains speeches by both the head of the Combat Training Department of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Vladimir Nikolayevich Kurdyumov, and the Inspector General of the Red Army Infantry Andrei Kirillovich Smirnov.

Kurdyumov fought, died in 1970. Smirnov, commanding the 18th Army of the Southern Front after the start of the war, died in battle near the village of Popovka (now the village of Smirnov) in the Zaporozhye region.

**In the report of General Smirnov there is not a single figure at all**, but the following was said about the fees (p. 30):

"We are now holding training camps for infantry commanders. It should be noted that almost all the districts took the training camp of the command staff of the infantry quite seriously. If the first gathering was still poorly organized, now the main link, which should resolve all issues of combat training - the link of the command staff, has taken its appropriate place in the understanding of the leaders of the districts, corps and divisions.

General Kurdyumov devoted the fourth section of his speech to the training of the commanding staff, and there are numbers in his speech. In particular, reporting that the deployment of new units leads to a shortage of senior and middle commanding staff, especially in internal military

districts, he said:

"So, in the PriVO, 70 percent of the middle command staff and battalion commanders have practical command experience from 5 months to 1 year (this was clear to Kurdyumov's listeners, and I'll remind the reader that I mean not command experience in general, but experience in the occupied positions at the moment - S.K.). In the same district, all the commanders of rifle regiments, except for one, command units for the first year.

General Kurdyumov cited this example as the most disturbing, but one must take into account that PriVO is not Prib

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OVO ... The second is the border *Baltic* Special Military District, and the first, where the situation with the regiment commanders was not the best, is the deeply internal *Volga* Military District, the combat capability of which is decisive didn't matter.

That's why I don't trust General Sechkin! And not only to him - I'll tell you more about it ...

ACTUALLY, General Sechkin refutes himself. At one point in his book, he claims that units of the border troops were not ordered to occupy defensive installations even after the General Staff ordered the military districts to put into effect a plan to cover the border. In another place, he reports that "there were no orders that would forbid the border guards from occupying defensive structures" at all. So, it turns out that the most experienced border commanders, who have long been confident that war cannot be avoided, realizing that now, most likely, everything will begin, and **having freedom of action**, were sitting at the outposts like gophers?

Yes, General Sechkin, wanting to bite Stalin and Beria here, is simply slandering his own comrades-in-arms! Moreover! He himself reports that on that night, from June 21 to June 22, 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD was on the site of the 87th border detachment of the Belarusian border district! So, Lieutenant General Grigory Grigorievich Sokolov happened to be there - in the direction of the main attack of the Germans?

Sechkin does not give the name of the head of the GUPV, and this is also significant! In his interpretation, this nameless chief, although he received at 2.00 on June 22, 1941, data on the movement of the Germans to the border, "did not give the order to the border guards to occupy the defensive structures." Knowing what we know (and what else we will know now!), we can confidently say that this is a lie!

Of course, the main border guard of the country could not be at the border without a direct order from Beria and without the sanction of Stalin. Since it was already clear to both of them that a difficult war would begin from day to day, Sokolov was needed right there, in Be

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Lorussia, in order to immediately organize the combat work of border guards already in war conditions with the outbreak of hostilities.

That's why Sokolov was in the border zone! For KGB participation in a close war!

37-year-old General Grigory Sokolov was quite worthy of such a task. A native of Mytishchi near Moscow, at the age of 16 he became a soldier of the Red Army on the Southern Front, and after the Civil War, step by step, he went through the entire service border ladder, starting with the assistant commander of a border platoon. He served on the border from Kirkenes to Siberia and Central Asia.

Having met the war on the border, he soon became the head of the rear guard of the Western Front - the hardest position, given the failures of General Pavlov

and K°. And it is significant that scanty biographical information is most often silent about this activity of Sokolov, counting his combat biography of 1941 directly from the post of chief of staff of the Central Front, which he held for only three days - from August 22 to 25.

They are also silent about the fact that from September to October, General Sokolov was Deputy Chief of the General Staff, collecting and analyzing data on the situation at the front and preparing conclusions and proposals for the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Since October, he has been chief of staff of the 26th Army, which took over *the* main attack of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group near Tula. At the end of 1941, Sokolov formed a new reserve 26th Army and went with it to the Volkhov Front.

Talking in such detail about General Sokolov, dear reader, I do not deviate from the main topic. Sokolov, who died in 1973, is clearly one of the "significant" figures of the last peaceful and first war days of 1941. And this is a figure from the Chekist cohort of People's Commissar Beria. The People's Commissar is slandered, one of his associates is silenced. In the one-volume encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War. 1941—

1945" Sokolov is not named. The compilers did not forget to include Soyfertis's graphics in the encyclopedia about the war. But Sokolov was "forgotten".

Still would! After all, the fact of Beria's direction on the eve of June 22

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1941 to Belarus, the head of the GUPV of the NKVD of the USSR - this is also one of the refutations of the anti-Stalin and anti-Beria myths that Stalin and Beria did not believe in the proximity of the war! But the truth is this: the fact that for the border troops of the NKVD the war began in the trenches, and not in the beds, is the merit of Stalin, and Beria, and General Sokolov.

The border guards have always been able to fight, and one experienced border soldier in a complex, dynamic battle without a single front line, without a clear command, cost, perhaps, five, or even ten, or even fifty ordinary *conscripts* .

There were about a hundred thousand of them, young and older guys in green caps, before the war on the western borders: 47 land and 6 sea border detachments, 9 separate border commandant's offices and 11 regiments of the NKVD operational troops. And in the war that began, they immediately played a strategic role, without exaggeration, because they kept *for days* in an environment in which army units would have rolled back in just *hours*.

Yes, they rolled - where at the head of the units and formations were those grief-"commanders" who were "provided" to the country by the emerging party of partocrats.

But the border guards, under the leadership of Comrade Beria, a member of the Lenin-Stalin party, met the war with dignity. That is, like the Bolsheviks and Russians

People.

Breast!

## Chapter 16

### WAR: RATING ON THE HAMBURG ACCOUNT»

AFTER 4:00 am on the penultimate Sunday in June 1941, all assumptions turned into certainty. The war has begun. But how and when did it begin for Stalin and Beria?

After the XX Congress, which took place at the beginning of 1956, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites tried to present Stalin as a scoundrel who left the country on June 22, 1941 to the mercy of fate and went to get drunk at the dacha in Kuntsevo, allegedly saying, they say, *prosra* ... the country, so now they themselves understand.

This "fact" was considered "reliable" for decades.

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Still - it was announced by the head of state and the party! Valentin Pikul painted "Stalin's insanity" with relish in his "Stalingrad", and there are many of our fellow citizens who believe in this vile lie to this day.

But in 1995, a book by retired Colonel-General Yu.A. Gorkov, consultant of the Historical-archival and military-memorial center of the General Staff, under the name "Kremlin. Bid. General Staff. The circulation is small - nine thousand copies, the general himself does not reveal a special historicity of thinking, talks about Stalin's "crimes", and the assessments of this retired General Staff officer are sometimes depressingly superficial. However, the book turned out to be valuable to others: almost the first Yu. Stalin in his Kremlin office" and published extensive

extract from it.

The general himself assessed the "Journal ..." as follows: "A unique, invaluable source is of particular importance - the register of persons who visited him (Stalin. - S.K.) in the Kremlin office, now stored in the archive of the President of the Russian Federation (former archive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU).

Indeed, the data of this "Journal ..." exposes many lies about Stalin, and even General Gorkov writes:

"Let's go back ... to the first days of the Great Patriotic War. It was around them that the most dense atmosphere of gossip and rumors concentrated. Unfortunately, it has already become a textbook opinion that these days I.V. Stalin, deeply depressed by the collapse of his offensive doctrine (God forbid, where could he have had it in 1941? - S.K.), deceived and humiliated (wow! - S.K.) by Hitler, fell into deep apathy, and 22 and on June 23, he generally drank soundly, not taking any part in the affairs of government.

So, the analysis of the journal of visits by I.V. Stalin shows that I.V. Stalin was in his Kremlin office from the early morning of June 22, 1941

of the year..."

For "full clarification of the circumstances of the case" Yu.A. Gorkov gives a table of I.V. Stalin in June 1941, from which it follows that: on June 22, Stalin began

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reception at **5.45** and finished at **16.45**, taking people 11 hours straight!

On June 23, starting at 3.20, he finished at 0.55 already on June 24, and on this day, after Stalin's rest, the flow of people flowed through his office for "only" 5 hours and 10 minutes. However, it was necessary to understand the situation in more detail, to think ...

But on June 25, Stalin's working day was all 24 hours! On this day, he received 29 people!

On June 26, 24 people were received in 10 hours and 35 minutes, and on June 27, in 10 hours 05 minutes - again 29!

Like this!

General Gorkov concludes:

"I think now the question of the disappearance of I.V. Stalin in the first days of the war can be considered resolved, since the official register of visitors to his office is not a opportunistic source. This document of strict secrecy was not intended for publication and can serve as the most reliable source of information about the persons who visited Stalin's office.

You can't rank Yuri Gorkov among the "Stalinists" - his personal perception of the figures of Stalin and Beria is not far from the images that Antonov-Ovseenko, Volkogonov, Radzinsky are imposing on us ... However, as far as documents are concerned, the general did not disappoint here! For which he thanks!

As for the extracts cited by him from the "Journals of visits to I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office", then these extracts begin on January 1, 1935 and end on December 17, 1945. Unfortunately, Yu. Gorkov's daily lists are not complete - he stipulates that they "selectively indicate the names of visitors to Stalin's office who were directly connected with the organization of defense and military operations during the Great Patriotic War." And such a "selection" allows, as I understand it, to cut off most of the records about Beria. But not all.

On June 21, entries begin at 18.27 with the arrival of Molotov.

At 19.05 Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov joined Stalin and Molotov, Voznesensky, Timoshenko, Kuznetsov.

At 20.15 Timoshenko and Voznesensky left, and after 35 minutes Timoshenko returned for an hour and a half already with Zhukov and

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Budyonny... It is believed that Directive No. 1 was discussed at that time, but a short document of twenty lines was "discussed" for something too long... After all, even before that, the participants in the meeting had been talking about something for almost an hour and a half...

One way or another, after 10:20 p.m. on June 21, 1941, only three people remained in Stalin's office besides his owner: Molotov, Voroshilov, and Beria. Soon Beria went away for a short while and at 10.40 pm came again.

At 11 p.m., Beria, Molotov and Voroshilov left, and Stalin was left alone. It seems that he already understood that his directives of the last days were executed very badly by the army team. But at the moment he could not change anything, and he needed to rest - the next day promised to be difficult.

I think that Beria also slept that night, and for the same reason - from now on he will a busy work schedule for years became super-dense.

DAY 22 June 1941 began with the fact that at 5.45 Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis, Zhukov entered Stalin's office. At 7.30 Malenkov came and left with Beria at 9.20. But at half past twelve, when only Molotov remained in Stalin's office, they again appeared together for half an hour. And before that, often associated with common tasks, Malenkov and Beria would now interact more and more closely for all twelve subsequent years - until the day of Beria's arrest on June 26, 1953.

The full "photo" of Stalin's first working war day, the first of those 1418 days when he bore responsibility for Russia unprecedented in history, is as follows:

Molotov	5.45 -	- 12.05
<b>Beria 5.45 - 9.20</b>		
Timoshenko 5.45 -	-8.30	
Mekhlis 5.45 -	-8.30	
Zhukov 5.45 -	-8.30	
Malenkov 7.30 -	9.20	
Mikoyan 7.55 -	-9.30	
Kaganovich 8.00 -	-9.35	
Voroshilov 8.00 -	-	10.15
Kuznetsov (CC)	8.15 -	- 8.30
Dimitrov	8.40 -	- 10.40

Manuilsky 8.40 -		- 10.40
Kuznetsov	9.40 -	- 10.20
Mikoyan	9.50 -	- 10.30
Molotov	12.55 -	- 16.45
Voroshilov	11.40 -	- 12.05
<b>Beria</b>	<b>11.30</b> -	- <b>12.00</b>
Malenkov	11.30 -	- 12.00
Voroshilov	12.30 -	- 16.45
Mikoyan	12.30 -	- 14.30
Vyshinsky 13.05	-	- 15.25
Shaposhnikov 13.15	-	- 16.00
Timoshenko 14.00	-	- 16.00
Zhukov	14.00 -	- 16.00
Vatutin	14.00 -	- 16.00
Kuznetsov (Navy)	15.20 -	- 15.45
Sandpiper	15.30 -	- 16.00
Beria	<b>16.25</b> -	- <b>16.45</b>

Note: both on the last day of peace and on the first day of the war, the last person to leave Stalin's office was Beria. He appeared again on June 23 - exactly a day later, minute by minute, and again for twenty minutes.

On that day, June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was formed, and from the same June 23, Beria became one of the permanent advisers to the Headquarters. There were twelve of them in total: Marshal Kulik, Meretskov, Air Force Chief Zhigarev, Vatutin, Air Defense Chief Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mekhlis and Beria.

From midnight on the night of June 23-24, Beria stayed in Stalin's office for more than an hour, and in the following days he sometimes remained in it for three hours, then for half an hour, several times a day.

And the office was reminiscent of a seashore in a storm: they rolled on it and human waves rolled, but did not overwhelm

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him, and rolled back again into the sea of the outbreak of war. By the way, on June 24, from 20.15 to 20.35, Stalin found time to receive test pilot Stepan



Suprun, who made an appointment on June 23! Suprun is, in general, although a well-known, but quite an ordinary military man. However, Stalin not only found time for him, but also immediately gave the go-ahead to his idea of forming selected aviation regiments from test pilots.

And it was not memoirists or writers who told us about all this, but an extremely dry (last name, date, time; last name, date, time ...) document!

That's it - it was enough to publish the document, and a huge layer of lies about Stalin's "binge drinking" collapsed. Although, to be honest, it would not be surprising to drink with grief, having discovered how Russia and its leader were let down by those on whom there was the most hope - the military! After all, for them, Stalin and the country gave weapons, personnel, funds. Constantly delving into *general* defense problems, Stalin left *purely military* problems to the military, to professionals.

And they...

Yes, much becomes clear when analyzing documents. And then the lie collapses. How lies about Stalin, and lies about Beria ...

POSSIBLE, the reader has long had such questions on his tongue: "Is the lie about Beria really so total? Is he really a worthy person in all respects, and not a "geek"? Well, you can believe that he was a great organizer. But his hands are covered in blood?

What can I say...

Blood?

When?

With the beginning of Beria's work at the head of the NKVD of the USSR, the scale of repressions in the country fell to that minimum, without which any state cannot do in acute periods of its history.

With the beginning of the war, blood became its (war) inevitable element. Soon after the end of the war, Beria withdrew from the work of the NKVD until March 1953.

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In March 1953, having returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he began with amnesties and rehabilitations. So where is the blood?

During the period of repression in Georgia? But even there it was minimal, and all the terrible stories of the "old Bolsheviks" and "victims of terror" about the alleged "sadist" Beria are not worth the paper on which they were written. Having said something about this, I will say something additionally in due time.

And here's another thing... Well, it doesn't happen that someone would behave like a person for years, imbued with concern for others, and then suddenly behave like a bloodthirsty monster! No, if someone is internally rotten, then his rottenness is somehow manifested in everything, and especially if this someone gets power. Especially the power over millions of people. *This immediately starts to amuse the demon ...*

Beria, having gained power in Georgia, not sparing himself, corrected the "collective farm" excesses of his predecessors and persuaded his fellow tribesmen that prosperity was better than poverty ... He immediately, unlike his predecessors, was concerned about the problems of developing young generations in Georgia and, in general, the rise of education in republic; immediately - unlike again his predecessors - thought about the restructuring of the Georgian capital, and not just thought, but became one of the authors of such an urban plan, where each idea was focused on the smart arrangement of the life of the broad masses, and not on pompous self-aggrandizement .. He turned Georgia into an all-Union health resort.

And suddenly - here it is, during the period of repression, he - if you believe some "memoirists" - begins to gouge out the eyes of his fellow citizens with a fork! Although objective analysis suggests otherwise...

No, there was never *innocent* blood on the hands of Lavrenty Pavlovich - he

knew her price, among other things, because he himself had to shed blood - his own. For the cause he served.

So what kind of blood are we talking about then? Maybe about the one that is connected with the activities of Beria's subordinates of the NKVD barrage detachments? Or - "with the forcible deportation of peoples"? Well, dear reader, we will reach both the barrage detachments and the forced deportation ...

However, I must confess ... About our recent history

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they lied and lie so much, and it is so difficult to believe in **the totality** of this lie that even I, the author of the book, periodically had the thought: "Do everyone lie about Beria so amicably? »

Well, okay, the embittered Antonov-Ovseyenko ... Or - direct agents of influence "politburoist" Yakovlev and "general" Volkogonov, libelist Radzinsky ... Well, okay, either out of their minds, or fictional Khrushchevites, "old Bolsheviks" like Snegov and Dora Lazurkina...

But Vyacheslav Molotov? Lazar Kaganovich? Klim Voroshilov? Anastas Mikoyan? Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev and aircraft designer Yakovlev... Marshals Voronov and Zhukov, Konev and Bagramyan? Metallurg Tevosyan? Admiral Kuznetsov?

Could they be lying like that? And if Beria deserved a kind word, then why didn't they say it about him at least decades later?

But, firstly, about Beria - when he was already destroyed - kind words were said by his contemporaries. And the reader will get acquainted with some of them in due time.

Secondly, even people who hated or disliked him sometimes gave evidence of Beria's human condition, although they themselves did not understand what they were testifying to. Later, the reader will be introduced to them.

Thirdly, Beria's objective assessments were suppressed so thoroughly for decades that, for example, the father of one of my senior colleagues Mikhail Vitoldovich Kaminsky, Vitold Savelyevich Kaminsky, whom Beria helped to solve the issue of building two factories for the production of aviation gasoline before the war, spoke about this already adult son under the strictest confidence, although he retained quite good memories of Lavrenty Pavlovich.

Fourthly, when my story reaches later times, I will give examples of the most vile lies about Beria at the highest level, and they will prove: yes, they lied totally, officially and vilely.

And, finally, I ask the reader to also take into account the fact that **all the first persons of the state mentioned by me above (as well as many not mentioned) were silent, complicit in Khrushchev's lies about how Stalin met the war!** After all, NONE of those who lived well in 1956, in the 60s, in the 70s and even in the 80s and

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knew **exactly** how Stalin spent the first day of the war, did not raise his voice in defense of both Stalin and historical truth.

After all, Molotov did not stand up in the hall of the 20th Congress and, in response to Khrushchev's insinuations, did not say at the top of his voice to the whole country and the whole world: "But how dare you lie so vilely, citizen Khrushchev, because after such a lie you are not my comrade! I left Comrade Stalin's office an hour before June 22, 1941, and re-entered his office the next morning at fifteen minutes to six. And then I was day after day in this office several times a day!"

And Malenkov didn't get up...

And Kaganovich...

The marshals and generals did not stand up when Khrushchev, scoffing at our history from the rostrum of the 20th Congress, signed himself up as a strategist and refused to be a commander

talent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But they were all sitting in the hall then - except for Marshal Rokossovsky, who was then the Minister of Defense of Poland.

Is it any wonder after that that Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites soon easily dealt with the same Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, pushing them into a dark corner of history?!

Marshals Voroshilov and Zhukov did not get up.

They didn't get up after Khrushchev said this about Stalin: "He didn't understand anything about military affairs, he almost went out with a globe when they reported the situation to him, he pulled out a map from behind his top, on which he was placed almost the whole world.,."

But Marshal Timoshenko, Marshal Vasilevsky, and Admiral Kuznetsov could tell the truth. But the latter somehow mentioned that he saw Stalin almost a week after the start of the war. But he was summoned to Stalin's office at 15:20 Moscow time on June 22, 1941.

And others - either who passed through this office in the first days of the war, or who received orders and orders directly from its owner - also did not  
got up.

They all then remained silent.

Why?

Let's go back to the days before the war and see what we have to drink.

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Sano about them in those memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov, which are called "On the Eve". Their supplemented edition Voenizdat released in 1990 ...

Page 285:

"Even in the afternoon of June 21, it became known: the next night

we can expect a German attack ... "

Page 299:

"At about 11 pm (June 21. - S.K.) the phone rang. I heard

Marshal Timoshenko's voice:

- There is very important information. Come to me..."

The question immediately arises: "So when did it become known: "on **the afternoon of June 21**" or "**about 11 pm**"? »

Reading page 299 further:

"... A few minutes later, we (with Rear Admiral Alafuzov. - S.K.) were already going up to the second floor of a small mansion, where S.K.'s office was temporarily located. Timoshenko.

Marshal, walking around the room, dictated ... General of the Army G.K. Zhukov was sitting  
table and wrote something ...

Semyon Konstantinovich ... without naming sources, he said that it is considered possible German attack on our country ...

Zhukov got up and showed us a telegram he had prepared for the border districts (the chronology of Admiral Kuznetsov does not agree well with the data of General Gorkov. - S.K.). I remember that it was lengthy - on three sheets (and the "Directive No. 1" now exhibited to the public is very short. - S.K.). It set out in detail what the troops should do in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany.<...>

I turn to Rear Admiral Alafuzov:

- Run to headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about the full actual readiness number one ... "

Admiral Kuznetsov, reporting this, did not seem to understand that he was actually almost debunking his "merit", because he gave the notorious order when delaying its return would be tantamount to treason.

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Secondly, if only five hours before the start of the war, the Chief of the General Staff bothered to sit down to write detailed instructions to the Armed Forces about what they "should do ... in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany", then such an unfortunate chief is not only in three necks must be driven in disgrace. He should be shot - for the criminal neglect of his duties!

Is not it?

But that's not all! Reading page 300:

"Later, I learned that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were summoned on June 21 at about 5 p.m. to I.V. Stalin. Consequently, already at that time ... it was decided to put the troops on full combat readiness and, in the event of an attack, repel it. This means that all this happened about eleven hours before the actual invasion of the enemy on our land.

And again the question arises: "What does Kuznetsov mean by writing "it happened"?"

Eleven hours before the attack "occurred", as I understand it, the last (but - if I was right in the previous reconstruction of events - not the first) Stalin's sanction to put the troops on alert. But even by 11 p.m. on June 21, "there was no" sending of a directive about this to the troops.

Why?

What, Stalin is to blame for this?

But that's not all! Read page 300 below:

"Not so long ago I happened to hear from General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev - at that time he commanded the Moscow Military District - that on June 21 **at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon** (emphasis mine. - S.K.) I.V. called him. Stalin demanded to increase the combat readiness of air defense.

It turns out that it is no longer "17 hours", but "2 o'clock in the afternoon"? But that's not all! Read page 300 below:

"That evening (June 21. - S.K.) to I.V. Stalin was summoned by the Moscow leaders A.S. Shcherbakov and V.P. Pronin. According to Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin, Stalin ordered ... to detain the secretaries of the district committees in their places ... "A German attack is possible," he warned ... "

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But what is interesting - neither Shcherbakov nor Pronin are in the daily lists of visits to Stalin's office, given by General Gorkov! Just as Merkulov and Fitin are not there in the entries for June 17.

Why?

Actually, in Gorkov's book there is a strange gap in dates: after June 11 until June 17, Gorkov does not give any data at all on visiting Stalin's office.

On June 11, from 21.55 to 22.55, Timoshenko, Zhukov, the commander of the PribOVO Kuznetsov, political workers Zaporozhets and Dibrov, and then aviators Zhigarev, Stefanovsky and Kokkinaki were there from 21.55 to 22.55. Moreover, with Stefanovsky, who left already at 1.45 on June 12, Stalin talked alone for half an hour. And then - according to Gorkov - he takes a time-out until June 17, but on that day - according to Gorkov - he only takes Vatutin for half an hour, and after midnight - Zhigarev, which we already know about.

Nevertheless, General Gorkov gave a sly reservation that he "selectively" cited "mainly the names of visitors to Stalin's office who were directly connected with the organization of defense and military operations during the Great Patriotic War." And it turns out that it seems that Gorkov was the discoverer of the "Journal ..." and at the same time he could throw out any surname, distorting the real "photo" of this or that Stalinist working day, without the risk of being accused of deliberately concealing the truth.

But what - there was not enough space and printing ink for the days from June 11 to 17?

After all, it cannot be that at such a time, being in Moscow, Stalin did not receive anyone these days! No, it seems he did, if on page 79 of his own book Yu. Gorkov says:

"In the context of the impending war, on June 13, S.K. Timoshenko asked permission from I.V. Bring Stalin to combat readiness and deploy the first echelons according to cover plans. But permission has not been received."

I can believe ... Stalin, realizing that the country was not yet ready for a serious war, did not want to give Hitler a single reason for it. We know that Hitler was

very displeased

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the fact that Stalin could not be provoked. Y. Gorkov himself writes about this - on page 78. Therefore, on June 13, Stalin could still hesitate whether it was time to take all possible measures to deploy troops. Therefore, he began his own soundings, starting with the TASS Statement, which, it turns out, after a conversation with Tymoshenko, he wrote.

That is, it turns out that the description of the last pre-war week and General Gorkov, and Marshal Zhukov, and others (for example, Marshal Vasilevsky, for example, later stated that "... it was necessary to boldly step over the threshold", but "Stalin did not dare on this") is fundamentally distorted!

Here is another thought-provoking fact from the memoirs of Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev, before the war, from the post of artillery commander of the Kyiv OVO, he was appointed head of the GAU:

"By June 19, I had already finished handing over to my successor and almost on the go said goodbye to my now former colleagues. On the move, because the headquarters of the district and its departments these days just received an order to relocate to Ternopil and hastily curtailed work in Kyiv.

What is written does not differ from the book by G. Andreev and I. Vakurov "General Kirponos", published by Politizdat of Ukraine in 1976:

"... in the afternoon of June 19, an order was received from the People's Commissar of Defense to the field administration of the district headquarters to be relocated to the city of Ternopil.

So, not even "2 pm" on June 21, but on June 19? But why did this district administration suddenly rush to Ternopil, where a front-line command post was located in the building of the former headquarters of the 44th Infantry Division? We are told that the "tyrant" and "fool" Stalin did not allow the commander of the ZapOVO Pavlov to withdraw troops to summer camps, although there was no crime in that - planned combat training. And here the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District is removed from its place! Who could give instructions about this, if not Stalin?

And what - the KOVO were given the order to deploy the field administration of the district (that is, already, in fact, the front), but the ZapOVO did not? Before Kirponos to Kyiv, urgent instructions for the second

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We reached the lovin on June 19, but didn't manage to reach Pavlov in Minsk by June 21?

Let me not believe!

And now, having asked *myself* and the reader these questions, I will indeed *finally* give the key chronology of the events of June 1941, as I imagine them ...

**The beginning of June** is an increase in information about military activity on the other side of the border.

**The first half of June** - an increase in concern, and then anxiety Stalin; his reflections and formation of the idea of Hitler's personal probing.

**June 13** - report by S.K. Timoshenko. Stalin's acceptance of the final decisions about their own strategic political sounding of the situation.

**June 14** - TASS report as the first sounding.

**June 17** - Merkulov's note and Stalin's conversation with Merkulov and Fitin.

**June 17 or 18** - Beria organized the flight of Colonel Zakharov and himself

flight.

**June 17 or 18** - Stalin's proposal to Hitler to send to Berlin

Molotov - as the final sounding.

**June 18** - Stalin's sanction to issue a directive to the troops to put them on high alert,

"lowered on the brakes" by bunglers and traitors.

**June 18** - the final sanction of Hitler, alarmed by Stalin's sounding, for the immediate start of the implementation of the Barbarossa plan and a sharp increase in the activity of the Wehrmacht, immediately noticed by Beria's intelligence.

**June 19-20** - personal inspection of the border by the Merkulovs on the personal instructions of Stalin.

June 20 - Report of Merkulov, who returned to Moscow, to Stalin about a strange

military lethargy.

**June 20-21** - Stalin harshly demands that Timoshenko and Zhukov give back

immediate directive to the troops.

**June 22** - the beginning of the war.

That's how it might have been, my dear reader! And personally, I am now sure that the entire then party-state and military elite later conspired to keep silent about the first war days of Stalin later

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mu that it was important for her to distort the picture of the last *pre-war* days of Stalin.

After all, to say loudly to the same Zhukov, or Timoshenko, or Vasilevsky in the fifties, in the sixties, whether Stalin not only KNEW, but also APPROVED TIMELY bringing the troops to combat readiness, is

well...

It's like committing civil suicide! Or - if you choose a more sublime comparison - lie with your chest on the embrasure. And none of them dared to sacrifice themselves.

And how could, say, Molotov dare to do this? He also lied **outright**, even in 1984. And this lie was then recorded by Felix Chuev, although he considered it to be the holy truth. In his book One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov, there is an entry dated January 13, 1984:

"I am reading to Molotov excerpts from Avtorkhanov's book on June 22, 1941: "We came to his dacha and offered to make an appeal to the people. Stalin flatly refused. Then Molotov was instructed ... "

"Yes, that's right, something like this..."

But that's not even close to true!

**This is absolutely not true!** On June 22, Stalin saw Molotov for the first time in his Kremlin office at 5.45 and was in the Kremlin all day, starting the war.

But Molotov could not tell the truth. She was very unattractive to him, too. And if **this** truth came out, then, you see, the truth about Lavrenty Beria would also come out ... And instead of the "camp dusty" monster, a brilliant statesman would appear before the eyes of astonished descendants, not only not threatening anyone with erasure into "camp dust" for warnings of an imminent war, but, on the contrary, with his organizational work and his personal actions, he ensured that Stalin was informed about it *in a timely manner* !

Alas, NONE of the first persons of the state either in real time or later stood up for the desecrated honor and good name of the leader, for the truth about Comrade Stalin. But it was the one who raised them, gave them gold epaulettes and

stars, gave high government posts ... This was someone who clearly - both formally and informally - towered over

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them by virtue of the obvious genius and greatness of personality and destiny.

What can we say about the name of Beria trampled down by them! He was not a leader stood, consider, next to them, if you look formally.

Informally, he was not only head and shoulders above them as a person, he was above them as a person - not chasing ranks, awards, not pretending to be a state figure.

To be, not to seem - for Beria it was not even a slogan. He just was - in the place where Stalin put him. And every time he was in the right place. And at the same time he was a living reproach, oh, for many of his colleagues and associates.

And so, depending on the degree of personal weakness or details biography, someone did not like him, someone did not like him. And some people hated it.

While Beria was in power, he hated quietly.

And when they said from above: "Face!" ...

EARLIER, I stated that the history of the war was falsified at the highest level by the apparent collusion of the partocratic and military elite. And here is a concrete illustration of this general statement.

In 1961, a long-awaited event took place: the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense published the first volume of "The History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" - "Preparation and Unleashing War by the Imperialist Powers."

The six-volume work was developed by a team of researchers from the Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU. And the Chairman of the Editorial Commission was Academician Pyotr Pospelov (a year older than Beria, he quietly rested at the age of 81 in Moscow in 1979). Konstantin Zalesky, whom I mentioned more than once, writes about him: "All the works prepared with his participation are full of juggling and distortion of real facts and have nothing to do with history." And this is the rare case when I agreed with Zalesky

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sen, if we mean, for example, Pospel's History of the Great Patriotic War.

What is funny, Zalesky further writes about Pospelov: "A convinced Stalinist, and then an adherent of N.S. Khrushchev, etc. And it was Pospelov who was preparing a report to Khrushchev on the 20th Congress "On the Cult of Personality", full of anti-Stalinist juggling and distortion of real facts.

Good "Stalinist"!

As for the "History of War", then in the capital (weight exactly 2 kg) of its first volume, created by the "Pospelov team", Beria's name is mentioned twice. On page 100 it says:

"The Soviet Armed Forces achieved significant success in their development, which worried the imperialist circles of the West ... These circles, in search of ways to weaken the Red Army, used Beria and his accomplices to destroy many of the most experienced and trained commanders and political workers."

Is it necessary to remind the reader of the chronology of events and the biography of Beria in order to understand the truth of such an accusation against Beria? But if in order to expose this fake, you still need to know what happened and when, and also who and when Beria was, then the second lie of the Pospelovites (on p. 479) is revealed even with a simple logical analysis of it:

"The fight against enemy air reconnaissance was assigned to the border

troops and units of border military districts. But, as it became known only later, back in March 1940, the traitor Beria categorically forbade the border troops to open fire on German intruder aircraft ... He actually opened Soviet airspace for enemy reconnaissance.

*Border troops and parts of border military districts are, as they say in Odessa, two big differences. And the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs simply did not have the right to allow or prohibit military districts. As for the border troops, why did they have to open fire on German intruder aircraft? The border guards are not an army, they didn't have anti-aircraft weapons,*

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as it was not (no matter who and no matter what argued otherwise) and its own fighter aircraft.

But this is the official history of the war! Nevertheless, on page 476, Beria's "NKVD bodies" were also blamed for the losses of our aviation on the ground! Like, the NKVD delayed the equipment of airfields and the planes were crowded there ...

The Pospelovites even blamed the NKVD for the location of airfields in the Western Special Military District, which was too close to the border, as if it was not Generals Rychagov, Smushkevich, Pavlov who were engaged in determining the location of airfields, but Chekist Beria.

All this was a lie, starting with Beria's accusation of beating command personnel in 1937.

So, one wonders, the high-ranking members of the Editorial Commission did not know all this: academicians Mints, Zhilin, Khvostov, marshals Bagramyan, Golikov, Sokolovsky, generals Grechko and Kurasov, lawyer Rudenko, writer Polevoy and others?

Why, in many other cases, the "Pospelian" history of the war is in the strangest way tongue-tied.

Let's go down from the "headquarters" heights to the level of the front trench ... And we will see in the initial (but not "post-spiel") history of the war an amazing example of the 41st Infantry Division. This personnel division was commanded by the oldest commander of the Red Army, General G.N. Mikushev.

The division was part of the 6th army of General I.N. Muzychenko and was stationed in the area of Rava-Russkaya. On the eve of June 22, General Mikushev put the division on alert and took up defensive lines according to the plan to cover the border. He coordinated his actions with the commander of the 91st border detachment, Major Ya.D. Small, but I do not think that he did not inform the army commander Muzychenko.

However, I am inclined to think that Mikushev only accurately carried out the order of Muzychenko, who came on command from ... the headquarters of the Kyiv OBO. On their own initiative, division commanders do not put personnel in trenches in peacetime, because they themselves can be put in jail for such things. And put to work!

Here, let's say, such a situation ... Military operations are not yet

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began, but the division commander sees that they are about to begin. It seems to be necessary to take up defensive positions. But he is just a division commander. His task is to be ready to carry out the order of the higher command. But there is no order!

Well, well, he arbitrarily put the division in the trenches. And with the first explosions of shells on the territory of the USSR, the army commander suddenly orders the division to take up other positions with an accelerated march. commander



comes from one deployment of parts of the division, but it is really already different - through the fault of an overly enterprising commander. No, for such things you can thunder under the tribunal. And the military knows this.

That's why I think Mikushev was following orders. But, one way or another, three German infantry divisions and part of the forces of three tank divisions moved against the 41st division and the border guards of the 91st detachment. And the division stood at its turn for six days! On June 23, she counterattacked the enemy and threw him 3 kilometers into Polish territory.

June 23, 1941! On the direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht!

Mikushev withdrew only because his neighbors had already bared their flanks, and there was a threat to the environment.

It was an outstanding episode of the beginning of the war ... However, there is not a word about the 41st division, generals Muzychenko and Mikushev in the Khrushchev-Pospelov history of the war, written in 1961 (Muzychenko is mentioned as Commander-6 on the eve of the war in the list of other commanders, and all).

For the first time, the names of these generals, information about the feat of the 41st division and the circumstances of this feat appear only in a brief "History of the Great Patriotic War" already "Brezhnev" edition of 1970.

Why?

Is it because the story of General Muzychenko and a number of other generals turned out to be indirectly connected with the name of Beria, moreover, it is connected in a way that is advantageous for the latter?

Ivan Nikolayevich Muzychenko began the war courageously, but during the Kyiv defensive operation in August in the Uman region he was taken prisoner by the wounded. At first he was kept in a prison in Rovno, then in camps in Novograd-Volyn

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Komm, Hammelsburg, Gogelstein, Moosburg. He was released from captivity by the Americans and on April 29, 1945 he was sent to Paris, to the Soviet Commission for Repatriation.

From May to December 1945, Muzychenko underwent a special inspection by the NKVD in Moscow. He, a well-known commander before the war, could not get past Beria's cabinet. And here's what happens...

Beria was People's Commissar of Internal Affairs on December 29, 1945. And just in December of this year, the special check of Muzychenko ended, and on December 31, 1945, he was returned to active service in the Red Army. Approximately the same thing happened with Major General Potapov, the former commander of the 5th Army of the KOVO, who returned from captivity through Paris, and Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front, who, seriously wounded, was captured on October 14, 1941, west of Vyazma. They also underwent a special check in the Beria NKVD from May to December 1945, and at the same time as Muzychenko were returned to the army.

Returned by Beria!

And on December 30, 1945, the former commander of the 12th Army, General Ponedelin, was brought from Paris again to the Lubyanka, to the NKVD under the leadership of Kruglov. Now they write that he was captured in August 1941, shell-shocked, after hand-to-hand combat. However, in a German photo in Francois de Lannoy's photo album "German tanks in Ukraine. 1941 Ponedelin does not look shell-shocked or torn to pieces. But he doesn't have the Order of Lenin and two Orders of the Red Banner on his chest, just as there is no medal "XX Years of the Red Army". Moreover, in a clear photo, holes from them on a field tunic without traces of a "fight" are not visible either. Yes, the Germans would not have taken off the order, especially before propaganda photography. Most likely, Ponedelin himself got rid of them, putting on a new general's tunic before surrendering. Not

the best certification for him.

In captivity, he also behaved below average, was anti-Soviet, but did not seem to cooperate with the Germans. The investigation into the Ponedelin case lasted five years, and only in 1950

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year he was shot (in order to be rehabilitated in the general stream in 1956).

They dealt with Ponedelin at the Lubyanka when Beria had not been there for a long time. And the final documents on Muzychenko, Potapov, Lukin were signed by the "monster" Beria. Of course, it was easier with these three generals - they fought courageously and behaved with dignity in captivity. And yet - even if Ponedelin, who had been heavily fined, had hit the Lubyanka at the same time as them, perhaps he would have survived. After all, Beria never craved extra, unjustified by circumstances, blood.

So, the name Muzychenko indirectly associated with the name of Beria. And if so, then what kind of merits in the war can Muzychenko be talking about? And the name Mikushev is also inconvenient. Tell us about them, and, you see, the truth may inadvertently come out about why some met the war in the barracks, while others - in the trenches.

First of all, Pavlov's Western Special Military District failed criminally, exposing the flanks and troops of the Kyiv Special Military District, transformed into the Southwestern Front under the command of General Kirponos. Otherwise, things could have gone differently in KOVO.

Alas, the last pre-war and first war days were subsequently rewritten so abruptly, the array of destroyed documents is now so large that it is devilishly difficult to restore the complete picture of the last few days before the war. However, one thing is clear: the more accurately we reconstruct that short period, the more clearly the guilt is seen not of Stalin, but of the top generals and especially Pavlov's "team".

The father of my colleague, Vyatich Vyacheslav Egorovich Butusov, Yegor Nikolaevich Butusov, met the war as a machine-gunner sergeant in one of the border units of the Kyiv Military Special District. Having drunk both hot and cold during the war, he died in 1969, exactly fifty years old. And as his son recalls, when he, having come from school, began to tell his father about the unexpected attack of the Germans, his father objected to him that they were already sitting in the trenches on June 21, 1941. Also in the Kiev Special Military District, but not as part of the 41st division. Not one, it turns out, General Mikushev showed some kind of "willfulness." Although he seems to

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and did not show, but acted on orders from above, which came from the headquarters of the district, which in Ternopil was transformed into the headquarters of the front.

And the "victim of Beria" is the commander of the Western Special Military District Army General Pavlov listened to an operetta on the evening of June 21, 1941.

But Beria's subordinate, Lieutenant General Sokolov, was on the border.

WAR was missed by marshals and generals, but after Stalin's death, everything began to be blamed on him. Fortunately, Nikita Khrushchev encouraged this in every possible way. And to blame everything on Beria after his arrest on June 26, 1953 - this was a rule of good form for the elite. After all, otherwise what I mean could be revealed.

wrote above.

And if we build a military "rating" of those responsible for the military failure in the first weeks of the war, then it will look, in my opinion, like this: Pavlov, Zhukov, Timoshenko, commanders of the Red Army military branches, Kirponos. And in the civil "rating" I would give the first position to Khrushchev.

The party and state leadership of Belarus, starting with the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko, it was also, of course, not without

sin ... There is a collection of documents "The Hidden Truth of War: 1941" of the 1992 edition. Slandering Stalin, viciously anti-Soviet in its spirit, it is nevertheless a collection of reliable documents.

Regarding Belarus, I will quote from there only two paragraphs from an extensive memorandum dated July 5, 1941, by the military prosecutor of the Vitebsk garrison, a military lawyer of the 3rd rank Glinka to the military prosecutor of the Western Front, military jurist Rumyantsev. This note is not only informative, but also good in a purely professional sense. In it, I found, by the way, confirmation that under Beria the NKVD could not think of any violations of the law. So, *in wartime*, the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Vitebsk region, Motavkin, and the deputy commissar of the NKVD of Belarus, Ptashkin, **asked**

Release Glinka from legal liability for allowing arbitrariness on

relatively

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to the prisoners of the head of the Vitebsk prison, sergeant GB Priemyshev.

Asked!

And the prosecutor of the garrison officially qualified the "behavior of these persons" as outrageous.

However, I promised the reader two paragraphs from the document and I quote them:

"Local regional authorities are dissatisfied with the work of the head of the garrison, Colonel Redchenkov, saying that he does not provide work and can fail. In my opinion, he is simply not able to cover the whole huge mass of issues and needs concrete business help. I suggested to the secretaries of the regional committee and its first secretary comrade. STULOV to send party workers to help him, of whom there are a lot of people in Vitebsk, but they all go around idle. These are secretaries of regional committees and district committees of other regions, members of the Central Committee, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. However, the regional committee did not accept my proposal, saying that he, the head of the garrison, could find people for himself ...

Regional bodies, including the regional committee and the regional executive committee (comrade STULOV, comrade RYABTSEV) ... were late with many measures, as a result of which an anxious mood, panic, flight, confusion and disorganization appeared in the city, i.e. something appeared that Comrade warned against. STALIN in his speech.

The picture is ugly, and although the Germans occupied Minsk on the sixth day of the war, it is difficult to justify the Belarusian Central Committee. A huge war has begun, and many professional representatives of the political vanguard of society cannot find a job ...

In Belarus, however, everything was complicated by military time pressure. And Khrushchev in Ukraine had enough time to turn the republic into a fortress. In addition, only Khrushchev was a member of the country's top leadership, was a member of the Politburo. When the central apparatus of the NKVD carried out the operation of Captain Adamovich in 1940, Khrushchev was furious, declaring that the Ukrainian, they say, the NKVD and Ivan

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Serov could have done everything themselves! But then the war began, and Khrushchev, instead of promptly "embroidering" the emerging problems of civil and economic life, began to pose as a strategist, misinforming Stalin and complicating the situation for Kirponos.

And on July 6, the head of the Political Propaganda Department of the Southwestern Front, Brigadier Commissar Mikhailov, reported to the Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, army commissar 1st rank Mekhlis:

"In some areas, party and Soviet organizations are showing

exceptional distraction and panic. Some district leaders left with their families long before the districts were evacuated.

The leaders of the ~~Novograd-Volynsky~~ Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky, Tarnopolsky districts fled in a panic long before the withdrawal of our units, and instead of taking out state material values, they took out personal belongings with the transport at their disposal ... "

On July 11, the same Mikhailov reported on the flight of the secretaries of the district committees of the CP (b) U Khmel'nitsky, Yanushpolsky, Ulanovsky districts ... This is Vinnytsia, it is already close to Kyiv. And that's all - Khrushchev's footage. But he did not put them against the wall. And why? They will still be useful to him after 1953 ...

Perhaps that is why Khrushchev lied so vilely after 1953 about Stalin. By blaming everything on Stalin, it was easier to "wind up" the question of the extent of one's own guilt. And many of the representatives of the post-war "marshall" and the generals were his natural allies here, because they also did not need the truth about how the war began.

After the war, Stalin generously did not make public the fact that not only Pavlov, but almost the entire military leadership, criminally missed the war. After all, readiness for war is determined not even by whether certain units met it in the trenches, but by how these units are trained, how they are equipped, how army life was organized before the war.

In principle, it was much easier to arrange everything here than in the national economy, because the army does not produce anything, it only consumes. And the generals only needed

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request, receive, distribute and teach subordinates of all levels to use distributed. The generals, however, could not do before the war

quite even this.

And someone clearly betrayed.

What was left for Stalin? After all, just before June 22, he found himself in a very difficult position. He hoped for the generals, and he failed the cause of the war even before it began.

And more than that! If I am right in my assumption that Merkulov was inspected on June 19-20, then we must add the following ... Suppose, after Merkulov's report, Stalin even suspected Pavlov of outright betrayal. After all, even in this case, he could not order his arrest before the start of the war! He could not, because the arrest at such a moment of just an **alleged** traitor in such a post is no less dangerous for the general tone of the army than leaving him in place.

But then the war began. The alleged failure became a fact. What to do? After the failures, it was impossible not to punish anyone at all - it was necessary to show the generals that the patience of Stalin and the Motherland was over. However, it was also impossible to punish many - now it was necessary to fight with someone!

At the same time, even knowing for sure that someone had betrayed, it was again dangerous to openly judge and shoot him as a direct traitor, because official information about the direct betrayal of part of the generals would make any command and control impossible for obvious reasons.

Therefore, Stalin did not point his finger at *the obvious* and remained silent. And he explained the military failure by the suddenness and perfidy of the attack. The fact that he covered up the sins, and even the betrayal of someone from the military leadership, was known to a very limited circle of people, some of whom, moreover, died or were shot.

Then it was necessary to fight again ... And when the Victory came - was it worth it to stir up the past?

Stalin thought so - he did not know that after his death almost all of his

marshals (except Rokossovsky) will behave more or less meanly and allow Khru

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Shchev and others to slander their supreme leader, and even the dirt themselves will be applied to his grave.

And to this day, it was not they who were guilty of the failure of the first days of the war, but the "tyrant Stalin" together with the "executioner" Beria, of course. After all, Beria "criminally brushed aside" the warnings of the "secret collaborators" Almaz and Carmen.

HOWEVER, at the end of June 1941, the Victory was still far away - it was necessary to solve many cases at once and rebuild the government of the country on a military footing.

Both the plans for the democratization of the country and the hope for alternative elections in December 1941 were pushed back into an indefinite future. The real power was to be exclusively executive power.

And then Stalin...

And then Stalin, it seems, experienced a moment of weakness ... And one can understand him - after all, he was the same person as everyone else ... And the number of nerve cells was the same, and the number of kilometers of nerves, and the heart was one, and the same five liters of blood.

And then there's the responsibility...

Moreover, he knew that, as the head of state, he did everything right: he was careful in time, and he threw aside hesitation in time, in time sanctioning the army and navy to start putting troops on alert. But he was let down...

And how let down! A week of war has passed, and Minsk has already fallen, the Germans have perli and perli forward ...

And Stalin, it seems, really went to the nearest dacha. Firstly, he was wildly tired during this first week ... And he wanted to be alone and alone with himself ... Secondly, depression could fall on him.

The moment of the crisis, if it was, must be attributed to the days of June 29 and 30. On the eve of June 28, Stalin received more than two dozen people, including Timoshenko, Zhukov, the head of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, Golikov, authorized orders and orders dated June 29.

From 22.00 to 22.10 on June 28, he had Spanish pilots

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Suprun and Stefanovsky were commanders of test regiments formed on Suprun's initiative. The time of stay in the Stalinist office of the most interesting visitors for us was distributed on June 28 as follows:

Molotov 19.35—	00.50
Malenkov 19.35—	23.10
Merkulov 19.45—	May 20
Beria	22.40— 00.05
Mikoyan	23.30— 00.50
Merkulov 00.00—	00.15

As you can see, all the time - from 19.35 to almost one in the morning on June 29 at Stalin's

Molotov sat alone, but half an hour before midnight, Mikoyan entered the office, where Beria was then, and remained there with Molotov until the end.

Of all those who passed through Stalin's office that day, only these two were professional revolutionaries and had known the owner of the office even before the revolution. And they didn't just know each other, but together with him they were preparing this revolution ... So the conversation at the end of the "day" was probably *all kinds* - not only business.

And then in the "Journal of visits ..." - a two-day failure. It was then, on the evening of the 29th, it seems that Molotov and Beria went to see Stalin. In a letter written in 1953 in a cell addressed to Malenkov, but addressed to all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Beria reminded Molotov:

*You remember very well when at the beginning of the war it was very bad and after our conversation with Comrade Stalin at his nearby dacha, you put the question point-blank in your office in the Council of Ministers that it was necessary to save the situation, we must immediately organize a center that would lead the defense of our homeland, I fully supported you then and suggested that you immediately call Comrade Malenkov to a meeting ... After that ... we all went to Comrade Stalin and convinced him [about] the immediate organization of the Committee for the Defense of the Country ...*

So, there was some kind of trip, and they took with them not only Malenkov, but also Kaganovich, Mikoyan ... And there were, presumably, sad conversations with Stalin - sad

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including because Stalin, a week after the start of the war, could well have experienced a deep mental crisis.

Temporary...

However, he quickly, in a matter of tens of hours, overcame it, and this crisis did not affect the general situation. Already on July 1, Stalin was again in his Kremlin office and until the end of the war harnessed himself to the daily military webbing. But on July 1, he received a few, but from 16.50 to 19.00 he talked with two: Timoshenko and Zhukov.

What they talked about remained between them and God, but perhaps Stalin told them everything he thought about them and about the top generals of the Red Army as a whole. And perhaps he, with all the harshness of his tone, spoke only about the case, having first familiarized himself with the current situation in detail. After all, he already understood that soon he himself would have to take charge of not only the rear, but also the front.

In terms of the direct conduct of the war, the Headquarters of the High Command, on July 10, transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command, headed by Stalin, received full power.

As for the rest, according to the Constitution, power belonged to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. But now it was necessary to bring everything into one fist, and on June 30, 1941, by a joint decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the State Defense Committee was formed.

Here is how the one-volume encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945", published by the publishing house "Soviet Encyclopedia" in 1985:

"The State Defense Committee (GKO) is the extraordinary supreme state body of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which concentrated all power. <...> Initial composition: I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov (deputy chairman), K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov. Later, N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesensky, A.I. Mikoyan were introduced into the State Defense Committee (encyclopedists of the Central Committee of the CPSU "forgot" about A.M. Kaganovich, introduced into the State Defense Committee, like the last two mentioned members, in February 1942,

Bulganin became a member of the GKO in general in 1944. - S.K.) ... "

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Excuse me, but where is the member of the State Defense Committee *since June 30, 1941*, the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (that is, the second person after Stalin in a warring country) since 1944, and he, since its formation in 1944, has been the Chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee L.P. Beria?

It was cut out of the history of the country and here. That is, even forty years after the Victory, the slightest mention of the name of Beria in an officially positive context was impossible. Nothing has changed here to this day, and I consider it simply shameful that even in 2005, in the capital work "The domestic military-industrial complex and its historical development" among GKO members L.P. Beria is again not mentioned.

But with the beginning of the war, Lavrenty Pavlovich ...

And here I am, my dear reader, lost!

Even an extremely dry, but *complete* story about Beria's activities during the war years would result in a separate thick book.

And what to do here?

First, list to the end all his duties and assignments during wars, and then consistently talk about them at least briefly?

Or immediately begin a consistent story, moving from duty to duties and simultaneously exposing the next anti-Beria myths?

Perhaps I will choose something in between, saying for now that the day before the creation of the State Defense Committee, by special order of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 00101 dated June 29, 1941, Beria was introduced to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. The previous order No. 00100 was assigned to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade. Beria L.P. the matter of forming 15 new divisions, which we will discuss later.

On July 20, 1941, the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security were again merged into one People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs under Beria's hand. And later he will have to visit the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, organizing the defense of the Caucasus.

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But now he, as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, had two main tasks...

Two?

No, three!

Three?

No, four!

Four?

No, five!

Five?

No, not even five, but more! And, I emphasize, only as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs!

Let us dwell, however, on the first five tasks. Now Beria had:

- 1) the formation of new formations on the basis of the NKVD troops, primarily the border troops;
- 2) the creation of barrage detachments to protect the rear of the fronts;
- 3) organizing reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind the front line, as well as the partisan movement;
- 4) Chekist counterintelligence (that is, countering enemy intelligence, including radio games, etc.), combating sabotage, protecting strategic

objects...

And, of course: 5) external illegal intelligence of the NKVD, again passed under the hand of Beria.

In addition, military counterintelligence returned to the NKVD - Special Departments, which in February 1941 were transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy and transformed into the Third Directorate of these People's Commissariats. And now it was necessary to rebuild everything again - on the go.

Oh yes! I also forgot among the primary questions of economic activities of the NKVD! And then they themselves demanded a lot of attention!

And this, my dear reader, is not all the problems that he had to deal with only through the NKVD. And he soon turned out to have so many different heterogeneous lines that one could get confused in them, as in a thick cobweb, if ...

If 42-year-old Lavrenty Beria were not a master at unraveling any tangle of problems.

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LET'S START rewinding the lines of his military fate and we ... So, State Defense Committee...

On July 3, 1941, Academician Vernadsky, while in the Uzkoysan sanatorium of the Academy of Sciences, wrote in his diary:

*"On July 1, 1941, the State Defense Committee was formed from Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria. In general, it is clear that this is the ideological dictatorship of Stalin.*

But the point was not in the "ideological dictatorship" (Vernadsky often hit the sky in his political assessments), but in the need for effective, concrete, daily and comprehensive management of the entire matter of the war, except for the direct problems of conducting military operations. In modern warfare, the rear meant at least as much as the front. And sometimes even more.

Therefore, Stalin had to distribute the supreme power among those who entered the emergency supreme state body of the USSR, and entrust each with a specific, as they say, area of work.

Who could do what in the first composition of the State Defense Committee?

Klim Voroshilov...

He was good where he was good. But, alas, by 1941 there were not so many areas of application of his nature. He was a politician, and he understood military affairs, but he could no longer pull much. One way or another, in the first period of the war, he was busy at the front, commanding the troops of the North-Western direction, and then - the Leningrad Front. Contrary to the slander erected against him, in August-September 1941 he did a lot to deter the Germans rushing to Leningrad. Replacing him with Zhukov is justified, but it must be taken into account that Zhukov was very lucky, although neither he nor Stalin knew about it then ... And it was lucky that Zhukov's appointment coincided with Hitler's decision in early October 1941 to stop the assault on the Russian northern capital and go to her blockade.

That is, the troops exhausted the Germans under the leadership - whatever one may say - Voroshilov. And Zhukov in many ways only reaped the fruits of the collective efforts of two months. Nevertheless, Voroshilov as an active bayonet by the winter of 1941 could not be taken into account. Especially when it comes to economic management.

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Second in the GKO after Stalin was his deputy Vyacheslav Molotov. However, he never did purely economic work: for this he had neither business acumen, nor sufficient special education, nor practical experience. He was first and foremost a political figure, and a typical "second



number". He was the "second number" under Stalin, dealing mainly with foreign policy affairs. The function is always important, and especially during the war. But what about the economy?

Kaganovich had a grasp, he knew the industry, but more in its public, so to speak, part. And now it was necessary to supervise the production of weapons with a confident hand, which Kaganovich would hardly have pulled.

Malenkov and Beria remained.

Sometimes in the West they are written about as a "tandem of technocrats", but if we give Georgy Malenkov an extremely harsh assessment, then we can say: a figure of the "listened-decided" type, that is, an "apparatchik", a functionary. And although he practically graduated from the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, his life flowed among the office desks of the Moscow City Party Committee and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Of course, Malenkov had to deal with the economy a lot. But he achieved no more than average success. Kaganovich recalled him: "A cultured man, but he did not shine with knowledge of economic life."

So who shined with us? And just the "forgotten" by the "encyclopedists" of the Brezhnev era, a member of the State Defense Committee Comrade. L.P. Beria.

Beria took almost the entire economy on himself in the State Defense Committee. Together with, of course, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Commissar of Defense of the USSR Comrade Stalin.

Only Stalin could bear the burden of Stalin. However, only Beria could bear the burden of Beria. And she yielded only to Stalin's workload, because during the war years Lavrenty Pavlovich was "only" deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee and chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, permanent adviser to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, candidate

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then a member of the Politburo, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

Kaganovich, Voznesensky and Mikoyan, who later became members of the State Defense Committee, relieved Beria and Malenkov to some extent, but only in quite certain areas.

As for Politburo member Khrushchev, his role in the war turned out to be exactly what he was able to play in times of formidable trials, that is, insignificant. The "closest ally" and "faithful disciple" of Stalin spent the entire war as members of the Military Councils of the fronts, without experiencing even a hundredth of the load that fell on Beria. No wonder Zhukov in his memoirs remembered Khrushchev in the sense that, hungry, he tried to call on him, an indispensable member of the Military Council of one or another front, knowing that Nikita Sergeevich can always have a good bite to eat.

Khrushchev's business level is determined by his famous "acquaintance" resolution on documents. Shepilov, who later recognized him well "and joined them," certifies Khrushchev as a complete ignoramus, but apart from Shepilov, we have such characteristics in abundance. The same Shepilov said, however, and so: "Khrushchev was densely uneducated, but he had a good head." If we add: "And also the subtly cunning and vile nature of the ideal pretender", then this will be the "gentleman's set", due to which Khrushchev kept "afloat".

So, one of the main lines of Beria's fate in the war was work in the State Defense Committee. And in order to give her a general assessment, I will use the information from the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953, published by the Democracy Foundation. This is the most reliable way to deprive Beria's haters of the opportunity to object, because this is what is recognized for

Lavrenty Pavlovich the "democrats" themselves:

"By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of February 4, 1942 on the distribution of responsibilities between its (GKO. - S.K.) members of Beria, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of aircraft and engines, issues of the formation of the Air Force, in addition, in the future, Beria was charged

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control over the implementation of decisions on the production of weapons, mortars, ammunition, tanks, as well as monitoring the work of three people's commissariats: the oil, coal industry and communications. In 1944, Stalin appointed Beria Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, which considered all current issues.

Some things are not mentioned in this certificate, but in general it reflects the military Lavrenty Pavlovich's load is correct, although with chronological inaccuracies.

Why Stalin instructed Beria to oversee aviation issues is understandable: in 1939-1941, sandwiches for Andrei Tupolev were prepared by NKVD officers. And during the time that TsKB-29 of the NKVD existed, Beria gained "aviation" experience. Although it is often believed that Malenkov supervised aviation. Yes, I supervised - when production was more or less established. And supervised insufficiently carefully and not very competently.

But how to understand the turnover "in addition, in the future control was entrusted to Beria ...", etc.? Yes, and to understand that those on whom this control was entrusted at the beginning, failed. And Stalin transferred their duties to Beria. As you know, a person is loaded as much as he can carry. And Beria carried as much as they loaded him.

That's where they loaded it.  
Since the beginning of the war!

I REMIND the reader what Lavrenty Pavlovich wrote in a letter to Malenkov after his arrest in June 1953:

*"The first weeks of the war, when there was nothing to cover the Western Front - which the Germans strongly pressed ... Our joint work to create, under the leadership of the State Committee, the Headquarters and personally Comrade Stalin, the Reserve Front to protect the approaches to Moscow ... For the Reserve Front alone, 15 full-blooded Chekist military divisions were organized ... "*

The last of the works mentioned above was for Beria the first major success in the war and his first major military service to the people. Already on June 29, 1941 was

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an order was issued by the Headquarters of the High Command on the formation of rifle and mechanized divisions from the personnel of the NKVD troops.

Here is its full text:

"Proceed immediately to the formation of 15 divisions, of which 10 are rifle and 5 are motorized. For the formation of divisions, use part of the personnel of the commanding and rank and file of the border and internal troops of the NKVD.

Missing personnel to be covered from the reserve. Formation of divisions to assign to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs comrade. Beria L.P.

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to provide the emerging divisions with human and material resources and weapons at the request of the NKVD.

*Headquarters of the High Command*

*TYMOSHENKO*

*STALIN*

*ZHUKOV".*

Of course, Beria did not stand on the parade ground, doing drill. Like

always, and everywhere, he first of all selected competent performers, and left behind himself the functions of control and prompt solution of those of the emerging problems that his subordinates could not solve.

And for the formation of Chekist divisions, Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov did a lot - Beria's Chekist ally in the Transcaucasus. Having come to the leadership of the NKVD, Beria pulled him to Moscow as well. And it was, as always, a good choice. After all, Beria had an accurate eye on people!

On the same day, June 29, 1941, Beria issues an order that says:

"1. The leadership of the formation is entrusted to my deputy lieutenant general comrade. Maslennikov.

2. When Comrade. Maslennikov to create a task force consisting of five Human.

3. Start forming divisions immediately.

4. For the formation of these divisions, allocate from the personnel of the NVD troops according to 1000 people ordinary and junior commanders  
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of the leading composition and 500 people each. command and command staff for each division. For the rest of the staff, apply to the General Staff of the Red Army for a call from the reserve of all categories of military personnel.

5. The concentration of personnel allocated from the NKVD troops to be completed by July 17 this year".

The border guards of the border districts have already fought - some in the troops for the protection of the rear of the fronts, some surrounded or in combat units. And the new KGB divisions were formed primarily due to the best personnel of the border troops of the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Central Asian, Turkmen and Trans-Baikal districts. It was a decision that was both correct and non-standard, because exposing even minor sections of the border was still a risky business.

But the risk was justified, and from distant border circles to the places of formation, in particular, to Yaroslavl, in a matter of days (in 8-11 days) from Transcaucasia and Central Asia, 3,000 commanders and 10,000 sergeants and privates arrived.

Plus - 500 people each from the personnel of the units of the Leningrad, Baltic, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Moldavian border districts that emerged from the encirclement.

Total - more than 15 thousand combat core for 15 divisions. Strong shots were also taken from the reserve. And the border guards played the role of alloying additives in ordinary steel. And the fusion turned out great!

Almost all command positions in the divisions were occupied by border guards. Graduates of the Kharkov Cavalry Border School became platoon commanders, students of the Higher Border School became battalion commanders.

The first year of the war was a bitter year for the Soviet border guards - after all, then tens of thousands of our guys died, beautiful, devoted to the Motherland and professionally able to defend it. However, the same year became a "star" year for the Soviet border guards, because never before or after the importance of the border troops for the country was so significant - given that then the very fate of the state was decided in a matter of months, and the border guards for

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in the same few months, they did as much as, perhaps, no one else to ensure its future.

On the KGB emblem - a shield and a sword. The Chekists-border guards could not be a sword during the first battles with the enemy - it was covered with too strong armor

enemy, and the sword of the army had to get it through this armor. But the border guards became a shield for the country, holding back and holding back the onslaught, weakening it and winning the main condition of future victory in those days - time.

It was truly a collective feat accomplished on the scale of war and history almost instantly. And in the way it was accomplished, Beria's style was visible. However, he would not be able to impose his style on the work of subordinates if he interfered in the details. He gave the right impulse, the initial push in the right direction, and after that he moved on to another task. He didn't have two or three of them. And not even five!

If everything went as it should, Beria further limited himself to receiving operational information about the progress of affairs. If something went wrong, he quickly corrected the situation and again gave the initiative to subordinates. So it was here! The decision to partially expose non-belligerent borders is up to the people's commissar. Moreover, it was not for nothing that Beria widely used the Transcaucasian border guards - after all, they were, in fact, his direct pupils.

So he gave a directive. And then - help only when it is needed.

The knocking together of six divisions of the first stage took place at the pace of Beria - ahead of schedule, because the front did not wait. Of course, two days to put together is very little. But in the zone of the former ZAPOVO, the current Western Front, a huge gap formed through which German troops poured and poured into Russia. And Beria's cadres had to close the gap.

The oath was taken on the way and at combat positions - this was dictated by the extremely difficult situation at the front. All fifteen divisions went where it was most difficult. Ten divisions (243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254 and 256th) - to the Western Front, five (265, 268, 262, 257 and 259th) - to the North-Western.

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And already a new problem arose... The frontier battle was lost by the army, and now it was necessary to think about the advance organization of defense in the Moscow strategic direction. And this was exactly what Beria wrote about in his letter from the cell ...

On July 14, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (on July 10, the State Defense Committee transformed the Headquarters of the Civil Code into the Headquarters of the Higher Command) issues order No. 00334 on the creation of a front of reserve armies at the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk to prepare for a stubborn defense. The front included six armies (29th, 30th, 24th, 28th, 31st and 32nd), four of which were commanded by border guards: the 30th - head of the troops of the Ukrainian border district, Major General V.A. Khomenko, who later died a heroic death; 31st - Chief of the troops of the Karelian-Finnish border district, Major General V.N. Dalmatov; 24th - Chief of the troops of the Baltic border district, Major General K.I. Rakutin. The Deputy People's Commissar, Lieutenant General Ivan Maslennikov, having formed Chekist divisions, accepted the 29th Army. He will fight valiantly and skillfully, end the war as an army general, commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of four Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov I degree, two orders of Kutuzov I degree.

In October 1948, from the post of commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, he returned to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs as deputy minister, but not Beria, but Kruglov. He will remain so even after the death of Stalin, but now he is again the deputy of Beria, who returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And shoot himself on April 16, 1954 - less than a year after the death of his military commissar during the war.

So, of the six armies that covered Moscow in the summer of 1941, four were commanded by border generals. Front commander of the reserve armies

a border guard was also appointed - the former head of the troops of the Belarusian border district, Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov.

On July 30, the front of the reserve armies was transformed into the Reserve Front under command of G.K. Zhukov (he invited Bogdanov as his deputy).

Let's calculate...

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On the western border, the war was met by about a hundred thousand border guards, and almost everyone fought for several army men. In fact, the border guards then became the last reserve of command at all levels, at whose disposal the soldiers of Beria turned out to be the will of fate and a military accident.

At the same time, until September 25, 1941, the border troops themselves had peacetime states, that is, they did not have means of reinforcement: anti-tank weapons, artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns ... After all, the border guards protect the border from violators, and do not reflect the aggression of the enemy. Fighting is the task of the army.

However, as in the Finnish war, the army command used the border units with might and main (meaning not 15 divisions of the NKVD, but border commandant's offices, border detachments, border regiments). But not always allocated them means of strengthening. However, the border guards in any "format" were a formidable and persistent force.

By the second half of July, in addition to the 100,000 border guards already at war, the country received at least 100,000 soldiers of border condition, the backbone of which was 15,000 of the best border guards. And the fact that, on the one hand, it was they who were thrown to close the breakthrough, and on the other hand, Stalin also instructed the border guards to occupy a new strategic line, speaks of the outstanding role of the border troops in the initial period of the war.

However, this role was already belittled in the very first capital studies on the Great Patriotic War.

Why?

Yes, because you evaluate the border troops on their merits, and you can run into the question: "And who was responsible for the formation of these 15 divisions?"

The impossibility of the answer immediately programmed the exception of the conditions for the question. Therefore, I spoke in such detail about the border troops. Their military history is also part of Beria's military biography.

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The SECOND and third major purely front-line affairs of Beria began with the beginning of the war:

- management of the work of the Special Departments in the Red Army and the RKKE, returned from NPO and NK VMF in the NKVD;
- organization of the activities of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear, including - the guard detachments that were part of them.

In the kitchens of many intellectual apartments, they used to sing: "This company was machine-gunned by its own barrage detachment." Today, these songs are "sung" to schoolchildren already in high school.

But, firstly, it is unlikely that in the history of the real, and not the Vasily-Aksenov war, there is at least one episode when some *company* was shot by some kind of barrage detachment. Although there were Soviet soldiers shot by barrage detachments. After all, there was a war. And in war they shoot - both at those who stand in the way of victory, and at those who deviate from this path.

But the Soviet rifle companies were also "shot" ... Or rather, they shot at the Wehrmacht military personnel in battles at the front ... And no one blamed the companies for this and does not blame them to this day. But the cowards who fled from the battlefield were the same enemies of Russia as the invaders who invaded it. Let me remind you that there was a war

where they shoot both at those who came to your land as an enemy, and at those who betrayed their land.

As for the barrage detachments, there were two different types of them. **And those barrage detachments, to which the NKVD of Beria was related, never ensured the combat stability of the troops!**

The latter function has always been the prerogative of the barrage detachments.

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO).

There is different information about the time of the creation of the first barrage detachments of both the NKVD and the NPO, but the earliest ones are found in the documents of 1941

of the year.

Here is an extract from the order to the troops of the Western Front No. 010 dated July 9, 1941 "On streamlining the use of vehicles and organizing traffic on dirt roads", signed by the front commander  
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Shalom Timoshenko, member of the Military Council, army commissar 1st rank Mekhlis and chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General Malandin:

"6. To the head of the rear guard of the Western Front, Lieutenant General Sokolov (the same one, the border guard. - S.K.) on the line of control and administrative stations of the front Rzhev, Vyazma, Zapoznaya, Fayansovaya, Bryansk, Shostka, set up barrage detachments with the task of detaining all illegally following vehicles and send them from the Smolensk region to the head of the rear department of the headquarters of the Western Front ... "

And no later than July 15, 1941, four controllers of the People's Commissariat of State Control reported to People's Commissar Mekhlis (he is also a member of the Military Council of the Western Front): "... The delay of idly wandering cars occurs through the commandant of the city and the NKVD barrage detachment. On average, 2-3 cars a day, which are transferred to the collection point ... "

And here is a quote from a memorandum dated July 5, 1941 by the prosecutor of the Vitebsk garrison Glinka, already familiar to the reader:

"I have received a message that the head of the blocking detachment of the NPO, quartermaster of the 1st rank MYSLOV, shot without trial the people's judge of the Tolotsinsky district, comrade. Abramovich for the fact that the latter ... accidentally fired a shot at the ceiling in his office. <...> I ask ... consent to the arrest ... MYSLOV with the transfer of the case to the VT (military tribunal. - S.K.) under Art. 180 of the Criminal Code (Criminal Code. — S.K.)". As you can see, the NKVD detachments detained cars, but the head of the NPO detachment detachment (not the NKVD!) "shone" a tribunal for reckless and reckless massacre of people. But "hands in blood", of course, have "henchmen of Beria."

But beloved even by the "democrats", Army General (future Marshal) Zhukov, having taken command of the Leningrad Front, on September 18, 1941, initiates a resolution of the Front's Military Council on intensifying the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad and instructs the creation of three barrier lines

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for some reason, it was precisely the subordinates of the "executioner" Beria ... And no one accuses Zhukov of having blood on his hands up to the elbows.

I have already noted that General Sokolov, mentioned above, is the same "borderline" Sokolov. And it was among his subordinates that the famous Tamantsev from Bogomolov's Moment of Truth "held the regime" in 1941 ("In August forty-four ...").

I can remind you:

"The tasks and duties of our border regiment, which at that moment held checkpoint and barrage regimes on the waste from Orsha, only

officially - by order - included:

guidance and maintenance of proper order in the rear of the front;

verification of documents, and, if necessary - in case of suspicion - and personal belongings ...;

protection of the most important facilities and ensuring the uninterrupted operation of communications;

detention and delivery to assembly points of Red Army soldiers and commanders who arbitrarily leave for the rear; catching and arresting deserters;

regulation of traffic on the roads and evacuation; maximum load of all transport ...;

and, of course, in the first place - the capture and destruction of German spies and saboteurs ...

All this was part of our tasks and duties officially, by order, and what we did not do just then - you can't list! "I even had to take birth."

Someone might say: "Well, this is literature!" No, not in this case.  
literature, but real life.

SOMETIMES, the NKVD detachments are compared (believing that this "whitewashes" them) with the Wehrmacht Feldjäger or the American military police "MP" - military police. I think this comparison is insulting to the memory of those of our guys who became the prototypes of the same Tamantsev. But some of the functions were similar: the fight against enemy agents

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in the rear of the fronts, with marauders, brawlers, deserters; protection of communications. And during the period of the first retreat - and guidance of an elementary order of movement on the roads.

Perhaps an adequate idea of the NKVD detachments of Beria is given by the following document:

*"Top secret*

*To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR To the General Commissar of State Security Comrade BERIA*

REFERENCE

From the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and NKVD detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front.

Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 military personnel by the NKVD detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.

Of those detained by the Special Departments, 25,878 people were arrested, the remaining 632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front. Among those arrested by the Special Departments:

spies - 1505;

saboteurs - 308;

traitors - 2621;

cowards and alarmists - 2643;

deserters - 8772;

disseminators of provocative rumors - 3987;

self-shooters - 1671;

others - 4371;

Total - 25 878.

By the decisions of the Special Departments and by the verdicts of the Military Tribunals 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot in front of the line.

*Deputy early Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR Commissioner of State. security rank 3 S. Miliutin.*

Perhaps if I stated the content of this reference in my own words, it would be easier for the reader to read the book. However, the author has always believed and still believes that it is better not to *state*

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facts *according to documents*, but to *communicate them* to the reader *in the form of documents*.

And only by informing them, one can express one's *own* thoughts and opinions to the reader ... And when it comes to Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, citing documents is simply necessary, because nothing exposes a lie so convincingly as a genuine document. And lies about Beria have accumulated over the years - the sea is spilled ...

Of course, the reader may ask: "And you, the author, vouch for the authenticity of the fact?" Well, I cite as evidence only those documents that I consider authentic. And those that I consider obviously false, I cite in order to show their falsity to the best of my ability ... So it will probably be the most true ..

So, the NKVD barrage detachments did not sit behind the backs of those who occupied forward lines of trenches. This was the work of the NPO guard detachments.

Their appearance is usually associated with the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense USSR Stalin No. 227 of July 28, 1942, where, in particular, it was said:

"... Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.

From now on, the iron law of discipline for every commander, Red Army soldier, political worker should be the requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command ...

The Supreme High Command of the Red Army orders:

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland ... "

The same order prescribed within the front

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to form from one to three penal battalions (800 people each), where to send the guilty middle and senior commanders and political workers (and not the "brave" criminals).

Within the army, it was ordered to form from five to ten penal companies (from 150 to 200 people each) for guilty ordinary soldiers and junior commanders.

So it was in the summer of 1942. However, we have already seen that NPO detachments appeared immediately after the start of the war, which was understandable: the first task of the detachments of the very first days of the war was not to shoot or stop the fleeing crowd with machine-gun fire ... Their first task, like the NKVD detachments, was to collect retreating military personnel who somehow lost their units or lagged behind them, send them to assembly points and etc.

But when the retreat sometimes began to take on the character of flight and when the war became more positional, the functions of the army detachments changed. And here I will again refer to the "democrats" of the Yakovlev Foundation. Well, if they do not hang all the "dogs" on the Soviet government, then this means that there is definitely nothing to "hang"! Even the Democrats.

So, in the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" on page 408 in note 30 to section II says:

"The first barrage detachments were created in 1941. Rate Directive



The Supreme Command of September 5, 1951, the commander of the Bryansk Front, A. Eremenko, was allowed (not ordered! - S.K.) to create detachments in those divisions that had proven themselves to be unstable. The detachments were instructed to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units from their positions, "and in case of flight, to stop, using weapons if necessary." By order of the NPO No. 227 of July 28, 1942, the Military Councils and army commanders were obliged to form from 3 to 5 well-armed detachments.

After the stabilization of the situation at the front at the end of 1942, barrage detachments were used as part of the NKVD units to protect the rear of the Army in the field. In accordance with the order of the NPO No. 349 of October 29, 1944, the detachments were disbanded.

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That's the whole truth about the "bloody" barrage detachments, allegedly shooting their own companies. But those who sang stupid infamy would do well to think about this: who will hold the front after the detachment shoots the company standing (in the sense of lying) in front of it? After all, then the detachment itself will be in the position of the company.

Therefore, the army barriers directly in the front line area, if ever they fired, then over their heads - to intimidate and clear their brains. And in rare cases, they could shoot the commander of a fleeing company.

In those days when he was sitting in the bunker after his arrest, Beria also remembered the detachments. I will soon cite that part of the letter of 1953 to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which I only "announced" at the beginning of the book, and then the reader will see that the former Commissar of Internal Affairs was proud of his involvement in the stabilization of the front in 1941. And not because of "executive inclinations", of course, but because it was really a merit from any point of view!

What does it mean to ensure barrage measures in the frontline zone **at the cost of only ten thousand executions in the first four months of the most difficult confusion?** This means acting professionally, prudently, and not poking everyone in a row unnecessarily with a gun in the mouth. But the manner of behavior of subordinates is to a large extent determined by the manner of behavior and the requirements of the boss. If Beria had threatened in vain with executions of the minelayers "for failure to comply ...", "for lack of rigidity ...", etc., if he had demanded "percentage" from the Special Departments and the command of the barrage detachments, then there could have been much blood more.

And innocent.

Moreover, if for the People's Commissariat of Defense the excessively high numbers of "wrapped" and shot were not desirable (after all, they would indirectly show the low level of stability of the army), then for the NKVD there was objectively a temptation to get carried away with "numbers" in the spirit of "war will write everything off" objectively. However, People's Commissar Beria never suffered from any kind of "percent mania" - especially in cases where blood could be shed. So, the subordinates did not suffer from it either.

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And NOW the time has come to tell the reader that part of Beria's letter, written by him after his arrest, where the names of Pervukhin and Saburov are mentioned ... And we already know enough about the author of the letter to read what he wrote in 1953 with understanding. Moreover, these confessions of Beria are important not only for a better understanding of his activities in the pre-war and war period in the NKVD ... They additionally illuminate his previous work in the Transcaucasus ... And his future fate too.

Reflecting on the lines below, we will temporarily digress from the topic Beria in the war, but - I hope - we can better understand his whole life.

So, on July 1, 1953, he wrote to Malenkov (some errors caused by

Beria's excitement, corrected by me):

*"Comrades Pervukhin and Saburov said that I had a privileged position during Comrade Stalin's lifetime. This is not true, Georgy, you know this better than others, other members of the Presidium know this too. In fact, when I worked in the Transcaucasus, and then in Georgia, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Comrade Stalin strongly supported and helped in my work ... <...> (The ellipsis in bold angle brackets replaces the phrase with which I will introduce the reader much later. It does not contain any actual revelations, but **psychologically** it turned out to be so unexpected for me, indicative and confirming the authenticity of the letter, that I will save it for now. - S.K.). But soon after the transfer to Moscow, when a little order was restored in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after Yezhov, Comrade Stalin separated the MGB from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and transferred a special department to the People's Commissariat of Defense. And only at the beginning of the war, when it was necessary to stop the fleeing - retreating our troops, it was again united ... The Ministry of Internal Affairs - the Special Department was returned from the People's Commissariat of Defense. And after the work done to stop the fleeing troops, when several tens of thousands were shot (see Milstein's "Help" with the exact figure. - S.K.) deserters, barrage detachments were created, etc. - the M*  
*T-scham, who worked closely in the Politburo, because it's good for them*

*known... »*

This was written after that meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee (which replaced the Politburo of the Central Committee), at which Beria and the arrest  
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wali. And Beria wrote about what was really well known in the Presidium to everyone, except perhaps for the "young" (by seniority in senior management) Saburov and especially Pervukhin.

Let's try to understand *what* he wrote? And what can we learn from what we read? extract? Perhaps this is...

Many "historians" are now trying to view the processes in the Stalinist leadership from the standpoint of intrigues and the struggle for power - I have already spoken about this. However, there are no objective grounds for this.

None!

To consider some actions of Stalin and his loyal entourage before Stalin's death as intrigues in the struggle for power means to engage in an ahistorical transfer of the atmosphere of today's troubled times, as well as the atmosphere of the Brezhnev and Khrushchev eras, to those Stalinist times that came after the "cleansings" of 1937-1938 years, when the highest echelon of the country's leadership lived for business considerations. And Beria's letter once again confirms: loyal Stalinist employees did not intrigue, but simply worked. And Molotov, and Kaganovich, and Malenkov, and the rest ... And above all -

Beria himself!

Today's unfortunate researchers either consciously substitute some motives for others - subserviently, or do it unconsciously - due to the narrowness of thought and soul. They measure themselves and their own kind and forget - in quotation marks or not - that in Stalin's USSR for those who loyally collaborated with him, higher power meant not more pleasure in an elite sauna, but more responsibility and workload!

Each of them - Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Beria, Voroshilov - would be glad, on the contrary, to get rid of part of the power. It is now: more power - more money and more pleasure.

And then it was the other way around: more power - more work and less pleasure. Supervised, say, Beria or Kaganovich in three industries. And what would they personally get if they supervised five industries? After all, the national economic sectors were not something for them personally.

like a cash cow - as is the case today.

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On the other hand, a major leader of the Stalinist formation was able to do what today the "leader" of the market formation would seem simply impossible! Here is what Beria's colleague and deputy, General Maslennikov, wrote to his wife from the front in 1941:

*"Fights go on daily and the most bloody. Here we are already smashing the fourth division of the Nazis. My army is in good standing ... The cold began, it rained, all the time knee-deep in mud and beyond. collar dripping from the helmet. My daily routine: at 4-5, sometimes at 6 o'clock in the morning I go to bed for an hour or two, then in positions up to 23, and then staff work.*

Beria in Moscow lived in a regime that differed little from Maslennikov's. Only there was no dirt up to the knee and no dripping from the helmet from the collar. Yes, bullets and shrapnel did not fly overhead.

Moreover, both a member of Stalin's close "team" Lavrenty Beria, and a member of Stalin's extended "team" and Beria's close "team" - Ivan Maslennikov, like their other comrades, "loaded" themselves not in the form of clever exchange speculation or resale of a batch of imported "second-hand", and, imagine, in the name of the Motherland.

It is unlikely that for the sake of the opportunity to live *such* a life, someone would start *intrigues*. And Stalin's "team" had no time for intrigues - when would it then deal with those mountains of problems, the presence of which was an objective feature of the grandiose transformation of Russia?

And therefore, even Pervukhin and Saburov, speaking of the allegedly privileged position of Beria, did not mean the privileges that the current "Russian" "authority" is allegedly fighting against and which the current "Russian" "authority" cannot overcome.

Beria, of course, did not have any privileges, if we understand by this what is understood today in the supposedly market "Russian", under Stalin. The "privilege" of his position was that Stalin always allowed Beria to take on the maximum possible.

And since Beria succeeded, he - not for himself, but for the work entrusted to him - received from Stalin the maximum that Stalin could give him. Not to give personally to Beria, but to the cause that he headed.

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That's all Stalin's "favor". And Beria was not bypassed by him never. Especially during the war...

IMMEDIATELY after the merger of the NKVD and the NKGB into one people's commissariat in the State Defense Committee and in the Council for Evacuation under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, a decision was made to partially evacuate the central apparatus from Moscow to Kuibyshev, Chkalovsk, Ufa, Saratov, Kirov, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Kazan, Penza, Molotov (Perm) and Ulyanovsk.

Of the 10,000 central apparatus of the old NKVD, 7,000 were to be evacuated, and from the former NKGB, 7,500 out of 11. A total of 33,000 people left, including family members. And by the end of 1941, 9 thousand people worked in the central office in Moscow, headed by the people's commissar himself.

After the departure to the front of the deputies of the people's commissar I.I. Maslennikov and S.N. Kruglov, the People's Commissar distributed the duties of monitoring the work of the departments and departments of the NKVD between himself and the remaining deputies as follows:

1st Deputy V.N. Merkulov: 2nd (counterintelligence) and 3rd (secret political) directorates, Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin (UKMK), 3rd secret department (searches, arrests, surveillance), 1st department (government security) and Mobilization Department.

I'll tell you right away that on April 14, 1943, top secret

By a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the operational-Chekist structures were again separated from the NKVD, and Merkulov again became People's Commissar of the State Security Service.

**B.Z. Kobulov:** Transport and Economic Directorates and the 6th secret department (Gokhran).

**VS Abakumov:** Directorate of Special Departments (UOO).

On April 21, 1943, by a top secret (of particular importance) GKO resolution No. 3222ss / s, on the basis of the UOO, an independent Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" - "Death to Spies" was created (at first they wanted to call it "Smerinsh" - "Death to Foreign Spies"), and Abakumov headed it.

**I.A. Serov:** Main police departments (GUM), fire departments (GUPO), local air defense

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(GUMPVO), the 1st secret department (accounting and statistics), the Prison Department, the Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees (UPVI) and State Archives (UGA), as well as the Headquarters of Extermination Battalions.

**A.N. Apollonov:** all military departments.

**V.V. Chernyshev:** Main Directorate of Camps (GULAG), Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps (GULZhDS), Directorate of Timber Industry Camps (ULLP) and Logistics (UMTS), Economic Directorate (HOZU), Department of Railway and Water Transportation.

**L.B. Safrazyan:** Main Directorate of Airfield Construction (GUAC) and construction of highways (GUSHOSDOR), Glavgidrostroy.

**A.P. Zavenyagin:** Main Directorate of Camps for the Mining and Metallurgical Industry (GULGMP), Glavpromstroy, Directorate of Camps for the Construction of Kuibyshev Plants and Dalstroy.

In 1945, Beria will take Zavenyagin to the Special Committee and he will become deputy head of the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars - Council of Ministers of the USSR Vannikov, also attracted by Beria to "atomic" affairs.

**B.P. Obruchnikov:** personnel department.

Beria left behind himself the supervision of the work of the 1st Directorate (intelligence abroad, which was led by P.M. Fitin), the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases (it was led by L.E. Vlodzimirsky), the 2nd (operational equipment), 4th (Special Technical Bureau, HF communications) and 5th (ciphers) secret departments, the Secretariat of the Special Conference (OSO, headed by V.V. Ivanov), the Control Inspection Group under the People's Commissar (headed by N.I. Pavlov), the Central Financial and Planning Department (CFPO) and the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR (S.S. Mamulov).

This is what the NKVD was like in July 1941-April 1943. Moreover, without delving into the daily work of those structures of the NKVD that were supervised by his deputies, Beria did not completely lose sight of this work. Otherwise, he would not have been Beria.

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But if other leaders of the NKVD had a range of problems limited to the duties listed above, then Beria had a lot more of them, and in addition to the NKVD. On August 21, 1943, Stalin introduced him, among other things, to the Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from the German invaders (chairman - Malenkov, members: Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky, Andreev).

As for the NKVD, it is significant that Beria personally left the supervision of high-frequency communications, realizing its increased importance. After all, now the troops spoke with Stalin over the high-frequency lines, and Stalin spoke with the troops. So don't

by chance, it was after the start of the war that the NKVD was fully entrusted with ensuring stable secret communications for direct negotiations between the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the fronts and armies. And by order of the NKVD No. 001430 dated October 2, 1941, government HF communications stood out as an independent structure within the People's Commissariat - the Department of Government Communications of the NKVD of the USSR.

And again, on the one hand, the people who control the war, more and more got into the taste of high-frequency communications, but, on the other hand, Beria himself contributed to this in every possible way, constantly expanding the circle of subscribers even on his own initiative.

So, on March 27, 1942, Stalin wrote "For!" on Beria's report on the installation of high-frequency telephone sets at the heads of the rear of the active fronts, and on October 11, 1942, Beria, even without the sanction of the Supreme Commander, ordered the installation of high-frequency devices for the heads of the Air Forces of the Oryol, Stalingrad and North Caucasian districts. Actually, by October 1942, Beria made a decision to bring high-frequency communications to each army operating within the fronts.

And I'll tell you right away about one more unit of the NKVD. As a member of the GKO, Beria was responsible for controlling the production of almost all types of weapons, including mortars. This type of weapon before the war was not appreciated by all the military, despite the obvious combat effectiveness and simplicity. Now mortars were needed in unlimited, so to speak, quantities. As, however,  
And all the rest.

And on September 5, 1941, Beria creates in the NKVD a new, 7th  
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the secret department of the NKVD of the USSR for the security service of mortar weapons, which existed until November 14, 1942, headed by I.M. Tkachenko.

I think that this is also the reason why, despite all the losses of industrial potential, the production of mortars by industry in 1941 increased by 4.34 times compared to the peaceful year of 1940 - from 38 thousand to 165.1 thousand!

This was the style of Beria, expressed most concisely and convincingly - in numbers.

And THAT was his style in the living description of Boris Glebovich Muzrukov. The name of this outstanding organizer of industry, twice Hero  
I mention Socialist Labor in the book for the first time, but by no means for the last time.

He received his first Star on January 20, 1943 as the director of Uralmash for the production of tanks, and the second - on October 29, 1949 as the director of Combine No. 817 - for our first plutonium for the first RDS-1 atomic bomb.

From June 1955 to March 1974, Boris Glebovich was the director of the largest nuclear weapons development center in Arzamas-16 (KB-11, later -  
All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics). But he had known Beria since the war, along the "tank" line.

So, I will quote a book about Muzrukov "I will give all my strength to the Motherland", published in Sarov ("Arzamas-16") in 2004, which also contains the memoirs of another major nuclear scientist, N.Z. Tremasov about what Muzrukov told him about work during the war:

"At first, the tank industry was supervised by Molotov. It was bad ... The aviation workers (who were actually "led" by Beria. - S.K.) have both energy, and fuel, and raw materials, while the tankers are poor and poor. "We," says Boris Glebovich, "asked Malyshev (People's Commissar for the tank industry, later also taken by Beria to the "atomic" Special Committee. - S.K.) to ask Stalin

change our boss, and he changed ... He appointed the chief of the tank industry ... Beria. Of course, it has become better with raw materials, energy, fuel, food ... "

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So, Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich at the head of the tank industry during the war. When asked about this person <...> Boris Glebovich answered (in 1965. - S.K.): "What can be said about a person who is much higher than you and with whom you have a relationship - clear and severe submission? There are no personal impressions, as far as the case is concerned, there was competence to the extent that was required for supervision. He was tough, but also helped. I don't know the time when he would be sleeping or absent, call at any time of the day or night, and he is always there "(one asks, when did he "walk around the women"? - S.K.) ... "

It must be said that Anastas Mikoyan in his memoirs presented the matter as if Beria, having slandered Molotov in front of Stalin, they say, he is not capable of operational leadership, he himself contributed to the fact that the tanks were given to him ... Molotov really he did not know how to make operational decisions, but Beria did not beg Stalin for tanks for himself. I hope the reader does not need to be convinced of this?

But here's what you can see ... Muzrukov testified that to the extent that was required to oversee the production of tanks, Beria had competence. However, Beria was competent - to the extent that was required for supervision - in aviation production, and in the production of weapons, and in the extraction of oil and coal, and in matters of communications and high-frequency communications, and much more ...

But he was also a professional - in his original case, in the KGB. And a strong professional Sudoplatov immediately saw in him the same professional. Although, by and large, intelligence and counterintelligence were not the professional peaks of Beria. Ultimately, he was an outstanding management professional, a great manager.

And at the same time - wealthy purely human!

But what is significant, dear reader... In the memoirs of N.Z. Tremasov, alas, a trace of that total pollution of the brain, as a result of which the image of Beria has developed in society, is directly opposite to the real one. Instead of the bold angle brackets I put down, Tremasov has: "... if he

can be called a man ... "

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Nikolai Zakharovich Tremasov has never seen Beria, but he "knows" for sure: Beria is a villain! Still would! So much has been said and written about this - as well as about the fact that the "villain" Stalin allegedly did not allow the "noble" Zhukov to raise troops on alarm until the very end ...

And now an intelligent person writes nonsense with an unshakable hand, not realizing that he himself cited evidence of Beria's high purely human standard, for can an intriguer and scoundrel work the way Beria worked? Someone will say: "If he tried not to work, Stalin's!" But after all, even with Stalin, not everyone worked like Beria - to the point of exhaustion. Otherwise, Stalin would not have delegated the duties of others to Beria. But the duties assigned to Beria, Stalin did not delegate to anyone!

Much later, the reader will get acquainted with the already "atomic" situations in which Muzrukov encountered Beria, and their description will highlight Beria's humanity even more clearly! But I can give vivid military examples ...

One day, Beria called Muzrukov and, inquiring whether there was a press at Uralmash, said that Muzrukov should be waiting for aviation engineers with drawings the next day - they urgently needed to stamp coca for aircraft propellers. Kok is a smooth aerodynamic cap that covers the propeller in front, and without

he does not have a combat aircraft.

Muzrukov protested: they say, he has a powerful, slow-moving press, but here he needs a stamping press, for a quick landing. Beria abruptly cut him off, declaring that aircraft cannot be sent to the front without spinners, and that the "regular" presses were lost in the confusion of the evacuation.

Koki began to be stamped, although Muzrukov understood that this would not end well. I note, by the way, that Beria could not delve into a purely technological issue, but after all, the engineers from the aircraft factory were obliged to understand that the Muzrukov press was not for their cooks and would quickly fail. However, they did not refuse the opportunity to solve their problems at the expense of tankers, even while showing blatant engineering frivolity. So for those who want to consider the situation as evidence of Beria's technical illiteracy, I recommend abandoning such an intention.

The master cylinder of the press after some time, of course,

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flew. And now Uralmash could not supply tanks to the front. What to do? Muzrukov calls Beria on the HF .. Midnight, but Beria immediately picks up the phone.

"I'm reporting ...," Muzrukov recalled, "I hear, he is silent, sniffs into the phone and suddenly asks: "Where is the second press?" I answer that I have no idea where the second one is (it was shipped to the Urals during the evacuation of the Novo-Kramatorsk plant, and it got stuck somewhere. - S.K.). "What the hell are you, a director," shouts Beria, "if you don't know where the press shipped to you is!" And hung up. Imagine my surprise when the Sverdlovsk security officers come to me in the morning and report in what echelons the units and details of the Kramatorsk press are located. It is incomprehensible, amazing: how in just a few hours, at night, it was possible in the great chaos and pandemonium of evacuation, among hundreds of echelons, to find what you need. The echelons with the press were given the green light, a week later they arrived, and after another, it seems, two, they replaced the main cylinder ... "

From this story, the true Beria is clearly visible - not only able to ask, not only able to help, but also able to admit his mistake not in words, but in deeds and correct it in deed.

Let's think about it! Even "Uralmash" for the scale of Beria is only one of a dozen priority problems. Well, the press was screwed up when carrying out Beria's assignment, but a member of the State Defense Committee could well pretend that he had nothing to do with it - let Muzrukov take the rap himself, since he "couldn't provide" ...

And Beria - since here he is not without fault - is doing everything to bring Muzrukov personally and Uralmash as a whole out of a difficult situation. And it's not just about an apology. After all, without the press there are no tanks!

Of course, it was not Beria who was looking for trains - others were looking for him on behalf of him. But on They found him on his behalf, but on behalf of others ...

I don't know if they would!

And the reason is not in fear of the NKVD and Beria - other leaders of the country knew how to threaten better than Beria and also had emergency military powers. But *their*

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the device could not fail, but it could *fail*. But Beria's apparatus - no, it could not. Because Beria had only competent personnel, not tolerating

incompetent.

About the members of the Council for the evacuation of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A.N. Kosygin, People's Commissar of the tank industry V.A. Malyshev, Chairman of the State Planning Commission N.A. Voznesensky sometimes has to read that they supposedly always knew where which echelon was and what was sent where. However, at a critical moment, Muzrukov called not the "tank" people's commissar Malyshev, but Beria.

Why?

Because Malyshev could help, or he could "set up", placing the blame on the director of Uralmash subordinate to him for disrupting the supply of tanks. And in Beria, Muzrukov, it turns out, was sure! He believed that Lavrenty Pavlovich would understand ... He would understand and help.

Already reading this chapter clean, I remembered by analogy about something similar situation from a completely different area. In 1942, the legal resident of the NKVD intelligence in Sweden, Boris Rybkin-Yartsev (Kin), who worked under the guise of an embassy adviser, and his wife and employee, Zoya Rybkina Voskresenskaya, whom we know, received a "super-operational" task from the Center to establish a communication channel with the Red Chapel in Berlin. A suitable candidate was quickly found - a Swedish industrialist, married to a Russian emigrant and often visiting the Reich on commercial matters. Having received the operational pseudonym Director, he completed the task, although not the first time - inexperience summed it up. And suddenly a message comes from the Center about the arrest and execution of all members of the Red Chapel. The Center believed that this was the result of the Director's provocation and, in order to verify it, ordered Keane to send this liaison officer back to Berlin to communicate with the notorious "double", about which the Center knew for sure that he was working for the Germans.

After analyzing the situation, Rybkin and Voskresenskaya came to the conclusion that the Director is an honest person and sending him back to Berlin means dooming him to death.

"We persistently tried to prove to the Center that we were right," Voskresenskaya recalled. - The order followed: "Follow the instructions." We ask again  
all vve 400

sit. The answer is a harsh shout. Then we decided to turn to the drug addict. We ask you to cancel the instruction of the head office, not to destroy a person. A couple of days later the answer came. Sending the Director to Berlin is canceled, with him ordered to stop all  
connection".

But the "commissar" is Beria. The one whom the general from "democracy" Volkogonov called both a ghoul and a soulless monster. But the real Beria was, on the contrary, sensitive, although absolutely without lisping, and a wise man. Knowing this, Keene decided to appeal directly to him over the head of the immediate  
bosses.

And, since I digress, I will say in addition that I was struck by the recollections of Bukharin's widow, Larina, about Beria's conversation with her at the Lubyanka in 1939. Larina-Bukharina does not deviate from the standard assessment of Beria as a "satrap", but - without realizing it herself - having accurately conveyed Beria's conversation and behavior psychologically and in specific details, she painted the appearance of a surprisingly, I repeat, wise and sensitive person, sincerely pitying that former fifteen-year-old the girl, for whose happiness he eight years ago, when she was visiting him with her father, raised a toast.

Let us return, however, to the war years and to B.G. Muzrukov. According to N.Z. Tremasov, he said that once Beria smashed him on the HF so that Boris Glebovich had already completely decided that he would be arrested now, and even moved home -  
say goodbye ... And now he is already dressed, standing at the door, and then the HF telephone rings. Muzrukov came up, picked up the receiver...

Beria...

- What are you doing?

- I'm going to sit down...

"We have to work," came the voice from the receiver, and immediately the all-clear beeps went off.

After reading this, I remembered the stories about how the Chief Missile Designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolev sometimes fired his subordinates three times a day!



There is a complex assembly, the schedule breaks, and the shop manager hears from him: "Goodbye! You're fired!" ... A couple of hours pass, and the same subordinate hears: "I'm reprimanding you"...

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And here the subordinate grins:

"But you have no right, Sergei Pavlovich!

- How?! I have no right to you! Strict reprimand!

"You don't... You fired me today... And they both laugh.

In emotional and overburdened people, such outbursts of feelings are possible and understandable. It's not libelous to scribble at a desk, it's a job ... The kind when you go into it not up to your throat, but up to your ears ... And up to your ears, not only because you are passionate about it, but also because it is so so much that it itself overwhelms you above the throat! But when they write such things about the Queen, everyone is touched: they say, that's even how it was! But in reality, Sergei Palych never fired anyone!

And Lavrenty Palych is denied the right to overlap in emotions ... He can't, he is a "monster", he is a "ghoul" ... But even Lavrenty Palych did not jail anyone - for disruptions in work! Neither Muzrukov, nor Malyshev, nor Vannikov, nor Shakhurin, nor the head of the GAU Yakovlev, nor the aircraft designer Yakovlev and others, who allegedly feared that they would "plant" throughout the war -..

Someone, however, was sitting - but not through the fault of Beria! Even such a slanderer of Lavrenty Pavlovich as the former deputy commissar of armaments Novikov (we will meet him soon) recalled already in the years of "perestroika" that during the war, precisely after "we found ourselves in the sphere of influence of the security agencies, the arrests of factory workers of any ranks have practically ceased.

And the former people's commissar Malyshev at the "anti-Beria" plenum of 1953 involuntarily admitted: "We thought that a person is doing a great job, getting excited, probably, this is how it should be ... of course, we also considered authority, we (here and below it is highlighted by me. - S.K.) considered him infallible, and sometimes we were afraid ... "

That is, they were not *afraid*, and sometimes *they were afraid* ... So, in a war, as in a war ... Moreover, we note that it was not Beria himself who considered himself infallible, but he was considered as such by no means enthusiastic boys, but experienced "captains" of the Soviet industry . It turns out that almost always his managerial

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decisions "hit the point", which created such a flattering reputation for the GKO member Beria.

By the way, about the "landings" ... Even the former People's Commissar for Armaments Vannikov, who was arrested twice before the war and spent time in prison, becoming the head of the "atomic" First Main Directorate, could in the era of solving the uranium problem, that is, when the Germans to Moscow as - they were not eager to transfer engineer Abramson, who made mistakes during the installation work, to the camp for prisoners. And at the same time "joking": "You are not Abramson, but Abram is in the zone." Although on the part of Vannikov it was a temporary measure.

However, Vannikov is not honored as a "satrap", but he is also served as a "victim" of Beria. And Vannikov, already in the fifties, in a private conversation in Arzamas-16, admitted that at one time he had "presumptuous" and "sat down" not without guilt.

And HERE is the style of Beria, described by a man, in his memoirs, never a name Beria, who did not mention, but wrote specifically about him ...

In 1981, the Military Publishing House published the memoirs of the chief of the GAU during the war years, Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev, "On Artillery and a Little About Myself". And that's what he's writing:

"Each of the members of the State Defense Committee was instructed to be solely responsible: one for the implementation of the supply plan for aviation

equipment, another - for tanks, the third - for weapons and ammunition ... "

It is funny and at the same time sad that Yakovlev actually writes about one in three persons (almost like the Lord God) Beria. And this is what he writes (without mentioning the name, of course) about Beria "ammunition" ...

"Under the member of the GKO, who was responsible for the supply of weapons and ammunition, at the end of 1941, groups were created from senior officials of the State Planning Commission and the Council of People's Commissars, headed by P.I. Kirpichnikov (weapons) and N.A. Borisov (ammunition). After that, the planning process went through these groups, who kept in constant contact with the people's commissariats and the GAU.

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Let the reader not be confused by the words "workers of the State Planning Committee", which make it possible to assume that under the member of the State Defense Committee, about whom Marshal Yakovlev writes, he means the chairman of the State Planning Committee, Voznesensky. Firstly, it was Beria who from the very beginning was responsible for armaments and ammunition in the State Defense Committee - he, as we will see later, was later noted for this. Secondly, Voznesensky was introduced into the GKO only from February 1942, and Yakovlev writes about the end of 1941. In addition, in 1981 the name "Voznesensky" was not taboo - unlike the name "Beria".

No, Marshal Yakovlev writes about Beria ... And once again I have to emphasize: here it is, Beria's style - clearly structure the task, find the right people, and after that ... But what, in fact, "after that"? If people are chosen correctly, if you can rely on them, then after that it remains just to work successfully.

What happened.

And this time, Beria found the people that were required. Here is what I wrote about P.I. Kirpichnikov and N.A. Borisov Marshal Yakovlev:

"They were highly qualified specialists, exceptionally hardworking people. They also had very knowledgeable engineers, they were directly subordinate to the State Defense Committee, which had unquestioned power in relation to the people's commissariats ...

I cannot but say that the representatives of these groups were sometimes not very favored by certain responsible officials of the people's commissariats. And first of all for their tight control. But I am sure that in their hearts they agreed with the need for such uncompromising planning."

Alas, historians and memoirists for some reason deny Beria the right to the same - tough - control. His attitude to business is explained not by a sense of high responsibility, but by selfish considerations. And therefore, in the memoirs of one of the deputies of the people's commissar of armaments V.N. Novikov (later Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), I will have to dwell in particular detail ... In a libelous collection known to the reader

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"Beria: the end of a career" in 1991, there are also Novikov's memories - Beria's patronage. And I already ask the reader for forgiveness for making the text heavier, but I will have to comment on many passages of Novikov right away ...

He begins with a discussion of repression, and then writes:

"... at the beginning of the war, our people's commissariat was subordinated to the NKVD, or, rather, as a member of the State Defense Committee, Beria ("Zubr" of the state administration, Novikov cannot but know that no one had ever subordinated his people's commissariat to the NKVD, but the NKVD - obviously "for fear" - remembers - S.K.). Consequently, he was personally responsible for us before Stalin.

Now they often recall this sinister figure, who seemed to always accompany Stalin (it turns out that both Novikov and Beria served as Stalin's bodyguards, because otherwise Beria would not have been able to

accompany, and Novikov could not observe this. - S.K.). But they approach his assessment in a simplified way, without going further than the "gloomy personality" and the "bloody executioner". And he was the People's Commissar of the NKVD (Beria had many other government posts, which Novikov cannot but know, but Beria is only an "NKVDist" for him. -

S.K.) Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, far from being simple and not as primitive as it seems to most writers and other creative people, but with their light hand (this is where Vladimir Novikov got to the point, although it was necessary to write "... with hard hand! - S.K.) and millions of readers and viewers.

I remember that at the end of July 1941, Beria held a meeting. D.F. and I Ustinov (People's Commissar for Armaments. - S.K.) were invited in connection with a sharp increase in the production of rifles ... He gave the impression of a decisive person. The face is wide, shaved (well, of course, so that the beard does not interfere with drinking blood. - S.K.), well-groomed (yes!), with a pale tint (wouldn't you have to wave to the mountains for a tan at the end of July 1941! - S.K.), pince-nez glasses (another vice of the "ghoul" - he wore glasses! - S.K.) ... There are rings on his hands ... "

The "true" detail about the rings I ask the reader to remember. As for the essence, Beria asked Ustinov - when could the Izhevsk plant produce five thousand rifles a day?

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Ustinov forwarded the question to Novikov, who a month ago was the former director of this plant. And he named a period of at least seven or eight months, because now they are actually releasing two.

Novikov further wrote:

"Beria frowned:

"What are you doing, Comrade Novikov! You know that at the front, some are killed or wounded, while others are waiting for released rifles, and you - seven months. This is not good, you have to meet the deadline of three months. Do you know the factory, who else can help us?

I replied that under any conditions it was impossible to meet the deadline.

They created a commission of two deputy chairmen of the State Planning Commission - V.V. Kuznetsova, P.I. Kirpichnikov - and me. The term is two days. Give suggestions on how to reach five thousand rifles a day in three months ...

Kuznetsov and Kirpichnikov were inclined to agree to a three-month period. I refused to sign the paper...

Again we are at the report of Beria, again a full cabinet of the people, including not only people's commissars of the defense industries, but also others.

The turn has come to our question. Beria reads the paper. Turning to Kuznetsov, he asks why there is no Novikov's signature?

Vasily Vasilyevich replies that Novikov considers the deadlines unrealistic.

Then Beria rather angrily:

- What is the deadline, Comrade Novikov?

I once again confirmed that the minimum term is a stretch of seven months.

Beria spat to the side (well, of course, although he refers to "you", but boor! - S.K.), swore (and how could Beria do without it. - S.K.) and said:

"Accept Novikov's offer..."

Novikov reports that Beria accepted his proposal because he "was mortally afraid of deceiving Stalin, who forgives a lot, but deception - never"...

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I repeat, it is sad to see how an honored person behaves vilely ... Firstly, Beria was not "mortally afraid of deceiving Stalin", but could not deceive him! He could not also because he himself did not tolerate deception from his subordinates, and

because a major leader who forgives deceit to his subordinates is automatically not-com-pe-ten-ten by this criterion!

And about "mortally afraid" ... If so, would Beria risk wearing, and even in July 1941, *rings*? Yes, Stalin would have adjusted anyone from his office for one *such thing* ! And fair! It was Heydar Aliyev who could give a huge diamond ring to "dear Leonid Ilyich" in Baku. And "dear Joseph Vissarionovich" did not even exist for his close circle - he was "comrade Stalin" for him too. And a comrade who did not tolerate personal indiscretion.

Beria took Novikov's opinion into account simply because it was expressed by the specialist who objectively should have known the situation at the Izhevsk plant better than anyone else. After all, Beria's method was not a whip, but reliance on people and trust in competent specialists.

But that's not all...

In 1988, Politizdat published Novikov's book "On the Eve and in the Days of Trials", where there is a chapter "On the glorious Russian rifle, and not only about it" ... And there Novikov does not even mention the task of five thousand rifles a day, but immediately proudly announces the GKO task twelve thousand!

At the same time, already in November 1941, the Izhevsk people produced four thousand, and "by the end of the summer of 1942" - twelve thousand rifles per day! And Novikov himself writes that Voroshilov, who arrived in Izhevsk, could not believe his eyes: "Rifles cannot flow like a river." And Novikov answered that "this is how rifles flow with us around the clock from week to week, from month to month" ...

That is, in fact, for a plan of five thousand rifles, the real time was no more than five or even four months. So, the question is, who was afraid to take responsibility for speeding up the deadlines?

Yes, Novikov had to stay away from Izhevsk for months, but Beria had hoped for his extraordinary efforts. And he had every right to do so, not only because times

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were extraordinary, but also because he himself gave all the best every day, and therefore had a "pale shade" of his face.

The same Novikov also describes another significant case ... In the spring of 1942, Lieutenant General Tkachenko came to him in Izhevsk from Beria with an assignment to personally monitor the production of Maxim machine guns, which Tkachenko himself announced during his first visit to the deputy commissar of armaments. I can't confirm, but everything turns out that it was the head of the 7th secret department of the NKVD for the Chekist support for the production of mortars, so he could not have been with Novikov for a particularly long time. But for a while, Tkachenko "deeply penetrated", following Novikov - if the latter is to be believed - like a shadow. By the way, Aleksey Toptygin, the author of The Unknown Beria, considers Novikov's story about a collision with an NKVD general "a frankly far-fetched anecdote," but this story, as I understand it, is basically true.

So, soon Tkachenko introduced Novikov to his memorandum from Beria. I note that it was not behind Novikov's back that he decided to send her to the people's commissar, but he introduced her! And despite Novikov's objections, he sent her to her destination. It is unlikely that Tkachenko was right about everything, although he, for example, assessed the director of the machine-gun plant Dubovoy as a weak worker and offered to replace him with the chief mechanic of plant No. 74 P.A. Sysoev, but Novikov "defended" Dubovoy as follows: "As for the director of the Dubovoy plant, he works in good faith, but ... I replace him in these difficult days. And if it is necessary to release, in your opinion, the director, then it is necessary to release me.

That is, Novikov neither in 1942 nor in the 80s realized that at least in

in relation to Dubovoy, he actually admitted that Tkachenko was right - strong workers do not need bosses, and, according to Novikov, it was not Dubovoy, but he, who was the actual director of the machine-gun plant.

By the way, in July 1942, Sysoev was appointed director of a new mechanical plant in Izhevsk, which I learned from the solid collective monograph "The Weapons of Victory", published in 1987, edited by Novikov. Moreover, the name (and portrait) of Sysoev, Tkachenko's "protege", is there,

but

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Novikov's "protege" Dubova is not even mentioned in this monograph.

One way or another, Tkachenko's report was gone. And now, at about three in the morning, Beria calls Novikov on the HF and begins to find out his opinion about those workers whom Tkachenko assessed as "pests." Novikov rejects everything, and Beria asks where is Tkachenko? And he just appears at the door, and Novikov passes the phone to him ... Further, according to Novikov, it was this:

"... I hear, every three or four words there is such a curse that ... In short, the meaning boils down to the following: "Why did I ... send you to Novikov - to spy on him or help him? For your telegram, you, so-and-so... are to be shot... You are engaged in the wrong business, I sent you to help, but what are you doing? .. Are you slandering good workers?"

Tkachenko is not pale, but blue, and only mutters endlessly: "I obey, Comrade Commissar" ...

I have never heard such "upbringing" in my life, neither before nor since. After this incident, Tkachenko did not appear to me for about ten days. And soon he completely left somewhere ... "

Allegedly, Beria's obscene lexicon and "didn't appear for ten days" are allegedly "black" - this is on the conscience of the memoirist. Firstly, before the war, and during the war, and after the war, Tkachenko was in the working "team" of Beria, and, as a rule, he was entrusted with control functions. That is, Beria Tkachenko invariably trusted, and the people's commissar was not in the habit of humiliating people. Secondly, it is unlikely that in wartime, after such a turn of events, the lieutenant general of the NKVD could afford to cool off in Izhevsk for almost half a month, and not leave for Moscow.

But what is important in Novikov's testimony? And the fact that Beria severely besieged his subordinate solely on the basis of Novikov's objections! So where is the suspicion and inability to trust people here? Moreover, Novikov himself emphasizes that "in especially acute cases, he called Beria directly ... And he usually answered: "Okay, we'll think of something ... "

However, Novikov explains such a reaction of a GKO member

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again, by the fact that Beria de "was afraid of Stalin, was afraid of his anger, was afraid of losing his trust and disposition ..." The conclusion is clear: not about the case, not about the needs of the front, the "monster" was sick with his soul, but worried about his own skin. ..

The case with Tkachenko is cited in their books by Yuri Mukhin, Alexei Toptygin, and Elena Prudnikova. And Yu. Mukhin states that Novikov, evaluating Beria as a selfish person, judged by himself ... This, of course, is too harsh an assessment of Novikov - he did a lot for the front during the war. However, Novikov's example is different. As in many other cases, when someone who has dealt with him personally speaks of Beria, the memories of Beria can be divided into two parts that are opposite in meaning.

From the description of *the facts* relating to the personal business communication of the memoirist with Beria, one can see a wonderful, in general, person, dedicated to the cause and able to do it.

From *the assessments* and from the information transmitted by the memoirist *from other people's words*, the usual image of a scoundrel appears.

So, Novikov writes that when coal was left in Izhevsk for a day, he called Beria, and the coal came. This is an exact fact from the lips of Novikov. He himself asked for this coal and received it himself.

But Novikov writes that Beria, using his power, turned to Izhevsk "coal" routes from Kuzbass, intended for aircraft factories in Kazan. They say, currying favor with Stalin, Beria ignored the interests of the common cause and infringed on the "aviator" Malenkov.

In principle, the redirection of trains could have taken place, although it is unlikely that Novikov, sitting in Izhevsk, knew about it. Was it up to Novikov to find out where the coal came from? Came, and okay!

But the fact that Beria arbitrarily and selfishly intercepted coal from Malenkov, "who took care of aviation," this already fully applies to Novikov's fabrications, inspired by the tradition of blackening Beria to blackness of a miner who had just risen from the mine. And the point is not even that such arbitrariness would immediately cost Beria dearly! The fact is that Novikov could not know the general situation and the general picture of transportation. That is, when he wrote his "perestroika" essay, he took advantage of the anti-Beria gossip. And after all, not Antonov-Ovseenko, but an outstanding organizer of industrial

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ness, Hero of Socialist Labor ... Alas, he was not the only one who slipped on a dishonorable attitude towards Beria.

Finishing the topic "Beria is a 'gunsmith'", I will say that these merits of his in the war are not only hushed up, but also repeatedly distorted even in official sources. And now, even E. Prudnikova, who is completely loyal to her hero, considers Beria, as a member of the State Defense Committee, supervising the production of weapons and mortars only from February 4, 1942 - instead of Voznesensky, who allegedly led this production at first as an adviser to the State Defense Committee (he became a member of the State Defense Committee in February 1942). But this simply cannot be! Otherwise, Beria would not have held any meetings on rifles in July 1941! Did he have little to do? And then in September 1941 the 7th department of the NKVD for mortars would not have been formed. In addition, what else of the weapons can be attributed to Beria, as a member of the State Defense Committee, from *the beginning* of the war? There were only five of them in the GKO at that time, including Stalin! Tanks, as we know, Stalin initially gave to Molotov, aviation was initially supervised by Malenkov (with the involvement of Lavrenty Pavlovich) ... Armaments and ammunition were the "clean diocese" of a member of the GKO, comrade. L.P. Beria.

And only then did the tanks with the planes go to the original "gunsmith" and "ammunition" of Beria (E. Prudnikova did not notice that Novikov himself dates the beginning of Beria's supervision of the People's Commissariat of Armaments to the beginning of the war).

Alas, and, say, A. Toptygin reported that "GKO (that is, in fact, Stalin. - S.K.) assigns control over the tank industry of the Soviet military-industrial complex" to Beria "since the end of 1942", while Beria "engaged" in tanks much earlier.

Beria did a lot to establish the production of the entire range of rockets for guards mortars - Katyushas. And one more thing ... In his notes of the 40s, Vannikov assessed Beria's efforts in helping the People's Commissariat of Ammunition as heroic. And this was, I remind you, only one of the "hypostases" of Beria in his military biography ...

RESERVE front, barrage detachments - this is a visible war. And for Chekist Beria, it has long become familiar, if you use journalistic clichés, "a front without a line

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front", "invisible front". And from July 20, 1941, after the reunification of the NKVD

and the NKGB, he again began to command this specific "front" ... It was not for nothing that he personally left supervision over the work of overseas intelligence.

Much can be written on this topic, but my book will be voluminous anyway. This is also why I, in order to avoid an increase in volume, did not give above many impressive figures on the growth rate of armaments for the front and other factual data showing the importance of Beria in ensuring such successes. And it would be worth it!

So in the story about the sphere of intelligence during the war, I will limit myself below to just one example showing Beria as a person. Moreover, the topic "Beria and intelligence in 1941-1943" is immense, and later I will have to dwell on the aspect of the initial "atomic intelligence" associated with Beria's work in the NKVD war years.

Therefore, together with the well-known tall beauty Zoya Rybkina Voskresenskaya, we will enter Beria's office to look at the development of events there.

Soon after the start of the war, Voskresenskaya was included in a special group, and she was engaged in "selection, organization, training and transfer of sabotage and reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines." And now, in October 1941, Rybkina was preparing for another separation from her husband, a major intelligence officer Boris Arkadyevich Rybkin-Yartsev. As the reader already knows, he was on his way to Sweden under the legal guise of an embassy adviser.

And here's what happened next:

"On the eve of his (husband. - S.K.) departure, everything turned upside down in my fate. The Commissar called me and asked what I was doing. I said that I was getting ready to go to work in the rear. "As who?" - "Railway watchman at the crossing." The People's Commissar laughed: "The Germans will arrest and shoot such a watchman. You need to go to Sweden..."

I had to hand over things ... A few days later, the two of us were already flying to "duck" ("U-2") in Arkhangelsk ... "

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Both the tone of the conversation of the nameless - in the presentation of Zoya Ivanovna - "People's Commissar", and the essence of his decision are able to bribe any person with their rationality and humanity. But the "People's Commissar" is still the same General Commissar of State Security of the USSR Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria!

Does the reader recognize in this - attentive to the fate of the intelligence officer, calm, benevolent and competent, in contrast to Rybkina's immediate superiors - the "people's commissar" of the "demon" and the "devil of hell"?

But about Zoya Ivanovna herself, a woman of rare charm (this can be seen even from her photo), vile gossip was spread. So, KGB Colonel E.P. Sharapov wrote that the poetess Margarita (Marietta? - S.K.) Shaginyan, who lived with her much later than the war in the same house on Krasnoarmeyskaya Street, warned her neighbors to be more careful in communicating with Voskresenskaya, since she had "arms to the elbow in blood" ...

Y-yes ... A familiar dictionary!

The "democrat" Marina Kudimova, who is also "passing" through the poetry department, took over from Shaginyan. And on October 20, 1993 (this was after Yeltsin's bloody execution of the White House!) In the television program "Lyasa" Kudimova talked about "a security officer whose hands are up to the elbow in blood."

Well, just like the Chekist Lavrenty Beria!

And NOW it would be necessary, and also briefly, to say about Beria - "partisan" and "saboteur" ... In the introductory article to volume 20 (9) of the "Russian Archive" - "Partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"

says:

"In July 1941, a commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was created to ensure the preparation of the party underground and the formation of partisan detachments. But she never got to work. Since August 1941, a special department for the leadership of the partisan movement began to operate in the NPO system of the USSR, but it also ceased to exist in early December, because. Stalin ordered the creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. However, in January 1942, when in full swing with

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with the help of the General Staff, the formation of departments and departments of this headquarters was underway ... the order was received from the Supreme to stop all this work ... and transfer the personnel to the NPO of the USSR ... "

Reading these lines, you are perplexed: "And who, before that, from the first weeks of the war, organized a guerrilla war in the rear of the advancing German troops?" And the standard answer: "The Party ..." - here is unlikely to be accurate and exhaustive.

So who is it? It turns out that no one really led the partisans, and the German echelons flew down a slope! Strange... And why did it take so long for everything to get organized? The almost official publication of Yeltsin's Russia (the "Russian Archive" series is published under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the RF Ministry of Defense) blames ...

Whom?

Well, it's clear who:

"... in such an unexpected turn of affairs, the influence of L.P. Beria. He managed to convince I.V. Stalin in the inexpediency of creating special bodies to control partisan detachments "from the people", because, Beria assured, the activities of such partisans are spontaneous, fragmented, not amenable to leadership and cannot give the expected operational effect (Beria, I must say, was here absolutely right! —S.K.). Such results, in his opinion, are within the power of only qualified saboteurs, for the training and guidance of which there are special bodies. "This is the most harmful point of view," recalled P.K. Ponomarenko (first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus. - S.K.), - unfortunately, shook the members of the State Defense Committee, and the organization of the Central Headquarters was canceled. But the need for such a body was so obvious (to non-professionals - S.K.) that the Central Committee of the Party and the government soon had to return to resolving this issue.

TsPSHD was created only in the eleventh month of the war - May 30, 1942. Its

approved the member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko...»

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I apologize to the reader for the long quote, but it contains all the main accusations against Beria, who allegedly interfered with the normal development of the partisan movement. And in order to deal with this accusation, I will continue to often resort to citing documents. So, I think it will be more reliable and easier. An opinion is an opinion, and a fact is a fact even for a "democrat". Unless, of course, he ("democrat") is no longer on the way to the Moscow "bedlam" -

Kanatchikova dacha, or its analogue - the structures of "power".

So here are the facts...

The resolution of the Central Committee on the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops was adopted on July 18, 1941, but did not give the proper result because it was hardly possible to bring the content of the resolution to the population of the occupied territories. What was needed was not general appeals, but specific measures. But, according to the testimony of the most experienced master of special operations of the NKVD, General Sudoplatov, already on the first day of the war, he was instructed to head the entire



reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the German army. Well, in the first, not in the first, but it was instructed ... And from the context reported by Sudoplatov, one can understand what Beria was entrusted with, although until July 20, formally, the People's Commissariats of the Internal Affairs and State Security were still considered separated. Nevertheless, on July 5, 1941, by order of the NKVD, a Special Group was formed under the People's Commissar (Zoya Rybkina was also included in it). Sudoplatov's deputies were appointed such Chekist "bisons" as Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Mordvinov, Gudimovich, Orlov. On October 3, 1941, the Special Group was reorganized into an independent 2nd department of the NKVD, while maintaining the direct subordination of Beria. Finally, on January 18, 1942, the 2nd Department was deployed to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD with the expansion of tasks and powers.

Unlike the generals of the General Staff and party functionaries, Beria's line was here, as always, a clear and appropriate situation.

1) The war has begun - you need to have a special operations leadership group.

2) By autumn it becomes clear that the war is for a long time. And the band expands to

department.

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And then - to management.

A select 25,000-strong (!) OMSBON was formed - a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes of the NKVD of the USSR, this genuine forge of partisan personnel for special detachments and special groups, with which the names of Medvedev, Vaupshasov, Stekhov, Prokopyuk, Kuznetsov are associated ...

Bureaucrats in uniform from the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense failed to start the "big" war. Now they also failed the guerrilla war. It was January 1942, and the General Staff was still *forming* the TsSHPD "at full speed".

The subordinate of the people's commissar of Beria, the captain of the GB Dmitry Medvedev, during this time managed to form the Mitya special detachment, on September 4, 1941, go with him to the Bryansk forests, conduct a number of operations there and in Belarus, return to Moscow on January 12, 1942, receive his first order of Lenin and start preparing for a new drop already near Rovno.

But on December 12, 1941, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria reported to the State Defense Committee "about the actions of the commander of the partisan detachment of the NKVD of the USSR, captain of the State Security Committee Comrade Medvedev" over the past month: a railway bridge was blown up, a train derailed, three bridges were burned, three oil refineries were destroyed, a turpentine plant, the military commandant's office and the police department were destroyed, two planes that made an emergency landing were destroyed. 10 officers, 39 soldiers, translator, two policemen, one traitor, three deserters were killed.

Squad losses: 1 killed, 2 slightly wounded.

Beria's report ended like this:

"The partisan detachment currently consists of 218 people and is growing at the expense of military personnel who find themselves surrounded by German troops. Armed with trophies.

NOTE. Partisan detachment comrade. Medvedev organized in Moscow and transferred to the front line in September 1941.

And the report on Medvedev's actions was, of course, bright, but only one of many pages in the general folder of files of the 2nd department and the 4th department of the NKVD. And the General Staff "formed" everything, and the head of the Main Directorate for the formation and staffing of the Red Army, Shchadenko, podsov

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gave Stalin the most stupid draft orders "on the formation of partisan armies" (I'm too lazy to even quote them) ...

But even the name of our most famous "non-Chekist" partisan commander, the future twice Hero of the Soviet Union Sidor

Artemovich Kovpak, became known to Stalin for the first time from the report of Chekist Beria dated November 21, 1941. This was the first news of Kovpak's actions, and in the report of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs there was not quite the right "Kovpak's partisan detachment."

That is, the real result was given by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Therefore, it is understandable why Stalin agreed with his people's commissar - the Moscow clerks were only "forming" *their* headquarters, and the Chekists were already undermining the *German headquarters!*

However, Ponomarenko Stalin, as we see, still "put the squeeze on". And in this confrontation between the party apparatchik Ponomarenko and the manager Beria, it was not some "departmental" friction that affected, but two different approaches to the problem. Ponomarenko's approach was in many ways "ostentatious", and Beria's approach was purely business.

How did Beria understand the tasks of the war behind enemy lines? The main thing is to contribute to the speedy expulsion of the Nazi troops from the USSR with the minimum possible effort and loss, with the maximum possible effect. Therefore, he saw the war behind the front line as a network of continuous special sabotage and reconnaissance operations organized by professionals and carried out by professionals with, of course, the support of the people in the occupied territories. Beria himself was a specialist in special operations. And he had experience in counter-partisan actions - in the Transcaucasus in the 20s and 30s, the OGPU plenipotentiary had every opportunity to gain such experience!

Moreover, it is impossible to explain Beria's desire to lead the war behind enemy lines by the fact that he wanted to brag to Stalin about his "partisan" merits. Beria already had enough to do, and therefore success, because for Beria to do business meant to do it successfully.

But Ponomarenko ...

No, Panteleimon Ponomarenko also wanted a speedy victory no less than Lavrenty Beria. But Ponomarenko -

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this is a party "general", and even temporarily without an army. Belarus is occupied. And just Ponomarenko had to be shown to Stalin: the Belarusian land is burning, Comrade Stalin, under the feet of the Nazi invaders. And our native party organizes the movement of people's avengers ... That is, Ponomarenko. So who, one wonders, acted here as a careerist and intriguer?

In the end, the TsSHPD was created under Ponomarenko's hand. But let's compare the two dates... The TsSHPD was formed on May 30, 1942. And on May 18, 1942, Kovpak received his first Gold Star. Without the "guiding instructions" of the head of the TsShPD, but not without practical help with weapons, personnel, tasks (this is also help!) From the side of Beria's department.

Of course, the benefits of having a TsSHPD during the war were still greater than the harm. But - no more than that. I think if everything was tied only to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, the war in the enemy rear would have been much more effective, without losing its completely nationwide character. After all, Beria did not rule out, but welcomed the expansion and development of the NKVD special detachments at the expense of "local resources", but the commanders of *such* detachments skillfully maintained the proportions between the number of detachments and the effectiveness of their combat work. They knew that professionals fight not by numbers, but by skill, even at the front. And behind the front line...

Professional Stanislav Vaupshasov, finding himself *alone* in an acute situation, from behind the bushes instantly shot *six* punishers at once, carelessly, unprofessionally, crowded into the clearing . Not in a Hollywood action movie, but in real life, this is extremely difficult to do.